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# DOCTRINES AS SOCIAL PATTERNS

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RELIGIONS, like men, have their days of judgment, when they are tried for their lives. Not alone in Greece has been heard the wail, "Great Pan is dead." Few religions have been able to withstand radical changes in the structure of society. Humanity is pragmatic. While outgrown beliefs may be honored as *bric-à-brac,* they are not likely to be given intellectual respect, and when a religion ceases to be intellectually respectable it is senile.

It is true that the case of religion is often tried before some revolutionary tribunal more eager to condemn than to acquit. But such tribunals are seldom permanent. The really critical moment for a religion is when it is being challenged by a new social mind to give reasons for its existence. Such moments come when a social order becomes so complicated that old authorities and customs no longer furnish unquestioned moral guidance. Scientific method is not necessarily the enemy of religious faith for, whether consciously or not, it presupposes faith in working hypotheses rather than absolute knowledge. The severest test to which religion can be subjected is that set by the mind-set of social groups. Into such mind-sets a great variety of elements enter. Men accept or reject religious practices and doctrines for no very clear reasons, often because of some unconscious affinity or enmity. A religious thinker does not need to be a philosopher to share in the mind-set served by philosophy any more than he needs to be a musician to prefer Beethoven to jazz. But a religion, let it be repeated, must be intellectually respectable if it is to win permanent standing in a social order.

But intellectual respectability is not first but second in point of time when compared with religious faith itself. The attitudes that are embodied in a religious group will be shared by those who have abandoned the reasons by which the attitudes are justified. They will themselves furnish their own reasons when the need of reasons is felt.

## I

The history of religion is one phase of general history. In particular it traces the development of the Christian movement from its origins to the present condition, not as something apart from the development of civilization, but as one aspect thereof. Any study of Christianity must take into account the development of the social process which gave rise to the situations in which doctrines were developed. To some extent this has been recognized by the historians of doctrines, but too often only in an encyclopedic fashion. Instead of treating Christianity as a continuous group movement of people they seem to regard it more as a system existing apart from people. The effect of such a preconception is to center attention on doctrine and to make the great question for the theologian the truthfulness of any doctrine. This in turn has led to a discussion of the validity of the authority upon which the doctrine has been built.

Such a method ignores the fact that doctrines have not sprung up as independent systems of truth. In this respect they do not resemble philosophy as much as they do law and especially the common law of England and the Constitution of the United States. In order to understand a doctrine one must know not only the time and place of its formulation, but also the social and religious tensions which gave rise to the doctrine. Strictly speaking, there is no history of doctrine; there is only the history of the people who made doctrines. A theology is a function of the religious life of a given period, and this in turn is the expression of a social order conditioned not only by elements of culture, like philosophy, literature, and science, but also by the creative forces which were engaged in the production of the social order itself. One can understand the history of Christianity only from this point of view, as a social eddy within the main current of the stream of history. It may become an object of special investigation, but only as it is a phase of the social history.

When a group is aware of a tension between its social heritages and the new conditions under which it must live, its method of procedure is likely to be one or more of the following:

It may endeavor to crush the new condition; it may abandon its inheritances; it may undertake to evaluate and re-express its inheritances; it may undertake to find some pattern in which the new and the old can be combined.

The rise of theologies cannot be understood if this adjustment of tensions is neglected. The full purport of a doctrine cannot be seen until it is regarded in the light of its origins as a means of legitimatizing some element of the religious heritage which the group organizing the doctrine wishes to preserve.

From such a point of view the ultimate test of any doctrine is not absolute, but pragmatic—that is to say, its capacity to vindicate the deepest faith and the moral conduct of that group of Christians by which it was drawn up. If a doctrine is to be appreciated it is necessary to study historically the origin of the spiritual tension from which it sprang to discover the reasons for its existence. In such case it may very likely be that a doctrine relieved a tension and legitimatized a belief which were themselves unwarranted. For example, one needs only to mention the various doctrines dealing with hell and the devil. In each case some doctrine made the acceptance of beliefs in such matters tenable for the people subject to the tension.

Whoever would understand a doctrine, however, and evaluate it as an element in our modern religious life must do something more than understand its origin and function. These are preliminary to a discussion as to whether any such tension now exists and if the doctrine historically developed meets a new tension which has resulted from the passage of Christian life and thought into a different world from that in which the doctrine was needed and developed.

It is at this point that one sees the importance of discovering what the real nature of doctrines is. In every case, with the possible exception of consubstantiability, the doctrines in Christianity are not metaphysical. They are really patterns derived from that total social life with which it is the business of the church historian to become acquainted, for it is the influence of the social forces in the midst of which the churches live that shaped the pattern which relieved the tension and, what is more, may have caused the tension itself.

As one approaches theology, therefore, from the historical point of view it is desirable to watch the pattern-making process, both from the point of view of the tension and from the point of view of its adjustment.

## II

The student of religion must be historically minded. Not truth but fact is the first subject of his search. Only after he has impartially described the religion is he in a position to measure its permanent values.

Such an attitude is especially demanded of a student of any religion of which he is himself a follower. If a Christian would understand Christianity he must examine its history in scientific detachment, otherwise he is likely to take apologetic shortcuts to assent. He must not permit his detachment to become distrust or his individual faith to become a criterion. He must first describe if he would understand.

From the strictly historical point of view Christianity as a religion is a technique of salvation, but just what salvation is and what it is from which men are saved have been repeatedly described. No single formula has had permanent control of the Christian's hope. Jesus made love the central attitude of morality, but he had no social program and no philosophy. In the first form of Christianity Jews whose revolutionary psychology had been given new direction by their acceptance of Jesus as the one empowered by God's spirit to be the savior of their nation made salvation a sublimated nationalism. But a nation's future was soon seen to be of secondary value. Men lived in a world of tragedy, and expected a new world of joy. They believed themselves the sport of Satan and his demons, but they also believed that Jesus would ultimately save them as individuals by crushing the forces of the Prince of Evil. They found themselves mortal and doomed to death, but they believed that those who had experienced the regenerating influence of the spirit which Jesus sent from heaven would, when freed from their flesh, be given new bodies and made citizens of a heavenly society. They found themselves the prey of passion and evil desire, but they looked forward to the time when, freed from these, they would live according to the Spirit. They awaited an awful Judgment Day, but because of their faith in Jesus they expected to be acquitted and admitted into the joys of the new age they awaited.

This hope of salvation is very different from the philosophy of Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius. The deliverance which the first Christians awaited was to be not only supernatural but limited to those who were followers of Jesus. The world lay in wickedness; the reborn children of God had passed from death to life. They awaited neither a political reformation nor the evolution of a better social order, but an emancipating catastrophe.

These characteristics the Christian religion has never wholly lost. True, there have been those who would translate it into some philosophy or social program, but they constitute almost a negligible fraction of the hundreds of millions of people who have sought deliverance through Christ from whatever evils they endured in a present world and the imagined evils which were to follow death.

For Christians have always looked to live after death. The eternal tomorrow has cast its shadow or light upon today. Epicureans might summon men to eat and drink because tomorrow they were to die, but teachers of the Christian religion have called upon men so to order their lives that death may be a door into eternal joy. When men have thought as the first Christians thought, they have not tried to forget death. Their religion has been to them the means by which death lost its sting and the grave its victory. Men, they believed, ought to live worthily of their new hopes, and express in conduct the spirit of Christ, but they were not saved by a moral régime. They were saved by a God who had sent his Son to show them the way to be saved and through their inner appropriation of his spirit had given eternal life to those who believed upon him.

Such a religion is no more static than life. Only as they are seen to be functional, efforts to rationalize Christian attitudes and hopes, can doctrines be understood. In every case the definitive question is not whether a doctrine is true but how successfully it co-ordinates religious experience with unquestioned beliefs and thus satisfies men's search for satisfaction and courage in the pursuit of the ends they seek to realize. For religion is an extension of life into help-gaining integration, like that of an organism with its environment, with those elements of the cosmic Activity with which personal relations are possible, that is, with God. Christianity, let us repeat, is a technique of such integration. Its central element is he in whom such integration is held to be complete and whose experience is judged the way to freedom and deliverance from all that would hinder such union of a man with his God.

## III

If the center of Christian technique of salvation is Jesus the Christ, the center of his significance has been his death and resurrection, as a sample of salvation. As the crucifix and the altar focus the attention of those who enter a cathedral, so the death of Christ has been the focus of the Christian religion.

But when men have attempted to say just how this was true, and to place the death of Christ in the economy of the Christian salvation, they have followed different ways of thinking. On the one hand, they have differed in the conceptions of that from which the believer was to be saved; on the other hand, they have differed as to how the death of Jesus Christ helped salvation. Sometimes that from which men need to be saved has been declared to be infinite wrath of God, sometimes the punitive justice of an infinite sovereign. Sometimes the saving significance of the death of Christ has been that of the sacrifice, sometimes that of ransom, sometimes that of the fulfilment of feudal requirements, sometimes the vicarious bearing of mankind's punishment. Viewed superficially, there seems to be no unity in these various doctrines, but viewed functionally they all serve the same end. Each has a social origin. The death of Christ has been used by the Christian thinkers to remove difficulties raised by current customs or conceptions in rationalizing the experience of salvation. The assurance-giving interpretation placed upon the death of Christ has been derived from the same pattern as that which gave rise to the question concerning the credibility or even possibility of the already experienced salvation.

The permanent values in these beliefs cast in the pattern of dominating social and religious institutions are not to be gained by new epochs of religious thought as long as they or their assumptions are accepted literally. To discover the values that lie beneath the various interpretations of the death of Christ, the historical student must study these interpretations from the point of view of social psychology. The practices and institutions embodied within them must first be discovered and their function in setting forth religious faith must be perceived. Only in this way can we see the true meaning of the death of Christ in the development of the Christian religion.

A belief or fact gets theological or philosophical value only when interpreted. Such interpretation it is that distinguishes the history of thought from encyclopedic information. To be understood a fact must be integrated with some unquestioned social conception or practice. When one is convinced that a fact has a bearing upon actual life the desire to rationalize such a belief leads to the discovery of some inclusive formula which connects it with that which is unquestioned. Obviously this process is a form of analogy. Some similarity is discovered between that to be interpreted and that which is a matter of common and unquestioned experience. Sometimes this analogy is frankly a comparison, as when Jesus says that the Kingdom of God is like leaven; at other times it is metaphorical, as when the psalmist declares that the Lord is the rock of his salvation. In such cases the analogical quality is clearly recognized by its author. But interpretation is not content with conscious analogy. A satisfactory interpretation comes only when a description is regarded as fact rather than analogical, axiomatic rather than imagined. When the past spoke of God as a spirit or as a sovereign, when the practices of courtiers and the conceptions of the law-court were employed to describe men's relations with God, such descriptions were not regarded as analogical but as elements in the religious conceptions themselves. That is to say, they were patterns rather than metaphors. For a pattern is a social institution or practice used to give content and intelligibility to otherwise unrationalized beliefs. What the axiom is in mathematics a pattern is in thought. Later criticism may discover the analogical character of the pattern, but as long as it brings intellectual serenity and allays intellectual obscurity a pattern is regarded as fact rather than as metaphor. As such it forms a distinct element in the total conception which expresses religious fact or an element of faith.

All Christian doctrines are patterns. They originated in the impulse to make something intelligible by discovering a likeness to something unquestioned. But among the various metaphors so used some ceased to be used as metaphors and became realities which could be analyzed and from which corollaries could be drawn. That is, they became patterns. So long as these patterns were the projection of actual social institutions and practices they brought intellectual assent. To include any element of faith within the pattern was to give it acceptability. Its new classification with accepted reality deadened doubt and prevented intellectual irritation. Men could continue to believe and hope.

It is difficult to draw a line sharply between metaphors thus used as facts and those which were consciously analogical, yet as one reviews the past these differences are apparent. The pattern becomes basic to an interpretation and this interpretation is subject to extensive development. Thus the conception of sovereignty carries within itself such corollaries as the absolute power of the monarch, decrees, law and its violations, trials, sentences, pardon, reward, and punishment. It is in this pattern that the more highly developed interpretations of the death of Christ arose. Indeed, every doctrine of the atonement may be said to be the use of some social pattern expressing a difficulty perceived in God's forgiveness of sinners and of the death of Christ as a basis upon which this forgiveness could be justified. The difficulty and its cure alike have sprung from a social practice.

That which gives value to the pattern is the fact that men do not regard it as analogical. When its analogical quality is discovered its integrating power disappears. Most religious doubts arise when a pattern is seen to be a metaphor. The social practice or institution which has been used as a pattern no longer has meaning or social control. Yet the value that has been rationalized by a social pattern can be appreciated when the analogical nature of the doctrine itself is recognized. That is to say, theology gets its lasting value when we come to see that it is a functional rather than final method of co-ordinating religious faith with accepted realities. Speaking generally, orthodox theology is the use of political experience to set forth the reasonableness of Christian confidence in salvation. It is, in fact, transcendentalized politics. But this is not to say that it is without value. It certainly helped its creators. As a method of rationalizing existing religious belief it follows the method which humanity always has pursued and endeavors to find reasonableness in the use of social pattern. It is only when, because of change of social institutions and processes, any given pattern fails to co-ordinate and so to give reasonableness to religious experience that criticism arises.

When such criticism appears the value that the doctrinal pattern expressed can be recovered very simply by recalling the origin of the pattern in a social practice so universal as to be unquestioned. The interpretative formula is something like this: as an absolute monarch was to his subjects, so is God to his people. The truth lies in the analogy rather than in the description of God as king. The same is true of other doctrines. Whatever a social institution meant to a given social situation becomes the analogical expression of a religious value.

## IV

The development of Christian thought has always been conditioned by a conception of God, and however much the philosopher might talk about the infinity of God, and however the theologian might discuss his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, in the Christian message of salvation anthropomorphism of the political type has always reigned. The naïve descriptions of the ancient world have been given a quasi-philosophical respectability but they have continued secondary in the pattern which is the center of orthodox theology, namely, God as a transcendentalized ruler. His dealings with men are thought of as absolute sovereignty on an infinite scale. Orthodoxy is cast in the pattern of politics multiplied by infinity.

But such conceptions of God fail utterly to satisfy men who know that God is no more a king than an individual circumscribed by space and time. Our knowledge of the universe makes sovereignty as a pattern for the conception of human and divine relations futile. No small part of the confusion of today's religious and moral thought springs from this fact. The universe of the chemist and physicist and astronomer is too great for any sovereignty. The atom and the nebula do not suggest a king, nor is the relationship of men to the universe to be described as that of subjects to a monarch. Such a relation is now the picture of poetry, not the description of fact.

The breakdown of the orthodox conception of God so far as philosophy is concerned is complete. Fortunately for the stability of the social order, the church has not discovered this fact as yet, but the man in the street senses it as truly as the philosopher. Only an illiterate mind can be terrorized by the fear of the devil and of hell which nerved Thomas à Kempis, Martin Luther, and Jonathan Edwards. For them sovereignty with its corollaries was an effective pattern. Hell was as vivid as a torture chamber of a feudal lord or a fire in a field of peat. Justification was as definite as the acquittal in a royal court. But the heaven and hell of the theologian have now no more standing in the minds of intelligent people than Sheol of the Hebrews and the Hades of Homer and Virgil. They expect no Day of Judgment or separation between the sheep and goats. They participate in cosmic forces whose mysteries are being disclosed. In a universe of billions of stars and distances too great for measurement even by light-years the celestial geography of Paul and the New Testament is as unthinkable as that of Dante. Such shift of scientific knowledge is inexplicable to ecclesiastical religion. To modify its pattern is to endanger the entire structure of orthodoxy. It is no wonder, therefore, that the advocates of orthodoxy should abandon intellectual consistency when engaged in the task of self-defense. They become reckless in their antitheses with the sole result that they win the approval of those who agree with them, but deny others the right to use the word Christian. And if Christianity be identical with the patterns which have determined the Christian doctrine, such exclusion is justifiable.

But such an identification of Christianity with its technique and patterns is not true of Christianity as a religion but of orthodoxy as a phase of that religion. There have always been men and women who have come into vivifying fellowship with God who denied the finality of these doctrines. So far as we can judge from his words, Jesus himself would have difficulty in meeting the tests of theological orthodoxy. The only test he placed upon his followers was one of attitude. Did men believe that God was fatherly, and did they undertake themselves to live in a brotherly fashion? To such persons and such persons alone did he promise that supreme good which in the pattern of his own people he called the Kingdom of God.

By the consent of every serious thinker, the supreme question in the field of religion and morals amounts to this: Was Jesus correct? Can one think of any reason or beneficent purpose in the cosmic forces, and is love rather than coercion a basis upon which to build human society and organize one's own individual life? Any attempt to answer such questions by recourse to the thought of God as a literal sovereign and of man's relationship to the cosmos as political simply complicates the problem. If religion is to have standing in the courts of today's intellect it will have to find a pattern which is as axiomatic for the modern man of our day as the pattern of sovereignty was to the modern man of the sixteenth century. The doubts which rise from a distrust of a pattern cannot be laid by insistence upon that pattern.

Such considerations affect the entire scheme of Christian thought and particularly those doctrines which have utilized the death of Christ. For the abandonment of divine sovereignty means the abandonment of the entire political pattern. Human guilt is the correlate of divine sovereignty and cannot survive its disappearance. The relations of men to God must be thought of in terms of cosmic rather than political relations. The fear of punishment must be replaced by an appreciation of the outcomes of maladjustment to the personality producing forces of God.

But with the disappearance of sovereignty on the part of God and guilt on the part of man the need of satisfying the divine honor or punitive justice must also disappear, and the death of Christ no longer gets significance from such a pattern.

How far removed from a present interest in religion are the questions raised by political patterns in theology appears from a consideration of the struggle between the thoroughgoing Calvinist and the Arminians, which culminated in the Synod of Dort (1619). The chief difference between the Arminians and the Calvinists had to do with predestination and its implications. The Arminian view began with the premise of the sovereignty of God and attempted to adjust that sovereignty to man's freedom. It was perhaps as successful as any solution of such a question may hope to be, but it is difficult to see how it can be more than emotional and literary. The Calvinist, on the contrary, was consistent logically. If the sovereignty of God be absolute, it is hard to see how it can be modified by human or other causes. Ecumenical Calvanism as represented in the Synod of Dort could hardly do other than take the position in its famous five points. If one's human nature is regarded as unable to choose the right because of original sin, as orthodoxy, whether Calvinist or Lutheran, claimed, it is difficult to see how the death of Christ should not be logically limited to the elect, or how the elect could withstand the grace of God or how they could ever fall from that grace. The Arminians modified the strict implications of absolute sovoreignty by the human consciousness of choice and saw in the fallen nature of man at least traces of an original righteousness. One can thus hold to the universality of atonement, man's ability to reject grace, and the possibility of falling from grace.

But here again theological difficulties really result from the pattern in which God's relations with men are expressed. If that pattern be abandoned the questions raised by Arminianism do not appear. Other and very serious questions emerge, but they spring from the other patterns. One could not, for example, think of affirming or denying that Cosmic Activity issues decrees, or exercises prevenient and irresistible grace. The values that these patterns, properly interpreted, express may continue, but the theological difficulties disappear. And with the abandonment of the political pattern there disappears also the guilt of humanity which deserves punishment. The empirical facts which, from the days of Augustine on, were used as evidence of guilt may remain but they are given another setting. From the point of view of evolution there can be no universal fall of humanity from a stage of moral innocence nor a discovery of sin in sex. The entire conception of sin is radically changed. With these theological patterns go all doctrines of the atonement drawn from them. They too become analogies rather than facts.

Satisfaction of the divine honor, endurance of penal sufferings to satisfy divine justice, the imputation of righteousness to select persons from a morally impotent race, the fires of hell, and the golden streets of Jerusalem are patterns in which the ultimate relations of men and God can be described. So viewed, they are no more literal than the music of the spheres and the breath of spring. But methodically examined they are sure to express religious attitudes and values which constitute the very heart of the Christian's faith. And this faith he is already beginning to legitimatize by patterns drawn from the natural sciences and social experience of our modern world.

# THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

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THE question of the value of the Old Testament for the Christian is not new. It cannot be denied that the Old Testament has sometimes lowered the religious ideas and degraded the practices of Christians. Theology and ethics, faith and life have sometimes suffered by an undue emphasis on Old Testament ideas and ideals. Again, the Old Testament has sometimes retarded intellectual progress and blocked the advance of science. And it has sometimes caused people to lose their faith in religion because they could not reconcile its teachings with the accepted truths of school and college. Why then should we not put it away altogether, remove this incubus which imposes, in addition to all the havoc it has been doing, so much hard study on the theologue and the minister? What a relief it would be to get rid of it altogether! We cannot do this because, in spite of all its drawbacks, the Old Testament is far too valuable for the Christian to discard.

We need it for a true understanding of Jesus. It was his Bible. He learned it at home and in school. He was rooted in it. He used it for his spiritual life, he derived strength from it in temptation and light on the deepest problems of his life. He learned from it the greatest truths, he loved its stories, he sang its psalms, and on the cross itself he broke into the cry of despair of one of them. He lived in the Old Testament, to him it was the bread of life. How shall we fully understand him if we do not know the Old Testament? How shall we estimate aright his teaching, not only the prophetic quality of it but also his attitude to the law? How shall we assign to him aright his place in history, as the culmination of the great line of prophets, whose highest hopes and ideals he fulfilled, whose messages he clarified and deepened and enlarged: the prophet of Nazareth, the final revealer of God—if we do not know the Old Testament? How shall we truly understand the records of the evangelists and the teaching of his disciples and especially of Paul? A knowledge of the Old Testament is therefore bound up with the central task of the Christian minister. He must know Christ in order to bring men to a saving knowledge of him; and he cannot know him as he ought, if he does not study the Old Testament in which Christ is rooted.

The Old Testament is next to the New Testament our greatest source for the enlarging and deepening of our spiritual life and thought. It is great literature, parts of it belong to the greatest literature of the world, e.g., some of its stories and Psalms, some of its prophets, and the Book of Job. In it we find the record of the experience of the great men of the spirit, the original geniuses of religion, the pioneers in the moral and spiritual realm. It is a book of power. Here we may nourish our spiritual life by fellowship with the prophets, deepen our sense of the reality of the spiritual world, refine our moral and spiritual perception. Here we may learn from Amos penetrating insight into social conditions, from Hosea's tenderness, forgiveness, and moral redemption, from Ezekiel's pastoral fidelity. Here are the sources of the social side of religion, the social ideal of the prophets, the kingdom of God, refined and deepened by Jesus. Here are the great teachers of prayer, the psalmists, who give us the words of worship which we use when we are inarticulate and dumb. Can we afford to forego all this? Need I mention the wealth of material the Old Testament presents not only for sermons and for religious education but also for theology, especially for ethical monotheism? One has but to think a little of all that is involved in neglecting or discarding the Old Testament to see how impossible it is for the Christian minister.

As for those damages which have sometimes been wrought by the Old Testament, of which we spoke at the beginning, they can all be avoided by the truer understanding and use of the Old Testament which we owe to modern criticism. Our fathers had studied the Old Testament deeply and they had great experiences of spiritual power and illumination as a result of it; they heard God speak in it to their hearts and consciences as the Spirit interpreted its truth to them. It was to them the word of God just as really as the New Testament, inspired by him, the infallible guide of faith and practice. Nothing but the extreme formulation of these experiences in a hard and fast doctrine of inspiration was responsible for all the havoc that has been wrought. If God himself had revealed his character infallibly in every chapter of the Old Testament, it was inevitable that many Christians should get crude ideas of God, should find sanction for their narrow legalism or for their views of war. If God's relation to the world, its creation and rule, and all we call the physical sciences, was infallibly revealed there, the pious Christian would, of course, oppose a science that was so palpably at variance with the Old Testament and he would brand it as science falsely so called; or if he could not do that, he would be in great danger of surrendering his faith in God altogether when he saw that science had overthrown the teachings of the Bible in regard to the world of nature.

But we have learned better now. There are some points in the new view and study of the Bible that are of cardinal significance:

1. We use the methods of literary study. That is, we study the biblical literature as we do other literature in order to find out just what the authors actually say, not what we think they ought to say. We do not read our thoughts into the text but try to get the writers' thoughts out of the text, whether they agree with ours or not. They may strike fire within us, set us aflame with high devotion, faith and hope, or they may leave us indifferent, or they may be even repugnant to us and im-

possible to accept. We find all these in the Old Testament, and as we try to understand them all we note:

2. That there is a development from lower to higher religious and moral ideas and ideals, a "progressive revelation," as it has been called, in which the lower levels are superseded by the higher. The naïve conception of the folk tale in which God walks in the garden in the cool of the day or eats in Abram's tent or fights with Jacob in bodily combat gives way to the exalted conception of Isaiah or Deutero-Isaiah. A prophet like Elisha can still back a revolutionary movement with cruel murders, but a century later Hosea is filled with horror as he looks back to it. They are not all on the same level, insight grows and revelation deepens until in Jesus the highest is reached, and there is given to us

3. The norm by which every step in the marvelous development is tested: the spirit of Christ. Whatever is in harmony with that spirit is true, whatever cannot stand this test must go. I once asked a Sunday school class after they had studied the life of Elijah, "Boys, can Elijah be our ideal?" A little boy answered, "In some things yes, in others not." I asked, "Why is that?" "Because in some things he falls below the Christian level" was the quick answer of the little fellow who had understood one of the fundamental principles of the true use of the Old Testament. It applies all the way through, no matter whether historians or poets or prophets are concerned; it applies even if they make the claim of direct inspiration by God himself. This principle Jesus himself used when He contrasted that which was said to them of old and that which he knew to be God's real thought. This is the truth which is expressed in John's Gospel in the promise of the gift of the Holy Spirit who is to lead us into all the truth as he unfolds and develops the truth of Jesus. But truth is sometimes expressed in a strange and antiquated form which is no longer tenable to us. This leads us

4. To the necessity of distinguishing between the truth

and the manner in which it is presented, between form and matter, between the temporary and the abiding. When we read, e.g., the story of the creation of the world in six days as it is told us in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis, we see that the author meant just that and we do not harmonize his scientific views—if we may call them so—with our modern science, for that is impossible. His views were those of the scientific leaders of his day. But they are merely the form in which he expressed the profound and abiding truth that the personal God is responsible for this world, it is His work and He controls it. That we may still believe today, however much our views of how the world came into being may differ from that of the author of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis. Sometimes the truth is expressed in poetry which, indeed, is one of the finest vehicles of truth and often more effective than prose. We must be on our guard in reading the Old Testament, lest we mistake poetry for prose and make such mistakes as happened to the prosaic writer of Joshua 10:13–14 who mistook the poetic expression of Joshua, when he called upon the sun and the moon to stand still in order that there might be time enough for Israel to follow up its victory, and interpreted it literally so that to him a most astounding and absolutely unparalleled miracle took place that day, when "the sun stayed in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day." Others have been just as prosaic when they have interpreted, for instance, the story of the Garden of Eden or of Jonah as literal history rather than as poetry, thereby making it impossible for many to see the wonderful truths those tales would tell if they were rightly understood. It is the truth we are after and nothing but the truth. If this is so then we must not stop with finding the true literary and historical interpretation but we must go on

5. To the spiritual appropriation of the truth. All critical study is largely a means to an end. After we have sifted everything critically, sorted out and appraised not only the his-

torical but also the spiritual value of the various elements, we must make those truths that have stood the test our own by meditation. The mighty personalities of the prophets, the great experiences of the religious geniuses must become real to us as we brood over them with quickened imagination and spiritual sympathy until they live again for us and their power passes over into us and enables us not only to speak of them to others but also to embody them in our lives. If this is done, the Old Testament will be a book of life and power again, not a hindrance but a help to Christian thinking and Christian living. Of course, this requires true study and constant application, but it is labor richly rewarded *des Schweisses der Edelen wert.*

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# "THROUGH ALL TO GOD"[1]

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ALL men are travelers through space and time. Some have not gone far from their homes, or town, or state, while others have gone far afield in the distant parts of our country, over seas, across continent, and around the world. In like manner some have traveled only through the years they have lived. Their day and generation have served to engage their attention and they have felt there is nothing in the past worth their consideration and nothing in the future of special interest to them since they will not then be living. Others, however, are historically minded: they move far into the past; they explore great streams of history in the hope of coming to the headwaters of the racial life, or they are future-minded and live in the long distant years and wonder what will then be. But in the one case as in the others they are thus travelers in time no less than through space.

There are, however, other travel experiences than these. One may stay at home, or travel far, and remain in the present or move into the past or future without going far, or deep, into life, for here, too, in this region we are travelers. Some do not go through much of life: they float over its surfaces; they do not plunge into its depths. Others there are whom we know and of whom we say, "They have gone through much." They have suffered poignantly, borne heavy burdens, experienced great sorrows, wrestled alone in prayer in their Garden of Gethsemane, and carried their crosses up Calvary. They, too, have traveled much: they have gone farther and deeper than those who have only traversed wide spaces or long periods. Their ways and their destination are different and their resulting experiences are far richer and deeper.

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[1] An address delivered at the meeting of the Alumni Association of the Bangor Theological Seminary, June 4, 1929.

We are or may be travelers, also, in still another region. If we remain in space and with time, or even in these varied experiences, we do not travel far and deep enough, nor do we reach the ultimate goal of our existence. Only as we go through space and time and the experiences of life, to the divine reality, do we travel as far and as deep as we should and reach the final goal. We may start from any point in space, from any moment in time, from any experience in life and take therefrom the route that leads to God. The starting-points may be various and the ways different, but since God is the goal we move in the divine order and the whole pilgrimage may be spiritual and our whole life, here and now, be profoundly religious. This is the truth adumbrated in all religions and great philosophies and made clear in the Christian religion. This is the true life of the human spirit, its dignity and glory. And the Christian church is set in society to help human beings on their way toward God.

Now when we look out upon this modern world and observe the way many persons live most of the time and all of them some of the time, we discover that, instead of going through the world, they remain with it. They stay with objects of sense. They live and move and travel, near or far, in the material world. They have chiefly to do with things. They cultivate the soil, or delve in the earth for its coal or minerals or oils; they work with tools; they build houses, mills and factories; they make roads and drive their cars or trains upon them; they buy and sell things that they can handle, weigh, or measure. They harness the forces of nature, whether water, steam, or electricity, to their work. They study in the laboratory the behavior of the subtler forces of nature, but even here they remain within the physical world. And in their pleasures, they seek the objects of sense for their gratification. From touch to sight, and all between, they move in the world of things. They remain on the sense level. Since their lives are thus so largely spent in the sense world, it is not strange that they should think the material world is the only real world, physical objects the necessaries of life, and earthly possessions the only true wealth. For them real things are the ponderable things; spiritual things belong to the class of the ghostly. They are shadows; the material world is the substantial world. The spiritual realities of which the poet and prophet, the philosopher and preacher speak are unreal and unintelligible to such persons. Talk of things like coal, iron, shoes, cloth, produce, houses and lands, trains and ships, and they can understand your language. Some of these men, whose minds as well as hands are dyed in this material stuff in which they work, are frank enough at times to say they don't understand what these poets and prophets, philosophers and preachers are talking about. They speak in a foreign tongue.

Materialism as a theory of the universe may be discredited, but materialism as a practice of life, by men who live on the sense level and deal with material objects every day for a living, has tremendous power, both in their life and thought. This dominant interest in the world of things and close confinement of thought and desire to objects of sense gave Jesus one of his greatest problems and made him feel profoundly the way things held men spellbound in the world of sense. Then, as now, men would not go through the things of the sense world to the values and realities of the spiritual world. They remained with sense objects. They did not go through them to God, the true goal of their lives. Verily the world is too much with us, or we too much with it.

If many persons all the time and other persons some of the time remain with the material world, it is probably true that the greater number of all sorts and conditions of people travel beyond the material and reach *the human world*. For the vast masses of human beings other persons are of more interest to them than *material objects*. They have more meaning and value for them. They think more of them, have higher appreciation of them, and find them to be more necessary to their own lives. They willingly work for them, suffer on their behalf, and even go to the limit of service and sacrifice to make their lives happier and nobler. After all, things are not as interesting as human beings. The doll may hold the interest of a little girl for years, but the time comes when another child is more fascinating. The train or tin soldiers may interest the little boy for a while, but the other boys soon usurp the place of these toys. The young man and woman soon find that the most wonderful things in the world are just themselves, each to the other. The parents look down upon the child in the crib and find in it something infinitely more significant and precious than all the wealth and lands, mills and factories, or flaming stars in the heavens. And the men and women whose lives have been touched to nobler issues, whose hearts have been stirred and their consciences quickened to make the world a decent place to live in for all sorts and conditions of men, feel deeply and strongly that good men are the world's greatest possessions. All those persons have traveled farther and gone deeper into the meaning of life than those who remain with things. The most radical difference in this world, as Hegel said, is that between a person and a thing. As we pass from and through things to persons we are moving on the way that may take us still farther and will, indeed, if followed to the end, lead us to God.

But, strangely enough, many persons in our day only pass through things to persons and go no farther: they remain with human beings. The "humanist" tendency in much of our literature, social sciences, and philosophy, and, oddly enough, in much of our religion, while it goes through the material to the human, does not go farther. It does well to go beyond the material and arrive at the human; to find something qualitatively greater than flaming stars; to use all physical forces for human ends; to organize the world in the interest of human beings; to set the highest worth on the great ethical values of life; to see the wonder of human life and rejoice in its splendor, and be willing to serve and suffer to further the interests of humanity; and to cherish bright hopes and high expectations for the coming generations, after the present generation, like all the past generations, is dead and buried and wholly turned to dust. For these humanists, the human beings they see appear to be glorified, before whom they would fall down and whom they would worship. They think they have arrived at the goal, when they have gone only part way. They have gone through things to persons, but they have not gone through the human to the divine, through man to God.

It is a strange phenomenon we observe in the attitude of the "thorough" humanists toward the Divine Being. They do not listen, certainly do not obey, the counsel "Worship God." Some of them ignore God altogether. They will not have him in their thoughts, nor his name upon their lips. One such humanist takes pride in the declaration that he once preached for a whole year and never even mentioned the name of God. Others have a morbid God complex. The very hearing of the name, or the sight of it, stirs them to anger and revolt. For all of them there is no God about whom men need concern themselves. Men arrive when they go through things to persons. They are at their destination when they are with human beings. They need go no farther. They have found the object of their desire, who is worthy of their worship and before whom they can and do prostrate themselves. There is nothing higher, nothing greater, nothing deeper, nothing more significant and worthful in the universe than a human being. So all wealth and institutions and the world exist for man and man exists only for himself. There is no reality higher, better, wiser, more enduring, more worthy of love and worship than man, and so all love, thought, aspiration, prayer, worship are to be reserved for him.

If those who remain with things of the world are many, and those who go through things to man are more in number, the two groups together, however, do not exhaust the whole of humanity. Perhaps most men some time, and certainly the greatest souls most of the time, and some few transcendentally great souls all the time have traveled through and beyond the world and human beings in search of God and have been satisfied only when they have found him. All men who have had a profound religious experience, who have had a vivid sense of God, who have had a passion for him, and whose absorbing interest has been the Divine Reality, have gone through the world and through humanity to the ultimate spiritual reality. Priest and prophet, psalmist and poet, seer and thinker have ever journeyed on this route and sooner or later reached God. The sacred scriptures of all religions bear witness to this *quest* and *discovery,* to this pilgrimage and arrival. And the greater poets and the profounder thinkers have gone their several ways but have reached this ultimate goal.

And, in our own day, in spite of all this remaining with the world of things and this refusal to go beyond the human, there is a strong and growing demand by poets and thinkers and religious souls that we pass through the world and beyond humanity to God. They teach the same lesson as the transfigured spirit in the Book of Revelation. We are not to prostrate ourselves before men, but pass onward and upward to worship God. We are bidden to travel all the way, go through all things and human beings, and reach God.

Let us listen to some of these prophetic souls. Here is a poet who protests against the lukewarm attitude toward God and the great truths of the Christian religion.

> The inbred fault and meanness of this time
> In art, in thought, in polity, in trade,
> I charge directly to the ruined will
> That neither takes nor leaves the Omnipotent
> Creator, the immortal soul of man,
> Heaven, hell, the Cross of Christ and all that once
> Was great in Christendom, *when God meant God.*

Bradford, the psychographer, who has taken to writing of souls rather than of things and external happenings and has looked into the secret recesses of all kinds of souls, damaged and undamaged, in his recent study of D. L. Moody, whom he characterizes as "a worker in souls," begins and ends his book by making one emphatic affirmation. It is "that God is the one and supreme universal need of humanity, and that the need was never more pronounced than in America today." And his closing sentence is: "The simple fact is that, if God does not exist, the universe is but a wilderness of barren horror. If he does exist, life should be one long effort to know Him and to be at one with Him. Separation from Him is the most terrible punishment the mind can conceive."

And the scientist-philosopher in our midst, Professor Whitehead, in his *Religion in the Making* declares:

> Today there is but one religious dogma in debate: *What do you mean by "God"?* And in this respect today is like all its yesterdays. This is the fundamental religious dogma and all other dogmas are subsidiary to it. . . . . The modern world has *lost God* and is seeking Him. . . . . If the modern world is to *find God,* it must find Him through love and not through fear.

While this tendency toward God is becoming stronger and more conscious, we observe, however, that there are different ways in which persons set out to find and arrive at God. If there are multitudes of persons who remain in the world of sense, there are some persons who seek God and hope to find him apart wholly from this world. They are the mystics, found in the East and West, who travel on the negative way. For them the world is an illusion which holds captive the mind of man and makes him think it is real, whereas in fact it is nothing but illusion. It is a mirage without reality, and the sooner we see through it and discover its deceptive appearance the better will it be with us, and the sooner shall we arrive at reality. Or the material world is *thoroughly opaque,* no light from the transcendent sphere shines through it; no divine spirit informs it. It is mere changing, impermanent stuff. Or it is a machine that forever goes on its blind, grinding way. Life in the sense-world is imprisonment. To be born is to be cursed: to be released from the world is to be saved. The less, therefore, we have to do with it, the better. The wisdom of life consists in reducing our wants and our dependence upon it, to the lowest possible minimum. The more ascetic the life, the better. The closing of the eyes of the body upon the sense-world is the only way the eyes of the soul can see the spiritual world. For we are given two sets of eyes; with one set we look upon the world, and when they are open the eyes of the soul are shut; when these are open, the eyes of the body are closed. The spiritual world does not manifest itself through the world of sense. The negative way of such mystics, East and West, may lead to God, but those who travel this way journey with minds empty and arrive at a worldless Divine Reality.

It is clear, therefore, that if we are to travel and arrive with minds full of experience and thought, we must go through the world to God. We must go through the physical to the spiritual, through the tangible to the intangible, through the ponderable to the imponderable, through the material to the immaterial, and through the temporal to the eternal. This way provides us with invaluable experiences, a wealth of beauty, a fund of thought, and a sense of the wonder and mystery of the divine creative mind. Not the negative way of the world-despising mystics, but the affirming way of world-appreciating spiritual minds is the route that takes us, richly laden, to our ultimate goal, in God.

There are others who seek to arrive at God through the human. They are as "humanistic" as those "humanists" who appreciate the wonder and the worth of human life. Instead, however, of remaining with human beings, they pass through them to the Divine Being. They are humanistic in their starting point, but theistic in their objective. They start with man.

They end with God. In all things in the world, and more clearly in all things in human life, they discover signs that point them the way beyond the human. The body with its mysterious life points to the creative life of the universe; the mind with its thought points to the Divine Intelligence; the imagination with its delight in beauty points to the Divine Artist; the heart with its pure flame of love points to the Divine Fire of Love; the conscience with its judgments of right and wrong, good and evil, points to the moral power not ourselves that makes for righteousness; and the human spirit in its longing and yearning for an adequate companionship points to "the Friend behind Phenomena." Those who follow the human way and go beyond it to the divine, go laden with the wealth of experiences from all their human contacts. They are weighted down with love and friendship, thought and beauty, work and service. They leave behind nothing truly human in their experiences. They take with them the glory of their experiences and that of all their fellows.

It is to be observed, however, that some of those persons who go through the human to the divine do not go through Christ to God. They are truly and profoundly religious: they desire to arrive at the ultimate reality; they have a passion for God; they are theists in their life and thought. They would be theocentric in their religion. While thus truly religious, they are not distinctively Christian. They do not go *through Christ to God:* they go to God apart from him. For them Christ is not the way, the truth, and the life. If they are not distinctively Christian, they may be, and, indeed, are more profoundly religious than many Christians. They seek God and are not satisfied with any thing or person less than the everlasting God.

But if and since Christ was the greatest soul of all the world, who lived most truly the ethical life and most profoundly the religious life, then to go to God apart from him is to miss the richest experience and to be destitute of some of the deepest and clearest insight into the meaning of life, the world, and God, and so to arrive at God without the best possible thought and to fail to understand Him adequately in his nature and supreme purpose.

There is then for us the distinctively Christian way to God. It is through Christ. The point of departure is Christocentric, but the goal is theocentric. We start with Christ, we end with God.

There are some Christians, strangely enough those who are most conservative and evangelical, who are less profoundly religious than those theists of whom I have just spoken. They are almost as humanistic as the humanists. They are Christocentric in all their thought, desire, and worship. It is of Christ they always think, for him they have their ardent desire and him they chiefly worship. He fills the whole horizon of their lives. There are some evangelical hymnbooks, which contain but a few hymns in worship of God; most of them are in praise of Christ. There are fervent prayers in which Christ alone is the object thought of. God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, is for them as for H. G. Wells, the Veiled Being. Rarely does he come into their thought, desire, or prayer.

Now it is true, of course, that for such Christians Christ is more than human; he is divine; he is even a God, and so far forth they are more than humanists: they move in deeper realms than the positivist humanists. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that they are not as profoundly religious in their thought, desire, and prayer as those theists who want above everything else to possess God.

And what is of far greater importance, they are not as theistic as Christ seeks his followers to be. For Christ himself, God was the supreme desire of his heart, the profoundest thought of his mind, the consuming passion of his soul. His interest in God was all-controlling. His consciousness of God was vital and vivid. His faith in God was the unshaken confidence of his life. His communion with God was the uninterrupted experience, the ladder up and down which the angels of fellowship were always winging their way. His dependence upon God for life, for direction, and for power to face tragic situations was complete. No one ever went so fully and so far through the world and through human beings and had the clear and convincing sense of arrival at God as Christ. If then we are truly the followers of Christ, we will follow him through the world and humanity to God, the Everlasting Father and maker of heaven and earth.

Since writing these words I have read these striking words which are reported by the niece of Baron von Hügel:

> He spoke concerning certain young Anglican clergy whom he found to be fond of kite-flying.
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> They seem to have got a kind of Christism now, not God. God is too difficult. Christ is easy. (Is he easy?) They must have everything easy. We hardly need God if we have Christ. How different all this is to Our Lord himself. *Did he not come to show us the Father?*[2]

On our way to God, however, we shall go with Christ and through him. We shall not remain with him as some do; nor go without him as others do, but we will go with and through him in all the wealth of his experience, the profundity of his thought, the clarity of his vision, and the conviction of his conscience and the sacrificial love of his heart. For us he is the way on which we travel, the truth or divine reality we teach, and the life we experience in consequence in every fiber of our being.

But the goal of all our desire and seeking is the God whom he reveals to us. If and when we go with and through Christ, then we arrive at *the Christlike God*. When we go through the world to God, we go far and deep, and learn much of his reality, creative power, intelligence, imagination, and beneficence. When we go through man to God we go farther and deeper and learn more of the being and character and the purpose and love of God. When, however, we go through Christ to God, then we travel farthest, come to the central deeps of the being of God, know Him as the Father of our spirits, the lover of our souls, and we arrive at home. This way to God takes us to his very heart, and we behold Him as the one in whom all that Christ was in time He is forever.

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[2] Baron von Hügel, *Letters to a Niece*, p. xxxvi.

If we go through the world and humanity and Christ to God; if we travel thus through space and time and life to the Deity, then our individual religious experiences and the collective experiences of our churches will have three or four of the great notes or characters of the Christian religion at its best. If these notes are lacking today in the modern world, and even in some churches, it is because men have not gone through the world and man and Christ to God: but when and where they have done so, these notes or characters are in evidence.

The first is worshipfulness. "Worship God," said the glorified spirit in the heavenly world. This is what happens naturally and spontaneously when men arrive at God. When God is real and vivid to consciousness, then the soul awakes in wonder and adores Him. Then all its powers function at their best in their winged aspiration after God: the intellect in its pursuit of truth; the imagination in its appreciation of beauty; the conscience in its conviction of the right; the heart in its love of the good; and the spirit in its prayer. The whole being is in vital union and conscious communion with God. The divine object of worship takes possession of the whole soul and becomes the supreme interest in life, and holds it true to all things spiritual. Worship in the inner chamber with the door shut becomes the dialogue of God and the soul, and in public it becomes the glad hymn of praise and adoration. Religious exercises are then wings, not weights. When God is real and vivid in human consciousness, worship is spontaneous and inevitable.

Another note is serenity. As long as men remain in the world, which is forever in flux, or with human beings who are finite, transient, and dissatisfied, there can be no peace of soul, no quietness of spirit. And here is found the cause of our modern restlessness, our syncopated music, our jerky dance of life, our feverish search for pleasure. Never did men and women have so much of the world's goods, so much leisure, so many opportunities for pleasure, and never were they less satisfied. The cynicism in our literature, the pessimism in our philosophy, the discouragement in our social service, the widespread reaction in our democracy, all these manifest restlessness, dissatisfaction, disillusionment.

The way out of this cynicism and pessimism and dissatisfaction leads through the world and humanity and Christ to God. "Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless until we find Thee and rest in Thee," said St. Augustine, and Dante sang: "In Thy will is our peace." The problem of Faust is still the modern problem. How find the adequate object which can yield the enduring satisfaction to which we can say: "Verweie doch, du bist so schön." Not in things, nor in human beings, but in God alone can we find enduring satisfaction.

Still another note is power. The vocabulary in the New Testament is rich in words that express new experience of power which the Christian religion brought into the world. It piles up synonym upon synonym: strength, power, energy, might. The problem of the modern industrialized world is to secure physical power. Men have passed from the use of their own strength to the use of winds and water, steam and gas and electricity, and the scientists are now at work to release the pent up energy in atoms. But with the increase of the use of physical power there is the keen sense of the intellectual weakness and moral impotence of human beings and of the grave danger in granting them such power.

If and as long as men remain with things of the world and with human beings and their interests and organizations, it is not to be wondered at that they should be morally impotent. No one realized this more than Christ and St. Paul. In themselves and with things they were weak: with God and in and through Him they were strong, mighty, victorious, triumphant.

The superpower for the soul's life and the church's work comes from contact with God and the possession of the Holy Spirit. Here is the secret of moral energy and spiritual power.

Then, too, there is the note of hopefulness. If men live on the sense level and have chiefly to do with things, then it is hard, indeed impossible, to cherish any hope of life beyond the grave, for all things die and pass away or mingle with the elements; and so will man, for he, too, is a thing or an animal among the rest. If men live on the human level, then they may have the instinct of the immortal life and feel a longing therefor, but they will have no assurance thereof. When, however, men go through the world of things and human beings and arrive with Christ at God, then they have gone beyond the world of space and time and are in the world of Deity, and it is when the soul moves in the world of the spirit that its hope becomes bright and its faith firm, and its love undying. When a man finds God, then and there he begins the eternal life. He lives it in the midst of time. Let him go through the world and humanity and with Christ and through him to God and his eternal life begins. When God is real and vivid in one's consciousness then the assurance of immortality is strong and uplifting. Let the thought of God recede from the mind, then the hope of the immortal life passes away. Faith in God creates the hope of immortality.

Let me in closing impress upon the ministers the greatness and the glory of the task we have to perform. Reverting to Bradford's study of Moody, hear what he says: "In his day none worked more passionately, more lovingly and more successfully to bring God to man and man to God." There in a sentence he defined the transcendent task of the ministry: it is to bring God to man and man to God. It is a most difficult task, indeed none so difficult in all society, but then if accomplished none is comparable to it in its importance for the life of the soul and for the welfare of society. And ours is the high privilege to serve men in this way.

And the Christian church is set in society to be the spiritual demonstration in its membership of what life with God means. The church of the living God is the church to which God is living, real, present, powerful in its members. And it serves in society as a spiritual traveler's aid society. It cares for those who are on the way through the world of sense to the world of spirit, and through the world of the human to the world of the divine, and through the Christ to the Christlike God.

# SPIRITUALISM—A CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN RELIGION[1]

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SPIRITUALISM, its followers assert, is a science, a philosophy, and a religion. These three phases, however, are independent of one another, so that the religion may be considered separately, however much it uses the "science" (psychical phenomena) as propaganda.

Suppose we set aside, for the moment, the possibility of conscious fraud on the part of the medium, for a few mediums are honest and sincere. The occurrence, even then, of messages, rappings, movements of objects at a distance, materializations, photographs of "spirits" does not prove the Spiritualist hypothesis of discarnate spirits enjoying an eternal life in a spirit world which is a perfected reproduction of this one.

We may, for instance, reject a great part of Spiritualism, and accept Spiritism, the theory of spirit existences and their intervention in human affairs. Or, still accepting the phenomena, we may explain them in terms of human physiology and psychology. On the other hand, we can dismiss all the phenomena as faked or illusory, and yet Spiritualism remains as valid as any other religious or metaphysical system. The fact of the matter is that Spiritualism is to be accepted or rejected for the same reasons that we accept or reject other systems of belief: its capacity of compensating us for our frustrations and its possession of a sufficient degree of internal agreement to meet our intellectual standards. Indeed, Spiritualists themselves fall back on this criterion. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle says,

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[1] This article is based on a longer work, to appear soon, called *The Drama of Life after Death, a Critical Study of Spiritualist Beliefs and Practices.*

The final argument for the truth of our new revelation is that it is the most natural, reasonable, and comforting interpretation of the facts of human life and destiny which has ever been put forward. It is huge, sweeping, all-explaining, reaching out to all our difficulties, and giving adequate answers.

## I

The lay public thinks of Spiritualism as a crude lot of tricks appealing to simple-minded folk, which, for some reason or other, has also won over a few eminent scientists. Spiritualism, however, is not simply an appeal to one's sense of the marvelous. It is a definite, elaborate system of belief. While its crude, magical aspects attract the naïve, its extremely sophisticated sides attract the more intelligent and cultured. It is true, of course, that most persons who go to séances and message services know very little about the theoretical side. But this side exists, has had a long history, and is constantly increasing.

Spiritualism, like all religious systems, is based on the inveterate reluctance of human beings to admit that death is the extinction of their own or their loved one's personality. This faith is to be looked upon, therefore, as a partly primitive, partly subtle and modern attempt to satisfy a universal hunger. It is at once the oldest and the newest proof of immortality.

This system arises very naturally. We cannot deny that the body we see and touch and love disappears forever at death. Consequently, life, since we insist that it continue, must reside in something else that is indestructible, namely, spirit. This is the belief of all primitive peoples and the basis of all civilized religions.

The Spiritualist now goes on to postulate, not only a material body and a spirit as part of the constitution of man but a soul, or spiritual body, as well. Man is threefold. The material body serves the soul, first, as a covering and vehicle, second, as a form or mold. As for the soul, it is the bridge by means of which the spirit gets over into the material body. It is the temperament of man, his feelings and particular physical characteristics. It is not mind or thought, for these are aspects of the spirit itself. Spirit is the real personality, the divine part of man, descended from the higher realms of spirit (the Spiritualist deity is variously described as Universal Spirit, Universal or Infinite Intelligence). The spirit becomes incarnate in the human form and only in this form. Though the body and soul had a beginning and an evolution, the spirit has always existed, and always in perfect form. It became a tenant of the human organism only when this organism had gone far enough in evolution to receive it.

Once it is assumed that man possesses an eternal spirit, a soul, and body, old age and death are easily explained away. Growing old is a process in which the spirit and soul gradually withdraw from the material body, and death is simply the final stage in this separation. Thenceforth, spirit and soul—as the spirit's "body"—exist alone as an organized entity. Death is not only free from pain, it is a very joyous and desirable experience. It is nothing more than a process of transformation, a change of world, and the Spiritualists label their obituary notices, "Transition Notices."

The next step in the Spiritualistic epic follows logically. If the spirit and soul are to have an existence apart from the body, they must have a habitation. Whereupon, a spirit world is provided for them. This term does not merely denote the higher order of existence in a metaphorical sense. It is the heaven of orthodox Christians given a very definite geographical location, origin, formation, and shape. There are seven spheres (collectively, the spirit world) around the earth. But not only the earth has such spheres—every heavenly body that has progressed sufficiently has its spirit spheres. There are, in addition, universal spheres that are the combinations of the spheres of several suns or several planets. Man, however, must reach a very advanced stage of development before he can leave the earth spheres for the larger ones beyond in the great cosmos. These are so distant and their inhabitants so little interested in mere earthly matters that no communications have been received from them. The members of the earth spheres are the only ones from whom we have heard.

At death the spirit goes to that earth sphere most in harmony with his moral and intellectual nature. Geographical gradations in the Spiritualist system are, of course, the result of a desire for ethical gradations. The spirit world is divided into spheres in order to offer life at different levels to spirits at different stages of development.

The first and second spheres are dark, dismal places for low, undeveloped spirits. The third (or Summerland) is where average men and women go immediately at death, and where the inhabitants of the first and second spheres go eventually. The spirit is not startled by finding itself in some absolutely new and inappreciable experience. So gradual is the transition, so real and natural do things seem, that the spirits hardly even recognize the change of worlds. "The first thing I remember," a son informed his parents, "was waking as from a troubled sleep, and I saw faces all around me, and I asked what had happened."[2] And Raymond Lodge told his father, "My body's very similar to the one I had before. I pinch myself sometimes to see if it is real, but it doesn't seem to hurt as much as when I pinched the flesh body. . . . . I can move somewhat more freely." "Has he got eyes and ears?" Sir Oliver then asked. "Yes, yes," the medium answered, "and eyelashes, and eyebrows, exactly the same, and a tongue and teeth."

Just as there is no change in body structure, so there is none in mind. The spirit recognizes itself as the creature who once lived on earth, remembers everything it knew there, and continues to experience the same emotions for the same persons. The personality is unchanged, also, in the intellectual and moral realm. The individual retains his good and bad qualities, and is not advanced by death one bit. He starts life in the spirit world where he left off in the earthly world. It is only by later study and training that he raises himself to a superior stage of development.

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[2] L. C. Graves, *The Natural Order of Spirit.*

The spirits have homes amidst hills, trees, and rivers, just as they had on earth. Indeed, the Summerland is described as the earth with all its imperfections gone. The homes in this sphere, for instance, are built the way homes are built here, but with greater ease and with a far more perfect and beautiful result. Raymond describes a brickmaking machine called the "accumulator," and other spirits have told of similar devices called "hoppers" and "chemical generators." These homes correspond to the spirit's personality, as does everything which surrounds him, from the gardens outside to the clothing he wears. This clothing is formed out of extremely sensitive material and changes in accordance with the change of thought and mood. It may seem strange that clothing should be necessary in the Summerland, but the spirit communications state that since men and women after death possess in their spiritual bodies all the organs which existed in their material bodies, the dictates of modesty require that spirits be properly clothed. Hence, attendants are ready to provide all spirits with clothing immediately upon their arrival in the spirit world.

The spirits, particularly in the higher spheres, continue the activities engaged in on earth. Those who followed an uncongenial vocation are now able to pursue the work in which they are most interested. The spheres are filled with schools, and instruction is an extremely important activity there. *But the chief duty of the spirits is to look after the welfare and progress of those on earth.*

Marriage exists in the spirit world as it does here, but with the difference that spirits are married but once and then to their spiritual affinities or soul mates. This does not mean that all spirits find themselves immediately married upon entering the spirit world. Many spirits who left the earth centuries ago are not yet married. Marriage in the spirit world is Platonic, that is, it exists for the sole purpose of intellectual and spiritual companionship. No children are ever born of marriage there.

After the inhabitants of the third sphere have become sufficiently enlightened and developed, they progress to the fourth sphere, which is the home of the geniuses of the earth. Here originate the profound and remarkable thoughts which inspire men on earth. This fourth sphere is flooded with dazzling light, which the inhabitants find normal, but which would blind not only members of the lower spheres but us as well. The dwellers in this sphere live in brotherhoods, realizing the ideal of a communal life never attained here. (Many of the Spiritualists are interested in social experimentation.) Everything in this sphere, as in the higher ones, is formed primarily by thought, without the use of hands. The mind or will of the spirit acts directly upon matter, and molds it to his subtlest wish. Not only is the spirit omnipotent here; it has attained the highest type of power—magical creation of actually existing things, such as houses, furniture, etc., simply by thinking them.

In time, the inhabitants of the fourth sphere progress to the fifth, sixth, and seventh, and thence to the more universal spheres.

Sin and evil are defined by the Spiritualist as simply imperfection. There is nothing essentially evil or sinful in the universe, nor is there any instrument of punishment except the discomfort and suffering visited upon a person by his own misshapen and undeveloped personality. There is no hell except man's own nature, no Judgment Day except the ever-present verdict of his own conscience, and no one to intercede and atone for him. But there is a law of progress in the universe which ensures certain and unending development to every human soul. No one is irretrievably lost. All will, through their own efforts, unfold in time their divine attributes and realize their highest ideals of perfection.

## II

The Spiritualist proof of the foregoing beliefs is based, however mistakenly, on psychical phenomena. For additional propaganda, use is made of such occult beliefs as astrology, phrenology, numerology (fortune-telling by means of number); and, at the opposite extreme, of all the latest scientific developments, such as radio communication, telephony. The educated Spiritualists have found particularly welcome the theory of relativity and of a four-dimensional universe, the theory of the apparent immateriality of matter, as described by contemporary physicists, and, of course, such older theories as those of evolution and radiation.

One should not overlook that most interesting type of proof, the books and recantations received from famous scientists and skeptics now in the spirit world. Almost every skeptic of any intellectual importance has transmitted his recantation. Among these are Michael Faraday and William James, each of whom has written a three hundred-page book; while Mrs. Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, Mme Blavatsky, the famous Theosophist, and Houdini—who tried valiantly to believe, poor man, but failed—have all acknowledged the error of their earthly ways. Even Christ, in a book called *The Living Jesus,* received by the Rev. Fred Wiggin, of Brookline, Massachusetts, has presented himself as a normal, living human being; while many spirits have reported seeing him in the spirit world. The Spiritualists regard Christ as a natural man, though a very extraordinary person, and a very great medium.

In connection with the matter of propaganda, it is interesting to note that the philosophy of Spiritualism, which is supposed to have come after the communications with the dead had begun, in reality precedes it. The so-called facts, in other words, illustrate and are built on the philosophy. Andrew Jackson Davis, "the great American seer, and the father of modern spiritualism," predicted in his *Nature's Divine Revelations* (1846) an era of intercourse between spirits and the inhabitants of earth and described, furthermore, the nature and formation of the spirit world. Davis was not a medium; he was an inspired one, lying on his couch and dictating his visions to a group of attendants. The Spiritualist movement proper began in 1848 with the Hydesville rappings, and later literature contains descriptions fundamentally the same as those given by Jackson, who, it must be remembered, was a prolific reader of Swedenborg. Now, Swedenborg's intellectual ancestors are the mystics and neo-Platonists, so that the great similarity in the descriptions of the spirit world given by mediums scattered in various countries is due not to a common body of facts but to a common body of theories.

Descriptions of spheres whose geographical positions and physical states correspond to ethical values, are found again and again in the history of thought. Dante's Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise, tally with the Spiritualist's spirit world, in essentials, though there is some difference in terminology. How, one is tempted to ask, could Dante have arrived at so accurate a knowledge of the spirit world without the help of the spirits? Though the Spiritualists never refer to Dante, their answer would be immediately forthcoming: Dante, like all great artists and seers, was not a normal man. He was a medium receiving his knowledge from the spirit world, even though he was ignorant of his special sensitivity and the source of his information. On the same principle, the Spiritualists find every page of the Bible full of mediumistic phenomena. And epileptics, who die and are born anew with every attack, who are famous, even in a naturalistic medical psychology, for their descriptions of the other world, are also termed mediums by the Spiritualists!

## III

A religion is not merely a philosophy or theoretical faith, it is a practical one and requires an organization, officers, and services. The Spiritualist church has very little money and its organization is a loose one. Nevertheless, it extends to every part of the United States and over a great part of Europe. Public services are held several times a week in about forty churches in New York City, fifty in Boston, and in about as many in Chicago, to say nothing of those in countless smaller cities and towns. It has a seminary for the training of its ministers, and possesses many of the auxiliary features of the orthodox faith, such as a Sunday school for children, bazaars, and social evenings. A costume dance was recently held at the First Spiritualist Church, New York City, the invitation to which is worth quoting here:

Character Dance
Come dressed as your spirit guide
Prizes for the best and funniest costumes
Bring your friends.

An unusual element in the Spiritualist faith, not found elsewhere, so far as I know, is a spiritual and mental radio station, to enable members to tune in on the Great Dynamic Healing Circuit. It broadcasts three times weekly at 7 P.M., Chicago time, on universal wave-length. At this time members are supposed to send out and receive these thoughts:

I must, I shall, and I will be healed
(and)
I ask the operator of the Progressive Thinker Healing Center
To impress me what to eat, drink, and do
For my sake, my family's, my friends',
And the great Cause.

One church makes use of the physical radio, as well. Their advertisement runs:

> Listen in on your Radio
> Every Friday at 7:45 P.M., Station W.M.C.A.
> Communications clairaudiently received are read over the radio, by arrangement with the Spiritual and Ethical Society of N.Y.C. Copies of the paper read may be obtained by writing station W.M.C.A. enclosing dime.

The Spiritualist organization publishes several venerable weekly newspapers, some monthlies, and even a *Who's Who in Etheric Society*. It possesses a vast permanent literature whose authors range from men prominent in science and the arts to those nearly illiterate or suffering from some mental disease. These books and periodicals may be obtained in all the many bookshops specializing in Spiritualistic literature. One in London, called the "Psychic Bookshop," has for its cable code, consistently enough, "Ectoplasm."

With regard to the services, it is important to distinguish between a séance and a message service. A séance is a private service, for a small group of persons, or even a single one; it may be free, but nearly always there is a charge, anywhere from two or three dollars up—with no limit. Private services are the ambition of every medium, and their principal means of support. Here, detailed messages and other proofs of discarnate spirits are given. A public service is for a larger group which receives brief messages, only, and the members of which are expected to contribute from twenty-five cents to a dollar. These services are conducted by a minister who is sometimes an ordained Christian minister and often also the medium as well; if not, he is assisted by one. The services begin with an orthodox prayer, adapted to the Spiritualist interpretation, and the singing of hymn tunes (also adaptations). There is next a musical selection, provided by a pianist, and perhaps one or even more vocalists. Most of the Spiritualist artists volunteer their services, and impress one as destined for the lowest sphere available. Occasionally, a small reed organ is employed to furnish the accompaniments. One church, even more sorely pressed for funds than the others, resorted to a portable phonograph for its hymns and musical selections.

A sermon follows, if the medium is capable of it. Most mediums and ministers are inferior in culture and intelligence to the orthodox ministry, though one occasionally finds a well-educated and able speaker. The sermon usually deals with propaganda; the deficiencies of the orthodox Christian faiths, or of Theosophy or Christian Science; or with some technical phase of Spiritualism; vibrations, how to become a medium, etc. When this is over, the communications begin. These are an unchanging element in the ritual, however variable other elements, such as hymns, incense, may be. The communications are received from dead friends and relatives of the members of the audience. These are chosen as recipients in the following way: the medium "goes into the silence" for a moment, and then his mind is presented with the figure and face of a spirit, clothed and acting as he did on earth, who says that he has a message for someone in this audience. This presentation may come through psychometry, which is the term of the "science" of telling from the vibration of any object worn near a person's body or from a query which he has written on a piece of paper just who and what he is, and what spirit is trying to communicate with him. Or it may come through the contact, called vibration, which is suddenly set up between the medium and the member of the audience who is thinking very hard about his problem. Sometimes such a person is required to hold one arm aloft during the entire communication in order to keep the vibration "warm"; if it turns "cold" the communication is a failure.

The entire service lasts about an hour and a half. An occasional medium will try to squeeze in two services in one evening. About twenty messages, totaling an hour, are the maximum number that can be given. Since the average audience consists of fifteen or twenty persons, every member receives some word from the beyond. Some audiences, however, run as high as two and three hundred, and even larger, of which those at the revivalist meetings, held at Lily Dale, New York, and elsewhere during the summer, are instances. These places are meccas for Spiritualists who come from all over the country.

The audience is made up nearly entirely of women, most of whom are in distress of some kind and have come for help. Many of them are widows and spinsters. Of ten women at any meeting, one is under thirty-five, four are between thirty-five and forty-five, and five are above forty-five. The few men present are middle aged and older, though occasionally one finds a young man or even a child (accompanying a parent) in the audience.

As for the content of the messages, it is readily seen that the audience will get what it comes for and pays for. If one medium doesn't give it to them, another will. The spirit, after identifying himself, sends his love, as a rule, and tells how well he is getting on in his new life. The main part of the message, however, is devoted to telling the recipient what the urgent problem is that he is facing, how it is to be met, and what the outcome will be. The messages deal with health, legal and financial matters; the choice of a vocation or a residence; love, marriage, and child-parent relationships. The messages are optimistic, without exception. No matter how unfortunate the present may be, the future is always described in glowing terms. Let the sufferer only be patient and carry out a few simple instructions and all will be well.

It is true that some mediums hold that their chief function and the chief business of Spiritualism is the transmission of messages from the dead. Such say that Spiritualism is a "science" which may be utilized by anyone, regardless of his particular religious creed or lack of it. One writes in the *Call of Truth,* "Fortune telling has no more to do with Spiritualism than it has to do with merchandizing. . . . . To communicate with loved ones in spirit and to receive the teachings that come from Spirit is the purpose of Spiritualism." Yet this person on another page of the same issue, maintains a personal psychic service department which for 50 cents and a coupon solves the problems of the readers, never once mentioning in his answers the so-called loved ones.

It may be that the mediums tell fortunes because this is the only means by which they can hold their congregations, that they are sincere in saying they would prefer to be subsidized by the state and deliver messages free to all comers. The fact remains, nevertheless, that nine mediums out of ten, in message service or séance, practice magical prophecy and magical guidance exclusively, "spiritizing" their suggestions as a technical device to lend them weight and authority. Relatively few descriptions of life in the beyond or of the nature of the spirit world are transmitted, and these only at séances, where there is sometimes a special demand for them. I have no space to list Spiritualist advertisements in proof of this point, and can describe only their general import. They all promise for a small fee to heal, to remove evil influence, to give readings on domestic, business, and spiritual affairs, to teach a profession, either in person or by mail. "Absent treatments," the advertisements insist, "are just as effective as those in the office."

## IV

What is the function of Spiritualist belief? What relief and compensation does it offer for human frustrations that other faiths and techniques fail to give?

To begin with, Spiritualism may have a purely negative function. It is not orthodoxy. All cult beliefs, in part, serve as places of refuge for those who, in revolting against their fathers, revolt also against the faith of their fathers. Spiritualist literature is full of this exultation that is *not* orthodox

Christianity. Yet, ironically enough, it has its conservative and radical wings, and some time ago there was talk of a heresy trial for one of its ministers!

A similar negative function is served by utterance. To discuss one's problem affords considerable relief apart from any advice received.

At a positive level, though a simple one, there is the supposed satisfaction of one's needs to be obtained by means of magical prophecy and guidance. Many come to Spiritualism looking for good cheap advice. Such persons have few friends, perhaps. They may be alone in a strange city or even a strange country. (A large number of the members are relatively new arrivals in the United States.) When they get in trouble they cannot afford the fees of a lawyer or a physician. They are repelled, moreover, by impersonality and abstractness of the orthodox faiths. With no place to turn for advice or companionship, the Spiritualist service looms up as an oasis in an emotional desert. Here they are given a warm, personal greeting, their problems are discussed in intimate fashion, and a radiant future is guaranteed them. The individual becomes part not only of the living group of those also up against it but part of the group passed on. The universe drops its pose of stony silence, and shows itself as alive, talkative, protective—in a word, homelike. No longer need the suffering one turn in vain to a very busy, far-off God who knows and cares nothing about him. His dear ones will look after him now.

This strength of the Spiritualist appeal, however great at first, later proves its weakness. In the attempt to meet the inadequacy of other faiths and techniques which promise too little, it promises too much. Since magical prophecy and guidance ultimately fail, Spiritualism must necessarily lose a great part of its clientele. (I am not talking now of those interested in communication or of the believers in the faith.) But it gains as many as it loses. Those whose problems solve themselves in time, stop going; the others leave, sooner or later, to try other techniques. On the other hand, those disillusioned in these other techniques come now to try their luck with Spiritualism.

At a higher level, Spiritualism is sought after because it helps reduce the shock of death in a more effective way, perhaps, than any other belief. The usual person, though suffering greatly at the loss of a loved one, is able to adapt himself to the change. Time heals all wounds. But some persons find the adjustment much more difficult, especially if death comes unexpectedly or wantonly, as in accident or war. In such cases, communication serves to bridge the gap between life and death until such a time as the mind forgets, and the hurt disappears. A brief contact with the beyond suffices for such persons. The triviality of the messages, moreover, does not matter. The bereaved ones are overjoyed merely to learn that life continues somewhere, somehow; that death is not painful, that the spirit is well and happy. Once this is accomplished, their interest in the spirit world vanishes. Sir Oliver Lodge writes: ". . . . I have had many further talks with Raymond since the book [*Raymond*] was published; but the stress and anxiety to communicate has subsided; now that the fact of survival and happy employment is established, the communications are placid, like an occasional letter home."

This attitude toward communication may be said to be one that, though hardly normal, is not abnormal. But there is an inordinate desire to get in touch with the dead and continue communications over a period of years that is characteristic of certain pathological emotional situations, such as that of a feeling of guilt or that of an extreme attachment to a child or a parent. Some of the eminent, and many of the ordinary, persons who have accepted Spiritualism, have tried to atone, by way of communication, for their ignorance, their neglect, and even their dislike, of their so-called loved ones. Others cannot rid themselves of a dependent attitude. One old couple whose hope for economic security lay in their son's career, were overwhelmed by his death. The messages which they later received are filled with statements by the son that he will still take care of them, that he is preparing a fine home, with a splendid library, etc., for them when they arrive.[3]

This extreme type of desire for communications disappears with the attainment of an intelligent understanding of the motives involved. An excessive interest in the dead, therefore, is nearly always an indication of a present or approaching mental disorder. It is not the cause of it, as many persons believe.

At the highest level, Spiritualism meets the demand for a science of immortality, though, in the nature of things, there can be no such science. Today, orthodox religious leaders are perplexed to find suitable proofs of God and of a life after death. Let them become abstract and subtle, as befits disciplined minds, and they estrange their congregations by descriptions that tend to make men after death puffs of ether knowing neither themselves nor others. Such an existence seems a cruel mockery to one face to face with death. Yet, let the proof become too concrete and simple, and their audiences are insulted at so crude a doctrine. But all men, regardless of their intelligence, education, or training, desire the concrete type of immortality. Since this seems too good to be true, they are driven either into accepting the abstract type as a subterfuge, or into abandoning entirely the hope of immortality in any form whatsoever. When Spiritualism, therefore, offers proof, and "scientific proof," at that, of everything that the heart wants to believe, it is no wonder that it wins adherents, not only from laymen, but from scientists—who, indeed, are laymen when it comes to the problem of man's ultimate destiny. It is a psychological as well as spiritual truth that those who seek shall find.

In the light of these facts, the indifference of orthodox Christian leaders and laymen to this branch of their faith becomes understandable. It is due, I believe, to their antagonism to certain of the supposedly radical ethical tenets of Spiritualism, and to their desire to maintain a monopoly on the proofs of immortality. If one may communicate with the dead directly, either through another's mediumistic powers or one's own; if, furthermore, one can soon see for himself that the future life is our earthly one perfected; if there is no sin, no damnation, no Judgment Day, no vicarious atonement, etc.; if one prays to the spirits, instead of to the saints—if all this is so, then the saints, the theologians, and the ministers become superfluous.

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[3] L. C. Graves, *op. cit.*

What is the future of this religion? This can be determined only in the light of its past. Spiritualism is not only a belief in spirits but in spirit as well. It arose to combat materialism, and is to be looked upon as part of the post-Kantian idealistic movement in philosophy. Much of its work is done here, inasmuch as science itself now regards matter as immaterial. In the main, Spiritualism represents a revolt against the inadequate techniques and beliefs of the orthodox beliefs, particularly the Protestant. Inadequate with respect to relieving emotional tensions, anticipating the future, guiding and healing, and finally, meeting death. The majority of Spiritualists, it should be noted, are former Protestants. Furthermore, this movement received its greatest impetus during and since the war, and is strongest in those countries which lost the most men and are also predominantly Protestant.

Protestantism represents a move toward liberalization, but some persons cannot stand this liberty, this vagueness and austerity, and try to work their way back to the fixity and warmth of Catholicism in one form or another. Spiritualism has adopted several of the therapeutic devices of Catholicism, confession, communion with the saints (spirits); and many of its beliefs, particularly of medieval Catholicism, such as those in magic, demons, witchcraft. Spiritualism, hence, is a hybrid faith. It is partly Protestant, partly Catholic; partly Puritanical, partly liberal; partly Western, partly Eastern; partly intellectualistic, partly mystical.

One of the objectives of Spiritualism is that of making every individual his own medium. This is not possible, and if it were the religious aspect would be destroyed, for religion is always a group affair. Spiritualism, however, comes the closest to being an individualistic faith. Still another objective is that of doing away with communications altogether and having the knowledge already obtained suffice. But religion consists not of past practices but of present ones. Omit the services, and Spiritualism becomes simply a philosophic belief. This contingency is still far off.

All religious systems are to be considered as psychological protective devices; they are therapeutic, not descriptive. Their vitality, therefore, depends on the degree to which they transform, through the imagination, the simple brute facts of suffering, frustration, and death into something that will not hurt so much. For civilized man, if not all heart, neither is all mind. He needs to believe very primitive things, though perhaps in very sophisticated fashion. If Spiritualism grows stronger, then, it will be only because other religions have grown weaker, that is, grown even more vague, abstract, and cautious than at present. Supply and demand is the law not only of economics, it is the law of religion as well.

# POPULAR COMPETITORS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

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DURING the first three centuries of the present era the inhabitants of the Mediterranean countries cherished and were served by a vast array of different religions. At no period before or since in the history of civilization as known to us have so many separate religious movements flourished at one time within a single area so thoroughly unified culturally and politically as was the Roman Empire. Perhaps the nearest historical parallel to that ancient multiplicity of cults is to be seen today in the United States of America. If instead of employing the term "Christianity" we use the more general designation "religion," and count as distinct bodies the different sects and denominations, we find in this country at the present moment more than two hundred religions competing with one another for the allegiance of twentieth-century Americans. A very similar state of affairs prevailed in the Roman world, but perhaps the average person then was as oblivious to the fact of multiplicity as is the ordinary member of any particular Christian church today.

While the different religions within the Roman Empire were in reality often competitors of one another, it should be remembered that the Gentiles did not share the characteristically Jewish and Christian opinion that one's own god is intolerant of all rivals. The deities whom Gentiles revered were not "jealous" gods. No impropriety was felt in maintaining an attachment to two or more deities at the same time. In fact, it was commonly assumed that under one set of conditions help was properly sought from one god, while under different circumstances another deity insured protection. The denominational rivalries that make it so difficult in modern times to effect a union among Christian bodies were not so keenly felt by members of different religious societies in ancient times. There were, indeed, rivalries, as one found in this or that cult what seemed to him the highest measure of satisfaction for his own needs, and consequently the religion most worthy of recommendation to his neighbors. But participation in the activities of one worshiping group did not necessarily imply the renunciation of all others. It would be inconceivable in our society that a man could unite, say, with a Roman Catholic church in order to receive from it the emotional satisfactions resulting from participation in an elaborate ritual, and at the same time join some modernist Protestant church for the sake of the intellectual satisfactions to be found in the lecture-sermon of some able preacher. Such an individual would be immediately distrusted in both groups, if indeed he were not summarily dismissed from fellowship. But it was not characteristic of the gentile psychology, as it was of the Jewish and the Christian, to assume that genuine religion was attainable only through membership in one specific communion, or that loyalty could be rendered to but one god.

The absence of the particularistic attitude in Roman religion made it inevitable that many cults would freely appropriate features from others, until it became difficult for an observer to draw lines of sharp demarcation between them. While certain gods retained their distinctive characteristics, the tendency to fuse the attributes and functions of one with another made rapid progress during the later centuries of the Empire. As the same individual passed freely from one cult to another, worshiping here today and there tomorrow, he constituted in his own person a significant unifying influence by virtue of his individuality and his particular type of religious quest. A hundred or a thousand such persons, following this ordinary course of procedure, transferred from one religion to another a considerable body of common interests, attitudes, and rites. It was not unusual for the same individual to have served as a priest in more than one of these cults. Again, when the worship of a deity was set up in new territory by a few immigrants from some distant country, the imported god gradually took on characteristics of one or another deity indigenous to that vicinity. Especially when natives adopted the foreign religion did the strange deity gradually assume a greater similarity to the older gods among whom he now abode or whom he displaced.

There was a large measure of assimilation and fusion among the different cults within the Roman Empire. The result was an elaborate mixture of religious activities, creeds, and ceremonies—a complicated syncretism. These syncretistic religious movements are an impressive factor within Roman civilization during the early centuries of the Christian Era, and an understanding of their character is necessary not only for a correct appraisal of the part played by religion in Roman culture during the imperial age, but also for an appreciation of the conditions attending the rise and early history of Christianity.

## I

When it had been the first duty of religion to serve the needs of a single race of men, like the Hebrews in Palestine, or a group of persons living within one narrowly restricted area, like a city-state of the Greek world, the character of the religion corresponded to specific local demands. It was the function of the deities to guard a particular territory, insuring the fertility of the fields and the flocks for an agricultural and pastoral type of civilization, or protecting the business of the citizens within the walls of the town in the case of an urban culture. Such political organization as might be needed was also the care of the divinity, but his concern was with a limited territory or a specific group rather than with the individual. Since people rarely had occasion to travel abroad, one who did venture beyond the bounds of his own country and race must make the journey at his own risk, unless he could form an alliance with the deities who presided over foreign lands and nations. Originally the great gods of the ancient world were not migratory deities.

By the beginning of the Christian Era the older situation had been radically altered. Now all religions had learned to migrate with peoples. This result was a direct outcome of new social conditions that had been taking shape during the three preceding centuries. Alexander the Great had set in motion a type of social contacts and a process of racial intermixture that tended to fuse into one complex mass of humanity all the different peoples dwelling in the lands about the eastern end of the Mediterranean. This tendency was only further accelerated by the imperial policy of Rome. After Alexander's day Greeks swarmed all over the Eastern world carrying with them their traditional cultural heritages. But, inspired by the precept and example of Alexander, Greeks went abroad not simply as Greeks but as citizens of the world at large. They quickly learned both to give and to take. Alexander, it should be remembered, had not followed the example of an Egyptian, an Assyrian, or a Persian conqueror, who coveted foreign territory as a source of wealth for the enrichment of the homeland. After setting out on his conquest of Asia and Egypt, Alexander never returned to Macedonia, and had he lived long enough to reorganize the government of his newly acquired kingdom probably he would not have chosen any city of Macedonia or Greece for the capital of this world-empire. New cosmopolitan centers of culture, like Antioch in Syria and Alexandria in Egypt, were the inevitable consequence of those new social forces that had resulted from the activities of the Greeks under the leadership of Alexander. Older national and racial differentiae rapidly disappeared.

When Rome made conquest of the Orient, the blending of bloods and cultures continued and gathered fresh momentum. Aristocrats might lament that the Orient poured its dregs into the very city of Rome, but they were helpless to resist the westward sweep of that tidal wave. As early as the Augustan age Horace could quite properly remark that captive Greece had taken her fierce Roman conquerors captive and had taught her arts to rustic Italy. Had he lived in the age of the Antonines or of the Severi he would have had to add Asia and Africa to the countries that had placed Roman civilization deeply in their debt. Even before the end of the first Christian century one encountered at all the chief centers of population, including Rome itself, men of many different races and diverse cultural heritages freely mingling together in the various walks of life. The author of the Book of Acts, himself a Gentile, had undoubtedly seen in many a city just such an assembly of mixed peoples as he visualized at Jerusalem on the occasion of the first Christian Pentecost. There one encountered "Parthians and Medes and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, in Judea and Cappadocia, in Pontus and Asia, in Phrygia and Pamphylia, in Egypt and the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and sojourners from Rome, both Jews and proselytes, Cretans and Arabians" (Acts 2:9–11). Since there was nothing phenomenal about the bare fact of this promiscuous gathering, the writer of the Acts heightened the significance of the occasion by assuming that the Christian spokesman on that day had been miraculously endowed with ability to preach in all the various native tongues represented in the assembly. Had these Galilean peasants been able to speak Greek, as doubtless would have been the case if they had grown up in an urban environment like that of a Paul, no miraculous gift of tongues would have been necessary. Such miscellaneous groups of persons could understand any preacher in Greek whether he addressed an audience in Athens, Ephesus, Antioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, or even Rome itself. Among the masses of the population, apart from persons residing in the less frequented country areas, the Greek speech, which Alexander and his followers had brought into Asia and

Egypt, had become the common medium of intercourse between all the heterogeneous elements in that exceedingly syncretistic society. Even in Roman times, although Latin was the language of the rulers, Greek still had a wide vogue among the people of the provinces and must often have been heard even on the streets of Rome.

Powerful forces were in operation to effect the wide dissemination of many religions among the mixed population of the Roman Empire. Over the whole Mediterranean world there was both a free and a forced mingling of many diverse cultural factors. The institution of slavery meant the importation into Roman society of vast numbers of foreigners, who brought with them an allegiance to various strange deities. Not infrequently the slave was a missionary for his native religion within the very household of his master. Free laborers moved about from place to place in quest of a livelihood, and at the same time sought aid of new deities or proffered to their neighbors the assistance of their own tutelary gods. The artisan or the small trader, availing himself of the good highways and protected sea-routes maintained by the Roman government, was also an agent for the propagation of different religions. The army, too, served in this same capacity. Mercenaries were recruited from all over the Empire, and while they performed the traditional Roman rites prescribed for the camp, personally they nourished their hopes of protection in battle and safety in death upon any form of faith that might be dear to them, either because it had been the religion of their fathers or because they had tested its validity in their own individual experience. Whether the legions were transferred rapidly from place to place, or were quartered in some province for a lengthy period, or were finally discharged and settled in possession of the property received as a reward for their services, under all of these circumstances soldiers were no insignificant factor in the spread of religions. And to these more incidental agencies one should add the activity of professional propagandists and priests whose zeal for converts must often have been stimulated by the golden opportunities for success which the social conditions of the time afforded.

## II

Religions that could effectively serve humanity's needs under conditions obtaining during the later centuries of the Roman Empire were necessarily of a specific type. In the first place, there had to be about them an atmosphere of universalism. This was not a characteristic of the older cults. They had served well the necessities of a particular territory or people, but were quite unsuited to the requirements of the world at large and of mankind in general. A god who had been sufficient for a Greek living in Athens, or for an Egyptian residing in some isolated locality, could hope to survive in the imperial age only as he proved capable of serving his devotees amid the new experiences encountered by them as they fared forth into the larger world. A cosmopolitan society demanded for its satisfaction religions with strong universal tendencies.

The advocates of various existing religions soon rose to the occasion by declaring their favorite gods to be everywhere operative and all powerful over the whole area of both divine and human concerns. The greater gods of Greece and Rome were readily assumed to be the proper persons to take the universe under their protection, but no one thought of abandoning outright his own favorite divinity for the worship of a Zeus or a Jupiter. On the contrary a great number of divinities indigenous to particular localities were simply renamed, and thus acquired a more cosmopolitan air although retaining many of their former traits and often even their original names as a particular member of a Zeus or a Jupiter family. But a more whole-hearted procedure was to extend the province of one's own deity until he or she became unlimited and supreme, as happened in the case of Jehovah of the Hebrews, Isis of the Egyptians, or Mithra of the Persians.

The drift of Roman society toward cosmopolitanism was accompanied by an inescapable corollary. It gave a new poignancy to the personal experiences of the individual. If he spent his entire life in one place and within the circumscribed limits of some long-established occupation, his well-being might be sufficiently insured through membership in a group where religion, operating in traditional ways, served every man because it protected the whole community. Diana was revered by an individual silversmith in Ephesus, not because he by some voluntary religious act established personal relations with the divinity, but because he was a recognized member of the guild, as perhaps had been his father and his grandfather before him. But when he left the shelter of his ancestral roof to take his place as an individual in company with the great mass of humanity at large, he rapidly experienced a new set of emotions. In discovering that the whole world was open to him he also became aware of his own limitations. Torn from his old moorings, he drifted helplessly until he learned new ways of navigation and the location of new havens where safety could be realized. In the sphere of religion he needed not only to learn of a god who could minister to his necessities in any part of his expanding universe, but one with whom he could form a personal attachment that would be a source of comfort and inspiration in his experience as an individual.

Several religions were ready with answers to this demand. They recognized the type of human need that had resulted from the rapid development of both universalism and individualism within Roman society, and they offered converts the protection of deities all powerful throughout the cosmos and at the same time capable of entering through one's emotional experiences into the narrow confines of every human breast.

One group of religious movements, which for lack of a better name is commonly called the "mysteries," proved especially popular during this period. To list them under a single caption may, however, prove very misleading. While it is true that in the service which they rendered there were many common features, it should also be remembered that there were many remarkable differences between these cults, and that in their genesis both geographically and culturally sometimes they were widely separated from one another. There were in fact several different "denominations" of the mystery church in Greece proper even before the time of Alexander. The most famous of these was that which centered about the worship of Demeter and her daughter Persephone. But in Roman times probably Greece made her largest contribution to religious syncretism through the spread of the Dionysus-Orphic cult. Previous to the Roman domination the worship of Demeter had already been definitely localized at Eleusis near Athens, whence its fame spread so widely about the world that people from all over the Empire, even emperors themselves, came to seek initiation in these famous mysteries. On the other hand, the cult of Dionysus was not localized at one central sanctuary and in consequence of this very fact was capable of serving much more generally the religious needs of mankind.

The contribution of Asia to the religious syncretism of the Empire was extensive and varied. Judaism and Christianity were not the only Asiatic cults to spread widely over the Mediterranean lands. The name and fame of the Phrygian mother-goddess Cybele and of her male associate Attis were carried all about the Roman world by bands of wild devotees celebrating their orgiastic rites. From Persia came the worship of Mithra, especially popular with the soldiers and destined for a time to become virtually the state religion of the declining Empire. Egypt furnished the widely influential worship of Isis, with her associates Osiris and Serapis. And many other deities of less distinction but of similar worth to men in that age would need to be included were we to make a comprehensive rather than a representative list of the mystery-gods. Although not every one of these cults yielded exactly the same set of satisfactions, the ease with which people passed from one to another group of worshipers, and the readiness with which priests and theologians found in one cult and its deities the same characteristics that had originally pertained to another, made it possible for a great number of the mystery religions gradually to extend their influence over wider and wider areas.

The mystery type of religion was especially prized for its service to the individual. Here he found access to sources of supernatural power available for him regardless of his race, nationality, or status in society. Membership in the cult was attained by an act of his own volition and the rewards were also of a distinctly individual and personal character. Whether it was the orgiastic rites of the Phrygian Cybele, or a similar display of emotional activity in the Dionysiac ceremonies, or the more secret and symbolic ritual of an Isiac or Mithraic initiation, or even the extravagant appropriation of the deity through the blood-bath of the Taurobolium—in all or in any one of these ceremonies the worshiper realized a distinctly personal experience as he voluntarily presented himself for admission and participated purely and simply as an individual in the benefits which the god was believed to confer upon the devotee.

There were several different areas of personal experience that might be cultivated through the mystery type of religion. More and more the disciple who attached himself to one of these cults during the later years of the Empire came to feel that his membership meant, not simply union with a group of his fellow-men, but an incorporation into the very life of the god himself. Cleansing rites of initiation and sacred meals gave to the ceremonies a distinctly sacramental character. The good thus acquired was not simply human in its content, but was essentially divine. One who passed through the ceremonies, with their strong emotional stimuli, lost his sense of human weakness and attained to a conviction that now he was equipped with a divine increment of heavenly power for the battle of life. He was no longer a mere mortal but a mortal possessed with qualities of immortality, and capable of meeting without fear all experiences that might confront him either in this life or in the world to come. Sometimes he affirmed that he had been born again, born unto eternity.

The ceremonies of the mystery cults were designed also to produce from time to time a renewal of this experience of divine infilling. The esoteric character of certain of the rites, the effect produced by the liturgy, the advancement of the individual to higher grades in the order—in fact, the whole technique of procedure as experienced by the devotee from the most ecclesiastically tonsured and elaborately robed priest down to the humblest worshiper—yielded perpetually new emotional stimuli that gave much abiding value to the cult. Not only through entrance into the society did one experience a heightening of feeling, but one lived day by day upon an elevated emotional level. In the rites of those religions to which one belonged by virtue of birth or residence within a particular territory, the ceremonies might be performed carefully in order to safeguard the interests of one's family or of society, but slight if any emotional stimulus attended the religious act. Not so when one entered a communion by a voluntary procedure involving individual initiative, where success meant for one the attainment of a personal salvation.

In the mysteries men found help for their bodies as well as for their souls. In this respect, however, the services of the mystery gods were not distinctive. Healing in the name of religion had been a long-established fact for the people of that ancient world. The famous Asklepios had been operating from his shrine at Epidauros for ages, and Apollo before him had been rendering men much-needed assistance in times of affliction by disease or pestilence. But with the rise to popularity of certain of the mystery gods like Isis and Serapis, the healing function of religion received new emphasis. This was only natural in a connection where a high degree of emotional experience was involved. One is not surprised to find in the second and third centuries, or even earlier, that the reputation of Isis as a healer is very widespread and much stressed by her devotees. A religion that professed to be par excellence a healer of men's souls must for the ancients also heal men's bodies while it was still their lot to remain in the earthly prison-house.

The hope of a reunion with one's departed friends in a blessed life beyond the grave, and a happy destiny for one's self, were features of the mysteries that made a peculiarly strong appeal. While a belief in immortality and assurances of blessedness in the hereafter had long been the possession of the Greeks, in the mystery cults of Roman times the hope received new stimulus and was supported by new guaranties. The grave was a great leveler of social castes, and it was the mysteries that especially taught all men to feel a common need and to share a common hope. The inscriptions and dedications to one or another of the mystery gods attest abundantly the keen interest taken in their rites, not only by the lower classes of society, but by some of the most conspicuous persons of the Roman aristocracy. There is a well-known monument erected by one Paulina to her husband Praetextatus, on which she commemorated his many honors and remarked upon his noble birth, his learning, and his culture. But these distinctions were minor considerations when compared with the title which he had to a future blessedness in which he and his wife would be united. She was assured of this because he had shared with her his knowledge of sacred things. And in a companion inscription she was honored by her husband as one devoted to the temple service, a friend of the deities, and pure in mind and body, and benevolent to all mankind. People of social distinction frequently served as priests or priestesses of these deities, not restricting themselves to a single god, but passing from one cult to another in order that they might avail themselves of the full range of supernatural assistance furnished by this type of religion.

## III

Movements that exerted so wide an influence on society as did the syncretistic religions, particularly of the mystery type, cannot have been without great significance for Roman civilization. It is true that we should expect to find this influence greatest among the common people, but as a matter of fact ultimately these religions became the accepted creed of the imperial court. The defenders of Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries quite properly declared the gods of the Roman state to be without further vitality for the people of the Empire, but this decadence certainly was not true of an Isis, a Mithra, or an invincible sun-god of Syria. Indeed, the type of Roman culture that Christianity inherited with the downfall of the Empire was very largely determined through the influence of these Oriental religions in the centuries preceding the incoming of the barbarian peoples from the north.

There was hardly a single area of Roman culture upon which the syncretistic religions did not leave a very strong stamp. Perhaps their effect was least marked in the sphere of art and literature, although, in the case of the former, it certainly was not entirely negligible. And while the syncretistic cults furnished no remarkable stimulus to literature, inasmuch as they were in no sense book religions and had only a minimum of sacred writings, they certainly did inspire emotions and attitudes that colored significantly later Roman literature. The advocates of these gods were as ready to defend with zeal the attachment which they felt for their religion as were the Christian apologists to defend Christianity. And we may readily imagine that, had the processes of history been reversed, and had the cult of an Isis, of a Dionysus, or a Mithra triumphed over its Christian rival, the writings of the Christian apologists today might be as little known as are the defenses which advocates of paganism in the later Empire made on behalf of their religion when Christianity was rapidly gaining the ascendancy. Yet it is only proper to add that these gentile religions never shared the zeal of Judaism and Christianity for resisting or destroying competitors.

While the Oriental religions used art and literature in their service, their most distinctive contribution to the culture of the time must be sought in other spheres of activity. This is to be found in quarters where it might be least expected. One might imagine that the political constitution of the Roman Empire would have been so firmly established as to remain immune from influence through any such foreign contacts. But the fact is that the Oriental religions made a very significant contribution toward the political side of Roman civilization. The deification of the Roman emperor—not so much the apotheosis of a particular emperor as the deification of the office itself—was essentially an Oriental concept. This was the notion of a kingdom instituted by heaven, rather than a republic of the Roman people. In the Orient this was a religious concept of great moment. It is true, indeed, that for the Romans themselves the state had always been a concern of the gods, and it was of great importance to the pious Romans that the welfare of the state should be faithfully guarded by careful attention to the rites of religion. But from the end of the second century A.D. on to the fall of the Empire rulers of the Roman world sought supernatural guaranties for the government in other sources than those of traditional Roman religion. These new deities of the Roman state might be called by the old Roman names, but the manner in which the gods now functioned and the religious ceremonies of the imperial court were distinctly Oriental in character. If the Christian church had not attained to a position of prominence in the affairs of the state under a Constantine or a Theodosius, we may be sure that there would have arisen a religious institution of a similar character to function in the same capacity which might have been either an Isiac or a Mithraic church.

The effect of the syncretistic religions upon the moral side of Roman civilization has been variously adjudged. It has long been the custom among Christian apologists to declare the utter moral bankruptcy of the Roman world at the time Christianity appeared upon the scene, and to make the Christian religion alone responsible for introducing worthy moral ideals and attainments into a decadent Roman society. It is very true that glaring moral lapses were common enough among Romans, and also that the syncretistic religions offered essentially a scheme of redemption, rather than a program of salvation by works. Frequently, also, it has to be admitted that the rites of the cults operated by magical effectiveness to produce an extravagant emotion and to insure for the worshippers the reward of blessedness in the life to come. Yet there certainly was a marked sensitivity to moral values in many of these cults. While the devotee never attained to salvation by works, it was assumed that because he had been united with the deity through the sacred rites, he was therefore purer in his thought and more righteous in his acts than he ever could have been without the divine assistance. Also the Oriental cults were largely responsible for an attitude of aloofness toward the present world, and an ascetic discipline in religion, which had already begun to lay hold upon Roman society in the latter part of the imperial period and which prepared the way for a flourishing Christian asceticism and monasticism in the later ages.

The influence of the syncretistic religions upon the intellectual side of the later Roman civilization is most pronounced. The main trend of this influence was in the direction of magnifying the mystical and emotional elements in experience. At the same time, however, the new religions stimulated an enlarging horizon as they compelled their devotees to think of the world in the imagery of universalism. But even though the world was a unit, its essence was for them emotional rather than rational. From one point of view, it might be said that thinking about the deities moved distinctly in the direction of monotheism—one god to rule a single cosmos. But in the area of personal experience religion was too immediate and vital an affair to be adequately described by any philosophical definitions of deity in the abstract. Consequently whenever one assigned the universe to the control of a single all-ruling divine power, it was necessary that some very effective mediators should be introduced between the supreme god and the individual man who sought in the rites of the cult the deepest realities of his religion. To use a modern phrase, men might believe that God was in his heaven and all was well with the world, but all was not felt to be well with the individual until he experienced god in his own soul.

In formulating their religious ideas, the devotees in the syncretistic faiths were much more concerned to preserve the values attaching to their experience of salvation, than they were to abide by valid laws of logic or to adopt methods of scientific investigation. Their philosophy of religion found its center in soteriology; their primary concern was to obtain salvation. As they conceived it, the course of past history and of future events centered about the problem of rescuing an unfortunate humanity. Their thinking revolved about man and his welfare, and when they unified the cosmos about the person of a single deity, the most appropriate figure for such honor seemed to be one of the heroic divinities, who in rendering service to mankind had passed through those trials to which all human flesh is heir, but had come off triumphant, and therefore merited the reward of man's devotion and the position of supreme authority over all the world.

From this point of view the most valuable knowledge attainable by mankind lay not in the area of empirical investigation, but in the sphere of revelation. In whatever field one desired knowledge, the search could be fully satisfied only by access to some fountain of divine wisdom. One sought above all else to learn the will of the deity. Minds of different calibres and varying inclinations found a multitude of sources available for such information. Older methods of divination took on new significance. Men endeavored with new zeal to read the signs of the heavens. Professional diviners prospered as a superstitious generation sought more and more energetically to ascertain by every possible means the will of the deity over the whole range of human affairs from the most momentous to the most trivial. People of high respectability in society yielded to a state of mind that intellectual classes three centuries before would have thought rankly superstitious. But now this attitude of subservience to supernaturalism was esteemed a mark of genuine piety.

Even the more strenuous intellectuals of the age, who refused a full surrender of their mental powers to popular superstition, were still bent upon the attainment of a knowledge distinctly other-worldly in its character. The last school of philosophy which the ancient world produced, neo-Platonism, is a clear example of this fact. For its founder, Plotinus, who is also its most distinguished representative, ultimate reality was attainable not in the area of reason's operation, but in that more remote sphere of mystical experience to which one attained by long and devout meditation. Ecstasy rather than rationality was the logical goal of this intellectual quest. The followers of Plotinus found an easier way to acquire the ecstatic emotion. The rites and ceremonies of the syncretistic religions of the period furnished readier access to this type of experience, and thus these religions became perfectly respectable material for the philosopher to employ in what he regarded as the highest intellectual quest of the day. Thus the syncretistic faiths were instrumental in dragging the human mind down from the standards of sober logical procedure and empirical inquiry that characterized the attitude of an Aristotle, to the lower levels of emotionalism where one felt that true knowledge had been attained because convictions had been produced by a set of sacred stimuli.

There is room for differences of opinion as to the good or bad effects of religion upon the civilization of the late Roman Empire. The type of syncretism with which we are here confronted needs to be understood. It was not a movement toward unity like that which followed the Reformation in Europe in the sixteenth century, when a few irenic spirits of the time sought to heal the breach in Christendom by an organic fusion of features that could be adopted in common by all branches of the divided body. There was no attempt to reduce the various religions of the Roman Empire to their lowest common denominator, for the purpose of organizing a new denomination, so to speak, out of what might be regarded as the best elements to be derived from each of the component parts. The process of fusion then in vogue was one by which each cult absorbed, or tended to absorb, everything in the total environment. There was no effort to determine a select body of practice or doctrine to which those of more philosophical and tolerant temperament might be able to give assent. On the contrary that syncretism was the consequence of a willingness on the part of everybody to bring his religious standards down to the level of the masses. And if there was any gain to society at large, it must be found in the fact that people of the highest social standing and best education consented to join hands with the common man. This situation presents a problem which apparently even our wisest social philosophers of the twentieth century have not yet been able to solve. A modern scholar asks the pertinent question, which, however, he fails to answer: Is not every civilization bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?

Much as we may lament the breakdown of certain standards of ancient civilization in connection with the operations of religion in the declining period of the Roman Empire, when viewed from the standpoint of their immediate service to mankind, possibly a much larger measure of credit is due the syncretistic movements than has commonly been accorded them by their modern interpreters. At least, it must be admitted that those religions proved very effective in insuring to the ordinary man a sense of vital experience that lifted him above the commonplace into a higher atmosphere of emotional satisfaction. Their effects upon his moral and spiritual ideals were not perhaps of the noblest type, but, from the point of view of what life seemed to him to hold in store that was really worthy of effort, they made him truly religious. They gave a very needy humanity a large measure of satisfaction, peace, and hope.

# THE PRESENCE OF CHIASMUS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

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THE term "chiasmus" usually designates a rhetorical figure according to which words and ideas are placed crosswise in a sentence. The term is commonly applied to such figures that contain *four* words in the appropriate order, though there can be no objection to extend the use of the term to such figures that are found to contain more than four members. In all such cases there is no new principle involved, but merely a more extensive application of the well-known principle of chiasmus.

One of the best-known instances of chiasmus in the New Testament is Matt. 7:6 which has been noticed by commentators, because the sense of the passage seems to make a chiastic order necessary:

> Give not that which is holy unto the *dogs,*
>   neither cast your pearls before the *swine,*
>   lest haply they *trample* them under their feet,
> and turn and *rend* you.

The sense of this passage seems to require that the verb "trample" be connected with the swine and the verb "rend" with the dogs, thus effecting an inverted order of the subjects and the predicates.

Though this passage is often quoted as an example of chiasmus in the N.T., there are many other passages of the same kind which are both clearer and more extensive. The chiastic nature of the passage in Matt. 13:15 has been observed by many writers, and in Westcot and Hort's edition of the N.T. it has been printed with proper regard for its form.

For this people's *heart* is waxed gross,
  and their *ears* are dull of hearing,
    and their *eyes* they have closed;
    lest haply they should perceive with their *eyes*,
  and hear with their *ears*,
and understand with their *heart*.

In this passage we are dealing, not with four, but with six lines, and the symmetry is expressed, not only by means of related ideas, but by the identical *words* occurring in proper succession until the system is completed.

Were these and other brief passages the only instances of chiasmus in the N.T., they would be regarded merely as minor literary flourishes, which would interest the student of style and occasionally would give the exegete a possible clue to interpretation. But the extensive use of chiasmus by the writers of the N.T. seems to demand a more intensive study of this particular literary form. Not only will such a study increase our literary appreciation of some passages, but something new may turn up in the line of exegesis and textual criticism.

J. A. Bengel is, as far as I know, the first scholar who employed chiasmus in the interpretation of the N.T. in his *Gnomon novi testamenti* (Tübingen, 1742). Among the German writers there are sporadic references to chiasmus in the N.T., but for a more intensive and serious study of it we have to turn to English writers. The next writer of any consequence is John Jebb, Bishop of Limerick, who wrote a book entitled *Sacred Literature* in 1820. He shows that the origin of chiasmus may be traced to the O.T. and that the application of the principle extends, not only to lines, but to paragraphs as well. Jebb was followed by the Rev. Thomas Boys, M.A. of Trinity College, Cambridge, a curate in the Church of England and a soldier in the Duke of Wellington's army during the Peninsular War. He published *Key to the Book of Psalms* in 1825. The works of Jebb and Boys seem never to have made much of a stir, nor have they circulated widely. I have not been able to find these two books in this country, except in the Andover-Harvard Theological Library. There is an edition of Boys's work issued by Dr. E. W. Bullinger in 1890. This edition is based on notes found in the Hebrew Bible of Boys's and edited by Bullinger after Boys's death. It eliminates some of the preliminary discussions in the earlier edition, but extends the scope of the former edition so as to include all the psalms in the psalter. There is an earlier work on the N.T. by Boys entitled *Tactica Sacra,* but of this book there is no trace in this country. The next important work is John Forbes's *The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture* (Edinburgh, 1854). Forbes builds on the work of Jebb and Boys and there is a reference to Bengel, whom he regards as a predecessor. There is nothing in these works, however, that enables one to trace the extent of the English writers' indebtedness to their predecessors. In recent years *The Companion Bible* has been issued by the Oxford University Press under the editorship of Dr. E. W. Bullinger. The work embodies among many useful features also the principle of chiasmus, or, as it was first called by Jebb, of "introverted parallelism." Though the volumes of this work are gotten up on a generous scale and beautifully printed, they do not give the impression of a thorough and detailed study of the passages. The text is thrown into convenient blocks under the guidance of certain catchwords. The whole is made subservient to certain pronounced "dispensational" views of the editor.

Though no special work dealing with chiasmus to my knowledge has been produced since 1854, the figure has not been altogether forgotten. Jebb's work as well as his term "introverted parallelism" have been noticed from time to time by scholars. In Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible* and in *The Jewish Encyclopedia* there are brief notices but with only meager illustrative material. In Richard C. Moulton's *The Literary Study of the Bible,* in C. A. Brigg's *Biblical Study,* and in a few other books there have occurred brief references to "introverted parallelism," but not enough has been said in any of these works to acquaint a reader with the true state of affairs, as it is shown in the works of Boys and Jebb.

There is a more recent literature which deals seriously with the style of the epistles of Paul. In *Die Rhytmen der asianischen und römischen Kunstprosa* by Friedrich Blass and in *Das Neue Testament schallanalytisch untersucht: Der galaterbrief,* by Wolfgang Schanze, we have some attempts made to trace the rhythm of some of the writings of Paul. These treatises, however, take us into quite another field. Closer to our own field lie the works of the late Johannes Weiss, *Beiträge zur Paulinischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen, 1897), and his later work *Das Urchristentum* (Göttingen, 1917). In both of these works Weiss discusses matters of style, and the first-mentioned work is exclusively devoted to the study of the epistles of Paul. Throughout this long and interesting treatise Weiss compares the style of Paul with that of contemporary Greek writers and shows how similarities in their literary forms occur. Another treatise of the same type is Rudolf Bultman's *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (Göttingen, 1910). It may be said that as a general rule all these treatises are comparing the writings of Paul with those of Greek writers. Weiss, to be sure, has made mention of the Hebrew *parallelismus membrorum* which he notices in some passages, and has in places even pointed out a chiasmus of the more simple construction,[1] but of the more extensive use of chiasmus in the epistles of Paul he betrays no knowledge. Weiss observes that "in no way are these parallelisms a sign of an elevated speech, for they occur also in the more sober and business-like parts of the epistles." In such passages, however, where there is a "greater art, buoyancy, and grace" Weiss is led to think that the models are Greek rather than Hebrew.[2]

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[1] *Urchristentum,* p. 310.

[2] *Beiträge,* p. 169.

There can be no purpose in denying or even attempting to depreciate contemporary Greek influence in the writings of the N.T. They come in the stream of the general culture of the age and naturally must bear the marks of their Greek environment. But when this has been said only half of the truth has been stated, for in the New Testament we have not only a Greek but also a Hebrew environment and background to take into account. The influence of this factor upon the literary forms of the N.T. will naturally be minimized to the degree that students of the N.T. think of the early Christian community as non-literary or perhaps even illiterate. Yet the presence of the Old Testament in the church, aside from any other literary heritage, is sufficient to explain the extended use of chiasmus in the N.T. For in the O.T. we must seek the patterns that most deeply influenced Paul and other N.T. writers. The above-mentioned treatises, valuable as they are in what they prove as to the Greek influence, are limited in that they have not sufficiently taken the Hebrew influence into account, and need to be supplemented by the point of view presented in this article. The words of Rudolf Bultman are significant:

> A difficulty arises as the result of the complicated character of these [Paul's] letters. Not only that a literary species of letters (the diatribe) have influenced them, for the style of Paul may not at all be explained by the Greek literature alone, but is moulded just as much through the Old Testament, or the Semitic style. When both elements, the Greek and the Jewish, are acknowledged and displayed, then will for the first time the correct literary personality of Paul present itself. But this ideal cannot at present [1910] be realized, since the necessary preliminary work has not been completed.[3]

My own investigations in this field, begun in 1908, had by 1918 carried me into Ephesians, Colossians, and First Corinthians. In all of these writings and in many other passages I had found extensive structures of a chiastic order. Through the accidental discovery of Forbes's work, *The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture,* I found the predecessors in the field, Jebb and Boys, but their works were not at that time within reach, and when I finally had access to them, I found that their work had not been as extensive as my own, though in principle and in a few passages there was agreement. Though in the last hundred years the work of these early pioneers seems to have been forgotten by writers on the style of the N.T. and though to my knowledge there is no trace of such study before Bengel, it is conceivable that some of the humanists who were interested in form and searched the literary remains of the past should also have come upon these forms and studied them. Inquiries among scholars both in this country and abroad, however, have failed to bring to light any literature on the subject earlier than Bengel.[4]

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[3] *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt*, pp. 3–4.

Though the early English writers used the term "introverted parallelism," it seems preferable to use the term chiasmus. It is older and briefer and does not carry with it the implications of the term "parallelism," which is associated with poetry. The phenomena that we are to study are by no means confined to poetry, but are found in prose also. They are really concerned with the *order of ideas.* In a given system the ideas occur in a given order, until the center is reached, after which they are repeated in the *reverse* order, until the end of the system is reached. The *words* in which these ideas are expressed may be, as in ordinary parallelisms, either identical or merely related words. To bring out these forms clearly not even *lines* are necessary, as some of the examples will show.

We shall now set forth some of the many passages that are constructed according to the chiastic form. In Col. 3:3, 4 is one of simplest forms to be found:

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[4] In Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* there are some remarks on the rhetoric of Paul, but no mention is made of chiasmus (Bk. IV, 7:11).

For ye died,
  and your life
    is hid
      with Christ
        in God;
      when Christ
    is manifested,
  your life,
then shall ye also with him be manifested in glory.

In this passage the order of the American Standard Version has been changed in the last half of the system to restore the Greek order of the sentence. The reading "your life" for "our life" has been adopted in view of the parallel line in the foregoing, though "our life" would not break up the parallelism.

The following passage from Eph. 4:9,10 is used by Dean Paley as an example of Paul's habit of "going off at a word," but the passage is a regular chiasmus.

Now this, He ascended,
  what is it but that he also descended
    into the lower parts of the world?
  he that descended is the same also
that ascended far above the heavens.

From 1 Cor. 12:12–13 we select a passage which to the casual reader would appear verbose and extremely loose in structure, until its chiastic form is made clear.

For as the body is one
  and hath many members,
A    and all the members of the body,
  being many
are one body,

  so also Christ.

For even in one Spirit we all into one body were baptized
  whether Jews
  or Greeks,
B  whether bond
  or free;
and were all of one Spirit made to drink.

Both of these systems express the general idea of unity in diversity within the Christian church. In the first system (A) the *unity* is emphasized in the first and last lines and the *diversity* in the three intervening lines. If the second system (B) be observed the same emphasis is found to be distributed in the same way, except that the diversity is more specifically described. Notice the four εἴτε and the euphony in the Greek at the close of the first and last lines. In the first system observe also the recurrence of the word "body" in the first, last, and central lines. This passage also shows how one system may be made to correspond to another in both ideas and form. Such a principle of arrangement may be observed also in the following passage from 2 Cor. 1:1–3.

Blessed be God
and Father
A of our Lord Jesus Christ,
the Father of mercies,
and God

of all comfort, who comforteth us
in all our afflictions,
B that we may be able to comfort them that are
in any affliction
through the comfort wherewith we ourselves are comforted of God.

For as abound the sufferings
of Christ
A′ unto us,
even so through Christ
aboundeth also our comfort.

The symmetry of this passage is only equaled by its spontaneity. Though the order of the ideas is clearly brought out by their arrangement into lines, one can hardly imagine that either reader or writer thought of them in such visual representations. The connection was perhaps more subtle than that, a sort of unconscious or half-conscious rhythm which works itself out according to the accepted literary patterns. Of these three systems A and A′ are parallel because of the divine names. Notice "our" (A), "we" (B), and "us" (A′), all three in central position. In B we find the same distribution within the system of the word "comfort" in the first, last, and central lines that we found of the word "body" in the passage in the preceding (cf. 1 Cor. 12:12). In B, however, we find a new feature, namely, the *doubling* of the idea of comfort by using both the noun and the verb together in the first and last lines of the system. There are other instances where a system which happens to be central in a group of systems, like B is in this passage, is similarly distinguished by a double parallelism. The passage sets forth the meaning a Christian should ascribe to suffering, namely, that it enables him to comfort others, and this idea is found in a pivotal position in the central line of B. In the first and last line of A′ we have an antithetic parallelism in the ideas of "sufferings" and "comfort." The spontaneity of the whole passage is felt as we observe how easily one moves from the group of ideas in A into the following group in B without any break in one system or any fresh start in the other. In a passage of this kind one need not assume any great degree of conscious effort in order to effect symmetry. Perhaps no more effort was needed than for us to produce a longer, well-constructed sentence in which there has been some attention to the euphony of words.

There are several instances in which the central line of a system terminates in a triplet, which very effectively marks the turning-point of the system and must have served as a sort of guidepost to the reader who was conscious of these forms. The passage quoted is from 1 Cor. 14:1*b*–5*a*.

But rather that ye may prophesy.
For he that speaketh in a tongue
speaketh not unto men but unto God;
for no man understandeth;
but in the spirit he speaketh mysteries.
But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men { edification, and / exhortation, and / consolation.
He that speaketh in a tongue
edifieth himself;
but he that prophesieth edifieth the church.
Now I would have you all speak with tongues,
but rather that ye should prophesy.

Paul compares in this passage the relative value of tongues and prophecy. He prefers the latter to the former and gives his reasons for his preference. The two gifts of the Spirit are placed side by side and compared to the advantage of prophecy. This is done in the *first* two and *last* two lines of the system. The *positive* reason for this preference is explained in the triplet of the central line. It should be noticed again that the idea of prophecy is found in the first, last, and central lines. A further reason for the preference of prophecy is developed in the three lines on either side of the center. This is the same reason as that given in the central line, but stated *negatively*. Tongues are unintelligible in the Christian assembly. Hence they edify no man. Prophecy, on the other hand, is intelligible and therefore useful for the edification of the assembly.

That the triplet in the central line of the system in the foregoing is no mere accident but was felt to be an element of style is shown by the fact that it occurs frequently and also by the way in which this central flourish is obtained in some passages. The following passage is from Col. 3:16 and has a central triplet, but also a symmetrical arrangement of the prepositions.

Let the word of Christ dwell
in you richly,
in all wisdom
teaching and admonishing one another with $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{psalms,}\\ \text{hymns,}\\ \text{spiritual songs,}\end{array}\right.$
in grace singing
in your hearts
unto God.

The elimination of the conjunctions in the enumeration of the songs renders the triplet more conspicuous, for it gives to it a certain staccato movement which is very emphatic. In the triplet just observed in the passage from 1 Cor. 14:1*b*–5*a* the conjunctions are retained. The arrangement of the four prepositions, ἐν, is graceful, and there is a parallelism in the divine names in the first and last lines.

How much the triplet is felt to be an element of style may be seen from the following passage from Eph. 5:8–11*a*, for here the triplet is obtained only by the introduction of a parenthetic remark at the center, after which the regular sentence is resumed and carried to its completion, as the chiasmus demands.

For ye were once darkness, but are now light
  in the Lord;
    walk as children of light— (goodness, and
      for the fruit of the light is in all { righteousness, and
    proving what is well-pleasing (truth—
  unto the Lord,
and have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness.

We have already seen that two systems may be so constructed that they carry the same ideas which are distributed in the same positions within each system and thus serve to connect the systems into a pair (cf. 1 Cor. 12:12–13). Such twin-systems may be much more intimately related than is indicated by the example already discussed in the preceding. The following example from Eph. 6:5–9 is so intricate and yet so regular that one must assume that some degree of conscious effort has been exercised in its creation.

Servants, be obedient unto them that according to the flesh are your lords,
  with fear and trembling,
    in singleness of heart,
      as unto Christ,

A        not in the way of eyeservice,
         as men-pleasers, but

      as servants of Christ,
    doing the will of God from the heart
  with good will,
serving as unto the Lord and not unto men;

knowing that each one,
  if he hath done any good thing,
    the same shall he receive again
      from the Lord,

B        whether bond
         or free.

      And ye lords,
    the same things do ye unto them,
  and forbear the threatening,
knowing that he who is both their master and yours
is in heaven and respect of persons is not with him.

The chiastic form of these sections is clear without further comment. Section A, however, serves as an illustration of one feature which is prominent in chiastic arrangements, but which we have not as yet had occasion to observe, namely, the habit of making a sudden shift from one idea to its opposite when the center is reached. If A is read, one observes that it contains a *positive* exhortation in the first half of the system, the servants being told what they must do. When the center is reached there is a sudden shift from a positive to a *negative* exhortation, the servants being told what they must not do. This change is rather emphatic. After the center is passed, the positive form of the exhortation is resumed and continued until the system is concluded. In the center of B we have the two classes of servants enumerated and we have the two εἴτε, which we found in a similar position in 1 Cor. 12:12–13. Other instances of εἴτε in a similar position are found in the epistles. The next important thing in the two sections is the distribution of the words "Lord" and "lords," the heavenly master, and the masters among men.

In the first section, A, earthly lords are mentioned in the first line and the heavenly Lord in the last line, but in section B this order is reversed in two different ways. Instead of placing these words in the two extreme lines of the system they are placed in the two lines closest to the center, and instead of occurring in the order "lords," "Lord," as in A, they occur in the *inverted* order in B (cf. "from the *Lord*" and "ye *lords*"). This inversion of the ideas serves as a device to knit together related sections. It is found in several more extensive structures in which the counterparts are found widely apart in the text.[5] In this passage there is also inversion of related ideas. The "fear and trembling" in the second line of section A clearly goes with "the threatening" in the next to the last line of section B; and the "good will" in the next to the last line of section A is parallel to the "good thing" in the second line of section B. Clearly the two sections are constructed so as to support one another. Like two ornaments at the extreme ends of a frieze they are constructed so as to face each other, and the inversion of the ideas is the sign of their relation.

As an example of some of the more extensive passages in the N.T. in which the chiasmus is discernible not only in the individual lines within a system but also in the correspondence of the systems themselves, the following passage from Eph. 5:22–33 may be presented. Aside from a minor gloss in v.29*a* which editors of the text hitherto have not suspected, namely, "for no man ever yet hated his own flesh but nourisheth and cherisheth it," and a scribal error in the additional words in v.30, "of his flesh and of his bones," which are clearly a reminiscence of Gen. 2:24 and are therefore removed by editors of the text, because they are missing in some of the best MSS, this long passage is one of remarkable symmetry and regularity. The reason for removing v.29*a* is based altogether on the form of the section, which is complete without it, not only in form but in *sense*. This long passage is also interesting because it combines a number of features which hitherto have been observed separately in various passages.

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[5] 1 Cor. 12:9, 10 with v. 28, 29: "healings" and "powers." Cf. Col. 1:16 with v. 20.

A *Wives* unto your own husbands as unto the Lord.
For the husband is the head
of the wife,
as Christ also is the head
of the church
B himself the savior of the *body.*
But as the church
is subject to Christ,
so the wives also
to their husbands in everything.

*Husbands,* love your wives even as Christ also loved the church and gave himself up for it;
*that* he might sanctify it, having cleansed it by the washing of water with the word,
C *that* he might present to himself
a glorious *church,* not having
spot, or
wrinkle, or
any such thing
but *that* it should be holy and without blemish.
Even so ought *husbands* also to love their own wives as their own bodies.
He that loveth his own wife loveth himself,
even as Christ also the church;
because we are members of his *body.*
"For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother
B′ and cleave to his wife;
and the two shall become one flesh."
This *mystery* is great;
but I speak of Christ and of the church.
Nevertheless do ye also severally love each one his own wife as himself.
A′ And the *wife* that she fear her husband.

This is a fine example of how the logic of a passage is closely knit to its form. There are two formal exhortations addressed to the *wives* in A and A′. There are likewise two formal exhortations addressed to the *husbands,* namely, in the first and the last line of C. The exhortation addressed to the wives is further developed in section B and the exhortation addressed to the husbands is developed in B′. If the development of the exhortation to the wives or to the husbands be studied in B and B′, it will be found that the argument is made to turn in either case on *Christ's relation to the church,* which is the perfect pattern either of the wives' submission or the husbands' love. Now, this relation of Christ to the church, which is the pivot around which the whole argument turns, is presented in the three central lines of C. The construction of the passage is rigidly logical as well as perfect in form.

There is no need of pointing out the parallelisms of section B, for they are obvious. Notice, however, the central position of the word "body." If we turn to the central section C, we find in the *last* line an exhortation to husbands to love their wives "as their own bodies." In the *first* line this statement is varied to "as Christ loved the church," but knowing the Pauline teaching about the church as the body of Christ the implied parallelism is striking, "as Christ loved *his* own body," the church. The three ἵνα which introduce the central lines are striking. They are but another example of the formal triplet at the center. The branching off into another triplet of the central line is yet another instance of the same literary principle. How much the need of such a flourish was felt is evidenced by the additional words, "or any such thing." These words really add no new idea to the other two members of the triplet, but are merely formal, as if we would add "et cetera" in a similar enumeration. In Eph. 5:8–11 we observed how the triplet was obtained by the introduction of a parenthetic remark at the center. Such details carry with them a weight of evidence which tends to prove that these forms were not altogether the result of an unconscious feeling for rhythm, but that the writer now and then rested and deliberately considered details of form in his writings. Before leaving the central section we should observe that as we have a double parallelism in the first and the last lines, so we have a double parallelism in the two lines nearest the center (cf. ἁγιάσῃ and καθαρίσας with ἁγία and ἄμωμος).

The third section, B′, appears at first sight to be a little irregular. This is due partly to the extraneous material which has already been discussed, and which for formal reasons ought to be eliminated. One naturally raises the question whether this material can be regarded as extraneous even though there is no MSS evidence to that effect, at least not for v.29*a*. Two considerations, however, should carry weight in the settlement of the textual problem. Is it likely that a passage which is so clearly constructed according to a regular chiastic pattern in sections B and C should suddenly break down in section B′? Furthermore, in the other instances in which the exhortation is followed by a comparison introduced by ὡς or καθὼς, the comparison follows *immediately* after the exhortation, while in this instance the sequence is broken off by the words, "for no man, etc.," after which the comparison is resumed rather awkwardly, I think, in the words, "even as Christ," etc. These considerations as well as the *content* of v. 29*a* should determine that these words constitute a gloss.

The second apparent irregularity in B′ is the occurrence of a quotation from Gen. 2:24. Though this is an irregularity in so far as we have observed passages in this article, it is nothing irregular about it when we compare other instances of quotations in chiastic systems found in the N.T. We have another example in Eph. 6:1–4, in which the first couplet contains an exhortation to children and the last another exhortation to fathers, and *between* the two we find a quotation from the O.T. In the center of this quotation a parenthetic remark is also introduced. Could the centripetal tendencies of the chiastic order be more strikingly illustrated than by these two quotations? This tendency is brought out by the observance of other quotations within chiastic systems in the N.T. Now, no one looks for a parallelism in the quotation, unless there is one in the original O.T. passage, but that is not the case in this instance. If, then, the quotation is lifted out of its central position, we shall find that the two central lines carry the words "body" and "mystery," which mean the same thing in Paul (cf. Eph. 3:3–6, 9; and especially Col. 1:26, 27), namely, the church. The apparent irregularity is then dissolved and we have regular chiastic symmetry. For in the central positions in the three systems of this passage we find a reference to the Christian church. This also shows that the word "mystery" does not refer to marriage, as some interpreters would have it, but to the church, the body of Christ. Paul himself explains that this is the meaning, for he adds, "But I speak of Christ and of *the church*."

This long passage is remarkable in more ways than one. It is one of those passages which to the casual reader is likely to appear both rambling and prolix. When its chiastic order is observed, it will be found to be a closely knit logical argument in which each part corresponds to the other and all of them converge on the center, which is the pivot of the whole development. It should not be necessary to argue for the value of chiasmus as an aid to the interpretation of the epistles of Paul after observing such a passage. There are other such examples in which some acknowledged passages of Paul, which to commentators have appeared interminable and difficult to construe, yield a beautiful order when dealt with according to this principle. This passage also shows how the chiastic form may at times, when the conditions are favorable, be employed for the purpose of textual criticism. In v.30 an established conclusion is confirmed by the form of the passage and in v.29*a* a new point is raised, even though the MSS give no occasion for suspicion of the passage. The passage also combines several common features already observed, like the triplet at the center, which here is doubled by the three ἵνα in the beginning of the three lines and the triplet at the end of the central line. The habit of adorning the central section in a group of three systems with a double parallelism, which we observed in 2 Cor. 1:1–3, appears here also. Among so many signs of formality one marvels at the impression of spontaneity that the passage conveys. The writer does not even make a fresh start, when he begins the passage, for the reader will have to carry the force of the participle over from the preceding verse, "subjecting yourselves one to another in the fear of Christ, wives unto your own husbands," etc. This spontaneity is surely somewhat puzzling in view of the detailed symmetry of the passage, but it tends to show how to a mind imbued with the chiastic forms these details were not felt to be cumbersome at all, but rested very lightly on the writer's consciousness.

As I have pursued these studies during a long period of time, I have again and again faced the problem of how to reconcile a symmetry which seems to be quite rigid and inflexible with the evident spontaneity and freedom which especially the Epistles of Paul convey to the reader. The explanation, it appears to me, is to be found along two lines. In the first place there is a great deal of flexibility obtained in the use of the chiastic form by means of the various combinations of which it is capable. In the second place, we are possibly inclined to overestimate the limitations and encumbrances that literary forms may impose upon a writer. Especially are such exaggerated notions present in our mind, when we are confronted with forms that are totally different from those we are in the habit of using. As a general rule it is safe to hold that the conscious attention to form in writing is inversely proportional to the mastery attained. This is true of all forms. The medium of expression will only protrude itself into our consciousness in the degree that we lack mastery over it.

The extensive use of chiasmus in the writing of the N. T. originates in the acquaintance of the writers with similar forms through the medium of the O.T., as I have sought to prove in another article.[6] There is no objection to this view, even though the N.T. writers used the Septuagint, for these forms, though at times they are destroyed or to some degree blunted in a translation, may in most cases be preserved and sufficiently felt even in the O.T. Greek. There are some instances in which one must conclude that the translators of the Septuagint have deliberately attempted to reproduce the artistic features of the passage they render from the Hebrew, as in Amos 2:14–16, in which passage they produce a perfect chiasmus,[7] and more than that, they make the end of every line correspond with its parallel line by observing a certain euphony in the choice of their words. Even if it should be shown by some later investigator that chiastic forms were as extensively used by Greek and Roman writers as they are used in the Scriptures, there would be little reason to change one's opinion that the writers of the N.T. were influenced by the forms as they are found in the O.T. Of all books read by early Christians in the first century none could have entered more thoroughly into their life and thought than the writings of the O.T. To what extent this has actually taken place is seen in the Book of Revelation. Even though the Christian missionary movement very early became predominantly gentile, it could not have suddenly shaken off the literary influence wielded by the O.T. In a writer like Paul we are not at all surprised to trace such an influence, for he was according to his own confession "a Hebrew of the Hebrews," but even in Luke these forms are not wanting, as some passages in his gospel clearly show. Of course, in the case of Luke, one has to face the problem as to the extent in which he is reproducing verbatim written sources in his possession in which the chiasmus prevails. It is possible that some new turns may be given to the Synoptic problem by fresh material from this direction, though it is as yet too early to venture even a guess. One thing is certain, however, that the chiastic forms in the N.T. have not received the attention from scholars that they deserve.

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[6] *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XLVI (1930), 104–26.

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[7] *καὶ ἀπολεῖται φυγὴ ἐκ δρομέως,*
*καὶ ὁ κραταιὸς οὐ μὴ κρατήσῃ τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ,*
*καὶ ὁ μαχητὴς οὐ μὴ σώσει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ,*
*καὶ ὁ τοξότης οὐ μὴ ὑποστῇ,*
*καὶ ὁ ὀξὺς τοῖς ποσὶν αὐτοῦ οὐ μὴ διασωθῇ,*
*καὶ ὁ ἱππεὺς οὐ μὴ σώσει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ,*
*καὶ ὁ κραταιὸς οὐ μὴ εὑρήσει τὴν καρδίαν ἐν δυναστείαις [αὐτοῦ,*
*[καὶ] ὁ γυμνὸς διώξεται ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, λέγει Κύριος.*

The text of this passage is that of Tischendorf, except that *καὶ* in the last line has been added for obvious reasons. In the next to the last line the text of Tischendorf reads, *τὴν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ*. Since the parallel line, the second in this system, ends in *τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ*, the seventh probably originally ended, as suggested in this arrangement, with *αὐτοῦ*. The chiastic order of the ideas is perfect, and in addition certain aesthetic considerations no doubt have caused the Septuagint translators to observe euphonic values in the choice of the words ending each line and in the uniform beginning with *καὶ* (Swete's edition has *οὐδὲ* in the sixth line). This passage raises the interesting question, How far has aesthetic interest shaped the LXX in other passages?

# THE SUPERNATURAL IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY

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A PREACHER of last century, by way of illustrating the bounty of Providence, pointed to the remarkable fact that beside every great city you will find a river. The city could not maintain itself without proper supplies and communications, and for this purpose the river has been provided. Almost to our own day the study of Christian origins has followed a similar logic. It was observed by a long succession of pious writers that the message was first proclaimed in an age that was singularly fitted to receive it. The religions of the time, however debased, offered points of attachment to this new gospel. Greek philosophy had arrived at conclusions in the light of which Paul's doctrines were intelligible. Roman government had shaped out institutions which could be adapted, often with little change, to the organization of the church. It is only within our own time that some daring minds began to ask themselves whether this line of reasoning ought not to be reversed. Might it not be that the river had something to do with the formation of the city? If the Christian beliefs and practices were in such wonderful harmony with the age, was it not possible that in some measure they were produced by it?

The new point of view has been accepted slowly and reluctantly even among scholars. By the mass of people it is still regarded as a virtual abandonment of the whole Christian position. For many centuries faith has been entangled with a quite arbitrary doctrine of revelation, and the new theories, when tried by this doctrine, appear to be false and mischievous. Nevertheless, it is increasingly evident that they will have to be accepted, and that our ideas of revelation must be so changed as to make room for them. We owe a real debt of gratitude to the scholars who have been seeking, for more than a generation, to acquaint us with these new theories and to explain their true bearing. Among these scholars none has done better service than Professor Case. For a number of years he has devoted himself to the special study of the environment of early Christianity. He has sought in his various books to describe the ancient world in such a manner that not only classical experts but all intelligent men and women may feel themselves at home in it, and approach the New Testament with this knowledge. It must be added that with all his attention to the background of Christianity he has preserved his feeling for what was new and vital in Christianity itself. His chief aim, indeed, has been to make the real Christian values more apparent by clearing away that undergrowth of extraneous belief which was due to the conditions of the time and not to the inner spirit of the religion. In his latest book[1] he has covered a far wider field than he has hitherto done. His plan is to review the life of the ancient world in its whole extent, with the purpose of showing that it was permeated with the belief in supernatural agencies. To the people of that age the universe presented itself as a sphere of limited compass, governed by personal beings and separated into the three abodes of gods and men and the shades of the departed. The spirits resident in the upper world were constantly appearing, under visible forms, in this realm of earth. There were recognized mediums whereby the divine will was from time to time conveyed to men, and between gods and men there was an order of demigods, who had themselves shared in the human lot and now exerted themselves for man's redemption. Divine help was always available, but the supernatural powers had to be properly approached, and a vast system of sacred places, times, ordinances, forms of prayer, and worship had been built up for regulating this intercourse of men with the gods. The organization of the state and society was all determined by the belief in divine beings who had taken particular groups of men under their protection. Shortly before the Christian era this idea of tutelary spirits had been extended to individuals, and in the mystery religions the dependence on divine help took on a strongly personal character. The mind of the ancient world was greatly exercised with questions as to the nature and destiny of the soul. It was believed that man's body was conjoined with a mysterious double which entered on a separate life after death, or which was reabsorbed into that larger soul of which it had been a particle. On all these phases of ancient supernaturalism Professor Case throws a strong and vivid light. His method is to collect illustrations from history, literature, and the surviving monuments, so that we may feel as if we were living for a time in an ancient city and sharing in its practices and its outlook on life. Here and there we hear a voice raised in protest against the prevailing supernaturalism, but even the most skeptical thinkers in the end come back to it. The world, as the ancients knew it, lay at the mercy of invisible spiritual agencies. As Professor Case happily expresses it in his title, all human life was an "experience with the supernatural."

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[1] *Experience with the Supernatural in Early Christian Times.* By Shirley Jackson Case. New York–London: Century Co., 1929. 341 pages. $3.00.

The account which is offered us in the book is almost wholly objective. Even when he pauses now and then to indicate a Christian parallel, the author abstains from making any comment. His business is simply to collect the available evidence as to ancient habits of thought, and to present it as clearly and impartially as he can. To this purely historical treatment the work owes much of its value. Most of us are weary of the countless books which profess to deal with the conditions under which Christianity emerged, and which use history as the cover for some negative or apologetic thesis. It is refreshing to meet with a presentation in which the historical attitude is honestly maintained throughout. The reader is treated as an intelligent being who may be deemed capable, if the facts are fairly laid before him, of forming his own judgments. It is not because of any special pleading on the part of the writer that every reflecting reader will be driven to one conclusion. Christianity has come to us out of a time in which all men were dominated by the idea of the supernatural. As men of their age the thinkers of the New Testament shared in the general outlook and carried it into their interpretation of the gospel. Our estimate of their teaching must therefore always be qualified by the knowledge that much of it was colored by the ordinary beliefs of their time. In their conceptions of God and of Christ, in their understanding of the new life, in the analysis of their own religious experience, they were predisposed to the supernatural. The New Testament teaching has always remained normative for Christianity, and to this day the supernatural has played a great part in all our religious conceptions. Christian apologetic has often seized on this mysterious element as marking the divine origin and character of the Gospel. In the light of the evidence here set forth we are compelled to ask ourselves whether this element is anything more than an inheritance from those peculiar modes of thought which prevailed in the first century.

The effect on many readers will undoubtedly be a disturbing one. As they recognize in ancient thought generally so much that is manifestly of the same nature as Christian belief, they will infer that Christianity was nothing more than one of the many systems which owed their origin to a mistaken view of the world. They will feel that its survival into our own age is little better than an anachronism. But there are conclusions of a different kind which may equally well be drawn from the evidence which Professor Case has presented. He writes, it must be repeated, with entire impartiality. His one concern is to exhibit the workings of the ancient mind in matters of religion, and he has accomplished his task with brilliant success. There is no question of disputing his facts or trying to refute his arguments. All that is attempted in the present article is to develop one train of reflection which arises out of a deeply suggestive book.

In the first place, the whole issue depends on the validity which we allow to the conception of the supernatural. If we are convinced that the universe is nothing but a vast mechanism containing no element of reality which cannot be defined in terms of material law, the ancient ideas may at once be dismissed as purely fanciful. The Christian ideas must be classed along with them and dismissed likewise. If we are prepared to acknowledge something more than a material order, then our attitude to those supernatural beliefs will be different. It is true that the ancient mind worked in narrow grooves and was compelled to fall back on theories which in the light of our better knowledge were palpably mistaken. All those speculations as to the nature and motions of the stars, the activity of invisible spirits, the modes of interpreting the divine will, the birth and destiny of the soul, read to us now like a tale for children. But the particular form which the old conceptions assumed do not affect the idea which lay at the heart of it. The grown man, listening to a children's tale, is sometimes wistfully aware that the child has a truer insight into the being of things than he has. Fairies and enchanted castles may only exist in a world of imagination yet he knows that there is a wonder and mystery lying all about him if he could only perceive it. The child is conscious of it, and is trying, in those fancies of his, to express what he sees. So the old supernaturalism is not to be put aside as mere ignorance. No doubt among the beliefs collected by Professor Case there are many which are utterly worthless; but others, to use his own word, have plainly sprung from a real "experience." We cannot but feel that the minds which devised them were sensitive to aspects of the world which we have now forgotten. In so far as it borrowed from those modes of thinking, Christianity was not perpetuating ancient error. It was preserving for man's strength and consolation an outlook on life which was eternally true, and apart from which all later knowledge could signify little. No thoughtful man will rule out the Christian beliefs merely on the ground that they are rooted in the old feeling for the supernatural. Such a judgment is nothing else than a begging of the question. It assumes that the attitude of mind which accepts the supernatural is a false one, and this cannot be granted. So long as we attach any meaning to poetry, to religion, to all that belongs to man's higher instincts and aspirations, we must admit that behind the old conceptions there was something profoundly true. It is easy to examine them one by one and point out their futility, but a distinction must always be made between the details of the supernatural view and its fundamental idea that the world which we see is in some way bound up with a higher order.

Again, it comes out very clearly from Professor Case's inquiry that at the beginning of the Christian era the old supernaturalism had entered on a new phase. The inherited beliefs persisted, but they had shed much of their crudity. They had become the vehicles of high speculation on the riddle of the world and the meaning of human life. There had been a time when Greek philosophy had stood aloof from the popular religion. It had sought to explain all things on purely rational principles and to construct a rule of life which should be quite independent of any superstitious rites and beliefs. Under the Stoic influence, more especially, the supernatural view seemed to be fast disappearing among educated men. But in the first century it had reasserted itself. Stoicism, which began as a protest against the current religions, became the chief agency by which they took on a new significance. Each form of worship identified its divinity with the ultimate Reason, and assimilated its teaching on the soul to the Stoic doctrine of the "particle of divine fire." This sublimation of the old beliefs through philosophy is the main theme of Professor Case's closing chapters. A similar change had long before been effected, along different lines, in the religion of Israel. The teaching of the Prophets and the Law had its background in a primitive mythology, God was conceived in traditional fashion as a magnified man, dwelling in the heavens; inherited beliefs of various origin underlay the angelology, the ritual practices, the apocalyptic hopes. But all this given material had been shot through with new meanings, and had been pressed into the service of a noble ethic and a spiritual worship. In like manner the oriental cults which had forced their way into the West, and which undoubtedly played some part in the development of Christianity, had grown out of nature-worship of the crudest type. They were blended inextricably with childish myths and rites which were meaningless and sometimes repulsive. Yet in the minds of some at least of their votaries these vegetation cults were now associated with the deepest moods of genuine religious experience. Thus the supernaturalism of the first century no longer obscured religious thinking but offered it the means of fuller and clearer expression. The more one studies those beliefs with which early Christianity came in contact the more difficult it is to separate their primitive elements from the deeper reflection which had been read into them. For a long time philosophy had been growing aware of its limitations, and had been seeking after new modes of knowledge by which to apprehend the higher reality. In this quest for a more adequate knowledge it had been driven into alliance with religion. That this was the final outcome of the Greek philosophical movement is a significant fact, which cannot be set down to a weakening of the rational impulse or the encroachment of vulgar superstition. It must be explained from that necessity to which Plato himself yields when at the close of several of his greatest dialogues he falls back on a myth—a symbolic utterance of those convictions to which reason has led him but which transcend the reason. Signs are not wanting that the scientific inquiry of the present day will issue in a similar fusion of rationalism and mysticism. It would be wrong, therefore, to think of Christianity as the product of an unreflecting age, which was content to solve all problems by the *deus ex machina*. In the supernatural beliefs of the first century we have to deal at the same time with high speculations. It is utterly misleading to say that the work of Christ was construed in the light of Pagan legends, which had formed around the worship of nature-divinities. These legends had undergone a transformation. They had gathered into themselves the results of philosophical thinking. They had been related to man's craving for redemption from sin and death and from all the limitations of this visible world. Christianity availed itself of the old beliefs in so far as they carried with them that higher purport. By means of them it sought to interpret its conception of Christ as the revealer of God and the bringer of a new life.

Here, however, we come in sight of the real answer to all criticism of our religion on the ground that it arose in a remote age, when everything was explained by supernatural action. This was true, it may be urged, of the philosophies as well as of the mythologies which had preceded them. In the later systems divinities are changed into metaphysical essences, warring or combining with one another; but Philo and the Gnostics and Plotinus still work with the theory of a world governed by supernatural forces. Their construction, it might be argued, was even more erroneous than the earlier one, for the old conceptions were frankly imaginative. They were flexible to the purposes of the poet and teacher, and might be taken as mere symbols of mysteries which no one professed to understand. But the later theories, while in substance just as mythological, were advanced seriously. They were supposed to offer a true account of the cosmic processes, and the Christian thinkers accepted them in all good faith, as we now accept the data of science. Since the New Testament teaching is thus based on a false knowledge, must we not deny it any just claim to validity? The answer is that the facts with which religion concerns itself have little to do with the manner in which we try to explain them. In ancient times as much as now, men were conscious of certain conditions imposed on them by life on this earth. They did not know how these conditions had come about, and their explanations, as we can now recognize, were all wrong. But the facts themselves were not affected by those ignorant explanations. Sickness, calamity, death were set down to the action of demons in cases in which we attribute them to their natural causes; but they have not on that account changed their character. The modern man, overtaken by poverty or incurable disease, is in no way comforted by knowing that this is not due to malign spirits but to the failure of a bank or infection by a deadly microbe. When he reads the complaint of some ancient man under a like calamity he fully accepts it as his own, couched though it is in the language of old superstition. Religion has to do with the facts of human life in their permanent aspects. With the progress of knowledge we are doubtless able to define them better and assign them to their true causes. In our ability to cope with them we have thus an enormous advantage as compared with ancient man. But the explanations, whether they are right or wrong, do not change the facts. In all ages they confront us with the same problems, and it is these to which religion offers its answers.

The point may be illustrated from the two Epistles to Colossians and Ephesians, in which the work of Christ is expounded on the basis of the old cosmology. No writings in the New Testament are so completely steeped in supernatural theories which we can no longer hold. The writer, most probably Paul himself, thinks of a tremendous warfare which had its origin in the world of spirits, and which has caused the whole universe to be divided against itself. Powers hostile to God have enthroned themselves in the planets, and their activity has brought about all the antagonisms which are found in nature, in human society, in our own inner being. God has planned in his mysterious wisdom "to re-unite all things in Christ," and so to rescue men from the tyrannical forces by which they are held in bondage. It may well be objected that Paul here works with an obsolete mythology and that his argument can have no possible meaning for the modern mind. Where we think of a universe ordered by physical law he speaks of principalities and powers. He conceives of men as vainly struggling to free themselves from the "world-rulers" who have enslaved them. Yet on a deeper view it is only Paul's scientific explanations that are at fault. He imagines personal agencies where we talk of evolution, heredity, laws of chemistry and physics; but our problem is essentially the same as his. How are we to obtain freedom in the face of terrible forces which beset us on every side? It does not much matter what we call them. They oppress us just the same whether we think of them as demons or as abstract laws. Under all modes of thought men have been conscious, on the one hand, of a higher life within them and, on the other, of a material world which is hostile or indifferent. They appeal to some power which will bring them deliverance, and Paul believes that we have access to it through Christ. He describes the work of Christ mythologically, as he does the nature of the world; but here, too, his idea remains unaffected when we take it out of its ancient setting and express it in our modern language. Christ, we would now say, represents those spiritual ends for which the world exists. All things are "united in him" inasmuch as he reveals those ultimate values apart from which they have no meaning. In a world of mechanism how can we attain to spiritual freedom? That was Paul's problem, and it is also ours.

Far too much is commonly made of the difference which has come about in our religious conceptions through the modern scientific view. The truth is that it has touched almost nothing that does not lie on the circumference. Ancient teachers, under their own forms of thought, apprehended all our problems, and their solutions were just as valid as any that we can discover today. Professor Case, in a graphic passage, has contrasted the smallness of the ancient universe with that which we now see around us.

> Men had then no "Outline of Science" where they might learn that an angel, even though he were to travel at the undiminished speed of a shell projected from the most powerful cannon would consume five hundred

years in traversing the diameter of Neptune's orbit, not to speak of the vast stretches of space lying beyond our relatively small solar system.

Yet ancient man could realize, as vividly as we do, that he was an insignificant thing in a mighty universe. When we still try to express our feeling in presence of the starry heavens, we do not quote the *Outline of Science* but the words of the old Psalm: "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" It is interesting to compute the actual distances of the stars, but after the first few million miles the figures mean little, and the essential impression is clear enough without them. Ancient man could respond to it as we do, and perhaps with a deeper sense of the mystery before which he was helpless. For the effect of much of our modern inquiry has been to obscure for us those central problems which religion has to answer. We assume that a fact has somehow lost its significance when we have stated it in new terms and examined its physical aspects. From the religious point of view all this is of little importance. The fact, in its spiritual import, has nothing to do with our theory about it, and to make them identical is mere confusion of thought. As Professor Case says in an eloquent passage,

> Ancient man lived under the menace of the cosmos. He was nervously conscious of his own helplessness in the presence of the inexorable operations of the world about him. How could he escape from the clutches of this world-power that seemed now to be grinding him to dust and whose eternal might would continue its heedless bruising of his spirit after the soul's departure from the body?

This undoubtedly was the attitude of ancient man, and one cannot but ask one's self, How does it essentially differ from our attitude today? We also feel crushed by inexorable forces. To be sure we have learned to call them by their scientific names and in some degree to measure and define them. But we are still aware that the higher life in us is in bondage; we are still seeking for ways of deliverance. The religious problem, and the possible answers to it, stand just as they did in ancient times.

Religion would, indeed, be meaningless if it had no value apart from a true system of knowledge. The modern critics of Christianity are all agreed that in that age when it arose the real nature of the world was unknown, and this much may be granted them. But they further take for granted that the false explanations have now been replaced by the true ones. On this assumption that all the facts are now known to us, they pass judgment on the Christian teaching as based on ignorance. They call for a new religion which will take account of the world as it really is. When shall we attain to such a religion? Nothing is more certain than that all our present knowledge is merely provisional. We smile at theories which were confidently held a generation ago by the leaders in scientific thought. Their conceptions of space and the atom are already antiquated, and a few centuries hence will be regarded much as we now regard the old mythologies. They will possibly appear even more absurd, since they were solemnly put forward in the name of scientific truth. The knowledge of today, we may be sure, is just as far from finality as any of the previous systems. If we cannot have any religion until science has disclosed the real nature of the world, we shall have long to wait. But however we explain the world we can put our faith in God. We can believe in goodness and truth and love. We can recognize in the soul of man something of inestimable value. It is these things that concern religion. They will have the same meaning under any future scheme of knowledge as they had in old days, when the universe seemed to be governed by principalities and powers.

So the question is not whether we can accept the ancient interpretation of nature, of the connection of soul and body, of the activities of spiritual beings. Admittedly the ancient ideas on such matters were mistaken, and in so far as they entered into Christian belief we have to acknowledge a time element of inferior worth. But the essential Christian teaching is not affected by these ideas. It is based on certain great conceptions of the meaning of life, the righteousness and love of God, the attainment of freedom through fellowship with God. How far was it possible, within the limitations of ancient thought, to lay hold of those conceptions? This is the real question, and it is not disposed of by any demonstration that men formerly explained the world in terms of the supernatural. In some respects they were better able than we are to apprehend the great religious issues, which are now confused with a multitude of others, more or less irrelevant. Paul could ask himself, "Who will deliver me from this body of death?" The modern writer, encumbered with all the new knowledge, feels it necessary to approach this question by way of psychology, sociology, relativity, with the result that he never gets anywhere near it or explains it away. Ancient thought, with its simpler outlook, was intensely alive to the main problems. Whenever we want language that will express the stark realities of human life, we go back still to the Greek poets, to the Prophets, and the Gospels. Ancient thought could grasp the problems; was it competent to solve them? The world has long believed that they were solved in Christianity, and this belief is in our day called in question. No one can deny that the challenge is legitimate, but it must not take the line that the Christian teaching is baseless because it comes from an age that accepted the supernatural. In its effort to explain the world the ancient mind had its own forms of thought, as we have ours, and we must allow for them and seek to get behind them. True criticism of the Gospel must deal with its essential message. It must arrive at some judgment on Christ himself and on the things he taught and the experience which comes through faith in him. Only by such inquiry into its inner truth can we test the validity of our religion.

# MISSIONARY ACTIVITY IN THE NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS[1]

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IN THE oldest religions known to us we hear nothing of a missionary activity in the proper sense of the word. We are well aware of the fact that when certain Mesopotamian cities extended their domains they introduced their originally Sumerian deities into the conquered territory. Also Egyptian or Phoenician princesses, who contracted marriages with Israelitish princes, introduced their deities into Israel where these new gods were worshiped even by others than those who were originally foreigners. But such persons carried on no distinctively missionary activity. On the contrary, according to II Kings 17:24 ff., the Assyrians who migrated to Samaria after the destruction of the ten tribes added to their religion the worship of the indigenous god, Yahweh. Likewise, the Egyptians accepted West Semitic and Nubian deities. It is true that three of the letters found at el-Amarna in Upper Egypt and written about 1400 B.C. in cuneiform by West Asiatic kings and court officials to the pharaohs Amenhotep III and IV have a mythological content. They contain parts of the so-called Adapa myth, parts of the myth of Nergal and Ereshkigal, and also parts of still another Babylonian myth. Yet they do not need to have served the purposes of missionary activity. They were indeed used for reading exercises, as is shown by the supplementary marks added according to Egyptian custom after the signs with which the words closed. But that exactly these texts were sent for this purpose was perhaps due simply to the fact that they were especially popular in Babylonia. And when in another of these letters it appears that the prince of the Mitanni, Tushratta, sent his son-in-law the pharaoh an image of the Ishtar of Nineveh it was only intended, as on a former occasion, to help him in a specific instance. That he should not worship the goddess permanently, or even retain her image, is evident from the concluding words of the letter: "For me Ishtar is my god, but for my brother she is not his god."

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[1] Delivered at the third course of lectures on the science of missions held at Bonn on January 15 and 16, 1929.

Moreover, the Mitanni, as we know from the inscriptions found at Boghazköi, believed in Aryan divinities, yet the Aryans of India carried on no distinctively missionary activity. More and more as time passed the deities introduced by them were taken over by the indigenous peoples. Consequently adherents of the originally fourth caste, the so-called Sudras, which originated from the native population, are already in evidence even in ancient customs. But at the same time the natives retained, at least in part, their distinctive notions and thereby exerted an influence upon the formation of the later Indian religion called Hinduism. Thus we cannot speak with certainty of a distinctively missionary activity among the Indian Aryans, at least of the more ancient period.

Indeed Zarathushtra, next to Moses the oldest founder, or at least reformer, of religion whom we know, was also the first real missionary. He endeavored to win not only his immediate environment or his own people to his new view of God, but also the Turanian Fryano (Ys. 46:12). In the fourth of his Gathas (Ys. 31:3) he asks Ahura Mazda to reveal his will to him in order that he may be able to convince all living people. So also in a later passage of the Avesta (Yt. 13:93 f.) it is said that at the birth of Zarathushtra all creatures prophesied "henceforth the good Mazdean religion will spread itself over all seven parts of the earth." Still later we read even of an evangelization of the Byzantine kingdom, on the one hand, and of India, on the other. These statements are certainly apocryphal, as the reference to the Byzantine kingdom shows, but in the later Avesta (Ys. 26:9; Vispr. 16:2) we read of both native and foreign devotees and especially of priests

(Ys. 42:6; Vispr. 3:3) who are active not only in the homeland but also travel abroad. Thus they are missionaries. As a matter of fact, the spread of Zoroastrianism went hand in hand with the spread of the Persian dominion, yet without the suppression of the other religions. Suppression occurred first under the Sassanids, of whom we shall have occasion to speak in a later connection.

At the outset, and even after the time of Deuteronomy (4:19; 29:25), the conception prevails in Israel that Yahweh has chosen his own people for himself but has assigned the other peoples to other gods, to the host of heaven, and hence Yahweh is not to be preached to non-Israelites. Nevertheless, Yahweh is considered to be none other than the supreme god, who dwells in heaven and who has created the sun and the fruitful earth. At least he is considered more powerful than the others. Therefore a captive Israelitish maiden commends him to the attention of her master, the Syrian Naaman, who, when healed of his leprosy, worshiped the god of Israel.[2] But this is a unique event, an exception, just as when the heroine of the Book of Ruth adopts the god of her mother-in-law. The daughter-in-law was not required to change her religion. Also the prophets, in accordance with their universal conception of God, expect either a destruction or a final conversion of all heathen. Nevertheless, they themselves engage in no missionary activity. Only of Jonah is it said that he was to preach to the city of Nineveh, yet at first only of judgment, but of repentance also after he had learned that this was the will of God. Similarly, the entire Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament, which is in part placed in the mouth of non-Israelites or borrowed from them, is at the same time actually meant for them.

This missionary intention is still more obvious in the noncanonical literature of Judaism, especially in those books which bear heathen names. Thus verses which glorify the

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[2] Note that for this purpose he is given "a burden of earth," a portion of Yahweh's holy soil, to carry away with him for sacred uses (II Kings 5:17).

Jewish belief in God are placed in the mouth of various Greek poets. Probably this was the procedure of an author who, under the name of Hecataeus of Abdera, a contemporary of Alexander the Great and of the first Ptolemy, wrote an entire book about the Jews or about Abraham. Again, about the year 200 B.C. the so-called letter of Aristeas originated, in which the alleged origin of the Greek translation of the Old Testament is narrated and its sacred and natural quality glorified (σεμνότης καὶ φυσικὴ διάνοια, 171). From the end of the second century B.C. prophecies were placed into the mouth of the Sibyl with a view to serving the interests of Jewish propaganda. Also the historic, epic, dramatic, and philosophic literature of Judaism had a missionary, or at least an apologetic, purpose. This is true throughout the whole literary activity of Josephus. When, finally, one turns to the magical papyri containing Jewish names for God or angels one may indeed say that no other religion of that age produced an equally extensive literature.

To this missionary literature one must add the oral preaching. This form of propaganda was so characteristic of the Jews that, according to a statement in Valerius Maximus, when they first came to Rome in the year 139, probably as ambassadors of the Maccabean prince Simon, there they immediately proceeded to proclaim their God. And also the saying in Matt. 23:15, "Woe unto you scribes and pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte," certainly applies not alone to Palestine. One hears also of the Jewish "apostles" who even after the destruction of the Temple continued to collect a tax and bring it to Jerusalem. On the other hand, they distributed circular letters and after returning to the homeland they with the patriarchs guarded the observance of the law. But that these officials were also professional missionaries cannot be proved in spite of Harnack.[3] When, according to Gal. 2:10, Paul was admonished by the primitive apostles to remember the poor in Jerusalem, and proceeded so zealously to collect funds for them, as the letters to the Corinthians show, his activity does not imply that they considered him and that he considered himself in a position similar to that of the Jewish apostles, who as a matter of fact were primarily financial officers. Rather, Paul placed his apostolate on an entirely different basis. And Judaism had no need of professional missionaries because every Jew as occasion arose made it his care to spread his faith. In this way a merchant named Ananias won the king Izates II of Adiabene (in ancient Assyria) over to Judaism, while another Jew converted the king's mother, Zaddan (Helene). Also the wife of Nero, Poppaea, had become interested in Judaism through an actor by the name of Alityrus. The importunity with which many Jews proceeded is made especially evident at the close of the fourth satire of the first book of Horace, where he threatens his readers thus: "The host of poets if need be will come to my assistance, for there are many more of us and we will force you, as do the Jews, to join in this multitude." Yet, of course, it was impossible for the Roman Jews actually to compel converts; it was only the Maccabeans who had proceeded thus against the peoples whom they subjected.

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[3] *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (3. Auf.), I, 314 ff.

The Jews of the Diaspora had still another means of attracting the needy people of the lower classes. Cicero says in his address in defense of L. Flaccus (xxviii.66), who as proconsul had forbidden the export of Jewish money to Jerusalem, that the defender of Flaccus had shifted the trial against him into a territory where many Jews lived because he knew that in this region there was "such a multitude, such unity, and such power to prevail in the assembly." Moreover, the Jews had, as we know from the Book of Acts and the letters of Paul, a jurisdiction of their own, and also were exempted from military service because their religion did not permit them to carry weapons and to make long journeys on the Sabbath. On account of these privileges they were also hated. As the passage cited above from Horace shows, they were ridiculed by the Roman satirists, and occasionally they were persecuted by the authorities. But all of this hostility did not prevent their religion from enjoying an extraordinary expansion.

Philo incidentally remarked that the Jews of Egypt were not less than a million strong. They may have been still more numerous in Syria. We must allow half a million for Palestine, and for all the remaining parts of the Roman Empire at least one and a half million. Thus in all one must estimate from four to four and a half million adherents of the Jewish religion. According to the estimate of Beloch,[4] the population of the Roman Empire at the time of the death of Augustus was only about fifty to sixty million. That means that every twelfth or thirteenth man was a Jew, yet not necessarily a so-called "proselyte of righteousness" but perhaps only a "god-fearing" heathen. Even if, with Harnack,[5] we estimate the total population of the Roman Empire at this time as sixty million, still 7 per cent remained Jewish, a number greater than that at the present time in any country except Poland. Hence we can understand how the Jews came to be called a "second race," even as later the Christians were a "third race." Their peculiar views and customs would not have sufficed to give them this designation. In Cyrenaica they formed one of the four classes of the population, and in Alexandria two of the five divisions of the city were called the Jewish. When Renan says "a generation of fanatics robbed Judaism of its reward and prevented it from gathering the harvest which it had prepared,"[6] he was probably thinking of the Christian missionaries. As a matter of fact, the war of revolution instigated by the Jewish fanatics, and later uprisings against Rome, broke the power of Judaism and at the same time lessened its attractiveness as a religion. Later it was also persecuted by Christianity and therefore could no longer engage in missionary activity. Yet especially in the kingdom of the Chazars north of the Black Sea, and subsequently indeed also in Poland, not only the ordinary individual convert, but also great multitudes, must have joined Judaism. At the present time Judaism, as it had already done in the Talmudic period, expressly renounces missions. Thus it is true, as Harnack says,[7] that the Christian mission was a continuation of the Jewish propaganda, which had not only created the communities where Paul began his activities but prepared the way for the Christian missions and provided it with a general model of procedure.

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[4] *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, p. 502.

[5] *Op. cit.*, I, 10.

[6] Cited by Harnack, *ibid.*, p. 18.

The Oriental religions also served in a similar capacity. Since the beginning of the Hellenistic age these religions had spread westward. In earlier times deities from Egypt and Asia Minor had been worshiped in Greece only by foreigners and by natives who merely imitated the foreigners. Earlier these natives had themselves borrowed some of the dieties from Asia Minor or from Thrace. The Romans also imported first some and then all of the Olympian gods from Greece, and toward the end of the Second Punic War they borrowed even Cybele from Asia Minor. Although this importation of religions was by official action, the new deities through their peculiar rites soon acquired a distinct significance for the people. In the so-called *lectisternia,* food was publicly placed before the images of the Greek gods. Cybele, in the form of her sacred stone, was carried about in processions. The worship of Serapis, whose rites were designed to unite both Egyptians and Greeks, was introduced into Alexandria by Ptolemy I. In the same manner, Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, according to Dan. 11:38, attempted to introduce in his entire kingdom the "god of fortresses" (*Eloa maussim*), otherwise unknown to us. It may be that the Maccabeans learned from Antiochus the methods of compulsory conversion, and that, as Gressmann says, one fanaticism aroused the other.[8]

Moreover, literature also was used as a means of propaganda for these religions. At an early date the *Babyloniaca* of

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[7] *Ibid.*

[8] "Heidnische Mission in der Werdezeit des Christentums," *Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft,* XXXIX (1924), 17.

Berosos and the *Aegyptiaca* of Manetho were most probably designed to advertise the Babylonian and Egyptian religions. And likewise Lucian in his tract on the Syrian goddess, in which he never indulged in ridicule, had in mind no merely literary or historical interest. Especially is this true of Apuleius. It was not hope of financial gain that prompted him to write his description of the Egyptian mysteries in the eleventh book of the *Metamorphoses*. Even had that been his main incentive for describing in the previous books those very questionable adventures of his hero before and during his transformation into an ass, he would not have added in the eleventh book an account of the Egyptian mysteries had he not been able to assume for them the same popular interest as for the obscene tales reported in the earlier books. In addition to these monuments of literature proper, there were also popular tracts which served exclusively the purposes of religious propaganda. This type of writing was especially in evidence in connection with the spread of Serapis worship. The festal oration of Aristides composed for the glorification of this deity informs us that there were whole bookcases full of such documents, and some of them are still preserved in papyri and inscriptions. Indeed, they furnished an immediate model for Christianity. Just as in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus the believers cry *εἶs Ζεὺs Σάραπιs* ("There is only one Zeus, Serapis"), and in an inscription from Delos the god proclaims *νικήσομεν* ("We shall conquer"), so the Christians often exclaimed *εἶs θεόs* or *εἶs θεὸs καὶ Χριστόs* and *'Ιησοῦs Χριστὸs νικᾷ* and the like.

In addition to an extensive literature, these cults also employed a distinctively missionary preaching. The priests of these foreign divinities did not hold civil office in addition to their religious duties, as at least was later the case with the Roman priests, but were able to devote themselves entirely to their spiritual calling. The first concern must have been for the extension of their religion. Moreover, since these cults for the most part, or at the outset, lacked state recognition, the priests were compelled to provide the means necessary for the maintenance of themselves and their religion. Hence they must have endeavored to interest as many persons as possible in their cause. Still more significant must have been the propaganda which the devotees of these foreign gods carried on both by precept and by example. Only in this manner can we explain the extraordinary growth, especially of the cult of Cybele and of the mysteries of Mithra, at least in certain circles, as among soldiers, tradesmen, slaves, and freedmen. We have already mentioned the fact that public ceremonies of these cults offered more attractions for the individual. Indeed, they specifically promised those initiated into the mysteries, whether these rites were a phase of the cult or its essential feature, benefits now and hereafter of which the older religions knew nothing.

Also the special interest which some emperors showed in certain of these cults contributed to their spread. For example, Augustus rebuilt on the Palatine the temple of Cybele that had been destroyed by fire. Gaius erected a double temple to Serapis and Isis, to which Caracalla added another. Probably Claudius admitted the spring festival of Cybele among the public festivals. At least for a time, Nero favored the so-called Syrian goddess. Elagabalus patronized the Baal of Emesa and Aurelian the Baal of Palmyra. Diocletian, and again Julian, favored Mithra, and especially is it evident from the surviving inscriptions that interest of the emperors aided the popularity of this god.

Even earlier, with the accession of the Sassanids in the year 226, a new expansion of the native Persian religion, Zoroastrianism in its later form, had begun. It was extended partly at least by force and partly through other inducements. The convert was promised money or advancement in rank, while those who resisted were threatened with the confiscation of their possessions or even with death. At first Parseeism spread as a result of commerce to the interior of Asia and even to China, where, disregarding unreliable tradition, we first hear of a temple devoted to this religion in the year 621. In the year 677, there is mention of another temple which is supposed to have been erected by a Persian king. The situation is similar in the case of Manichaeism, which may also be listed here, although it has only an external connection with Parseeism and must in reality be regarded as an independent religion. It too spread, so far as it did not engage in missionary activity at the outset, through commerce. Later it was favored first by the king of Tocharestan and then by the prince of the Uigurs. Parseeism itself when persecuted by Islam in the eighth century spread also to India and continued there until the eighteenth century to attract to itself Hindus of the lower classes. But this success aroused increasingly the suspicions of the strict Parsees who feared the defilement of their religion and therefore discontinued their missionary activities. Thus, as in the case of Judaism, Parseeism has also abandoned its missionary activity, while in the other non-Christian religions that have survived from antiquity missionary propaganda has continued to the present day or has been recently initiated.

From the very beginning Buddhism was a missionary religion. Buddha was not content with having attained enlightenment for himself, although he may have been tempted so to do, but instead he preached enlightenment as widely as possible, and for that purpose for a period of more than forty years he traveled back and forth between Magadha and Kosala, the two capitals of the two kingdoms. These cities are about as far apart as Berlin and Vienna. But Buddha's activity is not pertinent to our theme, for original Buddhism, although it did not doubt the existence of the gods, ascribed to them no significance for salvation and was for this very reason not yet a religion. It first became such when after his death Buddha began to be worshiped. In accordance with his own intentions his teachings should have been a sufficient substitute for himself. To be sure, at the outset he was worshiped only in a vague sense of the word, as his disciples attempted to visualize his teaching in certain symbols of him and in his image. But soon his followers worshiped him in the full sense of the term in order to secure help from him in the struggle for salvation. Then, as has been said, the Paul of this religion also became its Constantine in the person of King Asoka, who ruled a great kingdom in Northern India from 269 to 232 B.C. He spread Buddhism first in his own kingdom and then along the coast of the Dekhan and to Ceylon, whither his son Mahinda carried a branch of the tree of enlightenment. Probably this scene is represented on the east gate of the Stupa of Sanchi, only slightly later in origin, of which there is a reproduction in the Indian Museum in London. Moreover, Asoka enumerated in one of his rock inscriptions the Greek kings whom he alleges to have won to Buddhism. If we substitute the Greek for the Indian names and identify them somewhat more exactly, these kings were Antiochus II of Syria, Ptolemy Philadelphus of Egypt, Antigonus Gonatas of Macedonia, Magas of Cyrene, and Alexander of Epirus. Of course these rulers were not really won over to Buddhism; probably no missionaries of Buddhism ever went at least to the princes that lived farthest west. But that Asoka knows them proves he had the desire to win them to his religion. Also a Greek king, Menander, who ruled in Northwest India from about 125 to 95 B.C., was interested in Buddhism. He was rewarded with a "monument more enduring than bronze" in the form of a writing, the *Milindapanha,* the questions of Milinda or Menander, which the wise Nagasena answered from the point of view of Buddhism. The Indo-Scythian prince Kanishka who lived in the first century A.D. had a significance for later northern Buddhism similar to that of Asoka for the older southern Buddhism. Hence he has been called its Clovis, although Buddhism was favored by individual rulers in the other most important countries where it spread.

This was true of China, where in the year 61 A.D. the Emperor Ming is said to have seen in a dream a gold image of a god interpreted to him later as Buddhistic. Certainly Buddhism must have been known earlier in the middle empire. On the other hand, in Korea apparently Buddhism was originally introduced by princes in the fourth century. And one of them, the Prince of Paikchyöi, anticipated by some other Koreans, made Buddhism known in Japan in 538. Also Prince Schotoku, who ruled from 593 to 622, became as has been said the Constantine of Buddhism in Japan. Finally, in Tibet Buddhism was spread in the seventh century by King Srong btsan Gampo, indeed at the instigation of his two wives, one a Chinese and the other a Nepalese princess. Hence he has also been compared to Clovis. However, he was not very zealous for the new religion. It was first championed vigorously by one of his successors in the eighth century, Khri Srong bde tsan, who employed in Tibet a special means which we have not yet mentioned for spreading Buddhism.

Already under the Chinese emperor Ming an exposition of Buddhism was composed in Chinese, and a translation was made of Indian works of the same kind; a Buddhistic literature had to be set beside the literature of Confucianism and Taoism which themselves, except the modern Omoto Kyo Kwai, also never had engaged in missionary enterprise. Henceforth various Buddhistic writings continued to be translated or new ones to be composed. At the end of the sixteenth century the canon, as it may be called, comprised 1,662 writings, and in the eighteenth century as many as 1,720. At present it is about seven hundred times as extensive as the Bible. This literature was used by Korean and Japanese Buddhists who possessed no similar native literature. Only in quite recent times has Japanese Buddhism produced translations in addition to the somewhat older original Buddhistic writings which it already possessed. In Tibet, however, the two kings previously mentioned, particularly the latter, initiated the work of translation. The entire sacred literature, called Kandschur and Tandschur, is extraordinarily extensive in Tibet.

Buddhism was propagated also by oral teaching. In some places this was the only agency employed in missionary activity. We know of numerous Indian monks who came to China and Tibet, as well as Chinese monks who came to Korea, in order to preach their religion. Later missionaries also came for the purpose of working among converts already made. A similar activity must be presupposed for Indo-China, Sumatra, Java, and Bali, where Buddhism also established itself. Among the more primitive peoples, as all of them were except the Chinese, Buddhism had a cultural significance in consequence of the civilization which it brought; and even the Chinese were as yet unacquainted with temples and images of the gods such as were introduced by Buddhism. Moreover, it frequently supplied curative agencies, particularly of a miraculous nature, and finally in accordance with its emphasis on love established charitable institutions. It is true that in the highly civilized China we hear of only one such institution. In the year 469 a Buddhistic Joseph, as one might call him, Than yao, introduced the so-called *Seng chi su,* that is, the communal corn. He stored a part of the harvest in monasteries and then distributed it in time of famine. In Japan as early as the year 593 an asylum for homeless people, a hospital, and a dispensary were opened in connection with a Buddhistic temple. Also during the next centuries physicians were sent out along with the missionaries.

Subsequently this missionary zeal flagged but more recently certain Buddhistic sects, especially the Jodo and Jodoshin sects, have again displayed a vigorous and extensive missionary activity. These branches of Buddhism worshiped the heavenly Buddha, Amida, as the supreme, indeed the only God, whose sole requirement was that one believe in his love. At the Paris Congress for the History of Religions in the year 1900 a representative of the Jodo sect declared: "The twentieth century will certainly be a time of revival for Japanese Buddhism, and our new growth will be displayed upon an international or cosmopolitan stage." In 1921 the sect had thirty-one missionaries in America, who labored not only among the immigrant Japanese and Chinese, but also and indeed with success among native Americans. In all, the Japanese Buddhists have at present 839 missionaries. The Congress of the Far East which took place in Tokyo from the first to the fourth of November, 1925, and was attended by thirteen hundred persons, deliberated chiefly on the advance of Buddhism and voted the evangelization of the world.

Also in Ceylon and Burma attempts have recently been made not only to revive Buddhism but to spread it to America and Europe. This is the aim of the Mahabodhi Society, founded in 1891 and so-called because its primary purpose is to re-establish the place of the enlightenment of Buddha as a sanctuary of Buddhism. Its founder, the Dharmapala from Ceylon, appeared frequently on the program of the religious parliament that convened in Chicago in 1893. In recent years (1925–27) he has been active in the same cause in England. Also Jayatilaka, who calls himself president of the Buddhistic young men's association in Colombo, most probably belongs to this movement. In 1910 he spoke at the Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress in Berlin. The Buddhasasana Samagana, founded by two Scotch converts to Buddhism, betrays its cosmopolitan tendency in its very name, International Buddhist Society, which it recently adopted. But these activities need not concern us in this connection, for the original Buddhism which the International Society attempts to renew is, as we have seen above, not really a religion. And the new Buddhism which the Mahabodhi Society, following the example of many Europeans, proclaims to be the truly scientific view of the world and of life is moreover no historical quantum, but a modern product of the imagination.

We may merely mention in passing another missionary movement that originated in India. Missionary activity has been undertaken by Jainism, which however only later became a religion. A representative of this movement, Vircand Gandhi, not to be confused with the oft-mentioned Mahatma Gandhi who was also influenced by Jainism, took part in the religious parliament at Chicago. Later he lectured there and in England, and founded in America a Gandhi philosophical society; while in England even a Mahavira Brotherhood[9] sprang up, to which however only six Europeans appear to have belonged. Whether either of these societies still exists I cannot say.

We are more exactly informed, thought not so fully as we should like, about the misionary activity of Islam which continues to the present day. Islam from the very beginning felt itself called to be a missionary religion. At the end of the thirty-eighth Sura of the Koran it is said: "This book is an admonition for the whole world." The letters which Mohammed himself is credited with writing to the rulers of his time, Emperor Heraclius, the king of Persia and Abyssinia, and the governor of Yemen and Egypt, are in all probability apocryphal. This seems apparent since he devoted the last years of his life chiefly to the spread and consolidation of his power, as was also the policy of his successors. That the rapidly conquered people for the most part quickly joined Islam is explained by the fact that their former religions, Zoroastrianism and also Christianity with its internal strife and other defects, did not satisfy them. On the other hand, many of them were impressed with the piety of the Moslems while the primitive tribes especially were powerfully influenced by both the magic of Islam and its higher conception of God. Furthermore, they appreciated the protection afforded them by their new comrades in the faith, as well as the sense of fellow-feeling and the higher respect which their conversion to Islam insured, sometimes especially in the eyes of women. Also there were many advantages to be gained by joining the religion of the ruling class. When the Philippines came under the rule of the United States, as when at an earlier date Crete became Greek, Islam's power of attraction in these territories declined. In other words, it is wrong to suppose, as once was the custom and still is in many quarters, that Islam was spread by force. This course of procedure was out of place, if for no other reason than that it would have been disadvantageous to the Mohammedan rulers. They levied a head tax on the subjected unbelievers, which in turn however led many to join Islam. This may explain the fact that this tax in Egypt in the period from Othman to the first Omayyad decreased from twelve to five million denars. In those lands where Islam was spread by fire and sword, as occasionally happened, it gained almost no foothold. Thus the Berbers in North Africa are said, according to Arabian historians, to have apostatized twelve times, and when in 703 they were willing to submit to the conqueror their leader, al-Kahina (the prophetess, her actual name is unknown) preferred to die in the battle fought at that time. The compulsory conversions effected by Aurangzeb in the second half of the seventeenth century were not very numerous. Indeed, today in the residence of the great Mogul at Delhi only a tenth of the population is Mohammedan. Moreover, at the beginning of the previous century in Sumatra the so-called Padri attempted to convert the Batak by force, but without any success. These propagandists were influenced by the Wahhabites, the revivers of the original Islam, who have recently attracted attention. Indeed, the *dshihads,* or sacred wars, which certain African tribes waged against unbelievers have resulted rather in greater hatred of Islam in the Sudan. Still more recently certain Mohammedan rulers in that territory have again attempted to use force. The English captain, Burton, narrates that he met one who said to him: "Give us these guns and powder, then we shall soon convert these dogs to Islam." And the traveler and explorer Mungo Park reports that the Mohammedan king of Futah Toro sent his neighbor two knives with the message: "With one knife will Abdalkader deign to shave the head of Damel, if Damel will accept Islam; with the other he will cut his throat if he refuses. Take your choice."[10]

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[9] *Mahavira*, "the great man," is the honorary title of the reformer of Jainism.

But the princes who were especially interested in the spread of Islam, like the Omayyed Omar or the Abbasside Ma'mun, used milder means for this purpose and later they tried, following the alleged example of Mohammed, to win other rulers by correspondence. There are two letters of the year 1412, one in Arabic and another in Persian, in which the Timuride Schah Rukh Bahadur invites the ruler of China "to obey the law of Mohammed the ambassador of God, and to strengthen the religion of Islam, and in this way to exchange transitory dominion of this world for the dominion of the future." Still more interesting are two letters, one in Arabic and the other in Spanish, which the sultan of Morocco, Mawlai Ismail, wrote in 1689 to the dethroned King James II of England in order to convert him to Islam and to reproach him for his conversion from Protestantism to the idolatrous worship of Catholicism, which the sultan as a Moslem could not understand.[11]

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[10] Both references in Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (2d ed.), p. 353.

Scholars also composed writings in which they attacked other religions or justified their acceptance of Islam and even made propaganda for this religion. While their influence reached only educated people, the popular religious songs aided in converting the Kirgises and Siberian tribes. Otherwise oral preaching was practiced chiefly by lay members; as Snouck Hurgronje says: "In every Mohammedan, however worldly he may be, proselytism of some sort seems to be innate."[12] Similarly, Munzinger remarks: "The Mohammedan is by nature a missionary; he engages in missionary activities on his own responsibility and at his own charges."[13] That is especially true of the merchants who as early as the eighth century traveled by sea even to China, and who also supplied the population in the interior of Africa with wares of all sorts.

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[11] Following the example of the French editor of this correspondence, De Castries, the people of Europe are accustomed to call Mawlai Ismail "the last of the monsters." Cf. De Castries, "Une apologie de l'Islam par un sultan du Maroc," *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, XLVII (1903), 175.

[12] "L'Arabie et les Indes néerlandaises," *ibid.*, LVII (1908), 66.

[13] "Abessinien," *Petermanns Mitteilungen* (1867), p. 411.

Indeed, the Christian colonial powers, by building highways and railroads and insuring the greater safety of travel, smoothed the way for these Mohammedan missionaries. Also these powers have to depend to some extent on procuring Mohammedan officials to hold positions of responsibility in their colonies. Such officials at the same time serve as Mohammedan missionaries. In addition to these incidental agencies there are also professional missionaries who frequently precede or follow the merchant. Other independent missionaries have carried Islam into still other regions—the interior of Asia, Further India, the Sunda Islands, Molucca, Melanesia, China, and even Japan. Several Dervish orders have devoted themselves especially to this work, for example, the Naksha bandits among the Mongols, and in Africa the Amirghanites, the Kadirites, and the Senusi. In China, in the Kansu province, there is a missionary seminary whose graduates also work in other provinces. There is also a Russian seminary in Kasan. Recently in India and Egypt missionary societies have been founded after the Christian model. Among their other activities they conduct street-preaching and circulate tracts. In Christian countries they occasionally avail themselves of the printing press. For example, beginning in 1921 at least for a while a periodical was published in Berlin entitled *Islam, ein Wegweiser zur Rettung und zum Wiederaufbau.* Other movements issuing from Islam, or at least influenced by it, employ in their missionary work still other agencies, some of which have already been mentioned and hence need to be only briefly recounted in this connection.

The Babis or Bahais, as the party was called, was an Islamic reform movement that arose in Persia and later was transplanted to Mesopotamia and European Turkey, and finally to Palestine. The second leader of the movement was Baha Ullah who in the sixties of the last century composed letters in which he demanded faith in himself not only from the shah of Persia and the Turkish sultan, but also from Pope Pius

IX, Czar Alexander II, Queen Victoria, and Napoleon III. The Congress of Religions in Chicago, of which mention has already been frequently made, was attended by a Bahai who founded a community there and in other cities of the United States. Similar communities also arose in England, Germany, and Hungary and were in 1913 visited by the third leader of the Bahais, Abdul Baha. When he died in November, 1921, in Acca, Mohammedans, Christians, and Jews spoke at his grave. The consuls officiating in Haifa and other representatives of various nations participated at the funeral ceremony. Ministers and generals sent their sympathy to the family, and leading English and French newspapers printed long obituaries.

Also the youngest Mohammedan sect, the Ahmedijja, similar to Bahaism, has spread not only in the entire Mohammedan world but also in Europe and America. Its success has been due in part to the fact that certain prophecies which the founder of the sect had delivered and then published in his book and also in such periodicals as the *Review of Reviews* were fulfilled, or were alleged to have been fulfilled. A particular branch of the Ahmedijja founded in Woking, near London, a distinctively Mohammedan mission, published a magazine called the *Islamic Review and Moslem India* and won over to itself also a peer, Lord Headley. However, I know nothing of its further success, nor of that of another mission newly opened in Berlin.

Also regarding the Sikhs, a Hindu sect that arose in the fifteenth century and was influenced by Islam, I am unable to say whether the exposition of its entire tradition in a six-volume work by the Englishman Macauliffe, entitled *The Sikh Religion* (1909), has served or was intended to serve the purposes of propaganda. At the Berlin Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress in the year 1910 the representative of the Sikhs declared "a great hero shall soon appear with a threefold crown of thorns, steel and divine glory, and will introduce a new epoch of world history by extending the circle of divine knowledge over all mankind and free humanity from its worst foes, false pride of caste, color and dogma." But like other statements made on such occasions, this pronouncement at best represents the personal opinion of the speaker. There is no trace of a missionary activity of the Sikhs.

Finally, we may speak briefly of other Hindu sects. While Hinduism itself practiced no missionary activity, these sects display this interest. In the first place, the pantheistic, or as we more correctly say of late, the theo-panistic, acosmic Vedanta philosophy perpetuating ancient Brahmanism, was also represented at the Religious Congress in Chicago in 1893 by Vivekananda, a student of the sect's reformer Ramakrishna who lived in the preceding century. Vivekananda founded in America a Vedanta society, and secured followers in England and Germany. After his death in the year 1902 the so-called Ramakrishna mission labored in the same interest in North America with stations in Boston, New York, and San Francisco.

The Naba Bidhana, or new Dispensation, which had sprung from the Brahma Samaj founded in 1828 were represented both at the Religious Congress in Chicago and at the Congress in Berlin. Both of these sects have taken over into Hinduism various Christian ideas. When I myself was in Chicago twenty years ago, a church of the New Dispensation was still in existence, but whether it still survives I am unable to say. Finally, I might speak of the zealous propaganda which the Theosophical Society has carried on in Europe and America (where it originated), and also of the occasional approval which has been given here and there to the so-called Dev Samaj. But since neither is distinctively a religious group I pass them by. Theosophy, to be sure, purports to teach an understanding of all religions and above all to constitute in its followers "the kernel of the universal brotherhood of mankind." The Dev Samaj worships only the superman who has appeared especially in the person of its founder.

# CRITICAL REVIEWS

## A NEW PSALTER[1]

This book is intended to make the Psalter intelligible to the average man. To that end a new translation is offered and a new arrangement of each individual psalm, together with a general introduction to the Psalter as a whole and a brief special introduction before each psalm.

The translation is fresh and vigorous, though it may shock some lovers of the Psalms by its constant use of the name "Yahweh" for God. As an offset to this radical step, the old-fashioned form "hath" and the ending "eth" have been retained. The translation is not always consistently uniform, for instance, the word חֶסֶד, which is certainly a hard word to represent in English, is sometimes rendered "kindness" and sometimes "love." It is a bit startling to find "His Christ" in Psalm 2 for "His Anointed" or "His Messiah."

The text of the Psalter is not perfect, as all scholars know. A translator is forced to accept emendations at times. This translation has adopted many, and the translator's caution and wisdom in his choice are commendable. One suggestion of his own may be cited, in Ps. 45:7; the context is speaking of the King of Israel, when suddenly we read "Thy throne, O God, etc." The suggestion is made to read, "Thy throne shall be for ever and ever." The explanation is that the original text read the verb, יִהְיֶה; that this was by error read "Yahweh," and that this in turn was changed to אלהים (God) when the psalm was included in the Elohistic psalter. In Ps. 2:11 f., the text is given up as hopelessly corrupt. But it would have been better to accept the rearrangement of letters proposed by Wellhausen and Haupt, viz., נשקו ברגליו ברעדה, i.e., "Kiss his feet with trembling."

It is in the field of literary criticism that this translation is most radical. Numerous verses are omitted simply because they do not fit into the strophic scheme for the structure of a psalm preferred by the translator. For example, in Ps. 7 verses 6–11 are eliminated as consisting of two separate interpolations, and verse 17 as a liturgical addition. In Ps. 19, verses 3 and 10 are omitted as glosses, while the words "his going forth and his circuit" in verse 6 have to be repeated to fill out the poetic form. The familiar psalm 22 has to suffer the loss of verses 23–26 and 27–30. This sort of procedure is characteristic of the translation throughout. It is not that such eliminations may not be sometimes necessary; but it is the fact that they are made here with such confidence in many cases upon relatively slight grounds. The criticism is not sufficiently objective. The book will be interesting to scholars; but for the layman in scholarship, it will prove an unsafe guide.

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[1] *The Psalms or the Book of Praises.* A new transcription and translation, arranged strophically and metrically from a critically reconstructed text, with Introduction, Textual Notes, and Glossary. ["Biblical and Oriental Series," S. A. B. Mercer, editor.] By H. H. Gowen. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1929. 473 pages. $3.00.

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## ANCIENT WISDOM[1]

This is a commentary on Proverbs, based upon the translation in the Revised Version. In the comments, however, full use is made of the various textual sources and the Revised Version is corrected wherever necessary. The commentary proper is well done and makes good use of all the collateral material. Dr. Oesterley recognizes fully the dependence of the Hebrew Proverbs upon the older collections of Egyptian proverbs. These in some cases throw light upon a corrupt Hebrew text which can thus be corrected. By reason of the fact that it is only just published, this commentary on Proverbs is much to be preferred to any of its predecessors, for it had the opportunity to take advantage of the most recent discoveries and its author has availed himself of this chance. Not least of the merits of Dr. Oesterley's book is the series of excursuses, covering pages xxx–xxxvii. Most important in this series is the excursus upon "Wisdom Literature of the Ancient Oriental World" (pp. xxxiii–lv). Here are presented translations of the significant portions of the teaching of Ptahhotep, "The Teaching of Ka-Gemni," "The Teaching of Amenemhet," "The Teaching for King Meri-Ka-re," "The Teaching of Duauf," "The Wisdom of Ani," "The Teaching of Amen-em-ope," "The Babylonian Job," "The Bilingual Book of Proverbs," and "The Proverbs of Achikar." Selections from these writings are placed alongside of related passages in *The Book of Proverbs*. The relationship between Prov. 22:17—23:14 and the Wisdom of Amen-em-ope is so close and the verbal correspondence so great that the conclusion is inescapable that "the Hebrew Sage has made copious use of the Egyptian Wisdom book." A similar conclusion is arrived at concerning the Proverbs of Achikar and their relation to the Hebrew Proverbs. Over a hundred instances of community of thought between Proverbs and extra-Israelite writings are listed, and the general conclusion is reached that the material, Hebraic and non-Hebraic, belongs, in its essence, to one and the same mold—in other words, "that the wisdom literature of the Hebrews formed a part of the much larger Wisdom Literature of the ancient East as a whole." It is clear that this is a sound judgment and that there was borrowing on both sides, i.e., by the Hebrews and from the Hebrews. It is also worthy of note that the Hebrew ennobled whatsoever he borrowed. He pruned it of unworthy sentiments and of polytheistic expressions and brought it into harmony with his own native thought and feeling.

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[1] *The Book of Proverbs*. By W. O. E. Oesterley. New York: Dutton, 1929. lxxxvii+294 pages. $6.00.

The comparison with these early Egyptian documents on the one hand, and the frequent references to the King, on the other, lead Dr. Oesterley to depart from the commonly received view that the entire Book of Proverbs was of post-Exilic origin. He assigns the contents of the book chronologically as follows: 10:1—22:16 and chapters 25–29, to the middle of the eighth century B.C.; 22:17—23:14, 23:15—24:12, and 24:23–34, during the seventh century B.C.; 30:1–14, 30:15–33, and 31:1–9, pre-Exilic; 1:7—9:18 and 31:10–31, to the third century B.C. or possibly later. These dates may be slightly modified, but they seem pretty well supported by facts. The wealth of material presented in this commentary will make it a valuable addition to every Old Testament library.

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## THE ANTECEDENTS OF CHRISTIAN BAPTISM

In a new volume Reitzenstein[1] continues and completes his now famous studies on the hellenistic mystery religions. He first attracted wide attention by the publication of his treatise on this subject in 1910. Though not himself a theologian, he has for the past twenty-five years devoted his skill as a philologist to the study of themes that have an important bearing upon the history of Christianity in its gentile environment during the early centuries of its career. While his views have often been combated, his findings have been such that they can never be ignored with impunity. In this respect this latest volume is no exception. It presents a study of the origins and significance of baptism, and more particularly of the Mandean rite in relation to that of the early Christians. The first chapter treats of the form and meaning of baptism among the Mandeans, which their tradition derives from John the Baptist. This pre-Christian practice is found to have been the ancestor of the church's rite, and a sharp rivalry between the disciples of John and of Jesus inspired the attempts of Christians to make it appear that their practice was not inaugurated until after Jesus' death when in obedience to his command his followers initiated the baptismal rite. Further evidence to the same effect is derived from an examination of opinions and practices current among the Gnostic sect of the Cathars. Then, in proof of the antiquity of the Mandean rite, a wide range of data is examined. A doctrine of salvation, such as is connected with Mandean baptism, is found in the pre-Christian times, and is thought to be attested by Philo of Alexandria. In his *Life of Moses* (ii.288) there is implied a rebirth and deification thought to be too close to the Mandean notions connected with baptism to be accidental. Philo knew of the baptismal practice of John or of the cult to which he belonged. Hence the pre-Christian origin of the rite with its mystical and soteriological significance seems established. Also the notion of the primal man and similar conceptions regarding divine natures seen in Philo (cf. *Life of Moses* ii.210) trace to the same source. Finally the author turns to a closer comparison between the Mandean and the Christian rite. The hypothesis that both derived from Judaism, or that both arose spontaneously and later came into contact with one another, is rejected in favor of the conclusion that the Mandean provided the model for the Christian practice. This position is defended with great skill and patience, and in a measure carries conviction. In insisting that Jesus was actually baptized by John and that the Christian rite was originally a perpetuation of the Johannian practice, Reitzenstein's contention must be granted. But that John's baptism, and that practiced by the primitive Palestinian Christians, had a mystically sacramental significance, such as is evident in later Christianity and in Mandeanism, still seems questionable. Baptism in preparation for the coming of God in apocalyptic fashion and baptism as a sacrament effecting deification of the believer are two quite different things, although it is not difficult to understand how the latter might in the course of time supplant the former as God failed to appear and the new religion took a more permanent place beside older religions of a sacramental type.

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[1] *Die Vorgeschichte der Christlichen Taufe.* By R. Reitzenstein. Leipzig: Teubner, 1929. 388 pages. M. 14.

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## A HISTORY OF CHURCH UNION EFFORT

There is much to be said in appreciation of this comprehensive book,[1] but the discerning reader will regret that so much was attempted in a single volume. In the first chapter the author ambitiously essays to confine within forty-six pages the story of "early Christian and medieval efforts to maintain a united Christendom," and the term "medieval" is here made to do service to the Peace of Westphalia. The result is that movements of high importance are given slight and cursory treatment and the notable endeavors of the reformers to unite their forces are almost completely lost sight of. The references are extraordinarily meager and inadequate. What is one to think of the author's judgment on the Conference at Marburg, for instance, when he finds the short paragraph devoted to this subject annotated solely by reference to the Hulsean Lectures for 1886, a little book by de Soyres which touches the subject only incidentally, and to Schaff's *Church History?* For the Anglican-Lutheran negotiations of the 1530's we are referred merely to paltry articles in Ollard's one-volume *Dictionary of English Church History*. In too many cases the citations are of this character, neither sources nor fundamental literature apparently having been considered. A little research in the *Bulletin* published by the Societé de l'histoire du Protestantisme Français, for 1887, would have saved the author from treating Jean-François Salvard, minister of Geneva (d. 1585), as a mysterious person and calling him, on English authority, "M. Salnar." On Leibnitz Mr. Slosser makes no use of Jordan's recent or of Pichler's older work, studies which would have improved his judgment on certain particulars. Most surprising of all, no use has been made of K. W. Hering's two-volume *Geschichte der Kirchlichen Unionsversuche*, which though now nearly a century old, remains, for the facts and documents it contains, the most comprehensive history of Mr. Slosser's subject to the time of its publication (1836–38). It is strangely mentioned in one footnote as "referred to in an article by J. P. Lacroix," etc.

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[1] *Christian Unity*. By G. J. Slosser. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1929. xx+425 pages. $5.00

Notwithstanding glaring defects in research and in arrangement, this book is likely to prove of value and service to a large class of readers. The later periods of the history are treated on a more adequate scale than the earlier. Such omissions from the ranks of the advocates of union as the great Bohemian bishop, J. A. Comenius, the German C. M. Pfaff, the Swiss J. A. Turretin, and the Methodist leader, Thomas Coke, who twice made proposals toward union of the Methodist and Protestant Episcopal churches, and the failure to credit W. R. Huntington with the authorship of the Chicago-Lambeth *Quadrilateral,* are perhaps pardonable on the ground that this is not a history of the ideas of union advocates but, primarily at least, of union forces in organized activity. Very little attention is given to the thought side of the unity movement, and the author has no ecclesiology or union philosophy of his own to propound. Without subscribing to all his statements one may say with assurance that his judgments and selection of data are made in a spirit of faultless fairness to all communions. The movement in the last half-century grows in complexity as well as in extent, and offers increasing difficulty to the historian. Professor Slosser has selected here what in general may be taken as the essential materials and supplied his readers with a mass of relevant facts not elsewhere easily accessible. Many valuable documents are quoted in the text and the Appendix, and a number of useful charts and statistical tables are furnished. The book by no means exhausts the history of union efforts, but it furnishes a valuable introduction to that history, and will help to correct the defective because unhistorical approach to the question made in some quarters.

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## A PHASE OF CATHOLIC PIETY

Abbé Bremond plunges into an analysis of trends of religious thought of the seventeenth century and discusses the spirit of Francis de Sales; Père Richeome, S.P.; Père Binet, S.J.; Bishop Camus; and Père Yves de Paris.[1] He finds in these fathers a "devout humanism," a joy and confidence of soul, grafted upon post-Renaissance learning, which entitles them to be set in contrast to the oncoming Jansenists. His work is scholarly, gentle, lyrical, but he does not entirely succeed in conquering the tediousness of his subject. Neither does he succeed in winning the reader's assent to his enthusiasm and admiration for a literary form expressed in poems, stories, and ascetical passages, which is a preposterous amalgam of science, piety, and sentimental optimism.

The early part of *Devout Humanism* is a panegyric of Francis de Sales. Abbé Bremond illustrates the "reasoned sweetness" of the saint with more or less success. As an example Francis said to some nuns:

> Holy Church is not so strict as one might think. If a sister be suffering from a Tertian fever and an attack is due at the hour of Mass of a Festival, you may and should miss the Mass in order to remain with her, although no harm should come of leaving her alone: for you see, the love and holy sweetness of Mother Church are brimming over.

In commenting upon this passage Abbé Bremond writes:

> The very decided preferences which underlie the advice of the kind-hearted casuist should be noted. Here there is no question of a violent crisis which would have made hesitation impossible: the sufferer was merely in such a condition that ordinarily she would not have been left alone, but on a Sunday one would hesitate to "miss the Mass" by remaining with her. "Do not hesitate." Here is another passage perhaps *more beautiful*. . . . .

And our author goes on to illustrate again. It will no doubt appear strange to readers unacquainted with the religious thought of the time to hear

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[1] *Devout Humanism. A Literary History of Religious Thought in France, from the Wars of Religion Down to Our Own Times.* By Abbé Henri Bremond. Translated by K. L. Montgomery. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 417 pages. $4.50.

Francis' advice in the case recorded called "beautiful." But in contrast with the stern doctrine of the age it was both sweet and beautiful. Abbé Bremond, anxious to avoid all controversial questions, does not allude to the "love and holy sweetness of Mother Church" which at the time of Francis was manifesting itself in France by whipping up the government to fresh excesses of intolerance. Voltaire's story of the Calas and Sirvens makes a strange commentary upon Francis' eulogy of the church.

Abbé Bremond avoids identifying "devout humanism" with the effects of Jesuit pietistic teaching. But it seems as though in the wake of Jesuit teaching one finds that kind of preciosity, pious snobbishness, well-documented devotionalism, and polite trust in God's kindliness which is the essence of "devout humanism." In every Jesuit noviceship there is breathed the same atmosphere; sweet optimism, playing with dainty thoughts about the wonders of nature; pseudo-mysticism expressing glamorously the humdrum activities of daily life; trivial efforts in the direction of broad-mindedness, and back of it all a flattering self-appreciation, and patent priggishness. Hear, for instance, our author:

> We shall not confound the sacred and profane, mysticism and urbanity, but experience nevertheless shows us that the most holy souls—Teresa, Francis de Sales, Jeanne de Chantal—are also the more polished. The more grace raises us toward God, the more, such is the law of divine harmony, she humanises us.

Father Binet, a Jesuit humanist, in denouncing the laxity of folk who instead of confessing to well-qualified Jesuit confessors confess to poor country abbés, wrote:

> They confess to some worthy priest whom they know to be very ignorant. How can such an one judge in the dark, absolve, when he has understood no more than if it were High Dutch; how command to restitution when he did not know what restitution was? And into the bargain, having the opportunity to confess to some learned man, you yet go to some wretched village and select some poor blockhead who can hardly read. . . . . If you intend thus to mock at God, at him, yourself, the whole thing, you have done wisely. . . . . Some poor tattered wight who trembles before you and who will possibly dine with your lackeys after Mass.

Here surely we have the quintessence of the snobbery of the humanists above alluded to. A country priest is "a poor tattered wight" to the Parisian Jesuit; he is fit only to dine with lackeys and he "trembles" before a respectable penitent.

Abbé Bremond tells how his beloved humanists attained "the sweet attraction and disposition of courteous methods"—"body for spirit, spirit for virtue, virtue for grace, grace for glory." He tells how they chose for their favorite saint the fair and well-born Magdalene. "Her perfect beauty was for them a reflection of the divine beauty, such beauty seeming to invite or in some measure achieve, or at least to adorn the graces of holiness. *Pulchrior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus*." He leaves on his reader's mind the impression that devout humanism was little else than priggish, peruked Catholicism.

Despite the unattractiveness of the subject upon which Abbé Bremond spent his labor, we cannot fail to recognize the value of *Devout Humanism* as a veritable storehouse of learning. It is a careful and scholarly study into a vagary of the religious emotion of an artificial and narrow generation. It is gratifying that the author's work is so finely translated and that it has been so sympathetically received by reviewers in this country.

E. BOYD BARRETT

NEW YORK

## PICTURING AMERICAN IDEALISM

Volume X of the beautiful series of books entitled "The Pageant of America" is devoted to a most successful attempt at picturing American idealism, the most neglected phase of American history.[1] The editor of this particular volume is the dean of the Yale Divinity School, whose previous publications seem to have been entirely in the field of religious education, though his success in this difficult undertaking is at once evident. Perhaps, after all, religious education furnishes a better preparation for an understanding of American idealism than would the history departments of the average American universities.

The book has ten chapters: five dealing with religion and the churches in the Colonial period; three chapters are devoted to the story of the churches in the national period, while the last two are excellent portrayals of the development of education in the United States from earliest times to the present, the first treating the elementary and secondary schools and the last the colleges and universities. As a picture-book alone the volume is well worth while, for as a whole the pictures are not only very interesting but exceedingly informing.

The book might be open to some criticism because of the arrangement. One all-inclusive chapter deals with the period from the close of the American Revolution to the Civil War, entitled "The Development of the Free Churches." While the materials in the chapter are generally appropriate and interestingly presented, yet there are many omissions, and the arrangement seems more or less confused. It would seem that a separate chapter might well have been devoted to the slavery controversy, and this would have undoubtedly led to a more adequate treatment of that important period in American church history. As it is, less than five pages is given to slavery and the churches, and two of the five deals with the slavery controversy among the Friends, especially in Indiana. The most important slavery struggle in the American churches occurred among the Baptists and the Methodists, but such an impression could not be obtained from reading *American Idealism.* Again a separate chapter might well have been given to the "isms" which arose about midway betwen the Revolution and the Civil War.

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[1] *American Idealism,* "The Pageant of America: A Pictorial History of the United States," Vol. X. By Luther A. Weigle. New Haven: Yale Unviersity Press, 1928. 356 pages.

Mechanically the book is beautifully executed; there is hardly a major error to be found. Perhaps the one coming nearest answering that description is to be found on page 333, where picture 814 shows the Mitchell Tower and Hutchinson Commons of the University of Chicago and is entitled the "Chapel of the University of Chicago." Teachers of American history should welcome this book as a very real aid in presenting that type of material which is often the most difficult to present.

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## FINAL INVENTORY OF A DISILLUSIONED MIND

Those who have read the cool, dispassionate pages in which Albert Houtin has recounted the history of Catholic modernism—pages which are pretty sure to go down in history as the most comprehensive account of that whole remarkable episode[1]—may well have wondered what manner of man it was who could write so impersonally of events in which he had evidently been a participant. The first volume of his autobiography, *Une vie de prêtre,* published in 1926, lifted the veil of cool objectivity and disclosed a man passionately devoted to the church which in his youth he had believed to be the guardian of all truth, and cruelly disillusioned when he discovered evidence which convinced him that her pretentions rested upon a tissue of "pious fraud." The present posthumous volume[2] completes the story of his life, down to within a few days of his death, and assembles a number of important documents bearing on his career, from his own and other pens.

So far as external events are concerned, this concluding chapter in his life proves to be a drab one. A hand-to-hand struggle with poverty ensues upon his leaving the church; he is obliged to sell his books, and even to destroy his voluminous and precious reading-notes, unable to pay for a room in which to store them; a librarian's position in the *Musée pédagogique* finally enables him to eke out an existence and go on writing, until an incurable disease attacks him. But the real significance of this volume lies in the scattered notes wherein Houtin's final outlook on life is summarized. There are pages here that rise to the plane of high tragedy; notably the passage, written just before his death, in which he makes a final inventory of his mind, to explain why he has refused to make his peace with the church and receive the sacrament of extreme unction, in spite of the entreaties of his sister and the solicitous concern of his former spiritual adviser, Father Latourneau. Solemnly, in the presence of death, Houtin reviews the story of his progressive disillusionments:

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[1] See especially his *Question biblique au XIXe siècle, Question biblique au siècle, L'Américanisme, Crise du clergé,* and above all his *Histoire du Modernisme Catholique* (1913). His biographies of Charles Perraud and Father Hyacinthe are also significant.

[2] *Mon Expérience: II. Ma Vie Laïque* (1912–26): *Documents et Souvenirs.* By Albert Houtin. Edited by Felix Sartiaux. Paris: Rieder, 1928. 485 pages. Fr. 18.

> First the dream of my romantic youth: to be a monk. . . .
>
> Then the illusion of the catholic priesthood: when a remnant of good sense had prevented my joining a monastic order I had given myself with all my heart to the secular clergy, I had dreamed of reconciling it with the modern age; I had taken refuge in the chimeras of "modernism," until the day when the evidence had heaped itself upon me with crushing force that the Church is not a divine institution, but . . . . born of an explosion of fanaticism and illuminism.
>
> Then the illusion of Theism, to which I had clung even up to my last illness, repeating to myself pretended proofs, apologetic devices. . . . . My creator and my judge, God! I knew how man invented him.
>
> The meaning of my poor life then appeared to me very clearly. I had been another Don Quixote. During the greater part of my life, I had refused to notice what did not chime in with my dreams. When I consider the religions, what do I see dominating them but dreaming, psychasthenia, illusion, falsehood and imposture? As in the first two periods of my life I noted in the religions and the Churches "everywhere and always the elaboration of pious fraud," so in the third part of my life I noted the same thing in the majority of those so-called savants and thinkers who busy themselves with religion and philosophy in complete freedom—so they claim. Those who advocate a new religion are no more sincere than those who exploit or modernize old religions.
>
> Five centuries before our era, a Sicilian poet, Epicharmus, summed up all wisdom in this maxim: "Be sober and remember not to be credulous; this is the nerve of reason." Be sober and incredulous! Reader, I repeat to you this advice:
>
> *Sois incrédule. Ne sois pas dupe.*
>
> Such are the conclusions of a poor disillusioned Don Quixote.[3]

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[3] Pp. 64–84, condensed. The whole should be read to get the full cumulative effect of it. Cf. also the remarkable section headed *Mon Apologie*, pp. 305–36.

I can imagine no worse indictment against any man (or institution) than to accuse him (or it) of having forced such conclusions upon a naturally trustful and affectionate soul.

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## A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Not many people will read Whitehead's recent book in this generation; not many will read it in any generation.[1] But its influence will radiate through concentric circles of popularization until the common man will think and work in the light of it, not knowing whence the light came. After a few decades of discussion and analysis one will be able to understand it more readily than can now be done.

*Process and Reality* is an attempt to set forth a system of ideas which will illuminate the whole of experience, every instance of experience and all possible experience. This is audacious beyond words. It is metaphysics and cosmology. Therefore in the eyes of some it is ridiculous. It has all the audacity that metaphysics and religion have always had. It is that venture of speculative thinking to which men are inevitably driven, from which they cannot escape, and yet from which they shrink. Therefore it is good form to hold it up to ridicule. Ridicule is the last refuge of that kind of self-esteem which must be protected from the sight of reality.

Has Whitehead given us a true solution to the total problem of man in the universe? No, he has not. Wherein his error lies the reviewer does not know. He only knows the problem is so vast and the human mind so limited that the final word has not yet been spoken. But when it is spoken, if ever it is, there will be in it some echo, however faint, of this book. For the book is not a new creation achieved by the unaided efforts of one man. The author has leaned heavily upon the great thinkers of the past. He has critically absorbed what they had to say and has reorganized it in the light of the best thought of our times. He communicates with all the centuries and brings to renewed expression and to slightly further development the high thinking of Western civilization since Socrates. What we have here, then, is not merely the thinking of one man, but the thinking of many ages focused anew and become articulate again. This periodic recapitulation and new expression of the best thinking is the way the mind of man moves through history toward a better answer to the ultimate and all-important questions. These questions are: What is the universe? What is God? What is man? There is reason to believe the best possible answer up to date is here presented. Some day there will be a better answer, but not now.

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[1] *Process and Reality*. By Alfred North Whitehead. New York: Macmillan, 1929. xii+545 pages. $4.50.

Much of the language has been invented by Whitehead himself; that is to say, he uses old words but puts his own peculiar meaning into them. Every original thinker must do this more or less, but Whitehead does it to excess. Because of this peculiar meaning of words he at times seems to justify a kind of orthodoxy which further study makes plain he never intended to support. There is danger he will be quoted in defense of all sorts of orthodox religious notions that are quite alien to his thought.

One of the most striking features of the book is its comprehensiveness. Consideration is given to almost every aspect of experience. This is possible because of the high degree of abstraction in which he is able to think. He criticizes philosophy and philosophers for their failure to take into consideration this many-sidedness of the world. "Philosophy may not neglect the multifariousness of the world—the fairies dance, and Christ is nailed to the cross."

There is one short chapter of great beauty and profundity which all should read and ponder. It is chapter i of Part V, pages 512–18. He notes that the most precious occurrences are most transitory. The reason is that the dearest experiences are mutually exclusive, hence that which is of greatest value must pass to make way for other great values. This fact is symbolized by the ancient statement: "He giveth his beloved—sleep."

Therefore the chief problem of progress is to organize the world in such a way as to make less mutually exclusive and more mutually inclusive the best that men can experience and the best that can ever occur. There is an inclusive system of organization which holds together not only all that is actual but also all possibilities. This system is of such a sort that it promotes this increasing inclusiveness of precious objects. This system he calls God.

Permanence and change are equally important and indispensable. "Abide with me" expresses the value of permanence; "fast falls the eventide" states the fact of change. The perfect moment, the lovely scene, the dear friend, must pass. But "the perfect moment is fadeless in the lapse of time. Time has then lost its character of 'perpetual perishing'; it becomes the 'moving image of eternity.'"

Religion cannot escape the cosmological problem, try as it will. Writes our author: "The theme of Cosmology, which is the basis of all religion, is the story of the dynamic effort of the world passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of the World's multiplicity of effort." Religion can turn its back on cosmology when advancing knowledge presents a world that is foreign to the presuppositions of religious tradition, or when the cosmos appears too complex and baffling for any sort of conceptual grasp. But if we are sincerely and thoroughly religious we cannot escape the problem that way. It will stand at our shoulder blade like a specter casting its shadow on all we behold. *Process and Reality* has faced the specter and found not a specter but a problem.

The first requirement for an understanding of Whitehead is to grasp the distinction he makes between objects and events. Events constitute the ultimate fact beyond which there can be nothing else. Everything which is or ever can be must pertain to events. Objects are aspects of events. An object is that aspect which an event presents when it interacts with another event. When events interact they present reciprocal aspects to one another. These aspects are objects. For example, the table and myself are aspects of events which arise because of the interaction between that event to which the table pertains, and that event to which I pertain. "I" here means the social object called a personality.

As events transpire with the creative advance of nature they might interact in ever so many different ways, for there is an infinity of possible ways in which events might interact. That means there is an infinity of objects, actual and possible. But, as matter of fact, this infinite wealth of possibility does not occur except according to a definite order. That means many possibilities are excluded for the sake of this order. If it were not for this ordering principle which shapes the interaction of events the universe would be a chaos or, at any rate, be very different from what it is. But through all the changes in the interaction of events this basic order is maintained. Why? There is no reason save the arbitrary fact that interacting events do conform to the principle of an ultimate system. Within the bounds of this system they can undergo a great many different changes in the manner of their interaction, but the essential character of this system forever abides.

Possibility constitutes the nature of the universe quite as much as actuality. The possible interaction of events constitutes objects even when such interaction never occurs. Such objects are not actual; they might be called transcendental until they are actualized, if they ever are. The ultimate system gives order to these transcendental objects as well as to the actual occurrence of events. This ultimate ordering system is God. God is not an object. That is, he is not one aspect of an event which is presented to another event when the two interact. He is that ultimate ordering principle or system which becomes more and more manifest in the world of actual events as time goes on. Through him is all increase of value.

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## RELIGION AS DRAMATIC INTERPRETATION[1]

One turns from the finis of this book to see in some familiar mortared stones the face of beauty: so must the mood persist that here is nurtured in the reader. For epic is here, and small vignettes, and rhapsody. Dr. Alexander is an anthropologist, he is a philosopher of no less standing than to achieve distinction as a past president of the American Philosophical Association; but he is also a dramatist at heart, and in this volume philosophic thought appears garbed in the player's robes, now somber, now rioting in brilliant pageantry.

The book is written for the visual-minded: a caution against that visual preoccupation which takes a pointer-reading for reality; but an incentive to the visual enrichment of abstracted thought. For sight is our one source for scientific formulas, though modified by sense of touch that gives immediacy in space its meaning. To see is to believe; but then, alas, to see is to confuse unless the piecemeal puzzle of our visual sense be organized into a meaning. Such organized perception is a product of the mind and not the eye; and insight is a different thing from eyesight.

Yet science claims our last allegiance in these days, and scarcely anyone dare voice a protest against its tyranny of eyesight and touch. The deadliest rebellions are critiques; and this our author here essays in the name of imaginative understanding. He summarizes thus:

> Now of imaginative understanding three things have been said: First, that it creates a world which is cosmic according to its own laws, and is free and self-directing; second, that the primary forms of this world are a time and space which are vastly richer and more significant than can be any abstractly physical time and space, and which are the very breath of the being of the world of sense-perception; and third, that the symbolisms of music and art, which seize upon these forms and make of them a logic of the spiritual life, are for this very reason penetrating and powerful in the expression of truth, and especially of truths which may have no other communication [p. 36].

With this for his justification, Professor Alexander devotes the main chapters of the book to an interpretation of Christian history as a great drama of man's spiritual life. One thinks of Keyserling's *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* as the author describes the great movements of occidental Christianity in terms of their inner meaning; but the book is free from that calculated perverseness that characterizes the writing of the German savant. Not unnaturally, Jesus is here interpreted as the prophet and exemplar of the author's point of view, and the Judean tragedy becomes a valiant protest of this *innerlichkeit* against the stubborn simplicity of sensuous-minded folk. No wonder, then, that the Johannine Gospel is hailed as the *real* biography of Jesus; (a gospel, so the author states, by that same beloved disciple who wrote from Patmos). After the death on Calvary, Jesus was seen as Christ:

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[1] *Truth and the Faith: An Interpretation of Christianity*. By Hartley Burr Alexander. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. vi+313 pages. $3.00.

> Just as all things that are beautiful in Nature, the moment that their beauty becomes intensified into a poignancy, are lifted out of the heavy reality of physical things and into the frailty of their transfiguration, so the personality of Jesus, illumined with the poignancy of his Passion, became, even for those who had touched his body, a vision and an adoration [p. 102].

Through Paul, "the man who first discovered conscience; certainly it is he who first saw in it a personal responsibility and not a god's oracle" (p. 108), the sacrifice of Christ becomes an elevation, making the dualism of Plato and the Persians terrible with tragedy (pp. 121 f.). The intense activism of Paul's gospel merely reflects the mystery fane, the prophet, and the slave in the presence of which he lived; his apocalypticism is just "another form of this thinking through of things living" (pp. 121 f.).

With the coming of Christianity to Europe, oriental apocalypticism is transmuted into occidental logic, mystery into reason, and phantasm into science. The transition is epitomized in Origen, and culminates in the sterile logomachy of the scholastics; but the other experience of the Christ lives on in art. What vividness there was in the Faith in succeeding centuries was gained from social analogies pressed into service for the Church's need. The bond of oath, the comitatus of Teutonic hordes, is found as pattern for the Christian band in Caedmon and in Cynewulf. With feudalism came the family as the social pattern, another contribution of the northland to our Christian thought; till sovereignty becomes the later character of God. The Holy Family itself takes on regality; and ritual and heraldry share much in common. The sacraments become the symbols of life's deepest meanings: birth, adolescence, parentage, and dying gasp; the entrance into spiritual wedlock of the celibate taking orders; self-understanding and self-proof in penance; the shuddering, glorious commingling of God and man in one great act of fealty in the Mass. In Dante the whole universe becomes a majesty.

Following on the heels of devastation in the forms of war and plague, the modern world is ushered in; and with it comes the Protestant—and science. Dazzled by discourse men lose perspective, "excepting greatly Blaise Pascal," the man who saw the limitations of man's measurements (pp. 212–18). And still men blundered on, drawing a man-made circle around the earth and putting God outside save as a starter for the whole, till man became his own sufficient self, capable of perfection from the start. Protestant evangelism is a reflection of a democratized society where priest and people mix and subject worshipers become a congregation (pp. 231 f.); and yet it creates a religion of the heart, found in its hymns. To its warm glow is added as complement the stern, clean insight of the Puritan and the quiet peacefulness of Quaker silences.

A new world now appears within our purview. Just as the Black Death and the Hundred Years' War and discoveries geographical and scientific mark the inauguration of the modern world which now is passing; so the latest era comes with Peary and Amundsen, the Treaty of Versailles (placed as a marker not a harbinger!) and the shift of influence from Europe to the New World; Einstein and Riemann and Millikan. And this world, too, has idols born of its time and place: the state, civilization, humanity—all terrestrial and temporal—and science. The last has forced to their knees morality and religion, till the one becomes a vague "social service" and the other becomes a "subject" in the curriculum. Religion is regarded "as *a thing to be explained*, and not as *itself the explanation*" (p. 266).

Against such subjugation to scientific formulation the author flings his protest and joins hands across the seas with Eddington. The physical structure of the world is not its sole actuality, there is a moral structure just as real.

> Whatever more the world may be, none can say that it does not embrace what for us is better and worse, and what for us is desire and disgust. Now these words of themselves mean choice. They mean that . . . . there exist . . . . agencies of selection . . . . that the situation is *not* mechanical . . . . that it describes a freedom . . . . as expressing the existence of such a thing as character [pp. 269 f.].

Against the current philosophic panderings to science he also inveighs:

> Sometimes we are saying that the All is a pocket of stardust; or again that it is a race of time with eternity, like clockhands pinned to the circle of one dial; or that it is a syllogism, neat with self-abstraction; or a crush of sense; or a numbered ditty plucked where no strings are; or a vortex of self-deforming space, age-blown from naught to naught. These are the descriptions given by our philosophies and our sciences. . . . . Can any man whose soul has been wrung with an hour's passion or been lifted into but an instant's cloud-rift vision of the blue, can any dream that even this fleck of human truth is dispensed by such credulities? . . . . The net of reason is too loose of mesh if all the shining things escape it [pp. 271 f.].

From the newer physics and its relativism emerges again the dignity of man: observer in a time and space which find in him their definition, and in his understanding gain significance beyond a huge machine. In man are "higher" and "lower" given meaning and the moral comes again into its own reality in thought.

The argument is closely knit for all the range and richness of its expression, and if at times the beauty of diction lull the reader into unwariness it is not itself obscurantist. As befits the idealistic premises of its reasoning, it stands coherent as a line of thought. But there are some who will question whether insight is so strange to sense as this book says. For such the author's faith is not a truth unless he be convinced by reading once again the first two chapters. If then he can agree, let him give himself up again to the loveliness of the last chapter: the credo of a Christian who is consummate artist, human sufferer, honest thinker, and moral searcher—all in one.

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## A CRITICISM OF ORTHODOXY

An interesting and valuable book has been written by the professor of theology in the Meadville Theological School, which has recently moved from Meadville, Pennsylvania, to the vicinity of the University of Chicago.[1] The title of the book only indicates the temper in which it is written. It does not suggest the rich content of the book. Only twice or three times is there any reference to frankness in religion. Once when he discusses the question of miracles and deprecates the disingenuousness of one theologian who declares, "Science knows no single miracle because for science all the world has become miraculous," for he thinks that this statement might lead one to suppose that "science really supports the historical faith in miracles, which is not at all the case." The other time is when he comes to discuss the person and work of Jesus, and finds another thinker remarking: "The prudent mind halts before the mystery of Jesus Christ." Professor Hutcheon does not feel that the modern mind should halt before any mystery, but should push on in reverence and with eager, searching spirit to explore all mysteries, in particular the mystery of personality and no less the personality of Jesus.

There is no argument for frankness, and no claim made that only he and certain others possess it. He has this temper; he does all his work in this spirit and exhibits it unconsciously. It is the habit of his mind, and he knows full well that it is the characteristic of all modern men.

The book from the point of view of traditional theology is radical and destructive. It assumes that the whole traditional orthodox theology is in decay. The old supernaturalism in which it was built has been undermined and the superstructure is in ruin. The traditional theories of the atonement are as foreign to the modern mind as pre-Copernican theories of astronomy. The old dogmatic creedal views of the person of Christ are abandoned. Dr. Hutcheon would agree with the Catholic and Fundamentalist in their thought of him as a radical critic.

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[1] *Frankness in Religion*. By Robert J. Hutcheon. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. vii+307 pages. $2.50.

From another point of view, however, the book is truly conservative. The new "humanists" will think the book too conservative, for it keeps continuity with the deeper life and faith of the Christian church through centuries, it retains and maintains the theistic interpretation of the universe, and it cherishes the immortal hope for the dead. It is conservative in the best sense of the term, for it endeavors to conserve the vital experience, and the dynamic faith of all religions, and, in particular, of the Christian religion.

Back of all the theological interpretations, and ecclesiastical institutions, and popular superstitions, he holds there is a vital experience. It expresses the nature of man in his functioning in relation to spiritual reality. Religion is native to man in such a universe as this. It has its roots in the soul, and its branches spread widely in the free air. This is the vital reality of religion. Here he seeks its explanation, and from this point of view interprets its profound meaning, and on this ground justifies it.

He takes up one after another of the outstanding questions in theology, states the traditional interpretation, shows its utter inadequacy, and then proceeds to find the vital experience in it, and to release it, and give its meaning and value for modern men. While the temper of the book is frank, its content is a modernist interpretation of religion, and it is this in particular that gives it its value.

The book is written for ministers and intelligent laymen, and it is intended to help them in this time of the passing of the old theology, and of perplexity and confusion, and of fear that nothing of worth remains. And it admirably fulfils its purpose. There are some striking chapters in the book, such as those on "Religion and the Creative Imagination," "What Makes the Bible Unique," "The Present Values of Worship," "The Meaning of God in Modern Thought," and "Morality without Supernatural Sanctions." If one reads any of these chapters he will read all the others.

DANIEL EVANS

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

## RECOLLECTIONS OF A PREACHER

There are many clergymen who keep notebooks for sermons, but not many who keep notebooks for their experiences, problems, contacts, and events, and yet this is what Dr. Niebuhr did for some thirteen years, and as he leaves the pastorate for a professorship he gives us the benefit of his reflections and comments.[1] We see him as a young minister worrying about his sermons and wondering if he can produce new ones week by week; as a young pastor shrinking from calling upon his parishioners, exhausted by some calls and renewed in strength and faith by others; as a public-minded citizen deeply deploring the crude and crass interests of his city and the antisocial nature of its dominant industry; as a Christian minister with a world-wide horizon and a passion for the peace of understanding and fellowship.

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[1] *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic.* By Reinhold Niebuhr. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1929. xiv+198 pages. $2.00.

His personal contacts are numerous and various, and his comments on certain persons, preachers, churches, institutions, and industry frank and fearless, often drastic, and generally to the point. But he has his admirations also. There are some beautiful appreciative pages, especially those on Bishops Williams and McConnell, and on a poor, stricken, and dying woman with great faith. He is not a "cynic." He uses the term "cynic" on several occasions, but always for condemnation, because of its depreciation of the good and skepticism as to the true. And he is certainly not "tamed." He is eager and earnest, and courageous, and critical of himself as well as of others; he is well balanced and very tolerant.

Young ministers will find in the book much for their guidance and encouragement; older ministers will recall and compare their own experiences with his, and renew their youth; and young men who contemplate entering the ministry will be greatly helped by those pages which express his high estimate of the ministry. And if laymen would read the book and ponder its comments on churches, religion, and industry they would be given much to think about and to act upon.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY — DANIEL EVANS

## A PROGRAM FOR PIETY

The purpose of this book,[1] as stated by Professor Wieman, is to show "how religion can be made to produce definite, observable results in the improvement of human living." The author describes what seems to him involved in religious living and outlines the methods which would be essential in achieving the quality of religious living described. Throughout the discussion he applies his conception of God as the "integrating process of the universe," and of religion of the noblest kind as man's "attaining or seeking some richer integration of life through meeting the requirements of the progressively integrating process of the world."

The book gives an illuminating and indeed thrilling picture of the individual whose private religious living is effective: an individual who has freed himself from the established mores and is living in conscious recognition of the community of interdependence; who has found meaning for the trivial things of life because they are increasingly related to the great purposes of his life; who is free from demoralizing fear in the face of the crises of life, because he is able to accept the facts precisely as they are, and who can meet these crises effectively because he is sensitive to changing conditions, capable of changing his own ways, and with it all has become conscious that underneath all facts is the basic fact upon which all others depend, the fact of God; who has entered into an organic fellowship with others in such a way as to intensify and enrich the feeling of each, however different their feelings may be from one another; who is able to enjoy life because he is not restlessly striving after something not yet attained, and because he has overcome worry and anxiety and envy; who is intensely conscious of the unfathomable possibilities for good which are inherent in this present world, and who holds himself in readiness to make any sacrifice whatsoever, when such sacrifice seems to be the best thing to bring forth that other better world; and who finds human energy released because he has found his relationship to the process called God, which makes for increasing interdependence and co-operation in the world.

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[1] *Methods of Private Religious Living.* By Henry Nelson Wieman. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1929. 219 pages. $1.75.

The methods of religious living, Professor Wieman says, should all be directed to seeking and sustaining richer integrations of experience and ascertaining if these can be developed indefinitely. The chief method for attaining this quality of life, he considers to be private worship. A considerable section of the book is given, both in separate chapters and incidentally in other chapters, to indicating the conditions and describing the processes of worship. He confines his attention, however, to problem-solving or deliberative worship, and except as a setting for this type of worship, he does not consider what might be termed appreciative worship. He does not discuss corporate public worship, but the kind in which each individual conducts his own personal worship under the stimulation and co-operation of the group. For him worship is probing beneath the sham and pose, struggling to cast off the unconscious and unintended but inevitable hypocrisy, and getting down to reality about one's self and his world. It is to find out what is wrong with himself and establish that personal attitude through which one can receive from sources outside the influences which will correct the wrong. He outlines in detail what is involved in a process of this sort. Commencing with a general setting which reminds one of the vast and unimaginable possibilities for good which are inherent in this integrating process called God, the worshiper then carries through the analysis of his problem and the examination of his personal attitudes, and comes to a conclusion as to the readjustment of personality which is required. Professor Wieman rejects as undesirable several of the ordinary practices of mysticism and claims that it reaches its height when an individual "ex-poses himself to the stimulation of a problematical situation, with a mind freed of all bias and preconclusion, and waiting in this state or returning periodically to it until there dawns upon the mind that integration which will solve the problem." He insists that scientific method, that is, the method of intelligence can be applied to religion, and through this method illusions may be sifted out and practical plans may be made for carrying out the new possibilities for good.

But Professor Wieman's suggestions as to how these searching processes of worship may be carried on are disappointing. Repeatedly through the book is the statement that if an individual will take a little time each day, with occasional longer periods, for meditation in solitude, whether in the church or in some established place, these problem-solving and integrating processes will take place. Indeed, in connection with a description of the most profound type of problem-solving, that involved in the mystical approach, he makes the comment that "the practice in youth of reserving a few minutes every day for quiet meditation and worship is something which every adolescent should learn and establish as a habit. This gives the required training for mystical problem solving." Despite the new terminology, this has very much the flavor of the old "morning watch," and the assumption that any such results as Professor Wieman describes will take place in the experience of the vast majority of people, simply because they have these brief periods of quiet, is to fail to indicate to the individuals who read the book the price they must pay in mastering the processes of worshipful thinking which Professor Wieman describes. More than this Professor Wieman does not sufficiently make clear, what must have been true in his own experience, that these periods of private meditation are useful only as they are related to the most thorough processes of study, on the one hand, and to courageous experimentation in living, on the other. Professor Wieman would, I am sure, immediately admit that it requires wide study and rich experience, as well as real skill, to face the chief problem with which the individual is struggling and to survey it comprehensively and actually, or to discover the facts about one's self and one's world and to expose one's self to the stimulation of these facts until they have worked the physiological and psychological readjustment, or to discover the integrating processes as we find them in nature, in love, and in the various associations to life. Without the connection of these periods of quiet with these wider processes and without real skill in meditating, they will become superficial musing, no matter what terminology is used or how regularly they may be carried on. Professor Wieman quite unintentionally, I realize, is in danger of leading those who read his book astray in the same way that others have done. Because a great leader found a daily period of private devotion useful in his own life, others may adopt this practice without bringing to it either the method or the content which the leader had, and the practice may fail. Unless Professor Wieman supplements his present volume with another in which he shares something of the methods of study and experience which have enriched his life outside of the meditation periods, and which have brought him to his meditation with a preparation which gave to that period its great significance, others are likely to have only the trappings of what has been in Professor Wieman's experience a deep and far-reaching process.

Professor Wieman also seems to make an incorrect assumption regarding the relation of individual and social. He seems to assume in the introduction to his book and in the chapter on "Reconstructing Society" that all social problems are simply collections of individual problems, and that if the individual gets his personal life adjusted the social problem will take care of itself. The book fails to recognize the extent to which the problems of our civilization are corporate problems, which will be solved only as the structure of society is changed. No matter how much as an individual I may change my attitude and practice in relation to negroes, I soon come into the areas which affect the social structure, and in which I am party in spite of myself to basic social discrimination. The same thing is true in many other areas of life. In other words, the established mores are the ways of living together in social groupings, and the more one puts himself in conflict with these mores, the more does he find it difficult to live, and complete maladjustment means death. Corporate problems of our society will need to be faced corporately, and cannot be solved by private devotion alone.

A third limitation in Professor Wieman's suggestions comes in his assumptions regarding the place of autosuggestion. He proposes, for instance, that individuals shall meet fear and envy by suggesting to themselves just the opposite of these. This is a naïve application to religion of the methods of suggestion which some psychiatrists use. But no individual dealing fundamentally with such deep-rooted maladies as excessive fear and envy would be willing to assume that these basic difficulties could be any more than temporarily relieved by a method of this sort. To practice the presence of God simply as a way of persuading one's self that everything is all right, rather than as the method of search by which the solution to these difficulties is found, is inconsistent with the whole point of view of Professor Wieman's book. To be able to look at things with reality, and to be ready to accept the facts precisely as they are, will not come about simply by filling one's mind with the thought that underneath all other facts is the fact of God. It requires the thoroughgoing processes which Professor Wieman has described in the other parts of his book.

This book describes in a clear and challenging manner the results which ought to be achieved in methods of private religious living, but is inadequate in its suggestions as to how these results may be brought about.

Union Theological Seminary Harrison S. Elliott

## AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

The scientific literature of America is even today quite remote from the students of France and the European continent in general. Our intellectual movements as a whole have to a considerable extent remained unfamiliar to them, even in fields like the psychology of religion where America has had something distinctive and significant to offer. To be sure, the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, in 1922, devoted one of its issues to nine papers by representative American scholars on the chief trends in recent American thought; and among the contributions was one by Professor W. E. Hocking on "Principles of Method in the Psychology of Religion." About three years ago, moreover, the writer of the present review published in *Symposion* an account of the development of the psychology of religion in America, its chief literature, and the various points of view, methods, and aims of its leading representatives. Nevertheless, it may not be doubted that such publications as that of Professor Morgan's which is now before us are directed to a real need.[1]

Whether, however, the method and plan of the book are the best is more questionable. After a word of introduction the author launches into a chapter consisting of running accounts of the main points in Starbuck's pioneer volume, *The Psychology of Religion*, and then of those in James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*. This is followed by a chapter on "Social Theories of Religious Evolution as Set Forth by Ames and Coe." Here again we are given but brief epitomes of various chapters, in the order of their appearance, in Ames's first major work and in Coe's *The Psychology of Religion*. Little is said of functionalism as a method or of the important differences in the functionalistic and the social conceptions dominating the two books thus brought together. Throughout the volume, moreover, no account is taken of the development of views in the scholars considered, nor is their work as a whole placed before us. Stratton's *The Psychology of the Religious Life*, Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*, Leuba's *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, and Martin's *The Mystery of Religion* are abstracted in chapters iii–vii, the volume then coming to a close with some general remarks that throw but little light, regrettably, on the values and limitations of the American movements as a whole and the possibilities of the sort of empirical approach to religion which they essay.

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[1] *La Psychologie de la religion dans l'Amérique d'aujourd'hui.* By William Joseph Morgan. Paris: Jouve & Cie, 1928. 224 pages.

Professor Morgan's volume will probably serve both to increase in France the existing knowledge of the psychology of religion in America and to impel French students to the original sources. This doubtless was its central aim and in so far it is to be commended. To be of wider value, however, the book is too much lacking in interpretation; cross-references and significant comparisons are too rare, as are considered appraisal and constructive criticism. A rather extensive Bibliography is appended, but this is unclassified and its titles reveal no clear principle of selection. Texts on ethics, social psychology, and introduction to philosophy are included, as are general treatises on philosophical themes and Mary Baker Eddy's *Science and Health,* while Irving King's *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness,* for example, and all the rich literature in our scientific journals receive no mention.

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## PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE[1]

To a captious critic the very first word in the title of this book might be used as an occasion for fault-finding and dissatisfaction. To speak of *the* philosophic way of life suggests that a contrast is intended between a specifically philosophic and other non-philosophic ways of living. This suggestion receives confirmation when we read, on the second page, that there are "five major attitudes towards life: the religious, the scientific, the social, the aesthetic, and the philosophic." Presently, however, we discover that the writers chosen to represent the first four of these attitudes are, respectively, Royce, James, Dewey, and Santayana. Admirers and disciples of these distinguished writers may find themselves in the mood to join forces with our hypothetical critic in objecting to the implication that our foremost philosophers were lacking in the philosophical attitude. The more tolerant reader will perhaps find in the discovery of a new meaning for the term "philosophic" a certain compensation for this form of presentation.

What is this new meaning? The author has not the slightest intention of denying that each of the writers mentioned represents a philosophic way of life. But

> to see each of these as *a* philosophic way of life is itself the beginning of *the* philosophic way of life. Each of them as we have noted, constitutes an idea-way; each of them arises naturally and psychologically from describable sets of circumstances confronted by life in this actual world. The philosophic way of

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[1] *The Philosophic Way of Life.* T. V. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. xiii+234 pages. $2.50.

> life par excellence is not merely, however, to discover that each of them is a philosophic way but to see that each of them is a product at various stages of a continuous single process. That is, the first function and service of the philosophic way of life as such is to become wise in the way of ideas and sympathetic with the ways that ideas serve [p. 31].

To state the matter platitudinously, the first prerequisite for the philosophic way of life is open-mindedness. Each of the idea-ways reviewed in the book has something of value. This includes even the transcendentalism of Royce, although the author's endeavor to make this convincing requires some visible effort. He is happier and more at ease in stating his reason for dissenting from Royce, which is essentially that Royce's philosophy is a substitute for effort, a short-cut to results that can be achieved only by patient and persistent toil.

> We are here in the presence again of our elemental religious temper: if works won't, then faith will. When you see no other way to improve things, denounce the need to improve them, renounce the effort to do so; and, behold, the job is done. This is the royal road to such as find it possible. It encourages a renunciation of creative effort and a resignation to the order that already prevails [pp. 62–63].

The scientific way of life, as represented by James, meets with greater commendation. This way of life the author calls "the nucleus of my own philosophy." James, however, is not entirely consistent; and in dealing with religious topics is too much disposed to make use of a terminology that perpetuates the attitude of transcendentalism. Intrinsically it does not matter, of course, whether we use such a term as religion or some other designation,

> so only the simple-minded be not beguiled from science and art by treating vicarious experience as a short-cut to power that can come only through knowledge and manipulation of natural means. It is noted, however, that perfectly good names already exist to describe the other realms, namely, aesthetics and ethics and science [p. 201].

The social way of life, as expounded by Dewey, contributes the insight that "life cannot be lived wisely save in appreciative recognition of its debt to and duty toward society (p. 221)." Dewey has helped us to see that our moral standards and social institutions are not founded on an immutable reality but are the product of creative forces in our social life. As the author intimates, however, Dewey, is too much disposed to make man the measure of things; he is too insistent that "what things are for as mortals, only this they are for and of themselves." Santayana's exposition of the aesthetic way of life points to an attitude of detachment and contemplation that offers much for the enrichment of life. A serious defect of Santayana's attitude is the tendency to make too sharp a contrast between the useful and the beautiful. This contrast, so it is hinted, is an indication that Santayana has not become wholly emancipated from the bondage of tradition. But his great merit is that "he has made available an acceptance of the universe more active than resignation, more passive than rebellion—the harvest of a quiet eye content merely to observe the passing show" (p. 225).

This survey of attitudes brings us finally to the question of what constitutes the philosophic attitude, the philosophic way of life. Open-mindedness is an indispensable trait, but it does not in itself reveal or describe its character. The philosophic attitude is not resignation, not the quest for knowledge, not immersion in social relations, not aesthetic indulgence, but a pattern or way of living that borrows from all of these other attitudes without being completely expressed in any of them. It is an attitude for which we have as yet no universally accepted name. It counsels resignation in irremediable situations, but it does so in a spirit of sportsmanship, a spirit that has traces both of humor and of scientific curiosity.

> Man in trouble is so superior to his troubles that, as the traveler ignores the dust of the road, so man looks quietly upon the host of besetting evils, sees them for what they are, and feels that it is enough to know that all their values, whether positive or negative, borrow something from his own creative self. Why, then, should he not take them one by one, as they come, and find each event self-justifying? This is the essence of independence. Who has it not is yet a slave pulling for salvation [p. 216].

This point of view, which the author presents with engaging simplicity and charm of style, is not Stoic, either in its spirit of resignation or in its detachment from outward things. It is an attitude which proposes to make capital out of man's defeat, to salvage as much as possible from the wreck. There is wisdom in this counsel. For all our boasted control over nature, the individual person is in constant danger of being overwhelmed by circumstances and of missing the values that life has to offer. To cultivate a wise detachment and impersonal curiosity, in some form and to some degree, affords a measure of protection. The determination of this final attitude is what constitutes a person's individual philosophy. To some of his readers the author's emphasis on detachment will appear one-sided. Perhaps the little that he has learned from Royce is still too much. We do not want metaphysical substitutes for the fruits of scientific labor, but neither do we want an exaggerated sense of man's impotence. It seems reasonable to believe that the philosophic attitude advocated by the author could be maintained in its essentials, and with a richer content, in connection with a constructive social gospel for the redemption of the world.

Ohio State University Boyd H. Bode

# RECENT BOOKS

## RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

GUNKEL, HERMANN, and ZSCHARNACK, LEOPOLD (eds.). *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* 2. Aufl. Band III, Bogen 25–28, Tafel 1–8, M. 3.60; Bogen 29–37, M. 5.40; Bogen 38–45, Tafel 9–24. M. 7.20. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929.

Three more parts of this work are now before us. The thorough-going revision and uniform excellence of the earlier parts continue in evidence. The work of the editors has been done with great care, and the contributors have performed their tasks in an admirable manner. Different articles in the present *Lieferungen* immediately attract attention. Several pages are devoted to the subject of child psychology. The article "Church," with kindred treatments of church officials, buildings, organization, and the like, claims a large amount of space. But these subjects are treated in such detail, and yet with such care for proper proportion, that taken together they constitute essentially a new work on church history. There is a suggestive discussion of war (*Krieg*) with special reference to the effects of the late World War on the church and religion. The general theme *Kultur* and closely related topics constitute another important section of the text. The articles on art in its different aspects as related to religion are especially noteworthy, and they are accompanied by many splendid illustrations.

## HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

ASTLEY, H. J. D. *Biblical Anthropology.* New York: Oxford Press, 1929. 262 pages. $4.50.

Not an exhaustive treatment of the subject as such, but a series of essays, several of which have been previously published in various journals. The essays have, however, been so arranged that they lead the reader through the whole range of the contribution which anthropology can make to biblical study. They are rich in suggestions for further studies along the same lines, and constitute an excellent introduction to a difficult field. Bible teachers will find here, especially through the parallels drawn from modern primitive peoples, much material which will help them to make the Hebrews more real and lifelike to their students.

BERRY, G. R. *Premillennialism and Old Testament Prediction.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. 37 pages. $1.00.

This small but very striking essay is well worth the dollar that is asked for its thirty-seven pages. After a review of the teachings of premillennialism based upon passages quoted from the writings of such modern proponents of this system as Blackstone, Campbell Morgan, Scofield, Haldeman, and Gaebelein, Professor Berry comes to the following conclusions on pages 32 f.: premillennialism's picture of the future is Judaistic, material and un-Christian; its presentation of human relationships and of the character of God and Christ is immoral; these perversions are directly traceable to the premillennial dogma that the Old Testament predictions present God's definite program of the future which must be fulfilled.

To read this volume, and in particular the blood-curdling quotation from Haldeman on Christ's coming appearance as an autocratic king who will trample the wine-press of humanity in a furore of bloody frenzy, is to come to feel a more profound gratitude for the liberty won for all men, by the pens of a long line of patient biblical critics, from outrun, untenable, and positively immoral attitudes to Holy Writ. All those who must deal in daily life with the perverted vagaries of the militant and morally astigmatic type of premillennialist will find this little volume invaluable.

BERTIE, PAUL (Trans.). *Le Poème de Job—Traduction nouvelle, introduction et notes.* Paris: Rieder, 1929. 199 pages. Fr. 12.

A new French translation of the Book of Job. It is in rhythmic prose, each line of the poem being reproduced in eight syllables. A brief introduction dealing with the composition, the content and its character, and parallel materials in Babylonia and elsewhere, prepares the reader for an intelligent reading of the poem.

BLUNT, A. W. F. *The Prophets of Israel.* New York: Oxford Press, 1929. 126 pages. $1.25.

This very readable little book is designed as a help for teachers in secondary and public schools or in Bible classes. In the Preface the writer deplores the "convention of wooden, artificial reverence in the study of biblical stories" and reveals a purpose to assist in making scriptural characters and incidents lifelike and realistic with which the intelligent teacher will strongly sympathize.

The book reflects very clearly the author's thorough assimilation of the positions of modern biblical criticism, although many will take issue with the emphasis laid upon the "corruption" of Hebrew religion, through Canaanitic influences, after the entry into Palestine.

The experienced teacher will find useful the questions on the several chapters, which are appended. But the teacher who has not the gift or the technique for provoking discussion may find them less helpful. There is abundant room for other little books of this type in the field of materials for religious education.

CANAAN, T. *Dämonglaube im Lande der Bibel.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1929. iv +64 pages. M. 2.70.

The author succeeds in showing how very persistent among native Palestinians is the tendency, even in this age, to people the world with spirits and to explain all things not obvious by sense perception in terms of their activities. In his term *Palästinenser* he includes, as he is careful to tell us *der Fellache, Beduine und Städter (Mohammedaner und Christ).* One is, perhaps, to conclude that the Jewish elements of the population are immune from such survivals of demonism, which seems hardly possible.

This study will be of some value toward the understanding of many passages in the Old Testament where we have survivals of demonism. It should help to remind us that archaeological investigations of any given area should be supplemented by anthropological investigations into the life of its modern inhabitants. It is true that the present may illumine the past fully as much as the past the present.

FLEG, EDMOND. *Why I Am a Jew.* Translated from the French by Louise Waterman Wise, with a Foreword by Stephen S. Wise. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1929. xviii+100 pages. $1.25.

A charmingly written story of the writer's religious history, how he was brought up in Judaism, left it in his youth, and returned to it in his maturity. His Judaism is a broad and liberal kind and recognizes the close kinship between itself and Christianity. The really determining element in Fleg's spiritual evolution seems to have been the racial instinct in his Jewish blood. The work of the translator has been beautifully done, and the Foreword starts the book off on the right foot.

JORDAN, W. G. *The Book of Job—Its Substance and Spirit.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 194 pages. $2.00.

This is a popular introduction o the Book of Job. It contains six brief introductory chapters on such matters as the literary analysis of the book, its interpretation, its spiritual meaning, and the like, a brief bibliography, and nearly one hundred pages of the text in a translation revised from that by Professor Taylor Lewis in the American issue of Lange's Commentary on Job.

KELLETT, E. E. *A Short History of the Jews down to the Roman Period.* New York: Dial Press, 1929. 280 pages. $3.50.

This is a thoroughly modern treatment of the History of Israel. It is provided with a concise Introduction of seventy-eight pages in which brief sketches are given of various subjects, such as the Hebrew conception of history, the Hebrew idea of Yahweh, the composite character of Old Testament books, the Hebrew use of paronomasia, the chronology of the Old Testament Hebrew modes of speech. Four detailed maps are also provided, as well as a glossary, a short bibliography, a chronological table and an Index.

The book is charmingly written. The style is clear and winning and the narration is so full of interest as to carry the reader along without effort. The actual history is quite rightly begun with Moses. The Patriarchal period is relegated to the area of legend and myth. The homiletical character of the so-called "historics" is fully recognized; the rhetorical and bombastic character of much of the language is pointed out; and the unreasonable exaggeration of many figures is probably discounted. The point of view of the author is frank and free, unhampered by theological prejudices or traditional preconceptions. The work is but a sketch of the main course of events; it is lacking in the detail and minutiae necessary to a complete history. It omits all mention of the Assuan colony in Egypt. It pays scarcely any attention to the contacts of the Hebrew mind with the minds of adjacent peoples and civilizations. It carries the story clear down through New Testament times, yet makes no mention to the life and work of Jesus, the greatest of all the Jews.

It needs much supplementation in order to be a complete history of the ancient Jewish people. But it is an admirable bird's-eye view of the history of that people and an excellent book to place in the hands of an inquiring student, eager to know the truth of things as they are.

LIPMAN, A. *Authenticité du Pentateuque.* Paris: Leroux, 1929. xii+290 pages. Fr. 20.

The writer exhausts a volume of considerable size and displays a good deal of uncritical erudition in an attempt to refute the critical view of the composition of the Pentateuch. The following quotation from the conclusion of Book IV will give the reader an adequate idea of the sort of thing he may expect throughout this volume. "The historical problem of the origins of the Pentateuch is not solved by criticism. It cannot give, with any semblance of certainty, either the *names* of the authors of the different literary documents into which the text has been parted, with the pre-conceived idea of its non-authenticity, or the *ages* in which these divers documents may have been composed, or the *name* of the definitive redacteur, or the *age* of this last redaction."

Obviously the writer has no accurate idea of the critical attitude. Names and dates are to him the substance of literature and the soul of history. He succeeds in demolishing, entirely to his own satisfaction, from premises of his own choice, a point of view the deepest fundamentals of which he does not understand. But for all that he is inclined to be courteous, if withal somewhat condescendingly (cf. p. 280). For this small mercy all critics will feel due gratitude.

SPERBER, A. *Septuaginta-Probleme* (Texte und Untersuchungen zur vormasorethischen Grammatik des Hebräischen. Herausgegeben von Paul Kahle. III—Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament. III. 13.) Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1929. 101 pages. M. 7.50.

Sperber contends (1) that Lagarde's analysis of the sources of the Septuagint into three recensions, viz. (*a*) Origen, (*b*) Lucian, (*c*) Hesychius, does not accord with the facts; (2) that Rahlfs's division into four groups is no more satisfactory; and (3) that the key to the problem is to be found in the various forms in which proper names are transcribed. Many cases of variants are cited. The conclusion arrived at is that the age of recension is not determined by the script in which a manuscript is written, but rather by the place it occupies in the chronological series of manuscripts containing it. Also, it is incorrect to speak of variants of the Massoretic text when we should speak of variants from the Hebrew of which the Septuagint is a translation. On the basis of an exact study of the Greek text and its variants, the original Hebrew from which it was translated may be recovered. This study is a very valuable contribution to the textual criticism of the Old Testament.

## NEW TESTAMENT

DEANE, ANTHONY C. *How to Understand the Gospels*. New York: Harper, 1929. 212 pages. $1.50.

Here is a very readable popular statement of modern English critical opinion regarding the origins of the New Testament gospels. The views represented are in the main those of Canon Streeter, but with a somewhat stronger leaning toward traditional opinions regarding the Fourth Gospel. Such attempts to mediate between the research scholar and the general reader deserve high commendation.

FREUNDORFER, JOSEPH. *Die Apokalypse des Apostels Johannes und die hellenistische Kosmologie und Astrologie*. St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1929. x+148 pages. $1.80.

The treatise by Franz Boll, *Aus der Offenbarung Johannis,* is here subjected to a searching criticism with particular reference to his theory that the author of Revelation drew largely for his imagery upon the astrological notions current in hellenistic literature. This view is vigorously combatted at every point. The sources of the imagery are found nearer at hand in the seer's Jewish ancestry and especially in the capacity for "genuine visions" of which he was capable. The subject has not attracted much attention since Boll's book appeared in 1914, and this criticism will be welcome as a stimulus to further discussion if not a final solution of the issues.

KLOSTERMANN, ERICH. *Das Lukasevangelium.* 2 Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929. 246 pages. M. 9.50.

This volume on Luke completes the important new edition of commentaries on the gospels in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament.* In actual number of pages the revision is shorter than the original edition, but by the use of smaller type room has been made for a considerable amount of supplementary material. Large account has been taken of the more recent literature. There is a larger use of illustrative rabbinic citations drawn from the work of Strack-Billerbeck. On points of literary criticism the representatives of Formgeschichte have been cited as occasion has seemed to require. Readers are also made acquainted with recent English studies on the problem of a proto-Luke. Klostermann's two earlier volumes on Mark and Luke, now available in a second edition, ought also to be at hand for use in the study of passages where Luke parallels the other evangelists. The three volumes together constitute the most valuable critical commentary at present available on the Synoptic Gospels, just as the new edition of Walter Bauer's *Das Johannesvangelium* which appeared four years ago in this same series is still our best aid for critical study of the Fourth Gospel.

ROPES, JAMES HARDY. *The Singular Problem of the Epistle to the Galatians.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. 46 pages.

This very suggestive monograph, starting from Lütgert's theory regarding Galatians, continues and expands this line of investigation to more specific and significant conclusions. The chief point in the new intrepretation concerns the type of hostility which Paul encountered in Galatia and attacked in his epistle. We are told that while there were Judaizers there was also another party of extreme hellenistic liberals who were prone to carry Paul's doctrine of liberty to pernicious extremes. If these two groups of opponents are kept in mind when reading the Epistle to the Galatians it is thought that the difficulties formerly experienced by interpreters of the letter will be readily solved.

## HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

BASS, ARCHER B. *Protestantism in the United States.* New York: Crowell, 1929. xii+364 pages. $3.00.

This is one among several books which have appeared in recent months to help along the cause of Church union in the United States.

The book has two divisions: Part I, devoted to the origin and development of denominationalism in the United States; Part II, to interdenominationalism, its problem and progress. After a meager historical background, based on a few familiar secondary materials, the author proceeds to a discussion of the good and evil of denominationalism, in which the evils outweigh the good, though there is generous recognition of the "real and permanent" achievement which has been the result of separation.

Co-operation is the key-word of Part II, and each of the five chapters making up this division deal with some of its phases. One of the points made in the discussion of co-operation and distribution of denominations, is that co-operation sentiment is strongest in those sections where no one denomination has a decided lead but where several denominations are about equal in numbers and influence. Some interesting facts are presented in chapter viii concerning the increasing number of "United

Churches"; a movement of growing importance in many sections of the country. The last chapter deals with training for co-operation and begins with the declaration that the movement toward interdenominationalism cannot be permanently checked.

BEVAN, EDWYN. *Sibyls and Seers. A Survey of Some Ancient Theories of Revelation and Inspiration.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. 189 pages. $2.50.

This volume presents a rapid survey of ancient beliefs in the reality of spirits, visions, divine manifestations, demons, written communications from the unseen world, voices from heaven, ecstasy, dreams and like phenomena of revelation and inspiration. The illustrative materials are drawn mainly from Greek and Roman sources, with incidental allusions to Hebrew and Christian authorities. In the six terse lectures that constitute the book one will find a wealth of information useful for orienting the student in the gentile environment where Christianity first developed into a formal institution with fixed dogmas and cult practices. The pity of it is that Bevan is so little inclined to use the tools which he has supplied. When the description of ghostly apparitions, divine manifestations, voices from heaven, or possession by spirits, reaches the point where a flood of light might be shed upon the corresponding item in Christianity by noting its conformity with the current type of interests and beliefs, our author is either silent or else is prone to deny the propriety of admitting the parallelism.

CADOUX, CECIL JOHN. *Catholicism and Christianity.* New York: Dial Press, 1929. xl+708 pages.

An ample and fully annotated volume which traverses much philosophical and historical ground, and in a courteous but insistent way amasses a prodigious body of argument primarily against Romanism and secondarily against Anglo-Catholicism.

DOMBART, B., and KALB, A. (editors). *Augustinus de civitate dei.* Vol. II, Books XIV–XXII. Leipzig: Teubner, 1929. xxii+635 pages. M. 10.60.

With gratifying promptness this new edition of Augustine's *City of God,* in the convenient series of Teubner texts, has been brought to completion. Volume I, published a year ago, included Books I–XIII.

KRÜGER, GUSTAV (editor). *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten.* 3. Aufl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929. xi+135 pages. M. 5.60.

The handy collection of *Acts of the Martyrs,* edited by the late Rudolf Knopf, is now available in a third edition. The new editor has availed himself of the latest results of text criticism and has carefully revised and supplemented the extensive references to the modern critical literature. The book is an indispensable tool for every student carrying on research in the early history of Christianity.

KÜBLER, OTTO. *Mission und Theologie.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1929. M. 14.

A series of studies in exposition of modern theories of missions, beginning with Schleiermacher. The book offers virtually a history of German thought on the missionary problem.

MARCHANT, SIR JAMES. *The Reunion of Christendom.* New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1929. xiv+329 pages. $3.00.

A frank interchange of opinion by well-selected representatives of the principal branches of the Christian church, on the problem of reunion as viewed severally by the communions they represent. The book is illuminating, and will help to clarify the reunion situation.

MARTI, OSCAR. *Economic Causes of the Reformation in England.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. xxi+253 pages. $2.50.

A valuable contribution to Reformation history, indicating the economic changes and motives of the age, and their profound influence on the ecclesiastical revolution in England.

MEIFORT, JOACHIM. *Der Platonismus bei Clemens Alexandrinus.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1928. iii+93 pages. M. 4.40.

To Paul the wisdom of the Greeks had seemed but foolishness in contrast with the saving worth of faith in Christ. Throughout the first century representatives of the new religion made little or no effort to approve their cause to the intellectuals of the time. But during the second century a change of attitude gradually emerged. In Clement of Alexandria Meifort finds the real beginnings of that intellectual development which effected an adjustment along mutually appreciative lines between Greek culture and Christianity. The result was a new "Christian philosophy." This pamphlet makes a distinct contribution toward a better understanding of the process by which Christianity made conquest of those areas of intellectual interest which had previously been the peculiar possession of the heathen.

MÜLLER, HANS MICHAEL. *Erfahrung und Glaube bei Luther.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1929. viii+199 pages. M. 9.75.

This is a study on Luther's religion. The author deals with the problem of religious experience and asks himself how Luther describes and evaluates the experience of faith and what it meant to him in his own religious life. Nearly all the problems of recent Luther-research are touched, and sometimes they are put into a new light. The chief shortcoming of the book lies in the fact that it is not purely historical. The author writes of Luther as if Luther had been involved in the grave problems of the dialectical theology of modern Germany. It is quite possible—yes, it is a fact, that in his own way he was. But it is doubtful whether the author of this book did justice to him; for he seems too much concerned with his own theological position which is by no means clear. Thus he makes not only Luther, but also the "dialecticians" and the reader suffer; for even if they acknowledge his good work, they never know whether they understand what he has meant to say.

MÜLLER, KARL. *Kirchengeschichte,* Vol. I, 2d ed., 3d Lieferung. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929. xxxiv+569–816 pages. M. 20.

In his review of this work in the *Historische Zeitschrift,* Hans Lietzmann wrote as follows: "In the manifold and rich theological literature of our generation Karl Müller's *Church History* stands out in solitary height, and it seems that it is to be the last work of its kind. At any rate, the development of scientific research renders it almost impossible that anyone will again have the courage and the power to write a history of the church in all its fields from the beginnings to the commencement of modern times."

These words are weighty, and they are true. The future will probably see many an outline of church history, but hardly a *Grundriss* of the kind that Müller has presented to us. With full use of the rich bibliographical and source material that recent decades have cast upon the shores of the scholar, in full mastery of the diverse phases of the early history of Christianity, with the help of an exceedingly clear mind for which there is no problem too difficult to analyze, and in a form that is characterized by fluent, admirably calm style, he has completed the revision of the first volume of his work. This last *Lieferung* contains the history of the church in the ancient East and West from the time of Theodosius the Great until the dissolution of ancient civilization at the end of the sixth century after the reign of Justinian. The christological controversies, the régime of Justinian, the rise of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the bishops of Rome, and Augustine offer the great problems with which Professor Müller deals in this last part of the volume. Again, everything is excellent and as perfect as can be expected. Special mention must be made of the chapter on Augustine, which is of a remarkable objectivity and full of fine wisdom, and of the chapter on the Roman Episcopate, the rise of which is described in full detail. A minute Index will be found very helpful.

Professor Müller's kind reference to our announcement of the publication of the first two parts includes the statement that he can hardly expect to complete the revision of his work. But nevertheless, we hope that he continues what is so well begun. In assuring him of the gratefulness of the scholarly world for his labor, we express also the hope that he and his publishers will make arrangements for a translation.

PRIBILLA, S. J. MAX. *Um kirchliche Einheit.* St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1929. xii+332 pages. $2.85.

In this study a Jesuit writer looks into the recent conferences on co-operation and reunion, and expounds the Roman Catholic position on the question.

SCHMITT, FRANCISCUS SALESIUS (trans.). *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Liber Monologion. Florilegium Patristicum Fasc. XX.* Bonn, Germany: Hanstein, 1929. vii+65 pages. M. 2.80.

Critical edition of an outstanding work of Anselm with Prolegomena.

SCHRAMM, PERCY ERNST. *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio, I. Teil.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1929. xiv+305 pages. M. 18.

A noteworthy book on the early Middle Ages. It records the history of a hope, the hope of a renovation of the world through Rome. The literature of this great expectation from the fall of the Carolingian Empire to the Investiture controversy is examined with conscientious care and with close attention to historic events.

STEVENSON, J. *Studies in Eusebius.* Cambridge: University Press, 1929. vii+145 pages.

This excellent monograph may be read at a single sitting and is of enough value to justify the venture. In a half-dozen concise chapters the chief events in the career of Eusebius are sketched and the character of his work is interpreted. The writer is well acquainted with both the original sources of information and the modern critical literature in his field. He places the birth of Eusebius between the years 262 and 265, and infers from the limited evidence available that probably he had been born of heathen parents. A brief account of the older history of Christianity in Caesarea provides the setting in which to survey the early life and work of Eusebius. The aims and significance of his extensive literary work are set forth with genuine insight, but it is his connection with the Arian controversy and his activities at the Council of Nicea that receive freshest treatment. Our author finds Eusebius to have had strong Arian leanings at the outset but not to have possessed a vigorously controversial temperament. It was in the interests of harmony that he had proposed his Caesarean creed at the Council; but when it was altered in the direction of a stricter orthodoxy, he did not withhold his signature. This action indicates not that he was weak or two-faced but that he was fundamentally irenic. In the years of strife that followed, he was often involved in embarrassing situations, but was a victim rather than an aggressor in theological debates. Stevenson insists that he was never really an Arian, although on occasion his Arian friends used him for their own purposes. And the conditions of the age often conspired to make him their tool. Theologically speaking, he was more sinned against than sinning: "Unfitted by training, and apparently by nature, to control men, he was unable to influence those who traded upon his reputation in order to carry out their own doubtful transactions."

WRIGHT, F. A. (trans.). *Fathers of the Church.* New York: Dutton, 1929. vii+351 pages. $4.00.

No amount of reading in modern books about historical persons is quite adequate to give one the sense of reality and appreciation that comes from reading the books which the ancients themselves composed. This is measurably true even when the documents are read in a modern translation. Consequently students of early Christian history will welcome this volume of selections from the Latin Fathers, Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. In a brief introductory essay the translator describes the setting in which these Christian writers lived, and each group of selections is prefaced by a few well-chosen remarks on the life and work of the respective authors. Tertullian is represented by seven selections from his *Apology,* while his treatises on *Women's Dress* and *The Cloak versus the Toga* are given in full. Cyprian's *The World and Its Vanities* and *The Unity of the Catholic Church* stand complete, to which are added sections 23–29 from *The Lapsed.* These sections treat of the punishment of apostasy. There is one selection dealing with the gods of the Romans from Arnobius' *Against the Heathen* and one on the pleasures of the senses from Lactantius' *Divine Institutes.* Five hymns of Ambrose are given in both the Latin original and an English rendering. There is one excerpt from his treatise *On Virgins,* while a discussion on modesty and another on kindness have been selected from his *Clergymen's Duties.* Jerome's *The Story of Malchus* and *The Virgin's Profession* have been printed entire, and all excerpts from Augustine have been chosen from the *City of God.*

Of course it would have been easy to choose a different body of excerpts in accordance with the varying interests of students, but the selections embodied in this volume are truly representative of both the literary abilities and the interests of the authors who are cited. The translator has been unusually successful in producing an easy reading yet dignified version, and many students will feel grateful to him for making more readily available these interesting documents from the past.

## CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BAHA, ABDOU'L. *Les Leçons de Saint-Jean-d'Acre.* Translated by Hippolyte Dreyfus. Paris: Leroux, 1929. 424 pages. Fr. 36.

This is a new edition of a French translation of the *Table Talk of Abdou'l Baha.* The original was taken down in Persian by one of his English followers, Laura Clifford Barney, on the Island of St. Jean d'Acre, the headquarters of this religion with its stormy history of sectarian differences. The *Talk* has been arranged under such headings as: the rôle of the prophet in human evolution, the origin and capacities of man, moot points of Christian doctrine, God's manifestations.

EDDINGTON, ARTHUR S. *Science and the Unseen World.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 91 pages. $1.25.

Following out the implications of *The Nature of the Physical World,* the author draws a distinction between the real and the concrete. Scientific symbols are accepted for experimental purposes, but to religion is left the task of interpreting the symbols by a direct apprehension of meanings which science cannot give. The lecture is characterized by loose definition of such terms as "experience" and "knowledge," so that the argument is vitiated thereby.

HAWKINS, C. J. *Do the Churches Dare?* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 174 pages. $1.50.

Modernism has failed to give the world a constructive faith. The writer therefore essays an interpretation of the Christian doctrines of God, Christ, and redemption in terms of Lloyd Morgan's emergent evolutionism.

HOFFMANN, GEORG. *Das Problem der letzten Dinge.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. 120 pages. M. 7.20.

Nineteenth-century theology did not do full justice to the eschatological aspects of Christian faith. Now theologians are beginning to take account of the significance which New Testament scholars attribute to eschatology as the key to the understanding of primitive Christianity. The hope of an everlasting future is less a specific doctrine than it is a point of view which affects every doctrine. The author declines to follow the Swiss theologians in their assertion that there is only a hope of salvation. On the contrary, time and eternity are interrelated so that by faith a Christian may have salvation both as a present enjoyment and as an expected future bliss. This monograph lengthens the series of "Studies in Systematic Theology" edited by Titius and Wobbermin.

STREETER, B. H. *Moral Adventure.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 132 pages. $1.25.

The third chapter of the earlier book *Adventure* is here reprinted with a brief Introduction. In the discussion of sex morality, which occupies the larger part of the essay, the author takes a position between Judge Lindsay and "the morality of taboo."

WHITNEY, R. E. *Morality in the Making.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 167 pages. $1.50.

Morality is an adaptation to the environment which makes us feel that we are approved by others or by ourselves. The book fails of any significant contribution to moral theory because it fails to state the basis for the approval which determines moral conduct.

## PREACHING AND WORSHIP

MACKENZIE, JOHN G. *Souls in the Making.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 259 pages. $2.25.

This book is intended primarily for pastors, but it is of interest to all persons who care for the psychology of character and personality. The last two chapters deal with the practical results of the author's study. They handle with frankness and practical wisdom such questions as adolescence, sex, and the inferiority complex. They explain and enforce the preventive and therapeutic power of religion, discuss the relation between suggestion and prayer, and issue in a high appraisal of the place of the Gospel in the solution of problems of personal health and character. What gives this book an almost unique value is the combination in it of practical wisdom, religious faith, and psychological knowledge. The author is professor of sociology and psychology at Paton College, Nottingham. Incidentally the book is an introduction to the large body of recent psychological literature. It is equipped with a good Index.

MASSON, THOMAS L. *Ascensions.* New York: Century Co., 1929. ix+371 pages. $2.50.

This is a rather difficult book to characterize, but it is an extremely interesting book to read. It falls into two very distinct parts, the first consisting of excerpts from the author's diary written from 1914 to 1919. These excerpts cover many subjects but always with a view to the writer's spiritual experience during the period of the war. They are intimate and revealing. The second part consists of essays, speculations, deductions, convictions, on a wide range of intellectual and spiritual topics. The center of interest throughout is the interior life. Such titles as "Healing," "Confession," "Prayer," "On Being Led," "We Must Know Christ," "Confession," will indicate the wide scope of this part of the author's work. He has read widely, and often appends to one of his discussions a list of helpful books. He has also thought much, and where his conclusions may fail to carry the complete assent of the reader, they cannot fail to stimulate him to think more courageously upon his own experiences. The author has found religion, a religion of his own, as every man's religion must be to be worth anything. The literary charm of the book is quite equal to its spiritual insight. It is to be heartily commended.

MCCONNELL, FRANCIS JOHN. *Human Needs and World Christianity.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 231 pages. Cloth $1.50; paper $0.75.

Six chapters on the world-wide mission of Christianity, dealing with the need of better health, more wealth, sounder knowledge, larger freedom, closer fellowship, and the vision of God. The study is based largely upon the proceedings of the Meeting of the International Missionary Council held in Jerusalem in 1928. But much more has gone into it—practical wisdom gained from wide experience, a broad humanitarianism, a philosophic outlook, wide knowledge of historical movements, the saving sense of humor and proportion for which the author is well known. This little book carries conviction at every point. It has also the advantage not possessed by all good books, of being extremely readable.

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

BETTS, GEORGE HERBERT. *The Beliefs of 700 Ministers.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1929. 74 pages. $1.00.

Assuming that some definite content of belief is necessary to religious education, the purpose of the investigation reported in this monograph is to ascertain what the beliefs of ministers are as a criterion for determining what that content should be.

The method of the investigation is a questionnaire sent to 1,500 ministers. Replies were received from 500 ministers in service and 200 theological students in training—700 in all. Of the 56 beliefs included in the questionnaire there is unanimous agreement on but one item—the existence of God. Seventy-five per cent of the ministers agree on 22 items. When the theological students are included, there is a 75 per cent agreement on 11 items. With reference to the remaining items included in the 56, there is wide personal and denominational difference. The wide variation in the beliefs among the ministers in service and among the theological students in training indicates that very considerable changes are taking place in the theological beliefs of the clergy. On the basis of five criteria that seem to him sound educationally, the author concludes that on the whole the list of 11 items is acceptable from a functional and educational point of view.

The author suggests that the practical implications of the study are: (1) that a very simple statement of minimum theological content should be drawn up for use in religious education; (2) that such creedal statements as the Apostles Creed, on the several items of which there is such wide difference, should be omitted from religious instruction and public worship; (3) that no denomination has a right to impose beliefs that are not generally held; and (4) that belief should be regarded as functional in the development of religious personality and society.

It may be questioned whether the assumption that clergymen are the proper source from which to derive the criteria as to what the content of belief in religious education should be is correct. Such a source may be useful for determining the present status of popular theological belief. It would seem to be a much sounder basis for such criteria to take the expert judgment of a group of scholars who would arrive at their conclusion by a critical analysis of historical and biblical sources. And after all, is a minimum content of belief what religious education needs? Is it not to discover what are the essential values and attitudes of the Christian religion, and in their amplitude, as functional convictions for the guidance of the religious life?

HITES, LAIRD T. *The Effective Christian College.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 259 pages. $2.00.

At a time when an attempt is being made to determine what constitutes an effective college of liberal arts from the standpoint of its function in modern society the author raises the question as to what criteria shall determine whether the church college is effective as a Christian institution. The author assumes that the church college is an essential instrument of the Christian movement and that to be effective it must function in definitely religious ways. As an institution created by the church, the author holds that the function of the Christian college is twofold: to cultivate a positive and vital religious life among its students and to prepare intelligent and effective lay and professional leaders for the sponsoring church.

The book is divided into two parts. Chapters i–iv deal with the philosophy of education in the Christian college as distinguished from the philosophy of education in a state-supported college; chapters v–viii set up a program for concreting this philosophy. While the author believes that the Christian college should offer a major and a minor in religion and religious education, he believes that it is the function of religious teachers in every field of the curriculum to help students discover the religious values of their subjects and that there should be an intelligent and concerted action of all departments in this direction. He believes that the extra-curricular activities should be definitely organized with the curricular activities in the cultivation of religious attitudes and appreciations. He makes much of the function of the churches in the environing college community in enriching the religious life of students. The author stresses the fact that an effective program of religious education should include not only the religious values resident in the curriculum but also the fundamental procedure of learning through responsible student participation.

While the discussion is a critique upon the programs of the majority of church colleges as failing to fulfil their essential functions as instruments of the Christian movement, its chief contribution lies in its sympathetic understanding of the problem of the Christian college and in its constructive suggestions as to a program that may be considered effective.

LOBINGIER, JOHN LESLIE. *Youth and the World Outlook for Young People's Classes and Societies.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1929. 64 pages. $0.35.

This small study manual is another in "The Christian Life Series" planned for young people of high-school age or a little older. It is intended for discussion groups and is well organized. The point of view on missions is thoroughly modern, not to save the heathen from hell, or to confer benefits upon the undeveloped, but "to share capacity and experience in a mutual discovery of life," as the author puts it, quoting from H. F. Ward. The book does not attempt too much but should be fruitful in developing better knowledge of the missionary enterprise and truer Christian attitudes toward such than is the ordinary possession of young people.

OSGOOD, PHILLIPS ENDECOTT. *Pulpit Dramas, a Series of Dramatizations for Church, Pulpit or Parish Use.* New York: Harper, 1929. xxxi+191 pages. $1.75.

This is the third book of dramas by the same author. As pastor of a church he has felt the need of variation from the sermon presentation of truth. He has also felt the need of giving young people a larger and more significant place in the activities of the church. Experimenting with the use of drama, he has felt that it gives a definite opportunity for a vital co-operative discovery and interpretation of scriptural lessons.

Undoubtedly the purpose of the writer is praiseworthy, but the manner of his realization seems subject to severe criticism. Taking some incident from the Bible, his custom is to invite a group of young people creatively to dramatize it with him. But the samples given in this book show that the supernatural and miraculous elements are those which give the atmosphere and that are depended upon for impression. There is an unhesitating freedom in manipulating scripture and in putting into the mouths of the characters chosen the peculiar interpretation that the author wants to leave with his audience. While most of the situations have a historical coloring, accuracy gives place to sermonic purpose. Apart from its reactionary spirit, the labored way in which long dissertations are put in the mouths of the speakers and the artificial situations that are created make the whole a very amateurish production.

RUDISILL, EARL S. *The Intimate Problems of Youth.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 217 pages. $2.00.

This is a fair restatement of what a good many others have said about adolescents. The author was formerly an instructor in psychology, but his book lacks the exact scientific statements that might be expected from such training. The work throughout reflects the writer's present work of preaching. It tends to moralizing and to general statements without exact analyses or supporting evidence. The rating charts (pp. 85–89) are good illustrations of the failure to be scientifically accurate. No one with experience in rating would attempt to score with the method given or to lay any value on a composite score made with such a score card. For instance, what meaning would a composite score have if four different persons scored a young man on "appreciation" on a scale of "1 to 10 in ascending order of excellence"?

## MISSIONS

CAVELL, JEAN M. *Filipino Playmates.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 122 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

Prepared for primary children.

CONVERSE, B. H. *Little Kin Chan.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 101 pages. Cloth $1.25.

The adventures of a little Japanese girl and her dog, written especially for boys and girls from six to nine years of age.

EBERLE, EDITH, and MCGAVRAN, GRACE W. *Jewels the Giant Dropped.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 138 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

Ten stories about the people of the Philippine Islands for junior boys and girls, supplemented by suggestions for using them as study lessons. Bibliography.

HUNTING, HAROLD B. *Pioneers of Goodwill.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. xii+142 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

Brief accounts of an early Friend of the Indians, a Friend of the Colonists, the Father of California, an Apostle to the Red Indians, the Founder of the Moonlight Schools, and other pioneers of goodwill. For young people.

LAUBACH, FRANK C. *Seven Thousand Emeralds.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 158 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

A vivid description of the struggle for freedom and fuller life on the part of the Filipino people, written to enlist the sympathy and help of the youth of America.

LEIPER, HENRY S. *Blind Spots.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. xvi+143 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.60.

A book written out of wide personal experience indicating to people how they may rid themselves of the blind spots of race prejudice.

MEANS, FLORENCE C., and FULLEN, HARRIET L. *Rafael and Consuelo.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. vi+137 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

Prepared for primary children.

McLEAN, ROBERT N., and CRAWFORD, MABEL L. *Jumping Beans*. New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 151 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.75.

Eleven stories depicting the life of Mexican people in the United States, for junior boys and girls; followed by suggestions as to how best to present these to the class.

SAILER, T. H. P. *Christianity's Supreme Issues*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1929. 57 pages. Paper $0.25.

A guide book for the co-operative study of the six supreme needs of humanity, based upon *Human Needs and World Christianity*, by F. J. McConnell.

STAUFFER, M. T. *World Missions as Seen from Jerusalem*. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1929. 93 pages. Paper $0.50.

A course of six studies for adults based on *Roads to the City of God*, by Basil Mathews, and the Reports of the Jerusalem Council.

TYLER, ERNEST D. *China at the Crossroads*. University of Kansas, 1928. 45 pages.

A prize essay, dealing with the application of the teachings of Jesus to the Chinese temperament and the results that may be expected.

## MISCELLANEOUS

DENSMORE, FRANCES. *Papago Music* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 90). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929. xx+229 pages. $1.25.

In the state of Sonora, Mexico, and in southern Arizona is a gentle, agricultural tribe of Indians called the Papago. During the year 1920 the author of this compilation visited this tribe, and through the assistance of competent interpreters, transcribed their songs, which are now printed as Bulletin 90 of the Bureau of American Ethnology. The songs are gathered under eleven heads as follows: songs connected with legends, songs used in the treatment of the sick, songs connected with ceremonies, songs connected with expeditions to obtain salt, war songs, songs of the kicking-ball race, songs of the bat dance, dream songs, hunting songs, songs for the entertainment of children, and miscellaneous songs. There are pictures gathered by the author to illustrate the life of the Papago tribe, and a well-classified index.

FEWKES, J. WALTER. *Forty-Fourth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1926–1927*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928. vii+555 pages. $2.25.

A very small part of this big volume is given over to the annual report of the chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Mr. J. Walter Fewkes. In fact, the report occupies but nineteen pages, while the remainder of the volume, more than five hundred pages, is devoted to four papers of great interest. The first is by John P. Harrington on "Exploration of the Burton Mound at Santa Barbara, California"; the second by John R. Swanton on "Social and Religious Beliefs and Usages of the Chickasaw Indians"; a third on "Uses of Plants by the Chippewa Indians," by Frances Densmore; and the fourth by Gerard Fowke on "Archeological Investigations—II," the latter being a report on explorations in Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, Tennessee, Indiana, and Illinois. All the papers are copiously illustrated, and there is an excellent index, a matter of great importance in a book such as this.

MICHELSON, TRUMAN. *Observations on the Thunder Dance of the Bear Gens of the Fox Indians* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 89). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929. v+73 pages. $0.65.

This book contains two accounts of the Thunder Dance of the Fox Indians, given by two members of the society. The accounts are in the Indian text, with an English translation on the opposite page. The first is by Jim Peters, which was obtained some years ago but which, at Peter's request, was withheld from publication until after his death, as he would have suffered socially had it become known that he had revealed this information. The second account is more than twice as long as the first, and we are told that the name of the Indian who gave it is withheld to avoid his possible expulsion from the society. The two accounts supplement one another and contain a wealth of ethnological information.

ROBERTS, FRANK H. H., JR. *Shabik'eshchee Village, A Late Basket Maker Site in the Chaco Canyon, New Mexico* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 92). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929. viii+164 pages. $1.00.

The cultural levels of the southwestern part of the United States are classified under two main headings: the basket-maker and the pueblo, the basket-maker representing the older culture. The basket-maker group has three phases, the pueblo five. The author describes each of these several phases as an introduction to his description of the ruin which he studied in 1927, and which he called Shabik'eshchee Village, meaning "sun-picture-place," the name given by the Navaho workmen employed. The accomplishment of the expedition under Mr. Roberts is well told and illustrated by numerous pictures and drawings, while the "finds" are particularly interesting as well as revealing.

SWANTON, JOHN R. *Myths and Tales of the Southwestern Indians.* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of Ethnology, Bulletin 88). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1929. x+275 pages. $1.00.

The Indian tales and myths making up this volume were collected by the author, largely in 1908 and 1914, though some of the Creek myths were gathered years ago by W. O. Tuggle and have been preserved in manuscript in the Bureau of American Ethnology. The stories are divided into five sections as follows: Creek stories, Hitchiti stories, Alabama stories, Koasati stories, and Natchez stories. First under each division come the stories dealing with natural phenomena or the doings of ancient heroes which might more properly be called "myths"; next are the stories of visits to the world of the dead, of which there are comparatively few; then stories of contests between men and animals or supernatural beings in the form of animals; next stories of happenings among the animals, of which there are a great many; then stories of the "Southwestern trickster Rabbit"; and last stories borrowed from the Negroes and the whites and a few war stories. Many of the stories are quite suitable for children and compare favorably with the famous tales of Uncle Remus.

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# IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH—A STUDY IN PERSONAL RELIGION

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THE majority of the so-called "Apostolic Fathers" are little more than names to us; their personalities are faint and shadowy. The men who wrote treatises like the Epistle of Barnabas and the Epistle to Diognetus or the homily called "Second Clement" reveal views rather than individual characteristics; even Clement of Rome's epistle is more interesting on account of its contents than on account of any self-revelation on the part of the writer. There is a partial exception, it is true, in *The Shepherd* of Hermas, for Hermas naïvely reveals something of himself at the beginning of his book, where the autobiographical data disclose a man of flesh and blood, with definite experiences which throw some light upon his religious convictions. Hermas is indeed a second-rate Bunyan of the second century. Yet, after all, his introductory references to the grace which abounded toward him are on the circumference, and the bulk of his book is almost as impersonal as any church manual.

It is otherwise with Ignatius of Antioch. Here we touch a vivid, vital personality. Sometime during the reign of Trajan he was arrested at Antioch in a persecution which soon blew over; probably it was one of the sporadic local outbursts which compelled the authorities to take action, and the animosity of the mob may have been appeased by the prompt seizure of

Ignatius, the local bishop, who had been uncompromising in his attitude toward both Jews and pagans. A few weeks later the storm had passed, and the church at Antioch was once more at peace. But the passing trouble did not pass for Ignatius. The authorities had condemned him to death and deported him to Rome; not being a Roman citizen he was haled across land and sea to the capital, there to furnish a victim for the brutal games in which human beings of good physique were used to fight with wild animals in the arena, to the delight of the Roman mob. One source of supply for such involuntary wrestlers with beasts was found in condemned criminals, and provincial governors were expected to forward suitable specimens of humanity to the Coliseum, where ever since 80 A.D. *tableaux vivants* had thrilled the audience, who bent in eager excitement over men being worried by animals, as imperfectly clad or naked they fought for their lives with leopards, giraffes, bears, lions, and elephants. To this fate Ignatius was hurried across Asia Minor to Troas, where he was transshipped to Philippi, en route for Rome. He passed through cities like Philadelphia and Smyrna. At the latter place he found time to write letters to the churches of Ephesus, Magnesia, and Tralles, which had sent deputations to greet and cheer him; also he forwarded a letter ahead to the church at Rome. At Troas he wrote to Smyrna and Philadelphia as well as to Polycarp, the bishop of Smyrna. These seven letters are impromptu documents, written or dictated in extremely hard conditions; Ignatius could have had little privacy or quiet. But partly for this reason they stand out as sharp transcripts of his personality. We see a man behind the manuscripts, highly strung, even neurotic, but intensely religious. It has been common to study the religious ideas of Ignatius, as though he had a system of belief which he was anxious to enforce and transmit; he certainly had some definite ideas about organization and doctrine which are creative, but these spring out of something deeper, and it is through a study of his personal religion that his views fall into proper focus. In other words, to use the jargon of today, his theology is best approached along the line of his psychology. These short letters wrung from him as he was dragged from place to place are one of our first items in the psychology of the saints. They throb with individual faith.

This is partially but only partially recognized in three recent studies of Ignatius. The central thought in his mind is devotion to the Lord Jesus Christ. "Better that I should die for Jesus Christ than reign over the furthest bounds of earth."

> 'Tis He Whom I seek, He who died for us,
> 'Tis He Whom I desire, He Who rose for our sake.[1]

Faith and love, which are for him the sum and substance of the Christian religion, are elicited by Jesus Christ, who is their object and source as the real revelation of God to men. Ignatius is even impatient of praises lavished on him for his spiritual gifts by men who would not share his profound belief in the full incarnation of Christ. "What good is any man's praise to me if he blasphemes my Lord by refusing to accept His incarnation?"[2] His adoration of the Lord Jesus is a personal affection which becomes a stable center for life. Only thus can Ignatius understand how the Christian religion works at all; unless there is a recognition of the unity of Jesus Christ with God and man, especially as that is realized in the church and the sacraments, he fails to see how faith and love are possible. And he insists that this belief must accredit itself by deeds, deeds of loyal obedience to the ministry of the church as well as by faithfulness to the commands of the Lord in personal kindness and helpfulness. Wherever he uses the term "Christian," it is in connection with a demand for such practical proofs of personal religion. "The right thing is not only to be called Christians but to be Christians,"[3] instead of acting independently of the bishop, which, he argues, is to play fast and loose with the invisible Bishop, God. But he can also pray the Romans[4] to pray for him "that I may not only be called a Christian but may be found to be one." To be a real Christian or "Christ's man" is the result and aim of believing in a real Christ, not in some semihuman Lord.[5] This fundamental conception is missed by the French writer who uses the name of Henri Delafosse. In his *Lettres d'Ignace d'Antioche* (Paris, 1927) he ingeniously discovers that Theophoros was a Marcionite bishop of Syria who wrote some epistles to Asiatic churches as well as one to Rome, before he was shipped from Smyrna to the capital as a martyr. Then a wretched "Catholic" editor fused his personality with that of a certain Ignatius who, together with two companions, Zosimus and Rufus, was martyred at Philippi later in the century. The drastic manipulation of the text which this hypothesis involves leaves as many problems as it solves, however. There are still difficulties in the text, some of which Delafosse acutely unbares,[6] but his methods fail to set these in any more intelligible light, even in connection with the so-called "gnostic" background of the letters. The latter aspect is brought forward by Herr Schlier in his *Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen* (Giessen, 1929). He does more justice to the psychological problem[7] of Ignatius, following Reitzenstein, but unfortunately he has succumbed to the temptation of using Mandean parallels which are in most cases far-fetched and irrelevant. A saner line of approach is suggested by Canon Streeter in his volume on *The Primitive Church* (Macmillan Co., 1929). He is mainly concerned with the bishop's attitude toward the organization of the church, but he rightly traces back the ideas of Ignatius to his personal experiences. "When a man on his road to death is seen using every opportunity to impress one idea with all the prestige that martyrdom would give him; when he enforces it in lauguage neurotically extravagant; and when there is evidence that his subconscious, as well as his conscious, mind is dominated by the same idea, we may well conclude that it stood to him as the summation of his life's work. But if the consolidation of an ecclesiastical discipline, centered in the monarchical bishop, was the ideal for which Ignatius had lived, and which he hoped by a martyr's death firmly to rivet on the church at large, it is a fair presumption that it was a thing which he had had to fight for in his own church at Antioch." Perhaps so. At any rate we must allow that this "ecclesiastical" idea flowed from a religious conviction. Explain it as we may, the stress laid by Ignatius upon the divine authority of bishop, presbyters, and deacons, as the functionaries by whom alone the real sacraments of the church could be observed as mediums for fellowship with God and man, was one application of the supreme value which he attached to the person of the Lord Jesus Christ in Christianity. That is, his personal religion is fundamental, because it is personal religion dominated by devotion to Jesus Christ as divine. This is what makes the letters rather impressive.

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[1] Rom. vi. Ignatius becomes lyrical or at least rhythmical in his confessions of faith, as Weinel was one of the first to show (*Wirkungen des Geistes*, pp. 86 f.).

[2] Smyr. v. He hails this church as (1) "based upon unwavering faith, nailed as it were to the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ and rooted in love by the blood of Christ." The genitive *αὐτοῦ* or an equivalent after "faith and love" is objective, even in a passage like Eph. xx, where *αὐτοῦ* is loosely used first as objective and then as subjective: "faith in Him and love to Him, with His passion and resurrection" are the proposed topic of a tract which he did not live to write.

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[3] Magnesians iv.

[4] Rom. iii.

[5] One of his charges against the heretics is indifference to brotherly love. "Take note of those who have heterodox opinions about the grace of Jesus Christ which has come to us," he bids the Smyrniote Christians (vi); "see how contrary they are to the mind of God, they care nothing for love, for widows and orphans, for folk in distress, for prisoners, for the hungry and the thirsty." How far this blame of the dissenters was justified, we cannot say, but the words prove how keenly Ignatius held to brotherly love as the vital expression of faith and love for the true Christ.

[6] Particularly on pp. 60 f., where he discusses the difficult passage in Magnesians viii about the Word and Silence. But though Zahn and Lightfoot may not have spoken the last word on this text, Delafosse's argument that it (i.e., the reading which includes the negative) is an allusion to the Valentinian theosophy and therefore is a count against the conventional dating of the epistle, is not cogent. Schlier (*op. cit.*, pp. 34 f.) comes nearer to the truth, though he insists on dragging in the Mandean literature as a source for the conception.

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[7] The "mystical" fervor recalls St. Paul, but in Ignatius there is often, as Dr. J. Schneider contends (*Die Passionmystik des Paulus* [1929], pp. 124 f.), "ein pathos das nicht ganz aus dem schlichten Ernst der Christusgemeinschaft stammt." He suggests the influence of environment; Syria was the land of the Adonis cult. But we do not know if even Montanus had been a Cybele devotee, and it is only guesswork to connect the impetuous piety of Ignatius with a local cult like that of Adonis.

Here he differs from Hermas. That Roman writer in his long book never mentions the name of Jesus. It is "the Lord," not "Jesus," whom Hermas employs, whereas the name of "Jesus" is always on the lips of the Antioch bishop. Generally, as in St. Paul, it is "Jesus Christ"; "Christ Jesus" occurs only about a dozen times, and "Jesus" only thrice. But there is not a page of his letters which does not dwell on Jesus in some form or another. Indeed, he goes off, as we say, at the very mention of Jesus Christ, as though it prompted him to add some grateful and adoring comment on what the Lord meant to him and all Christians. Thus, in speaking of "the deacons so dear to me, who have been entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ," he instantly adds, "Who was with the Father ere the world began and at the end appeared."[8] Again, in exhorting the Magnesian Christians to adhere to the bishop and the presbyters he writes, "Gather together all of you to the one shrine of God, to the one altar, to the one Jesus Christ, Who proceeded from the one Father, abiding in Him and returning to Him.[9] Be fully convinced of the birth, the passion, and the resurrection, which took place in the governorship of Pontius Pilate, really and truly enacted by Jesus Christ our Hope—from Whom may none of you ever swerve."[10] In submitting to the bishop, he tells the Trallian church, "You show me that you are living not after the world but after Jesus Christ, Who died for us, that by believing in His death you may escape death. . . . . Also you must be subject to the presbytery as to the apostles of Jesus Christ our Hope, in Whom we shall have immortality as we live in Him." It is the way of Ignatius thus to convey the thrill of "Jesus" in his soul.

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[8] Magnesians vi.

[9] Magnesians vii, where the strange words καὶ εἰς ἕνα ὄντα ("abiding with Him") are a daring assertion of the true divinity of Jesus during the incarnation, as in the later medieval hymns. Thus St. Columba writes,

> Christus cum Deo sederat,
> Ubi numquam defuerat:

and in Thomas Aquinas we read,

> Verbum supernum prodiens,
> Nec Patris linquens dextram.

Delafosse has missed the meaning of the phrase altogether in his version ("qui est venue du seul Père et qui est retourné vers le seul"), which leaves it out entirely; he regards all this as a later insertion about the Logos (*op. cit.*, p. 108)! Such expansions are a characteristic feature of Ignatius, who is not thinking of the Logos at all but of the Lord.

The glow stirred by the thought of Jesus Christ belongs to the ardent temperament of the writer. Attempts have been made to explain this as Syrian, and no doubt a province like Syria may have been characterized by a certain fervor which is less marked than in the case, for example, of Alexandria. Syria may have resembled Brittany in France, so far as this specific warmth of life goes. A similar fervor is to be traced in North Africa, where Tertullian's passionate nature corresponds to the local spirit of the province. But environment does not explain all the data of personality here. Ignatius must have been a man of naturally fervid emotions. Later Syriac tradition played on his Latin name and even added "Nourono" or "Nourani," a synonym for "fiery," as though "Ignatius" denoted the fire *(ignis)* of his soul. Indeed, Renan actually thought that a name like "Nourana" was the bishop's original name in Syriac. But a reading of his letters reveals, apart from any etymology of his name, that he possessed a warm-hearted, passionate nature, which, after his conversion, thrilled with devotion to his Lord. It is only precarious inference which argues that he was by birth a slave or a Semite or converted in middle life. The point is that for him Christianity was bound up with a personal relationship to the Lord Jesus Christ, not as the Teacher of truth, though that element is admitted, not as the Mystagogue Who appealed to a man like Clement of Alexandria, but as the Savior, the Hope and Life of Christians, the object of a vital faith and love, moving within fellowship and worship.

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[10] Trallians ii. The closing words might be rendered, "dont nous partagerons la vie éternelle, si nous vivons maintenant en lui," as they are by Lelong in what is the most adequate and idiomatic version of the letters (*Les Pères Apostoliques,* Vol. III).

How he reached this passionate conviction, we cannot tell. Unlike Justin and Tatian he does not describe his passage into the Christian faith. But his attitude is fairly unique in its stress upon this personal faith in Jesus Christ. "When the Apostolic Fathers reflect on faith," says Harnack,[11] "which is only incidentally, they mean that they believe an aggregate of sacred traditions and obey them, hoping that the comforting content of these traditions will be fully revealed in the future. But Ignatius speaks like a Christian who knows what he possesses in faith in Christ, that is, in confidence in Him." The background of incipient "gnosticism" which is visible in some of the christological phrases and conceptions of Ignatius resembles that of the Odes of Solomon so remarkably that one is tempted to assume in both cases a reaction against contemporary syncreticism, as though Ignatius were driven to stress the sole and divine reality of Jesus Christ as the manifestation of God against some religious philosophy which to his mind undervalued the Savior. But this is merely a conjecture. The point is that by whatever avenue he reached Christianity, his religion meant for him pre-eminently a personal relation to Jesus Christ which assured him of immortality. He has his own mannerisms in expressing this truth. Even when he is echoing Pauline phrases or Johannine ideas, he does it in his own way. Yet he is nearer than almost any other in the second century to the primitive directness of faith in Christ which throbbed in the apostle Paul, indifferent as he is to the Pauline theology of the Cross.

"Depend upon it, sir," said Dr. Johnson to Boswell, "when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully!" The letters of Ignatius show that his mind was concentrated upon one or two things of vital moment to the churches, and these things were connected with Jesus

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[11] *Dogmengeschichte* (4th ed.), I, 191–92.

Christ. A fervid, dictatorial enthusiasm throbs in his words; he writes abruptly, repeats himself, as is only natural in the circumstances, and occasionally wrecks grammar as he pours out his messages. But with a desperate insight into the pressing needs of the churches as he saw them, he manages to say what is at his heart upon the vital subject of Christianity as he understood it, that is, upon the reality of the Lord Jesus Christ. "There is something specific in the gospel," he urged, something that even the Old Testament revelation lacks; it is "the coming of the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ, His sufferings, His resurrection."[12] Jesus Christ was really born, He really lived and suffered and rose; in fellowship with Him we have real life, as we adhere to His church. Ignatius had time to drive these convictions home to the churches before he was hurried off to his doom. And his messages are not simply a piece of apologetic which he considered to be timely. In some of the apologists we fail to feel the man; the arguments are more than the personality, and what they write seems sometimes to be elicited by needs of the age rather than to spring from the depths of their own heart. Not so with Ignatius of Antioch. It is impossible to mistake the personal religion that inspires every line of his counsels. Let others argue about the relation of the *Logos* Christ to creation; he is concerned only in the redeeming relations of the Lord to the church and the Christian, verifiable in experience.

The real presence of the Lord in the life of Christians is first and foremost. "Let us do everything in the consciousness that He is dwelling within us, so that we may be shrines for Him and He may be our God within us"—the idea being that it is the presence of God which makes the church. Then, he continues at once, "as is indeed the case, as will be plain to us, when we duly love Him."[13] The verification of the divine presence lies in devotion to the Lord. This truth of the indwelling Christ preoccupies Ignatius. "You have Jesus Christ in yourselves."[14] "Wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the catholic Church."[15] And the due love for Him which this involves is a keynote to the personal religion of Ignatius. "These are the last times," he tells the Ephesians; "so let us be reverent, let God's long-suffering keep us in awe, lest it prove a judgment on us. Either let us stand in awe of the Wrath to come or let us love the Grace that has already come—either one thing or the other; the sole point is to be found worthy of real life by union with Christ Jesus" (literally, in Christ Jesus). "Have perfect faith and love for Jesus Christ," he continues, "faith the beginning of life and love its end; when both blend into a unity, it is God Himself; all else, belonging to a perfect character, follows in their train."[16] That is, such a Christian has God, he possesses the life divine. It is a characteristic turn of expression. Swinburne may seem poles apart from Ignatius, but these lines from "Hertha" are a verbal parallel to "it is God Himself":

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[12] Philadelphians ix: ἐξαίρετον τι, "un trait tout particulier" (Lelong), "quelque chose de spécial" (Delafosse).

[13] Eph. xv.

> A creed is a rod,
>   And a crown is of night;
> But this thing is God,
>   To be man with thy might,
> To grow straight in the strength of thy spirit
>   And live out thy life in the light.

Ignatius becomes lyrical as he describes his personal religion; his words are not to be treated as if they occurred in theological formulas and arguments. When he cries that it is simply divine to have a full faith and love for the Lord Jesus Christ, he is speaking from his heart and experience, not caring to measure his terms—in fact, letting truth surge into poetry.

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[14] Magnesians xii. He prays (Polycarp viii) that the Christians at Smyrna may abide ever "in Jesus Christ our Lord, within the unity and under the care of God."

[15] Smyrnaeans viii. That is, as Schlier rightly points out (*op. cit.*, p. 101), the catholic church as the undivided body of Christ, the members of which adhere to Him. The modern idea that wherever there are Christian people Christ or the Church exists is not the idea of Ignatius.

[16] Eph. xi, xiv: Καλοκἀγαθία (a perfect character) is introduced by Ignatius into the Christian vocabulary from Greek ethics.

But this love for the Lord is elicited by the Lord's love. God is to be honored and revered as supreme, but the qualities of the divine nature which engross Ignatius are generosity, pity, gracious kindness, and unsparing goodness, especially as they are manifested in the person and work of Jesus Christ. One example may be given, from the inscription to the Roman epistle, where he calls the church "her who has obtained mercy by the munificence of the Father Most High and of Jesus Christ His only Son, the church beloved and enlightened by the will of Him Who has willed all that exists, in virtue of the love of Jesus Christ our God." The last words are loosely thrown in, not to explain that creation is due to the love of Christ, as in a theological treatise we might argue, but as a parallel to "by the will of" the Creator; the standing of the church is traced back to the gracious purpose of the divine nature. He proceeds to describe the church as "pre-eminent in love" (i.e., in the practical expression of Christian love), but the source of this is found in the divine love to which the church owes its very being.

Devotion to this Lord and Savior is explained to mean imitation of His example. No doubt, the maintenance of unity and the avoidance of dissent and schism are an expression of loyalty to Him as the one center of the church's life, but Ignatius calls upon Christians definitely to exhibit in their own lives the spirit of the Lord's kindly love. "By your concord and harmonious love Jesus Christ is sung aloud. Join this chorus then, each and all of you, that in harmonious concord, catching God's keynote by your very unity, you may sing with one voice through Jesus Christ to the Father, who shall hear you and recognise you by your good conduct as members of His Son."[17] "It is to your profit then to live in blameless unity, for thus you are partakers of God Himself." This is a true note of his religion, but there is another. You love God alone? Well, in this unworldly life, "pray without ceasing for the rest of men; there is hope of them attaining to repentance. At any rate let them have the lesson of your example, meet their angry outbursts with mildness, their vaunting with humility, their reviling with prayer, their errors with a stedfast faith, their fury with gentleness, never trying to repay them evil for evil. Let us prove ourselves their brothers by our forbearance; let us try to imitate the Lord, vying who shall best suffer wrong, fraud, scorn."[18] The religious note of the imitation of Christ is often struck, and never more impressively than in this connection.

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[17] Eph. iv. In μέλη (members) there is a play on the double sense of the term as limbs and musical measures. Other allusions to this obligation of unity are Philadelphians vii–viii ("Love unity, shun divisions, be imitators of Jesus Christ as He was also of the Father. . . . . Where division and anger exist, God dwells not") and Magnesians xv ("Farewell. Yours be a godly concord, yours that undivided spirit, which is Jesus Christ").

The line taken is not confined to Ignatius,[19] by any means, but his stress on gentle patience is characteristic, for this virtue appears to have come hard to him. One of his severest temptations in the Christian life was to be impatient. He was tried by the harsh treatment he received from his guards, irritated by the petty hardships which the soldiers had the means of inflicting on their prisoner. "All the way from Syria to Rome, by land and sea, by night and day, I am fighting with wild beasts," long before I reach the arena, "fastened to ten 'leopards' (that is, a company of soldiers), whom kindness only makes more cruel. Under their bad treatment I am learning more of what it means to be a disciple."[20] But it was a trial, which exasperated him, and evidently he found that it required all his Christian temper to stand the ordeal without yielding to anger. This seems to be the meaning of the rather difficult allusion in Trallians iv, where he speaks of the temptation to pride which his admirers furnished by their adulation of his prophetic or "spiritual" gifts, as he uttered his visions and revelations. He must not assume airs as a martyr, for all the enthusiasm of the churches over him. "I take my own measure, lest I be ruined by a boastful spirit. I have more need in these days to be afraid of listening to praise that puffs me up; flatterers are my scourge. (I do long to suffer as a martyr, but I know not if I am worthy; others may not see my angry irritation, but sorely does it ravage me; I need the gentleness that defeats the Prince of this world.)" The language is not unambiguous, but he appears to be conscious that pride and passion devastate the soul, and render a man unworthy of being a real martyr such as Christ approves. To yield to these passions is to give the devil a triumph. Now, Ignatius candidly adds, you outsiders may not see this and so you may take me for a saint; but I know how irritation surges up within me, as the soldiers maltreat me and as I am sometimes misunderstood by Christians within the church. A hot resentment of injuries was one of his besetting sins, he confesses, in a rare moment of self-analysis.

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[18] Eph. x. There is an unconscious echo of Paul's counsel, "Let your forbearance (ἐπιείκεια, same word as here) be known to everyone" (Phil. iv. 5).

[19] There is a fine parallel in the epistle to Diognetus (v, vi).

[20] Rom. v. The reminiscence of 1 Cor. xv.32 is obvious. Perpetua (*Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas* iii) speaks of the horrible darkness of the prison, the stifling heat of the crowded cells, and the "*concussurae militum.*"

In an equally characteristic passage, he notes the power of the Lord not only to induce repentance but to sustain the Christian under trial. "I put you on your guard beforehand against beasts in the shape of men, whom you must not only reject but, if possible, avoid meeting; be content to pray for them"—these heretical teachers and stray evangelists with their wrong notions about the Lord. "Perhaps they may repent," in answer to your prayers; " 'tis a hard thing, yet Jesus Christ, our true Life, is able to effect this." Then he proceeds, referring to these teachers with their docetic ideas of Jesus, "If it was merely in semblance that our Lord did all this" (i.e., His earthly sufferings), "then my imprisonment is a mere semblance too. Why have I given up myself to death, to fire and sword and wild beasts? Why? Because

Near the sword, near God,
With wild beasts, with God—

provided that one is suffering thus for the sake of Jesus Christ. 'Tis to share His passion that I am enduring it all, and He it is Who strengthens me, He Who is perfect Man."[21]

Now and then he speaks of Christians obeying the commands of the Lord,[22] but more often it is of living after (κατά) Him, making Him the rule and the inspiring guide of life. It is the Lord as authority rather than the authority of the Lord that Ignatius thinks of, and the difference is not one merely of phrase; it is another proof of how personally he conceived religion. To belong to God is to live κατά Jesus Christ.[23] Even when he speaks of the commands of the Lord, it is with a curiously personal reference, as when in the inscription to the Roman letter he greets the church "in the name of Jesus Christ the Son of the Father" as "those who are united to every command of His both in their flesh and in their spirit."[24] A characteristic expression of this devotion occurs in the ninth paragraph of the letter to the Magnesian church. "To this mystery [i.e., of the Lord's death and resurrection] we owe our faith, and by it we patiently endure that we may prove true disciples of Jesus Christ our only Teacher. How then can we live apart from Him, when the very prophets [of the Old Testament] who were in spirit His disciples awaited Him as their Teacher, till He Whom they had rightly expected came and raised them from the dead? Let us not then be insensible to His kindness. For were He to treat us as we act, we would be undone. So let us learn in His school to live the Christian life. Whoever adds another name to that of 'Christian' does not belong to God."

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[21] Smyrn. iv. Again there is a Pauline echo, this time of Phil. iv.13; it was probably in order to counteract the docetic heresy that Ignatius described the Lord as the Perfect or Real Man. The language of Eph. xx suggests that he took the "New man" of the Pauline Eph. iv.24 to mean Christ.

[22] Speaking in terms of the religious pageants of the cults, he remarks that the splendid vestments of the Ephesian Christians are "the commands of Jesus Christ" (Eph. ix). In the inscription to the Roman letter he hails the church as "keeping the law of Christ," for χριστόνομος is to be preferred to χριστώνυμος here. In Polycarp vi he appeals to the Christians at Smyrna as God's servants, and proceeds to use the military metaphor familiarized by Paul and Clement of Rome ("Give satisfaction to Him in whose ranks you are serving"), but at the end he touches the motive of direct experience: "So be long-suffering and gentle to one another as God is with you."

[23] Philadelphians iii.

[24] Delafosse mistranslates this; the Greek does not mean, "unis dans l'observation de tous ses préceptes," though Father Zeiller (*Die Apostolische Väter* [1918], p. 136) seems to suggest this in his version *("die dem Fleische und dem Geiste nach eins sind in jedlichem Gebot")*.

The last words are significant, since it was at Antioch that the name of "Christian" was first coined. But the passage is important for our purposes on two grounds: (*a*) The common stress on God's relation to the Christian in experience is notable. "Were He to act as we act, we would be undone." Ignatius likes to recall this thought. "Remember me as Jesus Christ remembers you," he tells the Ephesians.[25] "If you desire to do what is right, God is ready to aid you," so he promises the Smyrniotes.[26] Again, "Help all, as the Lord helps you. We must endure all things for the sake of God, that He may endure us."[27] These are no theological generalities but convictions stamped with individual experience. (*b*) Also the concentration upon the Lord is to be marked. It had been emphasized earlier in the same letter to the Magnesians.[28] "Death and life are set before us, these two issues, and to his own place shall each man go. As indeed there are two kinds of coinage, one of God and the other of the world, each stamped with its own mark, unbelievers stamped with this world, and believers, living in love, stamped with the likeness of God the Father through Jesus Christ." A passage like this is sufficiently explicit in a syncretistic age. Jülicher speaks somewhere about Jesus as the man of "Either-Or" and "Now-or-Never," meaning to bring out the stringent note of decision in the synoptic teaching. To Ignatius this note made a special appeal. He felt in and around the churches more than one current which seemed to him by its very broad-minded speculation to be carrying souls away from their absorbing devotion to the one Lord, and against this he sets up the argument that Christianity is Jesus Christ or it is nothing—and Jesus Christ in His full humanity as well as in His true divinity, the Savior and Hope of men. "Ah, why do we not all learn wisdom enough [to reject heresies] by receiving the knowledge of God—which is Jesus Christ?"[29] There is no *gnosis* (knowledge) but this. "Dispense with the evil leaven, which has grown stale and sour [i.e., Jewish ritual] and turn to the new leaven—which is Jesus Christ."[30] That phrase, "which is Jesus Christ," is a hall-mark of the style of Ignatius. It is his way of saying what St. Paul meant when he often chose to put a personal stamp on words describing the person and work of Jesus, as in "Who is made unto us wisdom," etc., or in "the things that are above, where Christ sitteth." The gospel, Ignatius cries, what is it but "the faith of God, for whose sake Jesus Christ was crucified? . . . . My spirit is the humble victim of the Cross, the Cross which to unbelievers proves a stumbling-block but to us salvation and eternal life."[31] There is an echo here of the famous words in I Corinthians, but the experience below the words is real and direct. It is indeed to this point that the personal religion of Ignatius always comes round. His arguments may circle widely, but this is their center; it is to this glowing consciousness of possessing all hope in Jesus Christ that he returns, as he rules out any practice or theory which would minimize the significance of the Lord for Christianity.

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[25] Eph. xxi.

[26] Smyrn. xi.

[27] Polycarp iii. This daring double use of ὑπομένω has a partial parallel in Newton's hymn:

> Could we bear from one another
> What He daily bears from us?

But the expression of Ignatius cuts deeper; it is one of the paradoxes which only a profound religious experience could throw out.

[28] Magnesians v. A similar application of Matt. xxii.19 (with Cor. xv.49) has been preserved by Clement of Alexandria (*Eclog. Prophet.* 24, *Excerpta Theod.* 86), the believer being stamped with the divine name instead of Caesar's or the world's.

"It would not be difficult," says an acute modern observer,[32] "to find men like Ignatius in the modern mission-field. I can think of an ignorant, pompous, self-important presbyter, fond of big phrases which he but half understands, full of polite self-depreciation, warm-hearted withal, ready to spend and be spent in the service of the gospel, mindful, when troubles come, of the greater sufferings of Jesus. The quaint comparisons of Ignatius are very similar to those that are sometimes employed by Chinese converts." But this is not all the truth. There is a note of genius in Ignatius, the genius of personal religion, and of personal religion at its best. As one reads these letters one is struck by the ease with which, e.g., the bishop identifies himself with the Lord in his unselfish concern for the churches. "My brothers," he will write to the Philadelphians,[33] "my love for you is overflowing, and in my sheer joy I would safeguard you—yet not I but Jesus Christ." Or again, "I beseech you (yet not I but the love of Jesus Christ)."[34] This is far more than an unconscious echo of Pauline language; it comes spontaneously to the lips of Ignatius as he thinks of his fellows with a pastoral concern. Ignatius is sometimes defending himself against criticism of his "spiritual" gifts and authority, but he is not pompous with the mock humility that is assumed for further ends. How little he is really occupied with himself and his reputation, when he is at his best, is seen in a casual reference to prayer, for example. Like the apostle Paul he not only prays for his churches but asks their prayers on his own behalf, and one of these appeals is significant in this connection. "In your prayers remember me, that I may attain to God; remember also the church in Syria, of which I am not worthy to be called a member. I do need your united prayers and love in God"—but why?—"that your church may cause refreshing dew to fall upon the church in Syria."[35] The last word, that is, is concern for his church, not for himself. The very metaphor has distinction. It is the only use of this figure of speech for prayer in the Apostolic Fathers; none of them ever employs the metaphor of dew in this connection. But there is religious as well as poetical distinction in the sentence, in the instant broadening of the thought from his personal needs to those of the church at Antioch from which he had been separated and for which he desires others as well as himself to think and pray. Prayer is one of the surest revelations of personal religion, and a comment like this throws a pencil of light upon the finer qualities which characterize the personal religion of Ignatius of Antioch.

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[29] Eph. xvii.

[30] Magnesians x.

[31] Eph. xvi, xviii.

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[32] Dr. Campbell N. Moody in *The Mind of the Early Converts*, p. 57.

[33] Philadelphians v.

[34] Trallians vi.

[35] Magnesians xiv. Delafosse with incredible lack of perception declares that the prayers for the Syrian church are artificially added to the original text; he has not even the excuse of an un-Marcionite theology to justify this arbitrary excision.

# THE COMMON TASKS OF PROTESTANTISM AND THE METHOD OF THEIR FULFILMENT[1]

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BROTHERS in the Gospel, what is the meaning of our Marburg celebration? What does it signify that Lutherans and Calvinists and Uniteds[2] and Methodists and Waldensians and Baptists and others, by whatever name they are called, are met together here for these days? What does it signify that from East and West, from South and North, from France and Germany, from near and far, from the polar regions and the sunny dales of Piedmont and from the lands of the New World far beyond the sea, you have come to meet us in our quiet little Marburg?

Is it only to foster common, historical memories, to celebrate an interesting and significant moment in church history, or to honor great men of the past and great events of long ago?

I know that we are agreed in this, *that alone* would not have been worth so much trouble, and it is not the inducement which has brought you here. Rather the greatness of the event that once happened here should become a present stimulus to us. It ought to set before us anew old aims and tasks, and also to spur us on to consider new duties and responsibilities. And in communion with one another our wills should be aroused and our powers liberated to devote ourselves anew to such common tasks in accordance with the circumstances and demands of the present.

Fully twenty distinct groups and types of Protestantism are gathered here. "An instance of the dismemberment and disintegration of Protestantism," our opponents will say. "An instance of the richness and fulness of life, which have been liberated by the rediscovery of the pure Gospel, have poured themselves out into the world and ought always to pour themselves out and take form more widely and fully," so we reply. But we may answer in this way, only if and because we know that we are one amid our differences, that we have common possessions, and that of necessity we belong to each other. Because we know this, and because the lively feeling that we belong to each other animates and upholds both us and you, therefore we are here. And we do not meet to celebrate a merely historical festival—with memories that are partly proud, partly depressing—but we have to do with three things:

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[1] Address delivered at the Marburg Festival held at Marburg, Germany, September 12 and 13, 1929.

[2] The name for the church in Germany of which some of the members are Lutherans and some Reformed.

There is first our witness before all the world, that we are one and belong to each other as children of the Reformation which the Lord God gave to his church, as the one great undivided communion of those who mean to live and die "gratia sola per fidem solam," trusting in God's word and work in Christ, apart from every work and ordinance of man.

But, second, this witness before the world should become for us a vow, which binds us anew to each other, and which we all mean to carry away in our hearts, when we return to the communions and groups that we represent:

A band of brothers we will be,
Whom neither need nor risk shall part.

This vow we will offer to God and to our common cause. We will offer it, thinking in particular of those evangelical brethren and communions, who, in the Diaspora, stand in greater and different "need and risk" than we, and who have to fight a hard battle for the maintenance and freedom of their Reformed faith. As we make our vow we greet them in particular, and assure them that we know about them, that we share their need and risk.

But, finally, if we seriously mean our confession and vow, we have a still weightier enterprise, and unless we fulfil it, both confession and vow are mere words, and words that impeach us.

This enterprise is seriously to call to remembrance once again the tasks that confront us as Protestants, to take them anew upon our conscience and to give ourselves anew to their service. It falls to each individual among us to think out for himself his own particular duties and calling. But here and in this hour it falls to us above all to deal with those things which we must call the *collective* tasks of Protestantism. I mean the tasks which confront it as a great spiritual communion and which as a communion it has to accomplish, if it is to remain true to its calling, if in the new world-situation it is to accomplish its tasks in accordance with the spirit of the age, if, indeed, it is to maintain securely its own stability and permanence.

## I

Protestantism has such collective tasks. It always has had them. It has them more than ever under the changed conditions of which we are about to speak. The chief task which, as it seems to me, confronts it today is this: to recognize that, in relation to its own collective and world-wide mission, it suffers from a grievous lack which we ought to remove—that up to now it is without an organ for collective action on a large scale. Let us define this lack as the want of a practical bond of union in Protestantism, and also as the want of an organ for collective action.

To remove this want was indeed the import of the undertaking of the Landgraf Philip. And our celebration as such, therefore, lays this task anew upon our conscience as of primary importance. But the new world-situation, in which we find ourselves, does so even more. One of its principal features is the formation of great practical leagues for the most varied ends and under the most varied conditions. And this because of urgent inner necessities which the solitary and isolated cause can no longer avoid if it is not itself to decline and be thrust aside. And such necessities confront Protestantism all over the world.

By a practical bond of union I do not at all mean the hasty and artificial establishment of an external church union, a kind of pan-Protestantism, with a uniform "faith and order." We will not attempt, by elastic generalizations, to establish a common "faith" by taking a common denominator of dogmatic formularies. Neither will we establish what seems to me to be the un-Protestant idea of uniform "order," that is, of a universally accepted outward constitution. Still less are we thinking of proposing an all-inclusive superorganization of Protestant church organizations, with perhaps a Protestant Vatican at its head. Neither a Protestant pope, nor an infallible general council, whose dogmas are binding on all, is desirable or even possible on a Protestant basis. We believe in the free play of the powers of the individual, in his independent activity and responsibility, apart from any infallible prescription, in free co-operation alongside of official organization. We will stand by self-development in rite, cult, and personal life as they take shape, now in this way and now in that, according to historical conditions, the particular demands of time and circumstance, and each particular situation, and as they thereby give play in proper spontaneity to the riches of free Protestant development, in mutual stimulation, competition, and help, according to the riches of the gifts of the spirit. We believe that, without any seeking or making, new unifications and, what might be just as good, new differentiations and reformations will be possible among us. We know that our brotherly feeling will not hinder this, and that this is of the essence of Protestantism. But we believe, too, that in all our diversity there is an inner unity, which for its part makes possible common action and in many respects demands it. And we wish that for this purpose Protestantism may find *an organ of common action.* Its form can never be that of one all-embracing organization which, in its dogmatic immensity, takes somehow into its service the subdivisions of Protestantism. And we refuse, therefore, to hang about it the mantle of dogmatic forms that mimic Catholicism. But it appears to us, that in the wholly undogmatic form of a "Union for Common Practical Purposes," somewhat in the shape of a "Universal Protestant Senate for the Protection of Common Protestant Interests," there is offered a modern means by which important common Protestant tasks may be fulfilled, which without it would fail of fulfilment.

The least and simplest thing required here appears to me to be something like what is called in English an "urgency committee," a committee to meet pressing common emergencies, in whatever way they appear. Such a committee is a permanent organ for collective action, but not an organ with permanent functions. It is there, ready, on the watch. But it functions only when from any side whatever there emerges a demand for a common *pronouncement,* or for common *defense,* and for relieving any general distress that may arise. It is under certain circumstances nothing else than the common mouth of a community, which is usually silent, but speaks, and speaks with the emphasis of an offical representation of the community concerned, where it is worth while to speak. Protestantism has at present not even a common mouth. And I believe this want has already been felt often and by many. Let us take the following example. We experience from time to time, at intervals that do not shorten, and unhappily with less and less tendency to cease and die away, a sort of invective against Protestantism issues from the highest official Roman quarter and in the highest official form. Only recently we have had experience of this. When the Vatican had its dispute with Mussolini, it was precisely Protestantism that was brought under accusation as being guilty of the ideas of chauvinism and so forth, and as being their source. This accusation was directed not merely against Lutherans, or Calvinists, or any single group of Protestants, but against the whole Protestant world. But this instance does not stand alone; it has a long chain of predecessors and we do not know how many successors it may have.

To answer such an attack, and fittingly to reprove confessional presumption of this kind, is, however, not the task of an individual, or of a single group, but of Protestantism as a whole. In this case it was unable to answer, nor will it be able to do so in similar cases when they recur, since as a whole it has no mouth that can speak, and speak with the emphasis of all Protestantism.

Or allow me to choose another and more pleasing example from the realm of common Protestant tasks—in this case from the realm of scientific theological studies, which are still of the greatest practical significance for Protestantism. You will know that Rome possesses an important institution for the study both of the Eastern churches and of Protestantism. On their side it has been wisely recognized how necessary such an institution is, especially today. And this task is recognized on a large scale, as a common task of the Roman church and is undertaken from the central office.

Our plan is to create a similar institution for the systematic investigation of Christian confessions, perhaps here in Marburg. Such an institution ought to serve to remedy a grievous defect, above all within Protestantism itself. For it must be granted that often in many respects we know too little even of one another, have too little mutual understanding, and do not adequately apprehend the peculiarities of our manifold groups in East and West, and their distinctive life. And the same applies to the other confessions of Christendom. To create such a research institute would make possible adequate scientific preparation for fruitful interrelations for interchange of ideas and for common intercourse. But it is, again, a collective task for the Protestant community in general, which a single group cannot accomplish, and which demands an ordered co-operation; once more, such co-operation presupposes an organ. Closely connected with this is the gratifying custom that has come into use of the interchange both of students and teachers, which has already produced such good results. But this enterprise would gain, if it could be methodically conducted from given points of view, and if it could be continuously and regularly placed under and assigned to a central office of all Protestantism.

## II

If we ask what the subjects are which especially today, in our present situation, must urge us on seriously to consider the task of a practical union of world-Protestantism and to reflect on its realization, it appears to me chiefly to fall under the following heads:

1. The fact, which I might define as the shrinkage of the world-arena, the coming nearer and coming together of realms that formerly were farthest apart, and the inevitable and irresistible coalescence of the great tasks of civilization in general. And this likewise affects the tasks of church communities and circles.

Every particular church communion which deserves the name has not merely to do with questions of the private morals of the individual, for the reason that there is not in general an isolated individual ethic. For every individual has a place in some kind of inclusive collective group. His sin is in most cases part of corporate sin; his mission is for the most part determined by realms of duty, which encroach on him as an individual and draw him into themselves. In them he finds his position, and relates himself to them by good or evil, right or wrong conduct. By them in great part, aim, activity, and moral vocation are appointed and given to him. Corporate sins become his sins, and his sins become corporate sins. Therefore, if a church will fulfil its office of condemning sin and of urging men to righteousness and to godly obedience, it cannot do so without defining its attitude to the great collective sins of society in their manifold forms. From this there springs its task of defining its attitude, in its teaching, preaching, and discipline to moral problems, as they are collectively presented in the realm of social ethics and community ethics in general. It must find answers to the questions how the individual and the community take their stand, what they do—what they should leave undone in respect to family and marriage, to training and popular education, in the relations of classes, races, and ranks to each other, in reference to the validity of the divine will as demanding justice in the behavior both of individuals and nations to one another.

In growing measure and with increasing efficacy the different church communities have recognized this as their task. But the things which formerly, in all these respects, through the great disunity of the world were treated as belonging to this or that separate geographical or national sphere—that is, were formerly "local questions"—these have long since become in many respects world-questions. The German "Kirchentag"[3] has, on its side courageously intervened through effective declarations when some manifest social wrong was under discussion in our land. But the social question is no longer a local question; it is today a world-question, and no single Protestant group can give an answer by itself, but the question is set to Protestantism as a whole, and as a whole it must give the right answer to such great moral questions, as it defines its attitude to great collective problems of right and wrong. And as a whole it must have a mouth, in order to speak, if in a flagrant way anyone is being sinned against by society—and not only a mouth to speak with but an organ to work with—and in this case especially, in order to work on the answers which are to be given to this kind of urgent, modern, collective problems of Christian morals. For we Protestants are not in a position to seek ready-made answers from a supposedly infallible, final authority. But we know that the answer to

[3] The name for the supreme Protestant Church Council in Germany.

difficult moral problems is to be striven after through the effort of conscientious, theological thought, if we would not answer like a dilettante and according to individual taste, such questions as that of marriage or of the worth or unworth of personal property, but if we, with responsibility before God, would make the often difficult application of the moral principles of the Gospel and the Reformation to the new situations of life and relations of the individual and of communions today. And, again, to work out these questions is a problem for Protestantism as a whole, which not this or that particular group, here or there, has to solve for itself, when we have to do with similar problems which everywhere correspondingly emerge.

2. Alongside these great pressing moral questions, there stand other questions, of general culture, which may affect Protestantism as a whole in consequence of that shrinking and unifying of the world, of which we have spoken. And there are questions in which Protestantism should by all means have its say, and in which, because it has no mouth of its own, it ought not simply to accept what the pope of Rome declares practicable. To name an example, there is the question of the eventual revision of the calendar or the fixing of the date of Easter. These questions will sooner or later be asked by the League of Nations. Whom it has to ask, when the Roman church is concerned, that it knows exactly. It is just the same with the Anglican church. But how can it put the question to Protestantism—not to a single group, or to a more or less private institution, which offers itself for the purpose, but to Protestantism as a whole? How can the League obtain from it a general and official pronouncement such as would here be required? And there may be many such general cultural questions, and occasions for taking necessary decisions may always be recurring.

3. The third and perhaps the most important and pressing

subject is, however, the imperiled position of our brethren, where they are met with in the Diaspora.

Protestant minorities—here I may count most readily on universal and speedy understanding. Whoever has been abroad and seen the situation there, and has heard their complaints of helplessness, will know what is here meant. I was abroad for some years. I may not name the place where this happened. Someone said to me, "Here we are in a minority and so are the Catholics. But how great a difference there is between their position and ours. If a matter arises affecting the Catholics, a very powerful official organization stands behind them, and occasionally the pope may send his nuncio and he seldom does so in vain. But how does it stand with us Protestants?" Now, we wish to send no nuncio. But we might desire that here Protestantism as a whole should recognize its duty of protecting the brethren, and that as a whole it should recognize this as its collective task, and find a way to fulfil it. It cannot do this through mere "alliances," or through occasional reaction of one or another of its groups. Still less is it effective for individuals to raise a lament. But it would be helpful if an organ of Protestantism as a whole were at hand, to speak in its name and actively to defend its minorities. Such a "Senate of United Protestantism for the Representation of Common Interests" would not supersede the beneficent operation of the alliances which work for the Diaspora. But it would be able to lay hold where their powers fail, and it might become the focus in which their powers unite.

4. Finally, the fourth subject which today demands consideration is the "ecumenical movement" that is too hopefully making itself felt. We welcome it sincerely, and as Protestants we welcome the fact that it has enabled Christians of all confessions to meet each other and to unite in practical questions of "life and work" which affect universal Christian activity, and that for this the formation of the Stockholm organization has given opportunity. But, according to our opinion, the

overarching "ecumenical" roof can only be firmly built, if it rests on three firm pillars, which carry it, and of these that of Protestantism as a whole alongside those of the Eastern and Anglican communions is like a clearly distinct and self-inclusive part in the whole. And it would appear to us a lack if, alongside the two definite unities of Anglicanism and the Eastern church, Protestantism should co-operate only in separated groups, and not on its side too as a Protestant working unity. Frankly, we might see here a peril for the ecumenical movement itself. For this would without question be imperiled if it should in any way appear as if those other groups conducted and asserted themselves in their conjoined historical unity, while Protestantism itself were less rigorously conscious of its unity, which has its one root in the Reformation, and were less strictly to preserve its own character. Alongside those two other historical forms and expressions of Christianity, the Protestant groups in the narrower sense, in spite of their differences in particulars, doubtless present a historical and essentially homogeneous unity of a quite distinctive character, of which they should be abidingly aware and which sometimes, face to face with the other groups, they will have jointly to vindicate for their own self-preservation. If they attach themselves to the ecumenical communion, they should do it above all as a united group of children of one house. One may not take the second step before the first. And only on the solid substructure of the three pillars named, can the "ecumenical" dome be firmly and securely built.[4]

The tasks which I have briefly set forth have for the most part been for a long time recognized and understood as common and collective. And the unifications, which we advocate, have long been in process in a gratifying way. The earlier local confessional groups are unifying into world-associations. The intercourse and fellowship between the confessions has everywhere set in motion their co-operation in great tasks. Forms of effective "Unions for Service" are found everywhere. I refer here only to the richly blest work of the Gustav-Adolf-Verein, which pursues with untiring energy its work of general evangelical assistance for the Protestant Diaspora; or to the Gotteskasten, whose special concern is for our Lutheran brothers in the dispersion. Since 1922, through the Assembly of the Bethesda Conference, the Europäische Zentralstelle für kirchliche Hilfsaktion has been created, which from the beginning has had the powerful support of the American Protestant bodies, and has worked in close fellowship with them. Its French name is Bureau Central Européen pour l'entr'aide des Églises. It is already a combined "fellowship of work," in an official form, of the majority of Protestant churches, for those interests of Protestantism as a whole that we have mentioned in paragraph 3. Actually only one final step would be required to unite with its work the remaining common tasks which we have mentioned, and to expand it into the Universal Evangelical Council that we have in mind. In this way a new foundation of a new body alongside of so many others would not be required. It would only be necessary to complete the sphere of activity of this already existing body, which is acknowledged on all sides and is already in full activity, so as to form, by such means of organic development and completion the impressive and powerful instrument of Protestantism as a whole, which would be to it at the same time both hand and mouth.

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[4] And even then, when we gladly and willingly meet together with the others and would share quite willingly and in a brotherly way the troubles of the Eastern church, yet we would even then not forget that no "ecumenical" good will is to be allowed to hinder us in our permanent common task of evangelization. Where doors open to Reformed preaching, where people seek and ask for the message of the Reformation, as is now so powerfully the case in the East, there its mission of evangelization remains constant as a common interest and common task of Protestantism; and no "ecumenical movement" should hinder or cripple our common devotion to it.

Brothers in the pure gospel! We are children of *one* house, in spite of—no, even because of—the varied characteristics which may distinguish us. This joyous and thankful assurance should animate us anew. Let us take this assurance away with us into our communions, whether far or near. Especially may our isolated and dispersed brethren take away with them the assurance that we all belong to *one* family, that one will stand by the others, and *the whole by its parts*. But if we are so minded, then let us seriously consider whether the hour does not demand that we attain to a new partnership in action, which needs new ways and new forms, and in particular an effective new organ.

# THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE IN RECENT CRITICISM

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THERE is and can be no such thing as a critical orthodoxy. In whatever branch of knowledge the scientific student works, he must hold himself, on his fealty to truth, ready to abandon his dearest hypothesis if need arise, if it appear to him that it is inadequately based or if there be facts of experience which can in no way be reconciled with it. It is true that he will generally surrender a well-tested theory only with the greatest reluctance, and that the problem created by the conflict between fact and hypothesis will often lead him to the development and ultimate reinforcement of the latter, but at the same time every such conflict must be held to imperil the established position until it can be fitted into is place in the whole scheme.

This does not mean that no hypothesis can be accepted as a practical working basis. On the contrary, there are not a few theories in the worlds of man and nature which so justify themselves by their reliability that only the very strongest evidence would induce any man to discard them. It is, indeed, on such hypotheses that the practical life of humanity is built up. No sane person would venture to doubt the reality of the law of gravitation so far as to throw himself from the top of the Woolworth Building, and, while this may be an extreme example, the same tendency holds good in many departments of life. We learn to trust the generalized results of experience, and in our search for a common explanation of phenomena we are prone to take much for granted.

These general remarks apply to the critical study of the Old Testament with as much force as to any other department of intellectual life. That age of criticism which first broke on the modern world in the Renaissance did not make itself seriously felt in biblical studies until the nineteenth century, but when it did appear there its work was comparatively rapid, and some of its conclusions seem likely to stand almost every test that can be applied to them. This is true especially of the criticism of the Hexateuch in the form we know as the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, which combined an analysis of the text into its constituent elements with an attempt at the dating of the various portions thus isolated from the complex whole. It involved the recognition of the sources indicated by the familiar letters J, E, D, H, and P, and their separation from one another. It also involved an effort to place them in their historical order, and, finally, theories as to the actual time when each came into being.

The whole hypothesis in its original form can hardly be accepted today without modification. The disentanglement of J and E is not always certain after the end of the Book of Genesis, and wide differences of opinion prevail as to the absolute dating of the different elements. Even in the last ten years we have had suggestions from Hölscher and Kennett, on the one hand, and from Oesterreicher and Welch, on the other, as to new assignments for the series, the first group seeking to thrust the whole bodily forward to a comparatively late date in the history of Israel, the second to throw it back into an earlier time than that which is generally accepted. But the main analysis, into JE, D, H, and P, still holds the field and is likely to do so, for the attempts made by such scholars as Eerdmans, Dahse, and Wiener to establish rival views have led in the long run to the formulation of hypotheses far less likely to command general assent than those which they seek to supersede. Nor has the relative dating of the sources been seriously disputed; their historical order has been generally accepted (with some doubt as to whether J comes before E and whether H is later than D), and when a fresh dating has been offered the whole series is moved backward or forward *en bloc*. Further study has indeed offered a somewhat more elaborate analysis, and both Eissfeldt and Morgenstern have found more primitive elements within J, though it must be admitted that as yet their theories have not been submitted to any thorough and searching test, while Sellin's *Introduction* includes efforts to identify some of those very early factors which have always been admitted generally to underlie the recognized documents.

The criticism of the prophetic books was less successful. In all studies of this kind there is more or less room for a purely subjective element. It is impossible often to give detailed reasons for an opinion, because it rests on the general impression which the reader forms, and the same passage may appeal to different students in very different ways. There are, of course, some impressions which are too general and too strong to be seriously regarded as untrustworthy; no one who is really familiar with Hebrew can fail to appreciate the difference between the two accounts of Creation in Genesis, chapters 1–2, for, apart from any question of analysis, the one stands as far from the other as does English prose of the eighteenth century from that of the sixteenth. But this is exceptional; usually a criticism which is based mainly on such impressions, and cannot point to any objective criteria, is likely to be weak and uncertain, often leading students astray and carrying with it little or no conviction to other minds. The nineteenth-century criticism of the prophetic books was almost entirely subjective, and though some of its conclusions are not likely to be seriously challenged, there was a marked absence of any guiding principles or objective criteria which could be employed in determining the date, structure, and authorship of the literature in question. Once given the bare idea of a composite document, and the proverbial schoolboy can analyze with absolute accuracy such a passage as Genesis, chapter 37; but the attempt to distinguish the various strata in the prophets rested almost entirely on minute questions of style and vocabulary, or, still more precariously, on the individual critic's own theories of the history of politics, literature, and theology.

Among the results of nineteenth-century criticism which seem most assured there are one or two which should be especially mentioned. Long before the end of the century it was recognized that the Book of Isaiah was not a unity, and that a clear-cut division must be made at the end of chapter 39, while within the earlier section it was felt that chapters 24–27 could hardly be attributed to Isaiah the son of Amoz of Jerusalem. There were a few passages in Jeremiah, notably in the chapters dealing with foreign nations (standing at the end of the book in the MT and in the middle in the LXX), which could not be ascribed to the prophet who was the author of the main volume. Ezekiel was left practically untouched, as were many of the books included in the collection of the Twelve. But the present books of Micah and Zechariah were recognized as composite, though in the case of the former opinions differed as to the point where the line of demarcation should be drawn. But beyond this the criticism of the prophetic literature hardly went until the last decade of the century, when a new and searching treatment of the prophets appeared, mainly owing to the work of Wellhausen and Duhm.

Wellhausen's handling of the critical problems presented by the prophetic literature went little further than the detection and elimination of glosses and interpolations, often of some length, and in this he was freely followed by a number of able and scholarly successors, typified by the writers on the Twelve Prophets in the *International Critical Commentary*. Duhm went further, and most of his criticism has found distinguished followers. Within Isaiah, chapters 40–66, he recognized two distinct authors, the work of the exilic Unknown ending with chapter 55 and that of the other prophet being much later. Few pieces of literature, ancient or modern (one exception will have to be noted shortly), have ever been subjected to such drastic surgery as that which Duhm applied to the Book of Jeremiah. Actuated by a theory that the prophet wrote only in the so-called Ḳinah meter, he eliminated all that could not be crushed into this particular form of poetry as he understood it. This principle (and there were even Ḳinah passages which were ascribed to other hands) naturally excluded from the genuine work of the prophet all the prose in which the book is particularly rich, and all poetry which could not be scanned in the necessary way. Sometimes Duhm's instinct for the fire and genius of Jeremiah led him to strange operations, for there were passages which he could not possibly deny to the prophet which yet needed curious handling to be reduced to Ḳinah—an outstanding illustration is his reconstruction of the great chaos scene in Jer. 4:23–26. At the same time it must be remarked that no commentator has ever had a deeper insight into the personality of the greatest of the prophets, or a keener sympathy with him, and Duhm's commentary on Jeremiah, in spite of its critical vagaries, must long remain as one of the most inspiring that have ever been written. It should be added that, among the prose sections of the book, Duhm ascribed a large number to a sympathetic contemporary of the prophet, whom he identified with Baruch, and accepted these as giving authentic details of Jeremiah's life, though they were not from his pen.

Duhm has been to some extent followed by later scholars, though probably none would indorse without reservation the whole of his position. Among important recent works on the subject that of Mowinckel may be especially mentioned as accepting in the main Duhm's attitude toward the prose sections of the book. Another recent scholar, Hölscher, has applied similar methods to the Book of Ezekiel, and reached conclusions not dissimilar, leaving to the prophet only a comparatively small portion of the book that bears his name. It is, however, impossible to escape from the feeling that Hölscher's criticism is in part due to the necessity of removing much of Ezekiel which might otherwise conflict with a Pentateuchal theory which places Deuteronomy well on in the post-Exilic period.

All this—and the specimens selected are but specimens—is, of course, almost entirely subjective criticism, based on the impression made by the books on their readers, and depending too little on definite objective criteria.[1] Even the wholesale relegation of prose passages in Jeremiah to the limbo of Midrash rests on such a judgment until the actual history of the literature has been discussed. A further weakness in the position lies in its treatment of each book by and for itself. A sound criticism would recognize that the same tendencies and methods were at work throughout the whole field of our prophetic literature, and that no book—no portion of a book—could stand or fall alone. Unless and until these difficulties can be overcome, the criticism of the prophetic literature must necessarily remain vague, uncertain, and exposed to constant revision and contradiction. It remains to be seen how far the criticism characteristic of the twentieth century has gone to provide what was lacking, but at least a promising beginning has been made.

There are two aspects of Old Testament study which have had considerable influence on prophetic criticism during recent years, and though both are comparatively novel and may yet need a great deal of discussion, they have progressed sufficiently to allow of their employment in the task of criticism. The first of these is the recognition of the essential principles of Hebrew meter. In its main outlines the dominant theory goes back to the work of Ley in the seventies, and it has attracted the attention of most Old Testament scholars since that time. Many of the points advocated by earlier students have been abandoned, and it has been felt that particular views of metrics have sometimes led to extravagant modification of the Hebrew text. But as time has passed more elasticity has been permitted, and the work of Sievers and Gray has made it clear that within definite limits of variation certain well-marked schemes may be observed. It is recognized that at bottom the rhythm of sound depends on a rhythm of thought and that the outstanding feature of Hebrew meter lies in "parallelism." This inevitably expresses itself in sound, and the result is that the whole of the rhythm depends on the balancing enumeration of significant words, i.e., of the words which seem to the poet to convey the full and independent elements of his statement. Negatives, propositions, and the like do not usually carry such momentum of significance as to form independent ideas without reinforcement, and the accentual system which lies at the roots of Hebrew grammar identifies the individual phonetic stress with the individual thought-unit. These word-stresses are grouped in *clausulae* ("stichoi") of never less than two or more than three units, and it is the combination of stichoi which makes the characteristic meter, the sense of a parallel, or balance of thought and sound, being never far away. Three types of meter alone are recognizable: (*a*) a type in which three stresses are balanced by two, with a variation in which each stichos contains only two, giving the scansion-formulas 3:2, 2:3, or 2:2; (*b*) a regular triplication, in which three stressed words are balanced by three, or in which three pairs of words balance one another, giving 3:3, 2:2:2, or even 3:3:3; (*c*) a comparatively rare type in which two double elements are followed by a single triple one, yielding 4:3, usually further to be analyzed into 2:2:3. After much discussion it seems to be growing more and more certain that, apart from such alternatives as have been mentioned, the Hebrew poet did not vary his meter within one and the same poem. This, of course, demands the occasional excision or insertion of words, but the number is less than is sometimes supposed, and it is a striking fact that (in some books, of course, more than in others) the LXX readings offer fairly strong evidence in favor of a metrical text on the lines above suggested, even where the MT seems to be irregular.

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[1] This, as we shall see, applies very much less to Mowinckel than to the other scholars mentioned.

Advance along the second line, that of the peculiar prophetic psychology, has been more recent, and it is extraordinary how rapidly it has made ground among Old Testament scholars, especially the younger men. Adumbrations of it were to be seen in the work of Wellhausen and Goldziher, but it was only on the publication of Hölscher's *Die Propheten* in 1914 that it was clearly set before the world. It had long been recognized that the earlier prophets, e.g., those of the days of Samuel, were ecstatics, who were likely to fall into, or to induce by artificial stimulation, a strange psychological condition, which manifested itself both in outward behavior and in mental experience. (As a matter of fact, it seems that these two were originally distinct, and that they coalesced in the early period of the Israelite monarchy.) Externally the access of the "ecstasy" produced conduct like that of the later "dancing dervishes"—frothing at the mouth, wild and uncontrolled contortions of the limbs, or perhaps constriction of the muscles, the whole sometimes resembling the symptoms of epilepsy or of insanity and sometimes those of a trance. One of the terms used to designate a prophet means literally "a raving madman," and the verb "to prophesy" in one of its forms is used to describe the behavior of Saul in his fits of derangement. On the other side the subject became conscious of another world than that in which he and other men normally lived. The usual phenomena did not disappear, but new ones were superadded to them, and he saw and heard things that were hidden alike from the rest of the world and from his own normal consciousness. Both the outward conduct and the inward experience are found elsewhere, but the combination seems to have been particularly characteristic of the Israelite prophet. Hölscher's great contribution to the study of prophecy lay in his attribution of this ecstasy in its completeness to the canonical prophets, as well as to their predecessors. Not unnaturally the view met with strenuous opposition in some quarters, but is becoming more and more the accepted position, and there are few Old Testament scholars of repute in Europe who do not hold it, at least in a modified form.

These are two new factors in the situation, but they do not explain the whole change that has come over the attitude of advancing scholars on the subject. The movement has been curiously silent, and it is difficult to say when it first took concrete shape.[2] It is as though the whole world of European Old Testament scholarship had suddenly waked from a dream to find itself in a new country.[3] The truth seems to be that the new position was implicit in much of the best work of the early years of the present century, and was unconsciously assumed by many scholars who had never formulated it to themselves. It underlies a certain amount of the work of Duhm (though in an embryonic state), some elements of it are obvious in such work as that of Erbt—and others—on Jeremiah, and the published portions of Gray's work on Isaiah (ICC) show that the author was tending toward a formal recognition of the position. It is, however, interesting to observe how often a scholar whose criticism is based on a partial and, possibly, unconscious adoption of the newer position, falls back into the older ways.

Even before the development of the ecstatic theory doubts had arisen as to whether the term "writing prophets" strictly applied to those whose words have come down to us in the canon of scripture. It was realized that they were primarily preachers of righteousness, and the very fact that several times it is noted that they wrote down, or took measures to have written down by others, the sermons that they preached suggested that the proceeding was abnormal, and that usually it was left to the hearers to remember and to preserve the oracular utterances heard. Acceptance of the ecstatic view, though by no means essential to the purely critical position,[4] turned the possibility into a strong probability. It seemed unlikely that men of this type would carefully record their utterances except in expressly specified cases. Further, the utterance which described an experience of the ecstatic condition would naturally be brief, and we must not look for long disquisitions or for extensive discourses. The older view had held that the prophets were authors in the strict sense of the term, writing their books at full length, and arranging the material in such fashion as to produce elaborate works of literary art. Scholars spoke of "publishing" the books, having in mind rather the conditions of the Graeco-Roman world of the first imperial centuries rather than those of the more ancient East. With the acceptance of the ecstatic view it was almost inevitable that this position should be abandoned, and that we should think of the individual utterance as being very short, and of its preservation as being due frequently to others than the prophet who delivered it. At the same time a closer and yet more general study of the text itself showed that it was possible to treat the whole mass of the prophetic literature on consistent lines, and to note certain definite facts which might serve as an objective basis for criticism. For one thing, the difference between the prose sections and the poetical pieces became obvious. Prophetic poetry had been recognized at least since the days of Lowth, but only the twentieth-century studies in poetic form enabled students clearly to distinguish between the two types of writing, and to apportion to each the appropriate sections in the prophetic books. Further, it was realized that within the prose sections we had two distinct types, one claiming to be in the third person and usually giving far more attention to events in the life of the prophet, and the other concentrating more on the message, written in the first person. To some extent Duhm had already recognized this distinction in Jeremiah, and his implicit position was made explicit by Mowinckel, who distinguished clearly and expressly between the three classes in Jeremiah:

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[2] Perhaps Mowinckel's work on Jeremiah is the first clear statement, but the writer applied his structural analysis only to the one book. A formal and general statement seems to have appeared first in an article by the present writer, published in the *Church Quarterly Review* for 1923.

[3] For years the present writer believed himself to be a lonely pioneer, and was equally surprised and gratified to find that the Old Testament sections both of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft meeting at Hamburg in 1926 and of the International Congress of Orientalists meeting at Oxford in 1928 seemed to accept his position as a matter of course.

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[4] E.g., Professor W. B. Stevenson, one of the few front rank Hebraists in Great Britain who reject *in toto* the ecstatic view, holds that what we have in our prophetic books is a series of brief summaries of sermons preached by the prophets, and by them committed to writing, not continuously and elaborately constructed books.

A. Oracular matter, always in poetic form
B. Biographical matter; prose in the third person
C. Autobiographical matter; prose in the first person

Like Duhm, Mowinckel regarded all passages of type C (except the account of the prophet's call, which, strangely enough, he failed to include in the group) as the work of a later Deuteronomic school which sought to obtain the authority of Jeremiah for its own peculiar views.

As a matter of fact, these three types of passage may be found in other books as well as Jeremiah, the list including Isaiah, Hosea, Amos, and Zechariah. The Book of Jonah consists entirely of type B, and, in its present form, so also does the Book of Haggai, though we may suspect that this is due to the final editor, since in other ways it resembles rather passages of type C. Ezekiel and Zechariah, chapters 1–8, consist almost entirely of type C. Several times, especially in Ezekiel, though examples are found elsewhere, we have longer poems with a fairly elaborate structure which are clearly works of art, and link themselves with types B and C rather than with type A.

It will be generally admitted that the recognition of these three types will in itself go some way toward solving some of the critical problems which the prophetic literature presents.

It is obvious that the books themselves are compilations which are not likely to be the work of the prophets whose oracles are included in them, except where the book consists entirely of type C. Perhaps we should add the opening collection of the oracles of Amos against foreign nations, and also Isaiah, chapters 40–55, where, though the poetic form has been retained, the structure of the individual oracles and the arrangement alike show conscious artistry. And there are other difficult problems on which light may thus be thrown. The story of Hosea's married life is told for us in two different forms, in chapters 1 and 3, and commentators have found considerable difficulty in reconciling the two—some have abandoned the task as hopeless. But the discrepancies are intelligible when we realize that chapter 1 belongs to type B and chapter 3 to type C; one is the account given by a sympathetic outsider, the other the prophet's own narrative.

In telling the story of the growth of these books, we readily distinguish three stages. The first is obviously the actual writing down of the oracles, whether by the prophet or by some other person. It is clear that in this latter case a passage may have a longer or shorter history in oral tradition, being handed on from one to another by word of mouth. But we notice at once that the types especially in the longer books, such as Isaiah and Jeremiah, tend to fall into groups. Thus in Jeremiah, while the book opens with a C passage, this is immediately followed by a section of type A which goes down to 3:5. C follows with 3:6–18, and from that point the A material is continued to the end of chapter 6. Similar grouping may be seen in Isaiah and in Hosea, where there are two oracular collections, the first—a very short one—introduced by the B passage in chapter 1 and the second by the C passage in chapter 3. There seems to be but one adequate explanation for this structure—these oracular groups existed as independent collections before they were incorporated in the present books. That is to say, there is a stage in which independent oracles are gathered into small booklets, never very long. We may speak of these as "oracle collections" and of the persons responsible for making them as "collectors."

The isolation of the individual oracles within these collections is not usually a matter of great difficulty. Three criteria may be employed. The first is the presence of an introductory or of a concluding formula. Often an oracle is introduced by the phrase usually rendered "thus saith Jehovah," and it is frequently concluded by another, totally different expression, usually translated in our familiar versians "saith Jehovah." The exact meaning of the last phrase is obscure and uncertain, but it clearly serves as a kind of signature, certifying the divine origin of the message, and it may have some relation to the ecstatic experience in which that message was received. It has often happened—as the evidence of the LXX shows—that one or other of these terms is simply due to a copyist's whim, but where they are original, they clearly mark the beginning and the end of the oracles to which they are attached.

A second criterion is a sudden change of subject. This may appear to open the door to subjectivity, and so, no doubt, it would do if it stood entirely alone. But that seldom happens, and the passage from one theme to another is usually accompanied by one of the other criteria. The single oracle was not a piece of reasoning; it was a sharp and passionate outburst in which emotion is much stronger than logic, and a single point is expressed. It is but rarely that we have reason to believe that in one and the same utterance a prophet passed from the one picture which had been presented to him while under the divine hand.

A third criterion is afforded by the meter. Where we have a clear and definite change from one rhythm to another, we may be fairly sure that we have passed out of one unit into the next. Another fact which emerges on a close study of the text is the frequency with which we find the metrical scheme breaking down at the end of an oracle. It would seem that even the collectors often found their material in a more or less mutilated state, and that they sometimes endeavored to finish them off without reference to the metrical scheme which the oracle originally contained. Especially instructive in this connection are the instances in which the same oracle has been included in different collections, e.g., Isa. 2:2–4 and Mic. 4:1–4 or (one of the most interesting illustrations) Jer. 6:22–26 and 50:41–43. Here the latter form of the oracle has been mutilated at the end, and, not only so, but the whole has been modified by the alteration of one or two words so as to apply it to the king of Babylon. The meter shows that in this respect the original form is to be found in chapter 6, though, on the same ground, the text of chapter 50 is at times to be preferred. Other instances may be found, especially in collections of oracles against foreign nations, e.g., Obadiah and passages in Jeremiah, where it is now clearly futile to ask which of the two recensions had the oracles in the original order since they were probably quite independent and were arranged by each compiler to suit his own taste. As a matter of fact it is very rarely that, where we have the same oracle in more than one collection, the two are of exactly the same length; one is nearly always mutilated at the end.

Mutilation has sometimes gone so far that all we have left is an isolated scrap, a single sentence, or sometimes not even that. Amos 5:7 is a relative sentence hanging in the air with no antecedent, and, it would seem, without any end. Certainly it has not the remotest connection either with what precedes or with what follows, and is one of the places where, on the older lines, drastic criticism is necessary to make a connected sense. Precisely the same remarks may be made of the next two verses, which belong to each other but to nothing else in their neighborhood, and, again, form a relative sentence with no antecedent. Yet, fragmentary as these bits of prophetic oracle were, the collectors saw a value in them, and preserved and cherished them.

The literary habits of the collectors deserve an attention which they have not yet received. But certain features of their work are already clear, and may from time to time help to elucidate the history of the prophetic literature. Some seem, for instance, to have had a penchant for collecting oracles which dealt with the same subject. This will account for a superficial air of continuity which some collections have in parts—Isaiah, chapter 1, furnishes one or two interesting illustrations. Especially they loved to bring together oracles which concerned foreign nations, and do not seem to have cared greatly from what source these were drawn, though sometimes we are safe in ascribing at least the opening oracles of such collections to particular prophets. Collections of this kind are found in several books—Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Amos are the most obvious examples, while the Book of Obadiah consists entirely of oracles dealing with Edom, or understood by the collector as dealing with Edom. As we have already seen, we have one obvious instance in which an oracle originally intended for Judah was directed against Babylon—not by the prophet who uttered it. The example of Obadiah (where only one nation is dealt with) suggests that we have two separate stages in this process, the first being the collection of oracles which dealt with the same nation and the second the combination of a number of these collections to form a little booklet—often including material of the most diverse provenance. Sometimes a catchword seems to have been the link between two successive oracles, a phrase common to the two suggesting proximity to the compiler, even when the real themes were quite different from one another. Oftener it seems that the juxtaposition of two oracles may be the work of pure chance.

The collections themselves were the product of a period of growth, and seldom do we find one which seems to be the work of a single generation. In this connection we observe one very significant fact. In many, if not all, of the collections now embodied in larger books—and sometimes smaller ones as well—the earlier oracles all make the same impression on us. But as we draw near to the end of the collection we begin to suspect that some of the pieces are by other hands, often later writers. Here, of course, we have to allow for subjectivity in the student, but often the indications of comparative lateness are so striking as to leave us in no reasonable doubt as to their authorship. Thus in Jeremiah we have a section which extends from chapter 7 to chapter 10. It opens, as is usual in Jeremiah, with a C passage, followed by an oracular collection. The greater part of this need awaken no serious suspicion, but when we reach chapter 10 we find ourselves in a realm of thought which few of us associate with Jeremiah, though, strangely enough, the section ends with what seems to be undoubtedly an original passage. We can only assume that a collector, at a comparatively late stage, was fortunate enough to stumble on an oracle which really was the work of Jeremiah. Sometimes sections which properly belong to type C were included, though this is comparatively rare, and in most of the prophetic books we find that the oracular matter alone has been absorbed by the collectors. We often notice, too, that when a collector found that there seemed to be some connection between two oracles he linked them with a word or phrase which would bring this out. Thus we may find a denunciation of sin followed by a prediction of ruin, the two being connected by some such word as "therefore," which proves on close inspection to be the insertion of the collector.

As an illustration of what has been said we may glance over a very small but very well-known collection, that which now forms the first chapter of Isaiah. Verses 2–3 form a denunciation of Israel for her ignorance of Yahweh. The meter is 3:3, with 2:2:2 in the first line. Then follows a piece in dirge form, bewailing the calamities that have befallen Judah (vss. 4–9), in a meter which is mainly 2:2, though varied with 3:2. It ends with a reference to Sodom and Gomorrah, and

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As an illustration of what has been said we may glance over a very small but very well-known collection, that which now forms the first chapter of Isaiah. Verses 2–3 form a denunciation of Israel for her ignorance of Yahweh. The meter is 3:3, with 2:2:2 in the first line. Then follows a piece in dirge form, bewailing the calamities that have befallen Judah (vss. 4–9), in a meter which is mainly 2:2, though varied with 3:2. It ends with a reference to Sodom and Gomorrah, and the compiler has used this as a catchword on which to hang the next oracle, which is entirely independent, and forms a denunciation of Israel's worship, and extends down to verse 17, the meter being mainly 3:2, with 2:2 as a variant. Verses 18–20 contain an offer of pardon and a warning of punishment in the same meter, with the phrase "for the mouth of Jehovah hath spoken it" as a "signature" at the end. At this point we begin to find irregularities. Verses 21–23 seem to begin as a dirge over the sin of Israel, in the usual meter appropriate to such pieces, i.e., 3:2, but this is not maintained, and the latter part of the piece is in 3:3 or 2:2:2, and contains concrete descriptions of Israel's iniquities. Finally, verses 24–31 seem to be a somewhat confused medley of prophetic phrases, with rapid changes alike of rhythm, metaphor, and even subject, including prediction of vengeance on Israel's enemies, a promise of restoration, and a threat of destruction.

Types B and C have received even less attention than the oracular collections. The former may have belonged to much larger collections of narratives regarding the prophets, from which much of the material on that subject, now in the Book of Kings, has been drawn. The groups which concern the canonical prophets seem to have been divided into something like chapters, and these are often dated. The best illustrations are to be seen in Jeremiah, though Isaiah includes examples, not only in chapters 36–39, but also in chapter 7, where, however, a simple textual emendation would reduce the passage to type C.

Type C usually consists in the main of oracular matter, no longer in its original form, but reduced to prose. Sometimes the change is incomplete, as in Isaiah, chapter 6, where the poetic form is retained in parts. How this process came about we do not know, but we may conjecture that where the oracles are original (as they may usually be assumed to be) the form was due to dictation by the prophet himself. We may suspect that the "roll" written by Baruch at the dictation of Jeremiah was of this type, and it is a significant fact that nearly all the C passages in that book purport to deal with events which took place before the date of Carchemish, the time when the roll was first written. Certainly in those books which consist wholly of C matter (Ezekiel; Zechariah, chaps. 1–8) we get the impression that the book is mainly the work of the prophet himself, and that he is responsible for its general order and arrangement. There is evidence to show that C collections may have had a history not unlike the A groups, since occasionally, at the end of a collection, we find a passage which stamps itself as late. Once or twice we have illustrations of the fact that the messages contained in these passages were originally in the usual poetic form of the oracle, e.g., in Jer. 22:10 we have an oracle in the form of a dirge over Jehoahaz. This is repeated in the next two verses, but in a prose form, all that is characteristic of the dirge being omitted, while the central message is retained almost verbatim. One interesting phenomenon occurs in Jeremiah, where we have in chapters 7 and 26 the same incident in two forms, one of type C, giving the message *in extenso,* and the other of type B describing the effect it had on Jeremiah, and the risks he ran in consequence of its delivery.

Here, then, is the second stage in the history of the prophetic literature. We have now collections of material, each ascribed normally to some prophet, but most of them containing matter, especially toward the end, which can hardly be attributed to the author of most of the oracles. We have also collections of narratives dealing with the lives and fortunes of the prophets, and similar collections of oracular matter reduced artificially to prose form. Many of our books have never passed beyond that stage, and it may be illustrated by Isaiah, chapters 40–55 and 56–66, and practically all of the Twelve except Hosea, Amos, and II Zechariah. The type, of course, varies though the stage is the same, for while most of the books are oracular collections (in two cases with Psalms attached), Jonah belongs entirely to type B and Zechariah, chapters 1–8, to type C—Haggai is one or the other, probably originally C.

The third stage is that of compilation. Here we have the three types of material woven into a single whole by some worker who is, presumably, later than at least the greater part of the material with which he deals. Ezekiel may have been both his own collector and his own compiler, unless the criticism of Hölscher is to hold good, when the final compiler must have been some centuries later than the prophet and have reduced all the extant oracles to prose himself. In no case did the compiler simply take all the material belonging to each type and place it together. He aimed always definitely at making some sort of artistic whole, and therefore used all the skill of which he was master. His normal plan was to take a section from one or other of the prose types, and use it as an introduction to one of the oracular collections which he had before him, taking that which seemed likely to fit it best. Sometimes he used thus type B, but more often type C when he could, resorting to type B only when his whole supply of type C was exhausted. This is especially obvious in Jeremiah, where the first B passage occurs in chapter 18, after which the only C passages are chapters 24, 26, 28, 32, 35, and a section in chapter 25, where it is preceded by a B section. In each case there is special reason why the C passage should be placed just where it is. Sometimes a compiler would place a B or C selection after his A collection, but this is exceptional. In Hosea the two oracular collections are introduced, the first by a B passage, the second by a C passage. In Amos all are grouped near the end, the solitary B passage appearing in chapter 7, among the C passages, to some of which oracular matter has been added. In all cases, however, the compiler seems to have exercised much care and a deliberate choice in the arrangement of this material.

Much still remains to be done in this field—indeed, we are but at the beginning of the conscious study of the prophetic literature along these lines. The habits of the collectors and compilers have to be discussed, and the collections themselves investigated in detail. We have, as yet, reached no conclusions at all as to the period at which collection and compilation, respectively, took place, and such conclusions can be formed only when we have carefully observed the character and probable date of the later matter which is so often grouped at the end of the collections. But the new method of approach is already recognized and accepted, and we may hope for a series of thorough investigations which will give us new light on the critical questions raised by the prophetic literature.

No scheme of criticism has ever been devised or ever will be devised which can leave no room for subjectivity, and hence for differences of opinion. The study of literature, in the nature of the case, is not capable of being reduced entirely to exact scientific and mathematical laws, nor can the views of a literary critic ever claim that certainty of logical proof which would satisfy the legal mind. But something may be done to formulate general principles which, within limits, may serve as a reliable guide to the investigator, and the new criticism of the prophetic literature has certain positive advantages over the old. It starts in the right way by considering the structure of the documents before proceeding to questions of date and authorship, thus simplifying problems of the latter classes when they arise. It is primarily because Hexateuchal criticism began here that it has proved so successful, and it is noteworthy that it is just the conclusions reached by the Graf-Wellhausen school on the composition of the books with which they dealt which have proved to be most stable and least exposed to serious attack. It is true that there are many problems which can be settled only by the impression made on the individual student, but these may be greatly reduced, and we may expect in the future much more unanimity on many points than we have found in the last generation.

One obvious result of the new view is its bearing on the questions of interpolation and arrangement. If we have a sequence of three passages, A, B, and C, in which A and C dealt with the same subject, while B is entirely foreign, the natural suggestion on the old view was that B was an insertion in the passage, due to a later editor or copyist, breaking the connection and interrupting the continuity of thought between A and C, and that therefore it had no connection with the prophet in whose book it occurs. Today this type of criticism has become largely superfluous, and, as an argument, is usually invalid, because, while A and C may resemble one another, may deal with the same subject, may involve the same metaphor, there is no necessary connection between them. They may be—indeed, generally ought to be—treated as separate and independent oracles, and the juxtaposition and order of the three are entirely due to the compiler. Elaborate analysis and consequent synthesis (such as we sometimes find, for instance, in the treatment of Habakkuk) are entirely beside the point. The separate utterance was not intended to convey more than a single thought, and the appearance of logical arrangement and of consecutive reasoning is again due to another hand than that of the prophet himself. In other words, the treatment of the apparently "interpolated" passages is removed from the realm of textual criticism to that of higher criticism, and in many cases it becomes possible to ascribe them to the prophet himself and not to a later hand. The existence of interpolations and dislocations is a fact to which the LXX bears testimony, especially in the Book of Jeremiah, but their number will doubtless be much reduced in the future, as these obtrusive sections find their explanation in the general history of the book as it came into being, not in the history of the completed text.

If we have lost anything, it is the appearance of chronological order which the books once presented to our eyes, but this was always illusive, and we can dismiss it without regret. It has long been held that some of the latest utterances of Isaiah are to be found in chapter 1, and the dating of the sections in Jeremiah has always shown us that the book is not intended to be historically consecutive. No one has ever seriously argued that chapter 24 is to be placed earlier in time than chapter 36. And even were this a complete loss, it would be a small thing as compared with what has been already gained. The new method of approach to the prophetic literature is yet in its infancy, and workers in this field are but beginning to devote to it their consciously directed labor. We may venture to hope that the first half of the twentieth century may in the long run be found to have thrown as much light on the prophets as the latter half of the nineteenth century did upon the Law.

# THE RELIGIOUS BASIS OF ETHICS

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TREATISES on ethics have generally been written by theologians or philosophers. The vocabulary which they invented was like algebraic symbols: right and wrong, goodness and sin, terms to which it was difficult to give definite content. The development of social science and the readiness of its followers to describe life in less absolute and more historical terms has brought new problems. Ethical teachers today are less concerned with definitions than with directions as to how best to live. From such a practical point of view questions of ultimate basis of morality are, say, less important than the history of mores.

Mr. Lippmann[1] is a responsible representative of a point of view which looks upon behavior as a trial of social living. Yet unexpectedly to him the term "morality" has a distinctly authoritative content. "In a world where no man desired what he could not have, there would be no need to regulate human conduct, therefore, no need for morality" (p. 145). This identification of morals with regulation of conduct is a suppressed definition of his entire discussion. His interpretation of human conduct is based unconsciously upon the supposition that there must be somewhere an authority outside of the human activity to which he can appeal and about which he will have no question. There are only two alternatives which he can see, that of popular religion which "rests on the belief that the kingdom is an objective fact"; and the other, the humanistic view that the problem is how mankind is to come to terms with facts. To our mind there is a third alternative which is genuinely religious although including the truths of humanism.

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[1] *A Preface to Morals*. By Walter Lippmann. New York: Macmillan, 1929. viii+348 pages. $2.50.

## I

The first and most convincing part of his volume is the description of the breakdown of inherited moral authority. The morality of Christendom and Judaism are derived from a belief in a supernatural force which gives a basis for conduct. Christianity has developed this conception into a system in which God is absolute sovereign. As a practical method of discovering the will of this monarch, Western civilization has relied upon the infallible church and the infallible Bible. These authorities he believes have been eaten away by the acid of modernity. Modern men he believes no longer think of God as a sovereign nor do they regard the church as having authority in social life. With such persons an infallible Bible has gone with the absolute monarch God. Sophisticated minds find themselves bereft of a basis on which to build their morality and undertake to order their lives in what they regard as the satisfaction of their desires. Yet sophistication and satisfaction do not give a sense of moral stability. The conviction that one has a right to self-expression in a search for happiness leaves its possessor not only unsatisfied but blasé and weary with increased uncertainty as to moral values.

This debacle of supernatural authorities leaves Mr. Lippmann anything but complacent. He believes that morality must be based upon religion. Seldom in recent literature has this need been more poignantly expressed. Because the acids of modernity have destroyed the ancestral order, he holds that there exists today on a scale never before expressed by mankind the need of a unifying basis for fellowship. With something of the zeal of an ancient prophet Mr. Lippmann calls upon men to base their morality upon religion. But he is too much of a modern man not to realize the difficulty such a thesis involves. The patterns in which our religions have been shaped are no longer unquestioned. The social attitudes they embodied, the very elements they regarded as axiomatic have all yielded to new social conditions. The patterns have changed to metaphors.

It is this central purpose of the book, rather than its deliverances on various disputed topics of our social life, to which I would draw attention.

## II

Mr. Lippmann sets forth the general position of all of us who are engaged in the history of religion at this point. In fact, many of his criticisms of modern religious conditions we have repeatedly set forth. The conception of God as absolute sovereign in the imperial, the feudal, and the nationalist minds no longer serves as a basis for moral imperative. We know God is not a sovereign and that, therefore, the entire structure of orthodoxy which draws corollaries from this pattern cannot be taken literally. So long as the relations with the universe can be expressed in political categories the problem of what constitutes right is easily answered. It must be obedience to the will of the sovereign God. But when the conception of sovereignty becomes an analogy how can this authority continue?

It must be confessed that the reader at this point misses any constructive method by which Mr. Lippmann furnishes the desired authority. His description of the modern mind and practices, his estimate of the questions which spring from biological knowledge, his recognition of the impossibility of a static ideal for the family and economic relations enlarge the problem which he has set himself. He sees that the modern spirit while it has destroyed the old authority by questioning the literal value of the patterns has not become sufficiently standardized to serve as the religious basis the ordinary man wants. He, therefore, sets forth a "high religion" which he feels furnishes the basis on which morality can rest.

Mr. Lippmann professes himself a humanist. This term is subject to a great many interpretations, but in his opinion it means that there are needs which give rise to the various patterns which have been outgrown and that the great problem is to come to terms with these needs. This does not sound altogether impossible, for it is to precisely this problem that the modernist theologians have set themselves. But we have this advantage over Mr. Lippmann, we recognize the existence of a continuous stream of human life in which these values are propagated. Every religion is a technique for coming to terms and so getting aid from that which is regarded as superhuman environment. The Christian religion is a continuous experimentation in the satisfaction of basic human needs. It is in this field that one can look for sources of moral control.

Any observer of actual human behavior will be apt to admit that the mores inherited from the past were largely determined by those elements of authority which Mr. Lippmann believes have disappeared from the attitude of our modern world. They were built into the current of social life so that they actually became influential in building up a morality. Moral behavior is not to be identified with that by which it is rationalized. It is a fair queston whether in moments of actual moral choice, men deliberately follow the course of action which they thought would lead them to avoid hell or obey the command of an infallible Bible. There is a vast difference between an appeal to authority and socialized ideals derived from authority. To say that we have lost the older authorities in morals is simply to say that we no longer include them in our ethical theory, but the mores which have been built up by people who did so ground their ethical theory are certainly elements in our present situation. Ancestors are not contemporaries of their descendants. The really disturbing matter is whether or not these mores are sufficiently integrated into our moral life to become independent of their parent-authority. About this there will be divergent opinions determined pretty largely by the particular grouping of the society one happens to observe. But one thing seems indisputable. Our mores are under criticism, and unless they can be seen to be grounded in something other than tradition they will not conduce to more personal customs and social estimates nor themselves long maintain vestigial control. The morality that has no theoretical basis in something more ultimate than itself will sooner or later become no more real than the smile of the Cheshire cat which persisted after the cat disappeared, and no ingenuity of pragmatism or humanism will make it real to men who know that values must be the obverse of existence. A human existence bereft of an objective cosmos will not function in its independence.

## III

And this brings us to the real question Mr. Lippmann raises but never answers because of his Confucian and Stoic "disinterestedness," which he renames religion, but which is really morality. If morality is to be based on religion, religion must be something more significant. To call ethical idealism a "high religion" does not make it religious.

A really religious basis of morality demands a conception of God as objective as any other aspect of our environment. There is no religious basis for morality—and this it should be recalled is the aim of Mr. Lippmann's quest—in any proposal that either dissociates man from his cosmic environment or undertakes to approach man from an unknowable God. As one approaches the sun through the experience of heat and light, so through the experience of search for adjustment on the plane of personality do we approach that total activity from which we came. Any understanding of the evolutionary process involves a dynamic relationship between that which is and the environment which can make it more than it is. Only as one thinks synthetically of a situation in which are included three elements, the organism, the environment, and their relationship, can one recognize the full meaning of that process through which differentiation and development are possible. God is the term we can apply to those personality-evolving activities of the total activity with which we can set up personal relations. As such He is as objective to us as any human society. As our attitude toward one another is not limited by chemical and physical forces, neither is our relationship with the universe. As we say "you" to a mass of chemical substances which constitutes the body of our friend, so we say "you" to the universe. As in friendship we set up relationship with personality, so we set up relationship with those elements of our total environment which are capable of making a response in the situation thus set up.

As we shape our conception of the human being by the interpretation of the physical body do we interpret God to ourselves. Any such interpretation must be relative to our experience and culture but such conceptions of God are no more final than our portrayal of the sun. We live in a universe capable of evolving humanity as we know it. It must possess forces capable of such results. These forces must be assumed to be still active, constituting an environment with which we must get into helpful and assimilating relationships. It is this consideration that compels the rejection both of exclusive mechanistic and humanistic interpretations of life. The personality-producing forces, the co-ordinating activity which instigates the chemical, physical, and biological forces are still in our environment and with them we must be in harmony. The pictures in which our search for harmony will be described will be drawn from those relationships of life which to us seem ultimate, but the relationship is independent of the picture. We can no more escape the influence of God so considered than the influence of gravitation. Gravitation is more than Newton's law. The attempt to utilize personal experience to make such adjustments effective is the function of every religion. The real difficulty with religions is that some of their patterns are incapable of integrating the human needs with these elements of the universe in which their satisfactions lie. It is an imperfect reading of the facts when one says the relationship desired has disappeared with the pattern. To feel that a traditional conception of God as sovereign is no longer of moral significance is not to say that reciprocal relationship of humanity with the personality-producing activity of the universe is at an end. It simply means that in religion as in physics our intellectual processes by which such relations are co-ordinated are to be rethought.

From such a point of view the moralist stops speculating about an authority external to himself and considers rather the situation in which he must act and so be most susceptible to, and gain most help from, its personality-producing elements. As far as the man-made environment is concerned, the integrating of the individual into the group is to be found by determining the relationship which makes toward the increase of personal values. If it does not develop personality it must be abandoned, not because some deity has commanded it to be abandoned but because it is incapable of assimilating the personal relations of a situation. That is another way of saying that human relationships must be determined by intelligent love. Here, too, the criterion is not quantitative or static, but rather of the nature of direction of development and of the participation of all the members of a group in the personal advance of any member of the group. For love as a moral factor may be defined as such action as attempts to share the advantages of any member of a given group with the members constituting the entire group. This is the process of co-ordination and integration on the personal plane. It is not a matter of affection, for in this sense of the word, we can love those we do not like.

Such hygiene of the personality is not easily gained by an antisocial person. The prophet and the ethical teacher judge these proper relationships and seek to give advice. But this is not external authority but counsel for adjusting life to the social and cosmic forces furthering personal values. A doctor does not have to call in a policeman to compel an intelligent sick man to follow his advice. The only sense in which he can be said to be in authority is that he knows more than the patient and the patient recognizes his superior intelligence. Yet, if the relationships were changed about, the doctor might follow the advice of his patient in buying stocks. In both cases the basis of action is confidence that a given advice is advantageous because it is in accordance with things as they actually are progressing.

The ultimate basis of morality is religious, in a far more fundamental way than that combination of sentiment and detachment called "high religion" by Mr. Lippmann. It is religious in the sense that the total process in which men are involved is toward personal value and that any antipersonal activity is contrary to the basic activity with which they are inexplicably involved. It is hard to see how anyone could fail to feel the worth of such a basis for morals. The God it recognizes is not a God of outgrown patterns but is the cosmic reason and purpose within the realm of actual situations in which man is involved. A given course of action is right if it is in accordance with the tendency of the process which has steadily differentiated personal from impersonal activities. This process may be described as the will of God, but such a description does not identify God with a sovereign but with personality-producing activities in which God is included. If one seeks a pattern in which to dramatize this fact it is easily found in the realm of biology, of sociology. As the organ must find support in the influences under which it has evolved, as the individual to grow more personal must integrate himself in the more personal activities of the group to which he belongs, so the human personality in its search for new values gets help and support from these personality-producing elements of the environment with which by his very participation in his cosmic relations he is involved.

## IV

Such a view emphasizes not submission to forces but cooperation with them. It embodies the wisdom of the ethical thinkers of all times but it does not bind itself to any external sovereign, or Bible, or church. Its God may be pictured in any pattern which emphasizes the fact of co-operative relationships within the sphere of personal values. The place which Christ will hold in such a morality will be not that of the lawgiver but that of the Way. The morality of the Christian will be an attempt to express the attitude of co-ordination and service expressed by Jesus by whatever technique science may show to be preferable. But the basic reason for adopting such an attitude is that it is the exposition of the meaning of an ultimate relationship. Humanity participates in an ongoing process in which it is rendered more susceptible to the personality-evolving elements in the cosmic totality from which it came and in accordance with which it must live if it would grow more personal. As we recognize those close relationships which increase the personal worth of the individual in the group of which he is a part, so we make dominant an attitude toward the sort of universe in which we actually live. To refuse to go on with the personality-producing forces, to seek to live in a universe which has given birth to a personality as if it were an impersonal machine is to assure evil consequences. As a man will be aided by gravitation if he build a wall plumb and opposed if he build it out of plumb, so human beings who undertake to order their lives in accordance with these personality-producing forces we know as God will build upon a rock. Not to live in harmony with them is to build upon sand.

## V

Certain corollaries follow from this conclusion:

1. Right and wrong are descriptive of attitudes rather than acts. As such they are absolute because they express a relationship with the personality-evolving forces of the universe. Because of ignorance an act may be injurious even though it be an expression of the attitude that seeks advance of personality both of the individual and of the group to which he belongs.

2. Technique is to be furnished by science rather than by the attitude. The worth of a technique, however, will be deter-

mined by the inquiry as to whether or not it makes toward personal values.

3. Experience of the race and of separate groups may be regarded as possessing value suggesting the basis of choice between techniques. Such racial experience, however, is always subject to criticism, and mores are in themselves not final but relative. In the interest of larger personal values, they frequently must be abandoned or sublimated.

4. Society is an immediate personal environment within which the individual must act. To treat human relations impersonally and human beings as without personal value is to run counter to the creative elements in the total environment. Political, economic, and domestic relations must grow more personal in accordance with this basic relationship.

5. Individual and social maladjustment to the personality-producing forces of the cosmic process results in suffering. It is the joint effort of the sciences and religion to avoid such maladjustment and set up corrective situations. The ground for hope in such efforts lies in the basic conception of religion that it is possible so to organize life in its social relation as to result in co-operation with the personality-producing forces of the cosmic environment.

# THE PEACE IDEALS OF THE CHURCHES

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## I

THE following is a study of 239 ecclesiastical peace pronouncements. One hundred and forty-six represent twenty-five different denominations while the remaining 93 are interdenominational.[1]

Nearly all of these pronouncements express their condemnation of war and their consciousness of a duty to work for its abolition. War is called "the greatest moral and political issue before the country." The Methodists brand it as a monstrosity "inglorious, ineffective, wasteful and unchristian." A "colossal and ruinous social sin," the Baptists and Unitarians label it. The National Study Conference stigmatizes war as "the most colossal scourge and calamity of modern life." The Evangelical Free Churches excoriate it as world-suicide and the irretrievable ruin of civilization. Similarly does the Murren Conference caution that war "menaces civilization." "Wholesale slaughter" is a Federal Council epithet. "The Church can be satisfied with nothing less than the complete abolition of war" declares the Federal Council. This body believes that working for peace is the truest way of honoring the memory of the fallen soldiers. In line with these sentiments, the Christian denomination holds it inconceivable that "national borders should be more than boundaries. They should never be barriers between nations." Copious are the commendations of international love, amity, trust, unity, and good will.

That these peace sentiments should crystallize around the customary theological affirmations is only to be expected. Thus the Committee on World Friendship among Young People urges: "Let us as young people lift our thoughts above the lower levels of distrust and doubt and believe that God holds for each of us a higher destiny than that of taking each other's life." Some derive the incentive toward peace from their conception of the unity of God, or the fatherhood of God, or the love of God. Sometimes the project is that of realizing a divine civilization which would be the building of the kingdom of God. The Jewish Women of Texas see aligned for peace God and the prophets. References to the deity are frequently combined with references to the worth of man and the unity of mankind.

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[1] A list of these pronouncements, classified according to denominations and otherwise arranged chronologically, may be obtained from the author of this article upon request.

Most frequent are references to Christ and Christianity. Highly favorite is the phrase, "Prince of Peace." Again and again is the opposition of war to the spirit of Christ asserted. With the war spirit abroad, according to the Springfield Methodist Conference, "the progress of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ is clearly at stake." The Seventh Day Baptists observe that "the way of the cross and the way of the sword involve entirely different attitudes and practices." A Reformed Presbyterian pronouncement regrets that the name of Christ is not mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Hence the weighty responsibilities devolving upon the churches. The church, it is held, cannot permit war. It should and can oppose war, speaking out against it and taking an active part against it. It must mobilize and marshal Christian public opinion against armaments and rouse Christian indignation against them. American churches meanwhile can enter into fraternal relations with the churches and Christians of Germany. The Methodists contend that in any policies that lead to war the churches should not acquiesce. Reference is occasionally made to ecclesiastical responsibility for war and to the fact that the churches have been blamed for the World War. Say the Methodists at the Council of Cities in Pittsburgh, February, 1924: "We declare our sincere repentance for past ignorance of or lack of faith in Christ's ideals and methods of righting wrongs." A passage from a Federal Council statement of 1921 reads: "Let us humbly confess our own share of sin in participating in the race of armaments. . . . . Is it not true that we have sinned not merely as a nation but also as a church? Has the church not left undone things it ought to have done in the teaching of brotherliness, good will and helpfulness?" A Federal Council statement of 1924 exhorts: "Let us pray as a people for forgiveness for our long apathy to the continuance of the war system, forgiveness for our blindness to the utterly unchristian character of war, for our lack of love to enemies, for our self-satisfaction and self-righteousness, for our race pride and arrogance."

Do these phrases refer to the part which the churches played in supporting the World War? The language is not unequivocal. It may mean that the churches are repentant for various other shortcomings without being specifically repentant for their departure from peace ideals when the war madness was raging. The Quakers are the only ones who are specific on this point. Their regret is that "a considerable proportion of our membership took some share in the active prosecution of the war."

Not far from this are the frequent admonitions to pray for peace. The Rabbis quote from their Union Prayer Book: "Grant us peace, Thy most precious gift, and enable Israel to be a messenger of peace unto the peoples of the earth. Bless our country that it may ever be a stronghold of peace and its advocate in the councils of nations." An Episcopalian group would have its communicants ask that God may touch the hearts of men inclining them toward peace. Of almost identical purport is the Presbyterian proposal indorsed by the Federal Council that Armistice Day, 1928, be made a day of prayer that "all nations may know a true brotherhood in Christ." The Methodist Conference at Springfield proposes that, at every communion service, there be a prayer for peace.

Particular pains are taken to combat the idea that war is inevitable. "War," says a Baptist pronouncement of 1924, "is neither inevitable nor necessary"—a view shared by many. According to the Chicago Presbyterians, the doctrine of the inevitability of war represents anti-Christian philosophy. The Colorado Methodists, condemning the contrary sentiments expressed before them the previous day by Senator Fess, evince particular opposition to the doctrine of inevitability. Akin to this are the reflections relative to the ineffectiveness and futility of war. It hardly needs telling that, in these peace pronouncements, militarism is roundly and frequently condemned.

Much is said about the outlawry of war. However, there is need of distinguishing between outlawry and outlawry—between outlawry as a concrete proposal identified with the names of Levinson, Borah, Briand, and Kellogg, and, on the other hand, outlawry as a vague expression of aversion to war. Outlawry in the latter sense is matter of frequent mention. A Federal Council pronouncement asks that war be made illegal. The Methodists at Springfield call for the outlawry of the whole war system, just as the Baptist Young People favor "every sane movement that looks toward the outlawry of war in the world." The Disciples of Christ "appeal to the government of the United States to co-operate whole-heartedly with other nations in every effort to outlaw war as a crime among nations." The Universalists would have war "recognised as a crime in international law." It seems to be assumed that in some way the church can outlaw war in a decade or two. Sometimes the objection is limited to "aggressive" war, the epithet "crime" being restricted to wars of the "aggressive" type. Now and then generalities are abandoned to the extent of calling for new definitions of aggression. The fact that a definition of a "just" war is sought would indicate the belief that, after all, some wars may be just.

Some of these antiwar demands are uttered with many a protestation of patriotism and loyalty. "We renew our pledge of allegiance to our nation and to every phase of its welfare," say the Presbyterians. "We affirm our patriotism unqualifiedly," the Congregationalists insist. "We avow our sincere patriotism and our unquestioned loyalty to the nation we love," the Reformed Church announces. "The Church," according to the Baptists, "should teach patriotic support of the state but should never become the agent of government in any activity alien to the spirit of Christ." In view of the Kellogg Peace Pact, the Columbus Conference of Churches singularly reconciles patriotism and pacifism: "The churches should teach patriotic support of the state in the conviction that the state is bound by the obligations of the Pact never to resort to war but to use only peaceful means for the solution of controversies." The Methodists go out of their way to recall that "the patriotism of the Methodist Church has never been challenged," while the Rabbis, reaffirming their love for America, reflect that "throughout the centuries of the past Jews have given gladly and unstintedly of their blood and means, whenever their country has called upon them." The patriotism of the Quakers is as beautiful as their pacifism. The Quaker pamphlet reads: "The Christian's love of country finds its source, its inspiration and its direction in his love of God and his fellowmen. . . . . Such loyalty to Christ is consistent with loyalty to one's native land." Noblest of all is their splendid declaration, issued March, 1918, while the war was at its height:

> To our beloved country, we affirm the deep loyalty of grateful hearts. We long to help her realize her noblest capacities as a great Republic dedicated to liberty and democracy. But we believe that we best serve our country and all humanity when we maintain that religion and conscience are superior even to the state. . . . . To our fellow countrymen who are following the leadings of conscience into ways where we cannot be their comrades, we give assurance of respect and sympathy in all that they endure.

Certain touches of sectarian pride are not entirely lacking in these pronouncements. Catholic statements refer to the specific work of the pope and "our Holy Church" for world-peace. A Jewish pronouncement is concerned to identify the antiwar movement with "the mission of Israel." A pronouncement of the Christian denomination also affirms some special denominational concern in the abolition of war, while the Unitarian Ministerial Union would wish for its denomination "an honorable, if not a leading part, among religious bodies in the abolition of war." A Wesleyan Methodist pronouncement, while bespeaking moral leadership for the churches in general, suggests a peace conference of American and British Methodist churches particularly. The Christian Scientists claim that their church's international character contributes to international good will.

The interdenominational tone, however, is the more pronounced. Thus the Reformed church, Episcopalians, Buddhists, and the Reformed Presbyterians indorse the Federal Council by name. Co-operation with other church bodies in the interests of world-peace is urged by Lutherans, Episcopalians, the Federal Council, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis. The Methodists conversely invite other denominations to co-operate with them. The 1925 Study Conference on Churches and World Peace has the commendation of Presbyterians, of Northern Baptists, and of Episcopalians. The Primitive Methodists favor an Interdenominational Committee for Peace, while the Moravians, along with expression of good will toward the Moravian brethren in other lands, voice approval for various non-Moravian peace organizations. The Baptists would join other religious bodies in calling a world-conference on peace. One of the Quaker appeals is addressed to "the Churches of Christ in all Countries," like the very recent one of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches which is addressed to "the Churches and to All People of Good-Will."

## II

As we proceed to utterances marked by a higher degree of definiteness, we meet a tendency to abandon theological and to substitute political language. Here stand the several expressions of encomium or expectation regarding America. The Catholics find reason for being proud of America as regards its record for world-peace. The Methodists, Presbyterians, The World Alliance for International Friendship, the Rabbis, and the World's Christian Endeavor expect America to lead the way. Meanwhile the Church Peace Union, the Northern Baptists, and the Federal Council are concerned that the United States should not stand aloof but should, as the Congregationalists say, be among those "bearing the burdens of the world." The Federal Council repeatedly exhorts America to co-operate especially in the outlawry of war, and particularly in view of the claim that the World Court is an American idea. The Young Women's Christian Association believes that America can do more than it has been doing.

Next come allusions to race relations, imperialisms, economic rivalries, etc. The Lutherans are of the opinion that nationalism does not exclude interracialism. The Methodists employ phraseology about the self-determination of nations, while the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia thinks that "all attempts to exploit the unorganized and undeveloped peoples should be rebuked." The Congregationalists urge that Americans should do business abroad at their own risks. The Congregationalists resemble in this regard the Methodists, the Cleveland Centennial, and the World Alliance for International Friendship. The last-named organization holds that investments should be subject to the laws of the country in which they are made. Like various other bodies, the National Study Conference considers the bearing of raw materials, immigration, race legislation, investments, and of minority groups on the issue of peace. In a more or less hortatory strain, some of these pronouncements set forth American obligations toward Armenia, Austria, Germany, and the rest of Central Europe, China, Japan, Latin America, Mexico, the Near East, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Russia. The Federal Council would include former enemies in schemes of reconstruction. This body also praises the South American trip taken shortly after his election by President-elect Hoover.

More or less vague references occur to the various procedures promising peace. The Federal Council asserts expressly that the church should not define detail and should not dictate, even while fostering the proposal "to settle every international dispute by resort to the authority of law, right and reason, rather than by resort to battleships, battle planes and battalions." The Baptists and the Methodist Episcopal bishops would rely, not upon the church, but upon the government to find the way to peace. The World Alliance for International Friendship professes to be "still in the process of finding the most feasible paths to peace." Among others, the Northern Baptists expect "the responsible statesmen of a Christian country" to do their part. The peace moves of President Coolidge are commended by the Reformed Church, the Presbyterians, the Moravians, and the Universalists.

Frequent are the animadversions to economic issues. The Federal Council calls for better economic adjustments and asks that toward that end an economic conference be held. The Young Women's Christian Association lays stress on trade agreements and reciprocity treaties. Abdul Baha deems profit-sharing within the nation relevant to world-peace. A Methodist resolution would stigmatize profiteering. The Federal Council again accords weight to such matters as international benevolence, humanitarian commissions, the proper handling of the opium traffic and of immigration, and the proper treatment of aliens. Then comes the World Alliance for International Friendship, which believes that the question of inter-allied debts should be treated as more than a financial problem, and should be handled in a manner that expresses "positively the good will of our people." Like the World Alliance, which would have us break off trade with an aggressor nation, the Young Women's Christian Association would have our government support "no power which has defaulted in its arbitration agreements."

Finally, we notice a number of references to the mental prerequisites of peace. We read of "the will to peace," of attuning hearts and minds to peace, of a new mind, a new moral atmosphere, and of applying the Golden Rule internationally. According to the Eloist ministry, war is a state of mind. The Congregationalists urge that we should cease to picture Europeans as "given over to intrigue, hatred and war, and ourselves as so superior in virtue that we can not work with these our fellow men." A Catholic report contends that "world peace is largely if not mainly a matter of human faith." The Presbyterians plead that the great need is not for resolutions but for regeneration.

## III

This brings us now to the group of deliverances that are the most specific. We shall consider them in the following order: studying the issues; educating the public; propaganda; freedom of speech; international language; international conferences; conciliation; arbitration; League of Nations; Borah-Levinson outlawry plan; World Parliament; World Court; war referendum; disarmament; conscription; gas in warfare; bacteria in warfare; military training; Washington Conference; Geneva Protocol; Locarno; China; Mexico; Nicaragua; Japanese exclusion; "Goose Step" Day; the big navy program; the Rosika Schwimmer case.

Exhortation to study the issues occurs repeatedly. The World Student Christian Federation demands a fearless facing of the issues. The Presbyterians are solicitous that especially the clergy should study the issues. One pronouncement would have the church focus attention on international questions every Armistice Day, while yet another (the Northern Baptists) would have the churches devote to international questions not less than four weeks annually. The Federal Council specifies classes, lectures, etc., and holds that our relations with the Orient are particularly in need of study. The Columbus Conference of Churches would, among other things, have the churches study the economic factors causing war.

Educating and agitating for peace are copiously asserted to be among the church's duties. Especially should such educative work be the task of the pastors acting "in the spirit of Christ" and, as the Baptists would have it, generating "a will for peace." The Federal Council dwells upon the rôle of the theological seminaries in this connection. Not a little is said about church committees and commissions having the study and teaching of peace plans as their function. According to the Lutheran Augustana Synod, public opinion should be demilitarized. The World Alliance for International Friendship speaks of such as "moral disarmament." The Texas Temple Sisterhoods declare that the church should terminate the custom of glorifying war before the young. In like vein, the Congregationalists would see the glorification of war eliminated from our textbooks, while the Baptist World Alliance would banish racial and national antagonisms from the textbooks of all nations. Putting the matter affirmatively, the Episcopalians call for the provision of suitable educational literature for the dissemination of peace. The Congregationalists believe that the members of Congress are among those needing peace education.

The menace of militaristic propaganda—"all mendacious war-time and peace-time propaganda," as the Congregationalists call it—and the importance of free speech are extensively recognized. The Columbus Conference of Churches protests against the army officers who go about propagandizing for the war system and attacking the advocates of the peace system. The Episcopal Diocese of Virginia would have the church rebuke all evil-speaking against other nations. It is particularly notable that resolutions voicing tolerance toward antimilitarists are passed by the ex-service men of Garrett Bible School. Striking is the declaration of the Congregationalists: "The

Council therefore recommends that, *especially* in periods of national excitement, freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are essential to clear thought and to right conclusion be zealously protected."

The pacific possibilities of a world-language are visaged by the Bahais.

International conferences are frequently recommended. The World's Christian Endeavor Union would have the United States call such a conference. The Methodists think that an international religious conference would be effective. Several of the pronouncements specify an economic conference and a disarmament conference. The Catholic church claims with pride to have worked for the Washington Conference and urges others like it. The Baptists wish a conference on reparations, armaments, and debts.

Conciliation is also specified as well as arbitration. The Theosophists speak of "neutral referees." The Federal Council mentions "boards of arbitration," while the World Alliance for International Friendship regards it essential to hold all questions amenable to arbitration, excluding not even those of national honor.

The number of pronouncements favoring an international court are too numerous to list. (There are at least sixty.) A number of American statements urge the United States to enter the World Court immediately. The World Alliance for International Friendship, the National Study Conference, and the Methodists, perhaps also Abdul Baha with his "supreme tribunal," favor that affirmative jurisdiction with which the Borah-Levinson plan of outlawry is familiarly identified.

Some Episcopalian groups would, like the Congregationalists, have the United States join the existing League of Nations or something better. A Methodist conference wants *a* league; a Bahai pronouncement asks for "a universal league of nations." The Quakers wish "a league or association of nations." They resemble the Federal Council, which also favors "an organisation or association of nations." The Pope asks for "a family of nations." Do the Methodists meeting at Springfield in 1924 intimate some disparagement of the existing League when they desire American entrance into an "effective association of nations"?

The Congregationalists find the admission of Germany a reason for approving the League which now exists. The League is also indorsed by the Young Women's Christian Association, the Christian church, the Moravians, the Council of the Presbyterian Alliance, the Chicago Presbyterians, the Church Peace Union, the World Alliance for International Friendship, the World's Christian Endeavor, the Committee on World Friendship among Young People, the Murren Conference, the Lambeth Conference, the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches, and the Church of England Peace League. The manifestoes of the Interdenominational Student Conference, and of the Reformed Presbyterians, and a Methodist statement are among the few American pronouncements which would have the United States enter the existing League. The Federal Council urges friendly relations between America and the League, and the Young Women's Christian Association, like the Northern Baptists, the International Good Will Congresses, and the Columbus Peace Conference, wishes this country to accord the League the utmost co-operation. Both the Federal Council and the World Alliance for International Friendship would have the United States join the League of Nations, if the covenant were amended in line with certain antiwar reservations suggested by the National Study Conference. The Primitive Methodists, a British body, deem it essential that all nations be included in the League. Various accessory activities of the League, such as its labor organization and its several committees and commissions, receive commendation even where the League itself does not.

Outlawry of war, not merely in the vague sense already considered but in the concrete sense of the Borah-Levinson proposal, also has its supporters. Federal Council and Methodist pronouncements mention the Borah-Levinson plan or the Kellogg Pact by name. The Briand overtures and the subsequent Kellogg Pact are welcomed by Unitarians, Baptists, Northern Baptists, the Federal Council, the Columbus Conference, and the World Alliance for International Friendship. A Presbyterian statement suggests outlawry arrangements between the United States and Great Britain from which not even vital interests are to be excepted.

We discussed one feature of the outlawry proposal when we considered the World Court and the plan to invest that court with affirmative jurisdiction. The other feature of the outlawry program, the proposed codification of international law, is sought by the American Council of the World Alliance for International Friendship, by the Jerusalem Conference, by the Federal Council, and by the Methodists. The Bahai pronouncement desires a parliament of the world.

The Presbyterians and the Central Conference of American Rabbis believe that war resolutions should be subject to a popular referendum. The Presbyterian statement, however, would except cases of threatened invasion. The Moravians think that a conscription of wealth and of labor as well as of fighting power would be helpful; while the elimination of gas and bacteria as military devices is deemed not too minute for mention by the Young Women's Christian Association. The Rabbis, again, are opposed to the private manufacture of gas and of arms.

In many of these pronouncements, military training is subjected to condemnation. A Presbyterian statement condemns it with reservations. Occasionally objections are waived provided the military training be collegiate and optional, i.e., not given in high schools and not compulsory. The Disciples of Christ, the Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, a Methodist pronouncement of 1927, and Congregational statements specify compulsory training as the butt of their objections. The

World Alliance for International Friendship opposes "military training in all public schools and all compulsory military training in colleges and universities except in institutions established for the specific purpose of military training." The Methodists brand military training as contrary to "the spirit of Jesus." A Christian church utterance commends recreation and athletics as desirable substitutes. The Methodists and the Columbus churches protest against the advertising of military training camps by means of postmarks.

Still larger is the number of pronouncements calling for disarmament in various forms and degrees. Sweeping reductions are desired by many. The Columbus Conference would have the churches study the possibilities of disarmament. A Federal Council statement of 1921, in demanding far-reaching reductions, asserts that the church has occasion to be indignant about armaments. Some of the pronouncements would retain armaments for police purposes only. The Catholics and a few others, while not expecting total disarmament, seek progressive disarmament. The World's Christian Endeavor Union would have "disarmament by agreement, if possible; by example, if necessary." The United States government is thanked by the Federal Council, and lauded by the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists, for its efforts to secure disarmament by means of international conferences. The conferences of Washington, Geneva, and Locarno are mentioned with satisfaction.

Definite problems are considered in the relations with such countries as China, Mexico, Japan, Armenia, and Nicaragua. The wish is expressed for fair treaties with China, non-intervention being the burden of the demand voiced by Baptists and by the China Inland Mission. Various statements issued at the time of the Mexican crisis ask arbitration with Mexico. The Japanese exclusion law is deplored by numerous groups. The Northern Baptists, contending that this law "does not represent the sentiment of the Christian people of America," would have the injury rectified. Yet another Baptist group asks definitely that Congress remove the discrimination. The Buddhists would avail themselves "of every opportunity to create better understanding between the United States and Japan and to strengthen the bond of friendship"—a sentiment which American Christian pronouncements earnestly reciprocate. The Ohio pastors demand the withdrawal of armed forces from Nicaragua, and the Columbus Conference offers a carefully worded proposal touching the Philippines.

"Goose Step Day"—September 12, 1924—meets the clamorous opposition of numerous religious bodies, while the navy program of 1928–29 evokes rebuke from Methodists, Federal Council, and Ohio pastors, particularly in view of the clause restricting the power of the president to suspend construction in the event of changing circumstances.

The most recent document is that of the Quakers siding with the minority against the majority of the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Rosika Schwimmer case.

## IV

It can hardly be charged that the churches are afraid to be specific. Equally unwarranted is the charge that the churches are busy meddling with details that lie outside of their proper domain. Radicals are wont to advance the former accusation and conservatives the latter. As a matter of fact, these pronouncements are themselves pervaded by contrasting radical and conservative trends. Let us consider the conservative first.

### CONSERVATIVE TRENDS

Conservative attitudes are exemplified when Methodists and Episcopalians in 1922 clamor for war with Turkey; or when, in 1924, a Northern Baptist convention defeats an outlawry resolution on the ground that a World Court and some preparedness must come first. Frequent are the declarations that war is always justifiable in "self-defense." The Reformed Church and the World Alliance for International Friendship assert this explicitly. The Methodist Episcopal bishops favor any war that is "indisputably in self-defence." Also the Federal Council modifies its devotion to peace by reflecting on the importance of having, before disarmament, security and by recognizing certain conditions under which armament would not meet its opposition. This body differs little from the Catholics, who do not even look for complete disarmament and who warn that, without some international agreement, disarmament is "unwise and dangerous." The Catholic Committee on International Ethics rejects the proposition that "all employment of force among nations is immoral" and reaches the conclusion that "a state may make war to safeguard its rights actually violated or in certain or imminent danger" and that "it is neither necessary nor wise to reduce considerably present military and naval equipment until the most powerful foreign states agree to do likewise." Like the Catholics is the Centennial Committee which recognizes "that nations must provide for self-defence under present conditions." The Diocese of Virginia believes it "the duty of the church to organise her forces to co-operate with the government in its rational, democratic policy of national defense"; while the World Alliance for International Friendship declines to raise "the question of the expediency of maintaining an adequate military and naval defense so long as the war system lasts." The Unitarian Laymen believe war necessary "to restrain . . . . gross injustice." A Lutheran pronouncement holds that as long as there is sin in the world there will have to be war. Quoting certain ecclesiastical statutes, this Lutheran statement affirms that "Christians may engage in a just war and act as soldiers." Among those belonging to the World's Student Christian Federation are such as maintain that "under certain circumstances, they ought to take their share in the struggle." The United Presbyterians in June, 1924, positively disowned "sympathy with any effort of anti-war propagandists which tends to encourage and promote disloyalty or dim the luster of national spirit and patriotism." Their language suggests that of the Central Conference of American Rabbis: "We do not champion extreme attitudes. We do not adhere to the doctrine of non-resistance. We believe that there have been righteous wars. Freedom and justice are worth more than life." The Chicago Presbyterians rejoice in the Allied victory. The divines of the Murren Conference, someone has observed, opposed war in general—which is, of course, compatible with the support of any war in particular. The Detroit Young Men's Christian Association, albeit under pressure from the Detroit Board of Commerce, adopted a resolution approving the National Defense Act of 1920, which provides for the voluntary organization of Reserve Officers' Training Corps camps. Abdul Baha naïvely visages other nations rising up against a recalcitrant nation by way of military enforcement of peace. The interests of tolerance, of course, oblige the most outspoken friends of peace, like the Quakers and Methodists, to show forbearance toward war-supporting coreligionists.

## RADICAL TRENDS

On the other hand, there are pronouncements whose radicalism is amazing. The Quakers, of course, are pacifists by tradition. "We oppose as a religious duty all participation in war," they say, "and believe that no more patriotic service in any nation can be rendered than to save that nation and others from war." "Loyalty to what ought to be is best loyalty to the country." Another Quaker pronouncement declares that a warless world "can be achieved only by refusal to participate in war." "We can not have any part in the way and method and spirit of war either for the settlement of international differences or as a solution of the social and industrial problems which beset this age," yet another Quaker pronouncement reads.

But the Quakers are not alone in this preachment, nearly alone as they may stand in practice. There are also the Mennonites who, not before the World War and not since the war, but in 1917, at the very height of the war, announced: "We can not participate in war in any form; that is, to aid or abet war, whether in combatant or non-combatant capacity." "This conference," says an Advent Christian pronouncement, "takes its stand as unalterably opposed to war." Also the Church of the Brethren is "unequivocally against war and its consequences." "We can not bless warfare or endorse the killing of our fellowmen," reads another resolution of that church.

The Unitarian ministers have this to say: "We, therefore, as ministers of religion and public teachers of morality declare now in time of peace our deliberate determination never to sanction or participate in a war." The International Committee of Antimilitarist Clergymen holds that "in opposing this crime, no sacrifice is too great which will enforce the moral truth that it is better to endure evil than to commit it"; while the Congregational ministers of England have the famous war resister's pledge:

> Believing that we are called by our understanding of Christ to an unreserved abstention from war and to a complete dedication to Peace, as the only true defence of our most treasured loyalties and loves, we covenant together before God, praying that in the day of calm we may win others, and in the time of storm we may stand firm to our witness.

The women, organized in the Department of Women's Work of the Pittsburgh Federation of Churches, assert: "We as Christian women can never again send our sons to war nor in any way be partial to war's destruction, brutality and hatred." The World's Student Christian Federation announces that, among its members, "some are concerned that under no circumstances can they as Christians engage in war." The Murren Conference, which, as we have already seen, is not otherwise conspicuous for extreme radicalism, holds at least that "even in defense of the suffering and oppressed, war is a most deplorable instrument for achieving its aim." In 1924, the Northern Baptist Conference, while defeating a resolution for unreserved outlawry of war, at the same time defeated a resolution favoring "reasonable preparedness." The Congregationalists in 1924 are resolved "to support no war in the future solely because of the dictum of the state. . . . . We must demand also that the Christian conscience shall be able to find no alternative under the circumstances." The Reformed church announces: "We claim for ourselves the right and liberty to speak at any time contrary to those who may be temporarily in control of the government, if loyalty to the spirit of Jesus Christ, as we apprehend it, demands such action"; while the Methodists at Springfield in 1924 assert that "governments which ignore the Christian conscience of men in time of peace can not justly claim the lives of men in time of war."

Not rarely is there voiced the determination that no war shall ever again have the support or sanction of the church. The following resolve of the United Presbyterians may be somewhat self-neutralizing: "We . . . . as a Church, declare our opposition to war and refuse to bless, condone or support it in any way except it be in justifiable self defense or as a clear necessity for the deliverance of an oppressed people." However, all of our statements are not thus self-neutralizing. "The day has come," say the Methodists of the North East Ohio Conference, "when our Methodist Episcopal Church as a part of the Church Universal . . . . should in its corporate capacity refuse to sanction or support any future war." Again, the Methodist Council of Cities, assembled at Pittsburgh, February 27–29, 1924, petitions the General Conference meeting at Springfield, Massachusetts, in May, 1924, "to inform our government that our church can take no part in any movement toward war." At that Springfield Conference, the Methodists actually did resolve: "We as an organisation separate ourselves from war and take no part in its promotion"; while the National Conference of Methodist Students offers "a memorial urging the Christian Church never to bless or sanction another war." It is the resolve of the Evangelical Synod

> that we advise our government that because of the increasingly profound convictions within our churches that war is un-Christian, it can not expect our financial, moral, social or political influence in any future war, nor sanction nor approval of any material or ideal war aims for promoting racial and national antipathy and hostility between nations.

Like them, the Congregationalists in 1924 served notice on the government "that the Church of Christ as an institution should not be used as an instrument or an agency for the support of war." The Unitarian Ministerial Association declared in 1924: "We affirm our conviction that the churches as such ought to refuse co-operation with the governments waging war; and we memorialize the American Unitarian Association at its coming session in May to repudiate the entire war system." The Moravians appear willing to be influenced by the recollection that the early Christians refused to bear arms. The Copec, finally, at its Conference in Birmingham, England, in April, 1924, goes at least so far as to determine "that the Christian Churches should unreservedly condemn and refuse to support in any way a war waged before the matter in dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal or in defiance of the decision of such tribunal." Some are so daring as to place "loyalty to Christ" above loyalty to the government.

Related to this is the scruple about freedom of conscience for war objectors. Say the Methodists of the North East Ohio Conference: "We do not presume to pass judgment upon the right of any individual, in the event of war, to follow his own enlightened conscience whether it takes him into the forces of armed defence or into the ranks of the conscientious objectors." Also the National Study Conference holds that "the Church should recognize the right and the duty of each individual to follow the guidance of his own conscience as to whether or not he shall participate in war." These identical words appear in a Northern Baptist pronouncement of 1926. A Universalist statement of 1925 declares: "The Universalist Church recognizes as being in accord with our fundamental principles, the right of members of this church to refuse on conscientious grounds to participate in any warfare." Of like tenor is the position of the Columbus churches "that the churches should support and sustain with moral approval individuals who in the exercise of their right of conscience refuse to take part in war or military training." This group would also restore citizenship to those convicted in 1917–18 of opposing war and protests against "the refusal of citizenship on the ground of objection to bearing arms." The Reformed church claims for its members "the right and liberty to speak at any time contrary to those who may temporarily be in control of the government." Yet another pronouncement advances the opinion that, if the people had more to say, there would be less war.

Whether or not these fine protestations can survive the days of peace and be effective amid the clamors and rationalizations of another conflict, no one should venture to predict. If it be true that "by their fruits shall ye know them," the Quaker and the Mennonite groups alone are entitled to our confidence. Perhaps the surest way to avert a collapse of these good intentions is to avert another war. War will probably destroy the good intentions unless the good intentions preclude such an issue by destroying war first. Once a war breaks out, few churches are likely to encounter insuperable difficulty in discovering reasons for abandoning their peace protestations and figuring precisely as they did in 1914–18. Such power as the churches can really exercise will have to be wielded in the interests of prevention. Let us hope that the outcome of these 239 peace pronouncements may show that the church is today more capable of averting war than it was of refraining from participation, a few years ago, in a war already begun.

# GRADUATE TRAINING FOR TEACHING RELIGION IN COLLEGE

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RELIGIOUS instruction on the undergraduate campus has fallen on better days, and adequate leadership is being demanded in greater quantities. Yet little attention has been given to the task of providing teachers of religion who shall be both well versed in religious content and equipped with a sound method and viewpoint.[1] Accordingly, we face the unfortunate situation of colleges crying for teachers of religion, and graduate divinity students seeking in vain to answer the call, despite the thoroughness of their academic training. The purpose of this article is to offer suggestions to those seeking to prepare for religious work in college, as to the sort of preparation that is likely—in the experience of the writer, at least—to prove valuable.

The problem will be dealt with by stating: (1) the objectives of college religious education; (2) the intellectual equipment needed to achieve such objectives; and (3) the graduate training designed to secure such equipment.

## I

Four objectives of religious education on the campus may be set down in terms of a college boy's experience. Bob comes to college either from a religious home (about which he avoids saying too much) or with no religious background of any particular strength. Very soon he encounters the much-heralded contrasts between religion, philosophy, science, and art. He learns from the innuendos of some teachers, the outspoken attacks of others, upon religion, and the apathy of the student body that while philosophy, art, and especially science are realistic, religion is dimly hid from the procession of vital concerns. A philosophic acceptance of science, with a touch of artistic appreciation, can dispense with religion, that outworn gadget of benighted medievalism with its stupid dogmas and its stupider ceremonies! Who will show him that religion is an inextricable part of any culture, ancient or modern, and is deeply involved in—and honestly concerned about—the findings of the sciences, the critical methods of philosophy, and the canons of artistic form? Who will show him a religion fraught with all sorts of honest questionings about the social and moral life of the campus; frank to criticize, as it is eager to contribute to, the healthy development of campus life? And who will help him and others interested to construct programs of genuine religious usefulness?

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[1] Notable in this connection is the work of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, directed by R. H. Edwards, Cornell University.

But Bob is having his own problems to face, too. Many of them grow out of the general problems which campus intellectual attitudes provoke. Yet here is an adolescent, in a new and stimulating environment, in need of catching up with it in his own assimilative thinking. What sort of religious attitude can a decent college man hold? New sources of difficulty, as well as of power, are furnished by his own physiological growth. What have these deep urges to contribute to a man's faith, or is it best to "let well enough alone" these strange feelings that produce now exaltation, now confusion? Are those cynical friends right who deny to his exaltation all religious significance, leaving him only a repressed *libido?* As Bob gets closer to the commencement platform, some doubts about his vocation arise, and fears take hold of him lest he be a misfit. Surely the religious leader has some help to offer at this point; or can he only lamely pat him on the shoulder and return to Pentateuchal criticism or the Kantian *Critique?* Is there not some such thing as a religious attitude in vocational choices outside the ministry and the rabbinate?

If Bob is to take all this seriously, then religion must be presented to him as a respectable concern for a college man. One sure way to do this is to develop respect for the study of religion as a thoroughly scientific academic enterprise. Let him be taught how to apply the canons of sound scientific method to religion, and to appreciate peculiar problems which this method confronts in the study of religious phenomena. Nothing but frankness will do here; hazy enthusiasms or rhetorical escapes will be as disastrous as pious injunctions to unintelligent faith. Let him see how religion reaches out into other fields like physics, and philosophic theories of knowledge, and emotional psychology, for its data. Let him see how intimately it is bound up with those fears and hopes that all possess and none dare confess.

College education should be self-critical. It should be able to produce intelligent student curriculum committees able to see the aims of education and the administrative problems of a good curriculum. Here enters Bob into the fellowship of the campus intelligentsia; or else, as a member of the "fringe of consciousness," is viewing his education as a total process. Where will religious instruction "rate" with him, with his confrères of the Curriculum Committee, or with the faculty itself? Clearly, the courses in religion and the voluntary expressional activities along religious lines must find a logical place in a well-rounded educational plan; but it is reasonable to expect that the college religious educator should know what that place is, if anyone should. Nay, more: he must be ready in the name of religious education to evaluate, from within, the entire curriculum of the college.

## II

Have we placed too heavy a burden on the teacher of religion in the college? Can anyone be equipped to bear the burden? Let us ask what equipment is needed for such burden-bearing.

What equipment does a teacher need to help him relate religion to the actual campus problems? How can he fit himself to aid in intellectual adjustments of religion to science, philosophy, and art; to promote the integration of religious with cultural development; to make clear the implications of religion for campus social and moral problems; and to construct programs of religious activity accordingly?

Certain lines of preparation are clearly indicated. He must himself possess a knowledge of the relation of religion, past and present, to general currents of thought in science and philosophy. He must know the relations of religion with art and literature, and with the cultural development of groups. He must understand what relation religion sustains to ethics. But, in addition, he must command a technique of social survey for ascertaining accurately the facts of campus life. Above all, he must have a thorough grasp of the psychological principles of social organization and their implications for college life. The sociological naïveté of well-intentioned religious programs on a campus is sometimes their most revealing feature.

Again, how is anyone to be prepared for the task of getting Bob properly adjusted as a person? Where shall the adviser find the foundations in himself for helping Bob achieve a well-integrated personality in which religion is a normal, functioning, vigorous agency in the midst of intellectual, social, sexual, and vocational problems?

Surely the findings and the technique of the psychology of religion in its relation to personality growth and to sexual phenomena must be part of the teacher's stock in trade. He must also have thorough knowledge of the physiological aspects of adolescence, including the established findings of endocrinology as they bear upon the emotional life. Intelligent comprehension of the field of psychiatry (not to make amateur attempts at therapy, but to detect border-line cases of emotional disturbance) is a requisite; as is also some knowledge of the basic principles and the resources of vocational guidance. Without such equipment, how can he understand those fits of depression which puzzle the adolescent as a "spiritual" difficulty; or sift out a rebellion against parental domination from an "intellectual difficulty" in the acceptance of a mother's faith in Special Creation; or be on guard against the cynical rationalizations of a socially maladjusted student? The relations of vocational maladjustment to religious experience have not yet been explored; but the psychiatric records furnish enough data to indicate that an important contribution to religious education can be made by the religious worker equipped to recognize when a student is struggling to find fullest self-realization in a vocational ideal which is unsuited to his capacities and temperament.

Religion on the campus has suffered more from contempt than from passionate attacks in recent years. In so far as it is coming into its own again, it does so by virtue of its critical self-examination which compels the respect of scholarly minds. To hesitate in pressing this self-criticism will be fatal; but possession of a fearless spirit of realism will bring the student of religion to a sense of security in the shift from defense to aggressive effort; from blustering or evasive apologetic to steady, well-grounded reconstruction. If Bob and his professors are to develop a respect for the study of religion as abreast of the best in academic enterprise, let them find in his teacher or counselor in religion someone ready to see religion in all its bearings without yielding its unique problems. But such a religious leader will need thorough preparation in the technique, the resources and the fields of research of the scientific study of religion.[2] For those prospective teachers who expect to specialize in this methodology, an understanding of the logic of science as applied to study of religion is imperative.

However, it is too easy for campus study of religion to become engrossed in religion as a subject and to forget that it is a relationship. How often a thoroughly modern conception of religion or of the Bible is embodied in an educational method which is long out of date! The difficulty is more serious when we realize that a view of religion as personal adjustment and a view of education as indoctrination are mutually destructive. Administration of courses in religion must be closely integrated with the general curricular organization and with the ideals of education. What does this mean for the theological student looking forward to college teaching? First of all, he should be intelligent regarding the history of higher education, especially in America. Historical perspective is the best cure alike for faddism and for reaction. No one who has read the story of the American college can be overawed by the current enthusiasm for European methods to be introduced bodily into our higher-educational process; nor fail to understand our debt to Europe.

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[2] The naïve, uncritical use of biblical materials by many "religious educators" illustrates the problem. Projects sometimes come dangerously close to proof-text use of Scripture.

Another requisite is a thorough grasp of the principles of education, of the psychology and philosophy of education, and of educational administration. A paper pedagogy may be no guaranty of successful teaching, but it is nevertheless a powerful instrument in the hands of a sensitive educator. The pedagogical tragedy is that our higher institutions of learning have been so completely neglected in the teaching of educational theory and method in the schools of education. Where specialized courses on teaching arithmetic to the fourth grade or geography in junior high school are offered, not even a general course of college teaching methods is available.[3] The prospective religious worker on the college campus needs some orientation in advance in the problems peculiar to institutions of higher learning, in theories of higher education with regard to administration and curriculum, and in the experiments now being carried on in college and university education, such as Swarthmore's reading for honors; Antioch's alternation of practice and theory; Vassar's individually planned curriculum; and Smith's special reading periods.

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[3] More provision is being made for this in summer schools of education, and in the Summer Quarter at the University of Chicago Divinity School; but there is an enormous field still untouched.

## III

To be more specific, what sorts of courses should be sought by a graduate student in preparation for religious work in the college field? The following outline is suggested, not as constituting any radical reorganization, but rather as a selection and supplementation of courses already available. This outline is arranged in a rough chronological sequence—at least as regards the five main divisions:

1. An Introduction to the Scientific Study of Religion:

   The success of college orientation courses suggests the value of such a seminary orientation course, giving the approaches of the various departments and the seminary's theory of theological training. Emphasis will here be laid on technique, problems, and resources of the different fields of study.

2. General courses in:
   - *a*) The historical development of religion in relation to the wider life of groups, with special reference to the Christian tradition as dominant in our culture. Here would be included the survey courses in Old and New Testament, history of religions, and church history.
   - *b*) The relation of Christian (or Jewish) religious experience, as formulated in theology, to current developments in science, philosophy, and ethics.
   - *c*) The philosophy and psychology of education, with special reference to religious education. This would include the general principles of education, the delimitation of the special function of religious education, and treatment of its special problems.
   - *d*) The psychology of religious development with recognition of the social nature of personality.
3. Special courses in the Psychology of Religious Development for the college field:
   - *a*) The physiology of adolescence, normal and pathological.
   - *b*) Peculiarities of social adjustment problems in the adolescent period. Adolescence connotes a degree of social recognition and social interest and freedom often overlooked in psychologists' preoccupation with physiological changes.
   - *c*) The relation of religion to sex life, including some study of physiology in relation to emotional behavior.

  *d*) The relation of critical analysis to participant enthusiasm. No one who has observed the problem of chapel and church attendance of "intellectuals" can fail to recognize in this psychological problem an acute demand for more thorough study than it has yet received. Much light is now available from aesthetics and collective psychology which should be used.

4. Sociological training for campus investigations and the organization of student activity:
   - *a*) The techniques of the social survey, covering survey methods, the correlation of data secured, and the presentation of findings to the layman.
   - *b*) The principles of social psychology as derived from studies in personal adjustment and the development of social attitudes, and also from collective behavior studies in public opinion and other forms of social control.
   - *c*) The implications of social psychology for social organization programs: a study of the rôle of formal organization in group life and of the processes involved in the growth and decline of organizational controls. The crucial problem of the student's relation to organized religion needs such analysis.
5. Educational problems in the American college:
   - *a*) The history of higher education in Europe and America.
   - *b*) The theory of higher education in America: the organization and administration of the college, the college curriculum, current experiments in higher education.
   - *c*) Religious education on the American campus: official agencies at work and their modes of operation, student activities in the religious field as related to curriculum, and a survey of current projects in college religious education.

It should be understood that the foregoing plan of courses aims to provide the necessary orientation and general background for college teachers; and does not attempt to outline a program of specialized study leading to an advanced degree in some technical field of research. Whatever may be said of the college pastor, the personnel worker, or the Association secretary, clearly the college teacher should be capable of advanced research study in some one field; but even here it should be remembered that specialized research does not mean mere factual encyclopedic knowledge of a small area of information, but a sense of interrelationships of a given limited area of phenomena with all contiguous fields of study. For specialization of this sort such a plan of study as outlined would seem to be necessary for the specialist in any field of religion. But, in the last analysis, the religious educator is a specialist in religious adjustment, and like the medical specialist cannot neglect his general training if his diagnosis or his therapy is to be trustworthy. His facts are always people-in-religious-action, whether in ancient Egypt or in modern America, whether as mystics or as social prophets, whether as philosophers of religion or as evangelistic preachers. To such a guide in adolescent religious hygiene, the great literature of religion is a series of social and individual case records; the historic religions are studies in the sanitary science of souls; the classic philosophies and theologies of religion are the history of therapeutic theories; and the principles of modern religious education are his *materia medica*. The religious hygienist requires thorough training as the only safe guaranty of his legitimate practice.

# CRITICAL REVIEWS

## A PHASE OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY[1]

Considering the poverty of literature in English on Chinese thought, it is disappointing that this book adds so little to our knowledge. Even what Dr. Creel appears to regard as new—the delineation of a background of Chinese ideas in relation with which the later historical systems have grown up—presents nothing very different from what Dr. E. H. Parker gave us years ago. His association of these ideas with the early village and agricultural life of the Chinese, though interesting, is not very significant. The book purports to be "an investigation of the origin and development of Chinese thought from the earliest period about which we can reasonably speculate down through the period of the classical philosophical systems." Its thesis is that there "exists a definite and peculiarly Chinese world-view." That the world-view expounded is fairly definite may be admitted, but it does not appear to be peculiarly Chinese except in its terminology. The term *Tao* has its analogues both in significance and in emphasis in other systems, and though less definitely, so have *yin* and *yang*. The author, however, makes some useful suggestions as to terminology, which might be followed with advantage. For example, as the idea of the *Tao* is implied, not merely in the teaching of Lao-Tze, but also in that of Confucius and others, he objects to the use of Taoism simply for the system of Lao-Tze (as is generally done) and proposes for this the name "Laoism" on a parallel with Confucianism. Dr. Creel's book is carefully written and may be recommended to those who wish for a brief survey of some main lines of Chinese thought.

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## THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN EGYPTOLOGIST

Champollion in 1822 discovered the key to Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, and thereby made possible the study of the Egyptian language. During the next decades Egyptian texts, the raw materials for language study, were assiduously gathered, especially by Champollion himself, by Rosellini, and by Lepsius. From the swelling flood of inscriptional material, copied with inaccuracies unavoidable under conditions then prevailing, individual scholars garnered as they might. Since the texts represented various periods of a language which had passed through thousands of years of growth and decay, their grammar and vocabulary were at best by no means uniform. Such fluctuations put a premium on intuition and clever guessing, which in turn had kept Egyptology in disrepute. To Adolf Erman, the successor of Lepsius at Berlin in 1884, belongs the credit for overcoming these handicaps and establishing Egyptology as a real science.

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[1] *Sinism: A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese World-View.* By H. G. Creel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. 127 pages. $2.00.

In his autobiography, written since his retirement,[1] Professor Erman recounts simply and unaffectedly his background and his career. The record was meant originally for his descendants only, but its interest as a cultural document justifies its wider availability. In his case, at least, blood tells; for preceding generations included many brilliant minds. The racial mixture involved—Swiss, French refugee, Christian Jew, and German—suggests our American "melting-pot." Poor at assigned school tasks, Adolph Erman was an omnivorous reader, with eager imagination and a friendly spirit. His interest in Egypt was awakened when he was only fifteen, and he and some of his comrades studied it as best they might entirely independently. At twenty he was able to begin formal study of Egyptian, first at Leipzig under Ebers, then at Berlin. Duties in the library of the Royal Museums, then with the collection of coins and medals under Friedlaender, contributed to Erman's training for the directorship of the Egyptian Museum and the professorship of Egyptology at Berlin. Along with his progress in study are told the human aspects of his career—among them his boyhood play, his fraternity life at Leipzig, his tramping and mountain-climbing, and the establishment of his own home. Frank character sketches of scientific contemporaries and comments on museum and university problems are equally readable.

Out of this background, with its ultimate happy combination of museum and university contacts, grew the sound basis on which modern Egyptology rests. Professor Erman differentiated Late Egyptian from the earlier phases of the language; he discovered and correlated fundamental grammatical principles; he fathered the great Berlin Egyptian dictionary, a co-operative product of the scholars of many nations, based on corrected copies of all the texts now known; he gave us standard treatises on Egyptian life, and especially on Egyptian religion and literature. His pupils include such leaders as his successors Sethe and Schäfer in Germany, Gardiner and Crum in England, and Breasted and Reisner in America.

Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in Professor

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[1] *Mein Werden und mein Wirken.* By Adolf Erman. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1929. viii + 295 pages. M. 12.

Erman's attitude toward Egyptian religion (pp. 278–81), and in the fact that a third edition of his book on that subject is soon to be hoped for.

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## THE GREAT MAN IN RELIGIONS

In the days before the dawn of scientific method in the history of religions it was customary to talk of the "founders" of religions, and to consider a religion in some significant sense a prolongation of the person or teaching of him whose name continued to be the emotion-stirring symbol of the group. Wherever revelation authority was involved there was even the tendency to identify the "truth" or "essence" of the religion with the life and teaching of the great person and to stigmatize as degeneration the successive changes encountered in the historic march of a living people through the ages of cultural transformation. But it has long been evident to the student of religions that the great man is a product of a moving social process; and that the historical religion which bears his name can go on as a living continuity with a singular indifference to the actual, historical facts of life and thought of its so-called founder. The great man may be epoch-making, but he is also a product of his own time. The living religion before him, out of which he emerged, flows on, to be channeled in new forms, leaving him behind, and remains a vital religion often by virtue of the very fact that it becomes a different religion from the religion that was his. Hence history of religions can never be written as biography; rather, periods of religious change where there are social conflicts and crises of thought and behavior must be used to furnish an understanding of the great man. Two recent books on religion illustrate these contrasting points of view. One[1] writes biography as the "story of religion." The other[2] interprets the "saviors of mankind" in terms of the social situations which produced them.

There is one way to appreciation of Mr. Potter's book, and that is to refuse to take it for what it claims to be. It is not the story of religion; but as a series of popular, biographical sketches of great religious leaders it may be enjoyed, since the author has an eye for the picturesque detail and the event of human interest. The descriptive subtitles of his chapters indicate his taste for telling phraseology, for example, Akhenaten, "the first individual in history"; Moses, "who discovered the personality of God"; Zoroaster, "who discovered the devil"; Buddha, "who found salvation in psychology"; Jesus, "who found he was the Son of God." Moreover, the author is generous with his biographies. Some sections of the book read like leaves from a biographical encyclopedia. But one must not look for scientific scholarship (Mr. Potter is not writing for scholars) nor for history of religions. If this book were telling the story of religions it would be necessary to conclude that the religion of Israel ended with Jeremiah and that Judaism with all its glory and tragedy has never been. Why Judaism is omitted is a mystery, for it cannot be for lack of biographical material. The author feels under obligation to mention the religions of Greece, Rome, Babylonia, Assyria, Mexico, Egypt, Shinto, the early religion of Japan, and Hinduism. But they would better have been passed over in silence, for they are put in an Appendix as "leaderless religions," with the explanation, "The leaderless religions were *not* great simply *because* they did lack great leaders. They all remained in an arrested stage of development." This is an amazing thing to say of Hinduism. If Mr. Potter could only have known of the great array of spectacular figures in the history of the religions of India, how much more colorful his book might have been! But he finds only Nanak. Jainism, with its twenty-six centuries of history, is spared the ignominy of a place in the Appendix but gets only a dozen lines, probably on the strength of the mere name of Mahavira. Half of the six hundred pages, on the other hand, are devoted to Christianity, and this proportion the author justifies as "due to the fact that since the advent of Christianity most progress in religion has been made within that faith." There is something very subtle here, for this statement must mean something, but one hesitates to touch with a single syllable an assurance so sublime.

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[1] *The Story of Religion.* By Charles Francis Potter. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1929. $5.00.

[2] *The Saviors of Mankind.* By W. R. Van Buskirk. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xiv + 537 pages. $3.00.

Mr. Potter probably does not intend to be confusing in his interpretation of the meaning of religion, but certainly he is not consistently clear. In his definition (p. xviii) it appears that religion is a personal experience of unification and harmonization of personality. But again he speaks of the evolution of religion as though it were a genetic, unilinear process moving from animism, through polytheism and monotheism to the idea of immanent law, or, in other words, that it is synonymous with the evolution, in a fixed order of theological belief. This is an archaic and discarded theory which may have entered his work as an echo and by oversight. In another place appears the idea of religion as an essential something inherent in experience which may be discovered and "its laws followed." The identification of religion with personal, individual experience is the natural result of the effort to write the story of religion as biography. If he had written the history of religions in which his great men stand out as mileposts, he would have been compelled to take the social evolution of peoples into account and religion could never have been identified with one of its moments under the general term of "religious experience." He would have discovered that there is no single thing that can be labeled by the name of a religion, but only a continuously changing flow of social life making its history not only where great individuals appear but, day by day, in the interplay of problems and hope among the lowly folk.

In *The Saviors of Mankind,* Mr. Van Buskirk indicates his allegiance to the modern scientific method in the study of religions. He says: "We shall never be able to understand the true nature and function of a religion until we are able to reconstruct the age in which it made its appearance." Though this canon of methodology is not new, and has long been the guiding principle of our outstanding scholars in the study of early Christianity and of the region of ancient Israel, it is sufficiently rare in practice to justify the author's labored insistence upon it. His scornful treatment of comparative religion is doubly justified if this discipline exists as he describes it, and it probably does. The full implications of the new method, however, have not yet come home to him as one might suspect from the phrase "made its appearance." When a new religion "appears" it is always the old continuing in a new direction with emphases, ideals, and program won from a new synthesis. There can be no doubt, for instance, that if the author had seen the common pattern of Hinduism underlying the Sankhya, Jainism, Upanishad Idealism, and Buddhism he would not have been so confused in his effort to interpret Gautama. The Buddha's novelty was in the way he continued the old by peculiar emphases and omissions. Moreover, Mr. Van Buskirk still has the theological mind, however refined, as is indicated by his repeated references to some mystic relation to a mysterious reality. If this is taken seriously as a controlling factor, the social interpretation of the "savior" is considerably weakened. Fortunately, in these studies, the treatment is thoroughly naturalistic and in so far as the author's grasp of the social situation is adequate each great man comes alive as a creative focus of his age.

The treatment of Moses, Isaiah of Babylon, Jesus, and Saul is admirable, though the fact that the author's method leads him to a different interpretation from that of other authorities using the same method gives one pause. The sketch of Socrates is the most brilliant and moving of all. In itself it would justify the book. This reminds us that Mr. Potter omits him because, unfortunately, he belonged to a "leaderless religion" which remained in a "stage of arrested development." In the oriental materials of India, China, Islam, and particularly Iran, the author's hand falters and his saviors do not emerge naturally out of his description of the social situation. The trouble here is not in the method but in knowledge of fact, and the inadequacy of factual materials is due to the author's dependence on the wrong sources or failure to use sources available. There is no gain for science when it is necessary to make conjectural reconstruction of social situations to explain a great man; the interpretation must include him in a natural, factual description. But the task is delicate and endlessly difficult for ancient India and China. It is enough to win the gratitude of modern scholars that Mr. Van Buskirk has committed himself to the new approach in the study of religions and has ventured to demonstrate it. The general reader, free from anxiety regarding facts, will find the *Saviors of Mankind* a stimulating and emancipating book.

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## BABYLONIAN INFLUENCE ON THE HEBREWS[1]

This series of five lectures, the first to be delivered under the Hilda Stch Stroock Foundation of the Jewish Institute of Religion, New York, constitutes literally the last of the many notable contributions of the late Professor Hugo Gressmann to Old Testament Study. The Preface by Professor Obermann contains a touchingly beautiful appreciation of the author's work and an eloquent tribute to his personality.

The theme of the lectures is the intellectual and spiritual relationship between Israel and the Babylonians. "The Tower of Babel" stands as the symbol of Babylonian civilization, and it is from the angle of the influence of the latter upon Hebrew thought that the theme is approached.

The first lecture deals with the form and the symbolism of the Babylonian temple tower and expounds the influence of these upon the architecture and thought of the whole ancient Near East. In the second lecture this theme is developed by an exposition of the dependence of the "legends of mankind in Genesis i–xi" upon the Babylonian legends. The third lecture discusses Babylonian influence upon the literary forms and ideology of Hebrew prophecy. It is followed, through an examination of the Johannine Apocalypse, by a lecture on the relation between late Hellenistic Judaism and Babylonia. The concluding lecture most interestingly contrasts and compares the religions of Babylon and Israel.

Making all due allowance for Professor Gressmann's well-known enthusiasm for the civilization of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, and for the fact that his theme itself did not permit the presentation of the claims of other civilizations to a part in influencing Hebrew thought and life, these lectures contribute materially to the very desirable end of freeing us from the tendency, fostered by certain dogmatic positions relative to the nature of Scripture, of regarding the Hebrew people as having lived their life, socially speaking, in a vacuum. They also contribute splendidly to a better understanding of the influence of the Semitic world on the origin and development of what we today designate as the scientific view of life.

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[1] *The Tower of Babel*. By Hugo Gressmann. New York: Jewish Institute of Religion Press, 1929. xxiv+92 pages, 11 plates.

William Creighton Graham

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## THE ETHICS OF JUDAISM

The work under discussion[1] is the English translation of the first volume in a projected series of five, the general subject of which is "The Teachings of Judaism." Subsequent volumes will deal with various phases of Jewish religion and ethics. The purpose of the writers of the present work is to present to the reader "the true ethical and religious content of Judaism as vouched for by its original documents" in order to inspire a "more just appreciation of Judaism" to the end that the teachings of Judaism may be appropriated by all mankind. It has a frankly propagandist ambition.

The present volume includes the following topics, among others: "Morality as the Basic Requirement of Judaism," "Freedom of the Will," "Reward and Punishment," and "Equality of All Human Beings." Each chapter contains a brief introduction of the theme by a modern Jewish writer, followed by a series of relevant quotations from Jewish sources, beginning with the Old Testament and continuing to the present day. Modern Christian sources are used to complete each chapter. An effort is made to avoid the interpretative bias and subjectivity of the usual method of treatment by letting the sources speak for themselves. However, it seems to the reviewer that the subjective element has by no means been removed. The limitations of space, and perhaps the interest of the editors have dictated a selective process in the choice of material. In reading over the quotations one obtains an impression of fragmentariness and incompleteness. This method has the weakness of all efforts supported by collections of proof-texts arbitrarily extracted from their context.

At least as far as the biblical material is concerned, the attitude is non-critical. Isa. 66:6 is used to show the spirit of universalism on the basis of piety rather than of ceremonial observance. But the passage distinctly refers to cultic requirements. On this subject of universalism one would expect citations from Jonah perhaps. On the other hand, a great number of passages with an intensely particularistic outlook could be found in the Old Testament. These, of course, have been omitted. On page 190 the quotations from Ecclesiastes to prove the idea of the joy of life are precisely the ones whose genuineness is open to serious question. The general tenor of the Book of Ecclesiastes is one of disillusionment and pessimism. Very wisely no reference is made to Amos or Micah, whose austere morality is far from cheerful. Hosea is quoted in support of temperance. Yet his ban on wine is certainly motivated by religious rather than temperance considerations. In using a statement from Genesis, "And God created man in his own image," to demonstrate the Jewish theory of man's innate goodness, a contradictory passage is omitted, "Every imagination of the thought of his [man's] heart was only evil continually" (Gen. 6:5).

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[1] *The Foundations of Jewish Ethics*. Compiled by Dr. Simon Bernfeld. Translated from the German by Armin H. Koller. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 265 pages. $2.50.

The reader is conscious of the pronounced attempt to distinguish Judaism from Christianity in several of the book's statements. Emphasis is laid upon man's ability to conquer his evil nature unaided. "Mankind shall set itself free from the sway of sin through its *own powers of amendment*." (The italics are the author's.) The Christian tradition concerning the atonement seems to be in the mind of the Jewish writer.

Notwithstanding the defects indicated above, the book will prove of value. The several introductions by contemporary Jews of note are illuminating commentaries upon the best in modern Judaism. The motive behind the book is highly commendable. Any serious attempt to interpret modern Judaism to the non-Jewish world will be gratefully received.

OTTO JUSTICE BAAB

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## JEWISH MYSTIC LORE

A. E. Waites has written a number of books on the history of mystic lore. He is the author of *The Secret Tradition in Alchemy*, *The Brotherhood of the Rosy Cross*, *The Secret Tradition in Freemasonry*, and similar works. His *Doctrine and Literature of the Kabbalah* is now out of print, but most of the material contained in it is incorporated into the present work.[1]

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[1] *The Holy Kabbalah*. By A. E. Waites. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xxv+636 pages. $7.50.

The purpose of the present volume is primarily "to show its [the Kabbalah's] contribution to the sacred science of the soul . . . . this work has been written by a Christian mystic for the use of mystics." This purpose is amply fulfilled. The book discusses not only the sources and the chief texts of the Kabbalah but also its doctrinal content, its connection with other mystic traditions, and gives an adequate evaluation of Christian studies on the Kabbalah.

Mr. Waites is evidently a fine student of mysticism. He should therefore have confined himself to this subject and not have dealt with the difficult problems of text criticism. To judge texts one must have an intimate knowledge of original sources. That Mr. Waites lacks this knowledge strikes the reader at once when he observes that when the author wished to give reference for the elementary fact that Talmudic literature is divisible into Halachah and Haggadah, he quotes as unscientific a source as Edersheim (cf. p. 30, note 1). That Mr. Waites does not know the sources is evident from the fact that he frequently quotes statements from the Zohar which are already found in the Talmud and other older sources. For example, the material in note 2, page 13, quoted from the Zohar is found in Numbers Rabba XVIII, 21; the dictum that the study of the law succeeds only in the case of him who kills himself for the law (p. 13) is found b. Ber. 63 b; most of the material on the pre-existence of wisdom quoted on page 15 from the Zohar is found in Genesis Rabba I, and in b. Sabbath 137 b, and so forth. On page 35 he gives the various meanings of the word *Kabbalah,* but he neglects to record that the word also means "the Prophets" (cf. Mishna Taanit, II, 1). He is evidently not well acquainted with recent Jewish history, especially with the moods and philosophy of the Hasidic movement. If he knew Hasidism he would never have stated, as he does on page 84, that "the mystic side of Kabbalism the path of ecstasy . . . . it is precisely the side of which we see no effect whatsoever in Jewry."

The author goes to great trouble to prove that Moses de Leon did not invent all the material found in the Zohar, but had quoted considerably from older sources. This opinion is already well known and adopted in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (cf. art., "Zohar," Vol. XII).

When the author confines himself to the subject of mysticism and leaves literary criticism alone, he shows his mastery of the subject. His opinions are moderate and his judgments sound. Except for the technical weaknesses mentioned in the foregoing, the work is erudite, informative, and in general a valuable addition to mystic literature.

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## EARLY CHRISTIANITY, ORIGINAL OR SYNTHETIC?

Victorian England produced a really great trio of New Testament scholars in the persons of Hort, Lightfoot, and Westcott, who were schoolfellows and lifelong friends. More recently Scotland has produced a group of three distinguished New Testament scholars who, still more recently, have come to America. All prophecies are precarious; but it is not unlikely that the next generation of students will speak of Moffatt, Morgan, and Scott with much the same high regard that still attaches to the Cambridge trio.

Of the three Scottish scholars Professor William Morgan, late of Queen's University, was the least productive, judged by a quantitative standard. The two books that he published were exceedingly well done. His *Nature and Right of Religion* was a most systematic exposition of Ritschl's value theory in religion, and his *Religion and Theology of Paul* remains the best book on that subject in English at the present time.

Professor James Moffatt, since 1927 of Union Theological Seminary, has been one of the most amazingly productive scholars who has worked in the New Testament and related fields of research. His bibliography numbers two dozen titles already, and includes four commentaries, two yearbooks, one volume of Hibbert Lectures, a vernacular translation of the Bible, and a novel. During the year 1929 alone, while carrying on a full teaching schedule, he produced four new books.

Professor Ernest Findlay Scott, who preceded Moffatt at Union by nearly a decade, has ten titles to his credit, almost all of them very substantial contributions to learning in the New Testament field. There is a fitness in the circumstance that his most recent volume[1] should be a publication of the Kerr Lectures for 1927–28, a distinguished lectureship to which his friend William Morgan made a superior contribution during the war years.

This latest volume by Professor Scott is characterized by those excellencies of literary style which the student has learned to associate with his name—characteristics that render his writings at once enjoyable and useful. Scott excels in the clear, terse statement of problems at issue; in the trenchant, yet controlled criticism of extreme positions; in the logical succession of ideas in argumentation; in the systematic, enumerative arrangement of materials. In the last particular his style possesses mathematical quality, like the style of the late President Burton, which renders the author's line of argument very easy of comprehension without in any way detracting from the literary merit of the work as a whole. It is worth while to compare this enumerative style with the Oxford technique of prefacing each chapter with a brief synopsis. Of the two the numerical methodology is more immediately effective and is generally preferred by serious students.

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[1] *The Gospel and Its Tributaries.* By Ernest Findlay Scott. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928. 295 pages. $3.50.

If one were to venture a criticism of Professor Scott's excellent style it would be to observe that his paragraphs tend to be too long and hence become confused, while his footnotes, which are precious, are yet too few and too brief.

In content *The Gospel and Its Tributaries* is the most comprehensive and distinctly historical piece of work that its author has yet essayed. Hitherto Professor Scott has been best known for his contributions toward the understanding of important and difficult New Testament books—the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews—and for his emphasis on apocalypticism in the teachings of Jesus. In his Ely Lectures on *The Beginnings of the Church* he threw open to the student, briefly, the life of the important primitive Christian community in Jerusalem. Now, in *The Gospel and Its Tributaries* he covers in a genetic study the development of the Christian movement through the century and more marked off by the New Testament writings, down to and including the rise of the Catholic church at the end of the second century.

The introductory and concluding chapters of the volume deal with the problem of original and borrowed elements in early Christianity in a manner respectively preliminary and summarizing. The intervening chapters are variously devoted to the Jewish inheritance, the Hellenistic influences, the contributions of outstanding leaders, and the final institutionalization of early Christianity.

Chief interest naturally attaches to the author's position regarding his fundamental problem of old and new elements in early Christianity. At one time he appears to be a Protestant liberal of the school of Harnack, maintaining that essential elements in Christianity were underived, original, self-perpetuating; and only non-essential elements were borrowed from other systems, Jewish or Gentile. The author maintains that the essential structure of Christianity has persisted through all the changes of history. "This," he affirms, "and not the modifications which have come in from time to time, is Christianity" (p. 22).

More frequently, particularly as he approaches the problems relative to the institutionalization of the Christian movement, the author writes in terminology that would command the approval of a Catholic modernist, with his conception of Christianity as a vital organism inherently characterized by a notable capacity for growth and absorption. After the completion of his task Professor Scott writes in his Preface, "My aim in this book has been to indicate how Christianity drew into itself many tributary elements, and in so doing transformed them, so that the result was not some nondescript composite religion, but a new and in some ways more adequate expression of the message of Jesus" (p. ix).

In this way the author seeks to reconcile the traditional conception of Christianity as a divine revelation with the modern scientific conception of the Christian religion as a social process. In the creative, transforming nucleus that constitutes the core of Christianity is the revealed element. In the appropriation and transformation of extraneous matter the historical process is represented.

The student of history turns away from *The Gospel and Its Tributaries* with a renewed appreciation of the multiplicity and difficulty of the problems involved in the genesis of the Christian religion. Is it possible at this distance in time and with available sources of information to differentiate at all exactly between original and derived elements in early Christianity? Do the facts of history bear out the assumption that essential elements in Christianity have remained invariable from that ancient period down to our own? In the first age of Christianity were new and original elements necessarily of superior worth? When early Christians appropriated and utilized extraneous elements, were the borrowed materials alone transmuted, or did not Christianity itself undergo radical transformation in the process? Had the author concentrated more on the social experiences of early Christian people and less on an abstract Christian gospel it is altogether likely that his own answers to these questions would have been different.

For the definition of these and related problems, for an individual analysis of Hellenistic influences significant for the development of early Christianity, and for a particular emphasis on the importance of Alexandrianism, the student of Christian origins is now further indebted to Professor Scott.

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## JESUS AND SOCIAL TEACHINGS[1]

Among the symptoms of a saner study of the social teaching of Jesus may be welcomed the latest volume from the New Testament professor in the Pacific School of Religion. The particular merit of this volume is, as its author anticipated, its emphasis upon the historical antecedents of what Jesus taught. The Jewish background, especially of the prophets, is emphasized as usual, but the author goes behind this to Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures since the ideals of Jesus' time were the inheritance of the influence of other cultures in the Near East and not merely of Judaism. That Hellenism is omitted from this volume is due to the fact that it influenced Christianity only later. It should be further observed that in another respect the author definitely limits himself throughout. It is the social teaching about poverty and wealth with which he deals.

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[1] *The Genesis of the Social Gospel.* By Chester Carlton McCown. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929. xv+394+xvii pages. $3.25.

Another merit of the volume is that it draws together light from several different angles. It is a synthetic piece of scholarship. The author has cast his net wide. The Bibliography gives a suggestion of the wide reading behind the present volume. Without being a sociologist the author uses the sociological approach and his writing, while not always faultless, at least escapes the disfigurement of excessive sociological jargon. A review of the Table of Contents would give a fair idea of the scope of the work. Suffice it here to say that the author uses his earlier researches in Palestinian climate and its influences and his comparison between Hebrew and Egyptian eschatology. The latter he supplements by Babylonian, Syrian, and Persian records and divides it into three parts, so that he deals with the viewpoint of ancient cultures on "The Recovery of Paradise," "The Perfect Prince," and "The Hope of the Poor." This part of the work is a useful collection of scattered and unfamiliar materials.

The remainder of the volume treats of material more familiar to biblical scholars. It deals with the Hebrew ideals as related to their history, with the Judaism of the time of Jesus and the social problems and programs which it presented, and finally with Jesus' own viewpoint and message. This part of the book is marked by the author's considerable acquaintance with recent literature on these fields and particularly by his own good judgment. There is little controversy about the social and religious influences coming down to Judaism through the prophets. Nor can one easily quarrel with what is described as the current economic and political situation in the days of Jesus as McCown reviews them. More open to controversy necessarily are the attempts to interpret Jesus' own message and his aim.

It is impossible here to review, still less to criticize, all these elements in the book. It may be more useful to express some judgments about this whole area of writing.

The historical approach, which is the author's scientific creed, is certainly justified. That ideals, even the ideals of Jesus, depend in large part on conceptions held by groups prior in time and shared by contemporaries is an axiom. The sociological approach is also justified. But there is always danger of forgetting that Jesus did not think sociologically. Jesus certainly had ideals of character. It is not at all clear that he thought of them as characteristic of an ideal society. In other words, the eschatology and the ethics of Jesus are both historically true of him, but they may not have been related to each other or adjusted in the way that our author makes out. Nor is it certain that Jesus' ideals were adjusted to any large comprehension of the whole contemporary scene.

Professor McCown must be given great credit for an honest attempt not to read modern prejudices into his interpretation of Jesus. He says quite honestly that he began his study merely "with the purpose of discovering what Jesus' ideal for society actually was." He arrived in the end at a conviction that it was a gospel useful for modern civilization. Throughout the book he tries to use modern ideals merely to illustrate Jesus, not as actually held by Jesus. Certainly only in a quite unmodern sense can one apply to Jesus such terms as democrat, proletarian, and the like. The accurate recovery of Jesus' own probable outlook is a delicate task, and we may say that few modern books go at it with so much sincere desire to think in terms true to historical reality.

No brief summary of the findings in such a book can be satisfactory to either author or reviewer. But since such a summary is expected, at least as regards the central item under discussion, it may be attempted in conclusion. I may mention, since Professor McCown apparently does not, the important summary of attitudes toward poor and rich in Dibelius' *Commentary on the Epistle of James* (1921, in the "Meyer Series,") Introduction, section 6.

Two strands of opinion with regard to poverty and wealth are to be traced through the Jewish and earlier cultures of the Near East. One is the ideal of poverty as an evil to be abolished or to be remedied by equalizing or even reversing the lot of the poor. The other is the view that the poor deserve care and protection, which develops in Judaism into a feeling that God's poor are specially blessed and that the rich are wicked. Jesus, who further inherits the hope of a golden age and actually identifies himself with the rôle of Messiah, which in Judaism is the heir to the dreams of a perfect prince, adds these traditions to the rural and proletarian sympathies of his personal background, and He himself has a keen perception of the evil effects of the current social system on both the rich, whose inner life it poisons, and on the poor, whom it deprives of opportunities for spiritual realization. The kingdom of God, whose coming he proclaimed, could not be reconciled with such a situation and so Jesus taught the sinfulness of wealth and the blessings of poverty, and anticipated that somehow (though certainly not by force) his ideals would be realized.

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## THE ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

Dr. Streeter's new book[1] has a special interest for American readers as the first-fruits of the lectureship instituted by the late Professor Hewett of Harvard. It may be expected that this foundation will result in many valuable additions to theological literature by distinguished scholars from all parts of the world. For America it ought to do the same kind of service as the Hibbert lectureship has done for England. The present volume has given an excellent start to the series. It will impress on all the future lecturers that, whatever may be their subject, they will have to offer the results of first-hand study and reflection.

The purpose of the book is to trace the development of church organization from New Testament times to the end of the second century. A vast literature has gathered around this subject, and it might seem as if little that was new could be added. Dr. Streeter has not attempted to work out some entirely new theory. The originality of his book is to be found not so much in his results as in his methods. Instead of advancing some hypothesis and then supporting it by various testimony, he sets himself to examine one by one the documents of the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic age, with a view to fixing their dates and places of origin. He then seeks to discover from each of them how the church was constituted in that particular time and locality. Thus he leaves himself unfettered by any preconceived notion of what the documents ought to say. He is willing to accept what they do actually say, and on this basis to build up his conception of how the church developed. His conclusion is that throughout the primitive age there was no fixed order. In each Christian center the organization assumed a different form, and was modified from time to time in accordance with practical needs. All the controversy about the original type of church government is beside the mark, for there were numerous types existing side by side, and only toward the close of the period can we trace the beginnings of uniformity. This general result would now be accepted by most scholars, though Dr. Streeter has given us a more vivid and detailed picture than we have hitherto possessed of the diversities of early practice. He has also enabled us to connect the various phases with definite localities—Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Rome, Alexandria. No future historian can afford to neglect the evidence which is here put forward as to the diversities of Christian thought and custom in the different parts of the empire. The chief value of the book, however, will be found in its literary criticism rather than in its history of theology. By his work on the Gospels Dr. Streeter has established his reputation as one of the most original and acute of living critics, and on a smaller scale he now does for the literature generally what he did for the Synoptic records. We cannot but feel that in some cases he is too subtle and ingenious; as when he makes out I Peter to be a sermon by Aristion, or gives the Elder a local habitation and a name as John, the Bishop of Ephesus. It cannot be denied that Ignatius is good material for the psychologist, but the attempt to solve the mystery of the Letters by modern psychological methods does not strike us as particularly happy. Dr. Streeter is on surer ground when he keeps to the critical tests which he knows how to apply so brilliantly. His chapters on Clement and the Didache and Hermas have put the investigation of these writings on a new footing. The book abounds on every page with keen observations and fruitful suggestions which remind us how much has yet to be done in the analysis of the early documents. That Dr. Streeter has correctly estimated the general course of development in the primitive church will not, we think, be questioned by any competent scholar. His book ought to give the quietus to much of the profitless discussion which has disturbed the peace of many churches. Perhaps he has taken too little account of the inner forces which combined with the outward ones in molding the early institutions. He admits that beliefs and doctrines reacted at every step on changes in organization, but has comparatively little to say on this all-important part of his subject. Above all we miss any thorough treatment of the influence exerted from the very first by the idea of the Spirit. This was surely a factor of supreme value in the development of the outward life of the church, as well as in the shaping of its theology.

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[1] *The Primitive Church.* By Burnett Hillman Streeter. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xiv+323 pages. $2.50.

E. F. Scott

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## LUTHER'S VIEW OF THE CHURCH

This book[1] inaugurates a series of studies in Protestant history and doctrine to appear under the joint editorship of Paul Althaus, Karl Bardt, and Karl Heim. At the same time it carries on the work of clarifying our conception of Luther's teaching on the church, a task to which important contributions have recently been made by such writers as K. Holl, F. Kattenbusch, and E. Kohlmeyer. While Professor Althaus is mainly concerned with Luther, he devotes two short chapters to the previous evolution of the meaning of the term *communio sanctorum*. From an examination of the principle of *κοινωνία* in the New Testament he passes to a brief sketch of the idea in medieval and post-Tridentine Catholicism. The New Testament conception of mutual love was soon replaced by the idea of merit, which dominates the later development. The treatment here is necessarily brief, and the citations, especially of the scholastics, are suggestive rather than adequate. Contemporary Roman Catholic theologians are cited to indicate an emphasis on merit and satisfaction; and exception is taken to their attempts to combine the two principles of merit and love, which are held to be alien to each other. The former is individualistic and calculating; the latter, community-forming and irrational in the sense of being uncalculating and incalculable. *"Die Liebe verdient nicht, weil sie dient."* Love "perishes in the atmosphere of the word 'merit.'" The author finds, however, in the writings of a younger school of Roman Catholic interpreters, expressions of "the genuine warm tone of the New Testament κοινωνία."

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[1] *Communio sanctorum: Die Gemeinde im Lutherischen Kirchengedanken: I Luther*. By Paul Althaus. München: Chr. Kaiser, 1929. viii+96 pages. M. 3.20.

An examination of the literature on Luther's communion concept indicates that the subject was little studied prior to the work of the late Professor Holl. Holl represented Luther as the reviver of the Christian idea of fellowship, and thus gave a new direction to interpretation. The main argument of Althaus is comprised within a long chapter on "the church as *communio sanctorum*." Here he works out in detail, with ample and constant illustration from Luther's writings, the suggestions put forth by Holl. He knows Luther's opposition to the late medieval conception, in his bringing of the *communio sanctorum* from heaven to earth, and in his rejection of supererogatory works. His doctrine of justification destroyed the traditional doctrine of the treasury of merit. In place of merit appears mutual service. Luther regarded the term *communio sanctorum* in the Creed as originally a scribal interpretative gloss on the previous clause, and in apposition to *ecclesia catholica*. The conception was related, too, to his *theologia crucis*, the doctrine of the centrality of self-denying love and its obligation upon Christians. It is not the privileges but the duties of fellowship that are stressed. Communion involves the duties of (1) temporal aid; (2) the service of teaching, encouragement, and intercession; and (3) highest of all, the bearing of a brother's weakness, the fellowship of good men with the sinful. The doctrine of believer's priesthood in Luther is shown to be the reverse of individualistic, and in harmony with his teaching on communion and the community life of the church. The importance of this point, and the constant misrepresentation of Luther's utterances on it, might have led the author to give it a more extended exposition (cf. the present writer's discussion, *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, VI [1929], 191 ff.). The teaching of Luther on the Eucharist is explained in relation to his general doctrine of communion. An interesting section indicates the limitations of Luther's view of Christian love. Love, according to Luther, is essentially compassion; it is something called forth by the needy condition of others. The final chapter relates Luther's communion concept with his treatment of the visible and the invisible church. Luther is defended from the charge of teaching a mere nebulous invisibility. The church of faith is likewise the fellowship of love.

Althaus writes as a theologian. He does not offer an explanation either of the historical emergence of Luther's exposition of communion or of its historical application in Lutheran religion. But the book deals with a phase of doctrine which is of the utmost importance for the history of the Lutheran church in its organized life, and vitally touches the whole interpretation of Protestantism. In the light of such studies it becomes absurd to regard the Reformation as an expression of religious individualism, or even primarily of religious nationalism.

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## THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND

That the factors which determined the earlier stages of the English Reformation were largely, indeed predominantly, secular—political, social, economic—requires no particular demonstration. Under the existing circumstances nationalism, above all, economic nationalism, was bound to express itself in antipapalism. Likewise the rising tide of lay-consciousness, the spirit of the *bourgeoisie,* was bound to find an outlet in anticlericalism. Roman avarice, ably served by legates, bankers, and tax-gatherers, the disproportionate wealth of prelates and monasteries, laid the church fairly open to attack. The breach with Rome was but the culmination of three hundred years of conflicting interests, during which the English nation was seeking to become more self-contained, and the English laity were striving to establish their rightful place in the church's life.

It has been Professor Marti's task—a task well and entertainingly fulfilled[1]—to illustrate all this by collecting and marshaling the evidence of the conflict. The abiding roots of antipapalism are traced back to the strained relations of Henry III's reign. They might well have been traced even farther back. The impulse to shear monks and clerics of the wealth they would not use for public benefit becomes prominent with Wyclif and the Lollards. Both these phases of a struggle between "two well-defined ideals" are amply and vividly illuminated by well-chosen excerpts from contemporary documents. On this score the case can be proved up to the hilt. But when it comes to the century immediately preceding the breach with Rome, the author is obliged frankly to acknowledge himself in difficulties. Anyone would probably find himself in trouble here. During the fifteenth century the voice of protest was not clamant as it had been earlier. But it was by no means silenced, and Dr. Marti might by diligence have produced more evidence than he has. As it stands, the link here forged between the age of Wyclif and the Henrician revolution is a very thin one.

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[1] *Economic Causes of the Reformation in England.* By Oscar Albert Marti. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xxi+254. $2.50.

It can hardly be maintained, and Marti does not dream of maintaining it, that when the plunder of the church's wealth occurred the new owners had any higher sense of public responsibility than the old. So little was done that was of public benefit, so much that served the interests of crown and gentry and the commercial classes. But this sordid story has often enough been told.

Behind the ecclesiastical revolution there lay an economic revolution "rapidly supplanting the old feudal régime, based on agriculture, upon which the wealth of the church rested." It was the rise of commerce and industry that sealed the fate of the old ecclesiastical order. "More subtle forces . . . . than the cupidity of the ruling classes, the needs of military defense, or the interests of national unity, were at work to overthrow the economic power of the clergy." All this is indeed recognized, but it is not used to the full in interpreting the economics of the Anglican Reformation. It is surely strange that not once are Troeltsch or Max Weber mentioned, and that Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* is similarly ignored.

One meets several errors in proper names. *Humilatati* and *Fratricelli* (p. 82), and *Odericus Vitalis* (p. 131) may perhaps be attributed to careless typesetting. But the transformation of Geraldus Cambrensis into "Gerald of Cambridge" can hardly be thus accounted for. The reference on page 160 to Cardinal Wolsey as opposing "the attempt of the primate of York" is meaningless as it stands.

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## A SIGNIFICANT PROTESTANT FAMILY[1]

A notable feature of French and Swiss Protestantism has been the existence of certain families which have become famous for the continuity of a family tradition of fidelity to the faith and effective service to the church. In France, for example, the Monod family, coming down to Alfred and André in the present generation. In and around Geneva, the d'Aubignés. Among the Protestants of Piedmont, one might add, the Tron and Comba families. The author of this volume, herself a representative of the Merle and d'Aubigné families, is slightly apologetic for assuming a public interest in the ramifications of her family tree. But her apology is superfluous. The genealogy may be of no general concern, but the fruit of this family tree has been good. The story of the several generations of the two families which united to form the Merle d'Aubigné strain—beginning with the flight of Jean-Louis Merle from Nîmes at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and with Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné, who was an officer in the armies of Henry IV, besides being historian, poet, and statesman—illustrates almost every step in the fortunes of Protestantism in France and Switzerland. Théodore Agrippa himself, who was the subject of a three-volume biography by Armand Garnier published in 1928, is properly passed over in this treatise with a mere mention.

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[1] *Une Famille du Refuge—Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné, ses origines, ses parents, ses frères*. By Blanche Biéler. Editions "Je Sers," Clamart (Seine), France, 1930. xi+272 pages. Fr. 20.

The central figure in this volume is Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné, the author of the history of the reformation which remained for the generation following its publication the most popular work on that subject. He was a potent influence in that evangelical revival which, especially after about 1830, endeavored to rescue religion from the arid Protestant scholasticism into which the Geneva theologians of that day had fallen, from the rationalistic trend which was dominant in German thought, and from the fervid but not always intelligent enthusiasm of the later pietistic school. D'Aubigné dates his own "rebirth" from the teaching which he received from the Scottish reformer, Robert Haldane, a retired ship captain who, having set afoot a lively religious awakening in his own country, spent the winter of 1816–17 at Geneva, where he gathered about himself a group of young men including most of the theological students in the university and taught them the way of the Lord more perfectly. When this new evangelicalism issued in the establishment of an independent theological seminary in Geneva in 1830, of which d'Aubigné was the head for nearly forty years, the tension between the new movement and the ecclesiastical authorities became so acute that d'Aubigné was barred from the pulpits of the canton for a considerable time. The independent seminary, however, drew students from all over Europe and exercised a notable influence in Germany and France and among the Waldensians in Piedmont.

Important as all this is for the student of church history, no less interesting is the character and personality of d'Aubigné himself who, with advancing years, attained something of the dignity of a *grand seigneur* and something of the majesty of the mountains. An American visitor to Geneva in the early sixties said that the three objects of interest in that vicinity were the cathedral, Mont Blanc, and Merle d'Aubigné.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO WINFRED ERNEST GARRISON

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## RELIGION IN PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA

In view of the radical change in the policies of the soviet government toward the religious organizations in Russia, whereby their right of religious propaganda was abrogated, Dr. Emhardt's work is timely.[1] This latest treatment of the post-war development of the Russian church consists of two distinct parts: the first is a survey of the history of the church from the period of the provisional government to 1928, written by Dr. Emhardt; the second is a separate treatise, entitled *The Living Church,* originally written in Russian by Professor Sergius Troitsky, edited in its English translation by Dr. Emhardt. The first part may be fairly characterized as a collation of documentary material relative to the subject, garnered from various sources, and accompanied by a running comment of the collator. The translations of some of these documents, especially such as relate to the events after 1926 and to the litigation over the property of the American Russian church, are published here for the first time, and as such are a real contribution to the subject. As for the author's standpoint of interpretation, although it is difficult to suggest a disagreement from a writer who made many gracious references to one's own book, it is with no thought of criticism that such a suggestion is made. But since Dr. Emhardt himself states in the Preface that his purpose was to produce "a compilation of documentary evidence of the weakness of the claims of the 'Living Church,' and its successor, the so-called Synodical Church," one need not feel apologetic for asserting that the book is just what the author meant it to be. On this basis it must be regarded as a defense of the Patriarchal party of the Russian Orthodox church.

Professor Troitsky, a recognized authority on the Orthodox canon law and a distinguished member of the Russian *émigré* colony in Yugoslavia, writes in his double capacity. As an *émigré* no one can blame him for the bitter animosity toward the Living Church which he manifests in his work. But writing as an expert in canon law, he has produced the ablest critique of the positions of the Synodical party so far published, and his work is likewise of undoubted value as representing the attitude of the majority of Russian churchmen. It is a most thoroughgoing treatise, based on all available sources; a work which must be taken into consideration by all subsequent writers on the subject.

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[1] *Religion in Soviet Russia: Anarchy.* By William Chauncey Emhardt. Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1929. xix+387 pages. $4.00.

But in spite of the undoubted value of the treatise, it must be pointed out that charges made by him against the Living Church and the Synodical party are not always substantiated. When he accuses the first-named organization of having availed itself of governmental aid in an unwarranted manner for the purpose of usurping the supreme power in the church, the quotation he cites from Titlinov is either incorrectly referred to or is non-existent (p. 352). The "admission of Bolshevist authorities" of such a collusion with the revolting churchmen (p. 353) is left unproved; the citations given in support of it do not seem to me to carry the point. Further, where is even a semblance of proof of the exceedingly serious charge that the leaders of the supreme ecclesiastical administration, Vvedensky, Krasnitzky, and Evdokim, received "instructions" from the G.P.U. (p. 359)? Such accusations should not be bandied about lightly and a serious historical student will not repeat them without an adequate proof. Moreover, although the author knows perfectly well that the reformist groups coalesced to form a new organization known as "the Russian Orthodox church" (p. 321), or popularly referred to as the Synodical party, and although he himself states that "Krasnitzky also separated himself [from this new organization], keeping the name of Living Church for his small group" (p. 322), what interests of historical accuracy are subserved by continuing to refer to the new organization as the "Living Church"? It is not, of course, difficult to see that for partisan purposes such deliberate confusion is undoubtedly useful.

Much time must elapse and much work must be done on the subject before we can hope to work out a correct estimate of the events in the post-war Russian Orthodox church. No work at the present stage can claim to be final. But the ultimate value of contributions such as those of Dr. Emhardt and Professor Troitsky will be in proportion in which they succeed in presenting an objective, unbiased study of these events, and in avoiding an *ex parte* interpretation of the facts for the purpose of defending one group in the Russian church at the expense of the rest.

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY MATTHEW SPINKA

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## A CHALLENGE TO ROME AND HER SYMPATHIZERS

This book[1] makes a vigorous and sustained assault upon Romanist and Anglo-Catholic positions. It is written by an English Congregationalist who has been at pains to understand the ideas and practices which he criticizes. In its preparation the literature of ecclesiastical controversy and interpretation has been searched with care, and the author's claim that he has gone to the original sources "whenever practicable" is supported by a formidable array of citations. Historical workers will find the book stimulating, since it utilizes a large amount of historical data. Yet it is not a history, but an elaborate pamphlet in which historical facts are employed in order to sustain a philosophical argument. Professor Cadoux is never a blind partisan, but has striven to be unimpeachably fair to his opponents. Seldom has a Protestant written so generously of Romanism as this writer in his chapter on "the merits and advantages of Catholicism." He craves for Protestantism the rich community sense and the ardor of piety that he finds in the Roman communion, and approves its protest against predestination. But these concessions are the prelude to an exposure of the errors of Rome, designed, as he says, to show "that her claim to infallibility is philosophically untenable . . . . that her claim to be a unique and divinely-maintained moral guide for mankind is . . . . stultified over and over again by the facts of her record." It is against Rome that his artillery is mainly directed; but some shells fall in the Anglo-Catholic camp.

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[1] *Catholicism and Christianity*. By Cecil John Cadoux. New York: Dial Press, 1929. xl+708 pages. $6.00.

In Part II, "the answer of Christian philosophy," the author combats the Romanist conception of infallibility. He passes by, as not in question between the parties concerned, the problem of the existence of God, and turns to the "basic problem" of authority in religion. A chapter on "the ultimacy of the inner light" defends the principle of private judgment, differentiating the latter from mere capricious opinion. There are chapters, written in a modern spirit, on "the authority of the Bible," "the authority of Jesus Christ," and "the authority of the Christian Church." Part III deals with "the answer of historical evidence." At somewhat disproportionate length the author here discusses the Catholic conception and use of the Bible, and then proceeds to subject to criticism the Madonna-cult, the seven sacraments, the primacy of Peter, and the historical assertion of papal prerogatives. The closing chapters of this section expose the belief in preposterous miracles and the lack of candor and truthfulness especially in the use of history on the part of Roman Catholics. Part IV, "the answer of human justice," dwells on the persecutions sponsored by Rome, combats the modern apologies therefor, and assails the Catholic claim of holiness in the light of Rome's attitudes on private and public morality.

In Part V, the final section, on "the future of the church," the author makes a courageous prophecy of Christian reunion, while at the same time solemnly emphasizing the impossibility of reunion on a Roman basis. He is more sympathetic toward Anglicanism, but finds Anglican terms, as so far stated, unacceptable to Free Churchmen. Unable to visualize clearly the united church of the future, he nevertheless suggests certain possible lines of progress, and counsels his Free Church friends to cultivate a passionate concern for the "One great Church" and to stand ready to modify their own church government in order to prepare for its visible realization.

The book, though laborious, is saved from dulness by the occasional introduction of aptly chosen illustrative anecdotes and literary allusions. Mr. Cadoux has the gift of being frank without being insolent, and writes as one who remonstrates with his friends rather than as one who harries his enemies. Yet the work will probably do more to confirm the opinions of those already sympathetic with the author's view than to convince anybody, since it moves in a realm in which emotion and tradition seem able to withstand the assaults of reason and historical fact. Its effectiveness might have been greater if it had been written in shorter form. Some chapters are too much of the nature of indifferently arranged compilations of data. An excess of detail sometimes impedes the march of the argument. Some Protestants will feel that the Protestant heritage itself is not quite adequately perceived and appropriated. There is a comparative lack, too, of a sense of the pull of the social order on religious institutions, and of the part to be played by community needs in the solution of problems that are here argued out on the grounds of philosophy and history. Yet the book stands without a rival among recent works in its field, and will probably long continue to engage the attention of those concerned for the outcome of the struggle between reactionary and progressive Christianity.

JOHN T. MCNEILL

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## CATHOLICISM IN AN AMERICAN SETTING

This book[1] presents Roman Catholicism as it has been influenced by its American environment. The presidential campaign of 1928 gave exceptional opportunity to a number of capable writers for a discussion of Roman Catholicism in its relation to the American government and American political ideals. Professor Moehlman's is the second book of the kind to come from the pen of a professor of church history; however, his volume seems to have entered the field as the special interest in the subject is somewhat subsiding, though Roman Catholicism is of perennial interest to the American public.

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[1] *The Catholic-Protestant Mind: Some Aspects of Religious Liberty in the United States.* By Conrad Henry Moehlman. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. xvi+211 pages. $2.50.

There are many good people in the United States who live in actual dread of the Roman Catholic church. They have some vague notion of Roman Catholic claims to the supremacy of the church over the state, and it is very easy to convince them that our federal and state governments are in immediate danger from Catholic aggression. The book has been prepared, seemingly, with this class in mind. In the early chapters the author shows that Roman Catholic theory is one thing, but the putting of that theory into actual operation in the modern world and especially in the United States is quite another. To be sure, the reigning pontiff, since February 12, 1929, must be heralded as pope-king—sovereign of one-sixth of a square mile—which apparently revives all of the ancient claims. But all this our author interprets as but an empty and meaningless gesture —victorious in theory, perhaps, but vanquished in fact.

In answering the question, just what has America done to Roman Catholicism, the author answers: First, Roman Catholic political theory, formerly so arrogant in its assertion of the complete supremacy of the spiritual authority over the temporal, is now willing and anxious to compromise with existing situations in the United States. Second, the American doctrine of the complete separation of church and state, though directly opposed to Catholic theory, is not only accepted but enthusiastically proclaimed by Catholic leaders. Such outstanding American Catholics as Hecker, Ireland, England, Gibbons, and numerous others have gone out of their way to proclaim their Americanism, while the most significant statement of all is that by Governor Smith, in which he categorically proclaimed his full acceptance of the American doctrines, from the equality of all churches before the law, to the full indorsement of the public schools.

To further fortify the courage of fearful Americans, the author points out that Catholic parochial schools are not keeping pace with the growth of population, and that in comparison with the public school system they are of small importance. He also points out that the rate of increase of Catholic church members shows a decrease since 1906, while he concludes that Roman Catholicism cannot influence the American mind "unless it compromises with the American environment."

The author has a sprightly style, sometimes bordering on slang, and it is evident that the book was intended for popular consumption, though too often the discussion is burdened unnecessarily with lengthy quotations.

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W. W. SWEET

## A DIAGNOSIS OF OUR ILL

This seems to be an unusually important book.[1] It is not merely a discussion of modern philosophy in the ordinary sense. Rather it is a diagnosis and portrayal of the present state of European culture. The mind of modern European civilization, not its political mind merely, nor its economic, nor its views of philosophy, but its thinking, feeling, striving with respect to life as a whole, is seriously diseased. Herr Heinemann endeavors to discover what is the trouble. His method is to make an intensive study of the cultural growth of this mind during the last three hundred years.

His method of investigating the state of mind of any moment in history is to study the mind of some outstanding individual who is peculiarly sensitive and responsive to all the trends of life in which he lives and thus reveals in his own personality the spiritual conditions of his time. Herr Heinemann seems to have a quite remarkable sympathetic understanding and to feel his way into the experiences of the many he is studying. But he never descends to mere biography. He is always studying the mind of the age through the personality. Of Ernst Troeltsch, whom he considers one of the tragic figures of our time because deeply infected with the illness of the age, he writes (translating into English):

> He was open to all stimuli and strongly influenced by everything which was going on around him, yet without the power to give to the enormous flood of European events which poured over him any distinct form. . . . . Potentially he was a great historian and prophet; actually he was a historian without a unifying view of history, and a prophet without an evangel. . . . . His life was like the strategy of the great war. He could set enormous masses into motion and win brilliant individual victories, only to lose in the end and on the whole.

The illness of our age, Herr Heinemann claims, is due to something which happened at the end of the Middle Ages and has been accumulating its evil effects ever since until today we are dreadfully sick. This disastrous happening was the separation of the human mind, with its reasoning and its consciousness, from the rest of nature. Nature and matter over here, human consciousness and reason over there, and a great abyss between the two which could not be bridged, this was the toxic state of affairs. Descartes gave the classic philosophical expression to it.

The first stage in the mounting illness ended with the skepticism and futility of the philosophy of Hume. It is not meant that the philosophic writings of Descartes and Hume caused all the trouble. Quite the contrary is the case. These writings merely brought to clear, articulate, and reasoned expression what was infecting the total culture of their day and shaping the lives of thousands of individuals who never knew that such men as Descartes and Hume ever existed.

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[1] *Neue Wege der Philosophie. Geist, Leben, Existence.* By Privatdozent Fritz Heinemann. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1929. xxviii + 434 pages. M. 16.

Kant made the first heroic attempt to save the situation by establishing some kind of reconciliation between human reason and the rest of nature. But his work, together with that of all the German idealists and the whole movement of life of which these philosophers and philosophies were mere symptoms, was only a makeshift and could not cure the human mind of its illness due to estrangement and maladjustment between human reason and consciousness, on the one hand, and the concrete processes of nature, on the other.

Further struggles of the human mind ensue in which it strives to cast off the sickness. But all these struggles were only like a rising fever. The fever fought the germs and kept them down but could not cast them off. Vaihinger, with his philosophy of "*Als Ob,*" the Marburg School (Hermann, Cohen, Natorp), Cassirer, Hartmann, Croce, Gentile pass before us. Not merely is the philosophy of each carefully studied but the total thinking, feeling, striving individuality of each is made an exposition of the mind of the time.

Then came Nietzsche and Bergson. They saw that the barrier to the throbbing, pulsing urge of the vital process of nature was abstract reason. So they cast away the whole apparatus of reason. If reason cannot be identified with nature, so much the worse for reason, said they. So they threw themselves into the arms of the irrational for better or worse. But they could not cure the sickness this way. Without reason we are lost.

Then came Dilthey, Troeltsch, and Simmel. They sought another way of escape. Not the irrational urge of vital impulse as upheld by Bergson and Nietzsche, said they, but through self-identification with the historical development of human culture, we are saved. Here in the progressive development of human history we find a process in which reason and nature are reconciled. We have sought the warm reality of concrete existence, only to find ourselves blind and helpless without reason. We have sought the clarity and light of reason, only to find ourselves estranged from the concrete reality which gives the breath and blood of life. But here in the cultural evolution of the human mind we find both joined in one. Yet this venture also fell short of complete success. Dilthey, Troeltsch, and Simmel found a way to narrow the breach between reason and nature, but could not bridge it altogether. Max Weber carried their work still further with his historico-sociological studies.

Then Herr Heinemann turns to consideration of recent developments in psychology and biology. These are serving still further to identify human consciousness and reason with the processes of nature. The behaviorists, psychoanalysts, the functionalists, the proponents of the psychology of character, the gestalt psychologists are all helping the good cause along. Also the biologists are showing how mind and body, organism and environment are inseparable.

Then we come to the present hour. The chief representative personalities chosen for exposition of our present state are Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger. These two abandon attempts to develop an abstract system of reason to be applied to the concrete world of existence. Also they do not attempt to commit human life to an irrational process of nature. Rather they endeavor to develop and clarify whatever rationality there may be in actual concrete existent things. This does not mean to commit ourselves to the keeping of the specialized sciences. They have their important work to do, but they are abstractions. They miss the concrete world of existence.

Scheler and Heidegger did not go very far. In fact, they give us suggestions and symbols rather than actual achievements. But the struggle of their lives indicates the way we must go. In the last ten or twelve pages Herr Heinemann indicates some of the work which must be done if this way is to be followed through and the old illness cured. We must carry on the work of Scheler and Heidegger. We must seek out whatever light of reason there is in the concrete existence of nature, which includes our own consciousness and rationality as much as it does plants and animals and the vital urge.

Herr Heinemann, because he is a German, points to Scheler and Heidegger as the great trail-makers who must be followed if we would escape from this valley of death in which we are struggling. We in America also have two men who are doing much the same thing. Dewey and Whitehead are also turning all their powers of investigation to the concrete process of existent nature to find whatever truth of life there is and claiming that here and here only is to be found the indispensable conditions for the further development of our human existence.

There are four kinds of intensive study which must be pursued if we are to meet the urgent requirements of the present and go the way which has been suggested, says Herr Heinemann. These are: (1) the kind of historical investigation represented by his own work; (2) the kind of psychology which reveals the oneness of mind and body; (3) the science of values, called axiology; (4) the kind of pedagogy which cultivates the total reaction of the individual to his total world. *Verknüpfung des Ganzen* *mit dem Ganzen ist also das leitende Ziel.* Out of these four lines of research, and pervading them, there must be a powerful, naturalistic religion.

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## VALUE

John Laird[1] classifies all theories of value into three kinds. First is the kind of theory he himself advocates, which he calls the theory of natural election. Second are all those theories which define value in terms of psychological interest. Finally is the theory which holds value to be a kind of absolute reality which is brought to light through the exercise of reason.

The psychological theory would limit values to that which is an object of conscious liking or disliking. Except where conscious minds can find something to enjoy or suffer, there are no values. The third theory, which Laird calls timological, would lift values quite outside the realm of nature into some absolute realm of reason. Mr. Laird endeavors to show that the psychological and timological theories can be assimilated into his own. What these theories hold to be the only values are but special kinds of value, he claims. They do not cover the whole field of value. In this way the psychological theory can be taken over very readily as a subdivision of his own view. But values according to the timological theory must be taken out of the realm of disembodied reason and shown to be simply values which emerge in nature when we exercise our powers of reflective thinking.

By natural election (or natural selection) is meant the affinity of one thing for another. Positive and negative charges of electricity have affinity for one another. So do certain chemicals. So does a magnet for iron filings. Whatever causes a reaction in anything else, whether that reaction be physical, chemical, biological, psychological, or rational, is of value because of this reaction. This reaction gives value to its object. His statement in one place is that "whatever matters" to a stone or a clod or a dry bone is of value to that stone or clod or bone. The term "matters" is not at all clear, but from his treatment would seem to imply any sort of affinity as of earth for sun. Our conscious likes and dislikes are cases of this same affinity brought upon the level of consciousness.

Most of the book is given to a critical consideration of other writers upon this subject. He has much in common with Spinoza and gives considerable space to a discussion of his view. The Greeks, the English utilitarians, the economists, and many modern writers are surveyed and criticized.

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[1] *The Idea of Value.* By John Laird. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xx+384 pages. $5.50.

The book is deficient in two respects: the theory of natural election is not sufficiently developed and clarified to make plain just what is involved in it; and the criticism of other works, while it covers an enormous range of reading, does not display that degree of sympathetic understanding which enables the critic to grasp the full meaning of what is criticized.

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## ABSOLUTIST EVOLUTIONISM[1]

Lectures on Christian theology by Dr. Roberts merit careful consideration, because of his wide influence as a preacher to the younger generation. For this reason also it is fair to view the book especially from the side of its adjustment to the concepts and methods of thought of modern-minded youth. That the author intends to achieve such an adjustment is clear from the closing paragraph of the volume:

> We have throughout our argument assumed the truth of evolution and have accepted it as a mode of the divine activity. But we have declined to accept it as the only mode. . . . . We have not discovered any reason in the knowledge of our time why we may not conceive of Him in this fashion [i.e., as one whose character is love]. . . . . But this is not to say that we have comprehended God all in all. We have, indeed, been compelled to admit that there are questions which for the present must go unanswered. . . . .

This statement reveals the author's approach so clearly that it is necessary only to note its implications. In the first place, evolution is accepted subject to two qualifications: (1) that it be regarded as a manifestation of God; (2) that it be not taken as a complete manifestation of God. On pages 78–91 these qualifications are explained. Since so many able philosophers find naturalism an adequate interpretation of an evolving nature, some defense is needed for referring the cosmic processes to God. The writer follows here the leading of S. Alexander[2] and C. Lloyd Morgan.[3] From the former he takes the conception of "deity" as the next higher step in the evolutionary process; but he attributes to it an absolute character not implicit in Alexander's thought. From Lloyd Morgan he takes the term "emergent" as indicating the novel character which is found in the product of familiar elements (e.g., liquid water is different from the gaseous character of its constituents); but gives a new cast to the line of thought by introducing the problem, "Why should the universe have brought forth personality at all, if at the end it is to be dropped overboard? . . . ." Apparently Dr. Roberts is taking over terms which have a relativistic bearing and trying to assimilate them into an absolutist theology, so that the next higher step in evolution becomes the highest possible step, and the novel emergent as demonstrating a new level becomes the topmost level for the cosmos. Thus the naturalistic relativities become supranatural absolutes connoted by his use of the term "God." Accordingly, the natural order of the evolutionary view is transmuted into an order wherein the personal Father discharges the functions of the traditional Christian God. By speaking of Jesus as an "emergent" a verbal transition is made to moral character in the universe. The confusion is illustrated in the following sentences which occur in a paragraph discussing the living God:

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[1] *The Christian God: The Merrick Lectures for 1928.* By Richard Roberts. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 154 pages. $1.50.

[2] *Space, Time and Deity.*

[3] *Emergent Evolution.*

> It is unthinkable that it [that something beyond the individual that is and the world that is] should be inanimate. If it be inanimate and cannot have any interest in what is going on in the universe; and if, therefore, the end of everything is nescience, well, then, what is the good of anything? . . . . What sustains the hope and energy of science and art . . . . is the belief that this sum of things as a whole does mean something. . . . .[4]

Presumably the only sort of meaning is that the cosmos is the interest of a living God! Is this the sort of meaning that science assumes?

The author admits himself unsatisfied with Lloyd Morgan's naturalism, for its implicit immanentism "would appear to make God something less than the process as a whole. In which case he is not God."[5] (This sounds suspiciously like the discussion leader who wants to go where the group thinking leads, but who, upon finding an unpalatable conclusion, states that this is not where the group thinking *really* leads.) Transcendence is necessary to the rest of the author's discussion: of prayer, the divine Christ, sin, and salvation. The distinction is therefore made "between God and His manifestations,"[6] and refuge is found in Whitehead's "principle of concretion," which is not a principle of emergence but is opposite.[7] Whether the concepts of Morgan and Whitehead can be made supplementary to each other in this way remains to be decided by some more competent metaphysician than the present reviewer, but they seem to be radically contradictory notions.

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[4] Pp. 90 f.

[5] P. 82. But note that Morgan's "emergence" is made to embrace supernaturalism on p. 147.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] P. 83

The initial quotation of this review raises a further question: Granted that, in the author's view, the conception of a cosmic Spirit of Love is not rendered inconceivable by modern thought, what positive evidence is adduced in support of the idea? The answer is given in the first chapter, on "Prayer and Revelation." Prayer is a practice hoary with antiquity and found universally in widely variant forms. It is a biological reaching out toward the unknown; and, as such, is a manifestation of the evolutionary "thrust into the unknown."[8] But it is distinctive in reaching out *beyond time and space* toward "the unknown-eternal,"[9] conceived as good.[10] This goodness is, therefore, not spatial or temporal; in fact, "underived from specific mundane sources,"[10] and is projected into the here-and-now, thus constituting a revelation.[11] (If this view of ethics be questioned, the empiricist is blandly told in the quoted words of Oman that any other morality is an affair of the "higher expediencies.") "From *x* comes a stimulus which evokes the response of prayer. The act of prayer in turn produces greater sensitiveness . . . . and . . . . a dawning recognition of the character of *x*."[12]

This process of reasoning is an increasingly common type of argument; but it is psychologically invalid. Granted that every response implies a stimulus, this stimulus is not necessarily external; nor is a universal type of complex response an inherited biological pattern. Furthermore, the direction of a response is not a reliable guide to the real stimulus; it may be due to distorted perception. The act of prayer does not argue an objective *x* stimulating this response; and the revelatory character of prayer is thus not guaranteed. The author is on safer ground in appealing to the pragmatic value of prayer; but this, without his stimulus-response argument, would not give him an objective God.

Several statements in the book need closer scrutiny beyond the possibilities of this review: "The Synoptic Gospels . . . . are not an exposition, but a chronicle."[13] Prayer, if as vain as often stated, should have disappeared long ago.[14] Since new lives of Jesus are always welcomed, this shows that he transcends our human classifications.[15] "If God be in us and only in us, there is an end of aspiration."[16] "Plainly, civilised man has had some kind of a fall, for he is grievously at odds with his community."[17] Mere evolutionary ethics has nothing to say on problems which are met by the conception of evil as due to wrong use of the will.[18] To speak of Jesus' ethical teachings as impracticable is "a silly old lie."[19] Since punitive justice is ineffective we ought not to ascribe such to God. (Note the mode of reasoning.)[20]

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[8] P. 18.

[9] P. 20.

[10] P. 22.

[11] P. 24.

[12] P. 30.

[13] P. 35.

[14] P. 12.

[15] P. 80

[16] P. 86. Have unachieved ideals any other than subjective reality?

One inevitably wonders if the new wine of scientific concepts does not require other skins than old theological methods of argument.

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## A RECENT RECONSTRUCTION IN GERMAN THEOLOGY[1]

The idealistic temper has not wholly subsided in Germany, for apparently not all of their religious thinkers have been impelled to yield to the crisis mood. Here, at least, is one German theologian of the present who views history with hope.

*Schöpfung* is the third of a series of writings by Professor Bornhausen dealing with religion and history.[2] They represent an attempt to reconstruct current religious thinking upon a basis which seeks to correlate culture and the supernatural. It is obvious from his presentation that he despairs of the hopelessness with which such writers as Karl Barth and his followers involve present-day religion. Nothing is to be gained, he believes, by this prevalent dialectic mood which can see only paralyzing contrasts between the holy and the human.

The specific objective undertaken by the author in this volume is to present a historical philosophy of *religions,* and upon that basis, to venture a guiding principle for a philosophy of *religion.* The author assumes the supernatural viewpoint with all of its characteristic absoluteness; yet he discloses a genuine appreciation for the place and function of the natural. He represents the supernatural and natural intermingling, not in an arbitrary or mechanistic manner, but in a way that might be harmonized with an organic view of a growing universe.

As a method of approaching his major inquiry, Bornhausen examines a variety of historical forms of religious manifestations ranging from primitive to present cultures. Interestingly enough, he differentiates between their *natural* and their *spiritual* history. However, he is careful to point out that this distinction is largely arbitrary, and does not imply any essential dualism in the point of view. "Religion," he writes, "is never wholly released from nature; nor can it ever be wholly suspended in the spiritual. The supernatural is neither believable nor conceivable without the natural" (p. 105).

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[17] P. 117.

[18] P. 119. Contrast p. 127.

[19] P. 128.

[20] P. 137

[1] *Schöpfung: Wandel und Wesen der Religion.* By Karl Bornhausen. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1930. (The reviewer is indebted to Mr. Karl J. Arndt, of the University of Missouri, for his counsel on translations.) viii+260 pages. M. 10.

[2] *Der Erlöser* (1927), and *Die Offenbarung* (1928) precede *Schöpfung* in the series.

Hence the point of his leading principle: Religion has to do fundamentally with the moments of creation—when the supernatural and the natural intermingle to give rise to events within the span of historic space-time.

With considerable care he surveys the historical appearances of such religious phenomena as the soul—in stones, in trees, and in men; the manifestations of occult power—in forms of taboo, the totem, in magic, and in sacramental holiness; he examines divergent types of religious expression—the mystical, the ethical, the aspirational—all with a view to discerning, not a psychological, but a metaphysical explanation of these behaviors. Accordingly, at the conclusion of his investigation he raises the question: What kind of philosophy of religion can be set forth on the basis of this historical philosophy of religions?

The one constant phenomenon discerned, conditioning all historic manifestations in religions, is a *creativity* incessantly giving rise to new beginnings, which, in turn, continue endlessly in time affecting innumerable areas in their associations: a creativity, that is to say, which unceasingly produces *originality* and *continuity* in the universe: two aspects of a single process, creation (*Schöpfung*). This correlation is important to the author's thought. Originality and continuity, he insists, are not two processes, but one. Yet, analyzed into their component aspects, the term originality characterizes, as it were, the numinous penetration into space-time—"a single, brief creative moment, as quick as the leap of an electric spark, as changeable as when, through a wind-driving torrent, a sunbeam streams through over the gloomy village, and in an instant, and for an instant, all is illuminated" (p. 221). And the continuity of this "*schöpferische Erleuchtung*" in space-time brings the supernatural and the world of events into inseparable correlation: God and man; the supernatural and the natural.

> Hier kommt die Unbegreiflichkeit des Wörtleins "Und" zum vollen Sinn, der eben die Metaphysik des geschichtlichen Lebens erhellt. "Und" ist nicht eine Separation, ein Unterscheidungsmerkmal, wozu die Wissenschaft es aus-

> deutet. "Und" ist kein Pluszeichen der Mathematik, wodurch Gleiches summiert würde. Sondern "Und" ist das Wunder des Lebens, wodurch das, was durch menschliche Begriffe immer getrennt bleibt, was nach menschlichen Verstand unmöglich und auf keinerlei Weise zusammen kommen kann, sich urplötzlich vereinigt und zu eignem selbstandigen originalen Leben kommt. . . . . Die Zusammenfassung von Originalität und Kontinuität in der Geschichte wird also durch einen Akt des Geistes vollzogen [pp. 221–22].

Now in accepting *Schöpfung* as the metaphysical principle for a philosophy of religion, Bornhausen raises the question himself, How can this interpretation of the history of religions be reconciled with the fact that "religion" has manifested itself in such a variety of forms, beliefs, and moods? If the "spiritual history" of mankind has been conditioned by a single creativity, then religion should manifest itself in a unity. Bornhausen meets this difficulty by showing how the manifold religious outreaches within the world's history, from its earliest eras to the dawning of Christianity, finally syncretized into one universal religion: with East and West meeting in Jesus Christ. *"Hier ist weder Grieche noch Jude, weder Orientale noch Europäer, weder Poseidonius noch Paulus: hier ist die Menschheit in einem Menschen zu Leben, Gestalt und Dauer gekommen"* (p. 227).

Accordingly, the coming of Jesus into history is described as the one epoch-making "creation moment," releasing upon the world a creativity which makes for man's redemption and education. For Jesus is at once the redeemer and educator of humanity: educating man here and now toward a Christian culture; redeeming him for a new order of life, which shall be everlasting. Thus God is really *in the world,* says Bornhausen. And through the world—its culture, its humanity (for men are the carriers of culture and of salvation)—his creativity is progressively fulfilling itself.

> Because God visibly leads men ahead and upward in history through their fellowship, languages, and through their conscious action, religious men must see as an answer to God's guidance in culture, as an answer to the care of all worldly gifts and goods, God's saving upbringing; they should not despise this culture as soulless, but should build it up as divine means of grace for the welfare of humanity. Christian culture is the creative task of Europe; the European people must fulfil a particular form of the divine will. Endless as creation is this task; but the creation of God knows no time. It creates! It happens! It steps from fulfilment to fulfilment. Creation is present time [pp. 232–33].

Professor Bornhausen has seized upon the basic problem of the philosophy of religion, and with characteristic German thoroughness has labored through his data. For those who are eager to correlate a supernatural Christian tradition with an ongoing culture, his book will doubtless serve as a helpful apologetics. And in Germany this should afford it a wide appeal. Apart from such, however, the author's treatment will probably not seem convincing; not only because of its supernaturalism, but to one who is accustomed to empirical methods, Professor Bornhausen, rather than having investigated his data, will appear to have *used* it to demonstrate an a priori conviction.

Students of the history of religions will doubtless wonder at the confidence with which the author philosophizes upon primitive origins, as well as at the metaphysical interpretations that they yield. And certainly the synthesis of religious faith, culminating in Christianity as the universal religion, with which Bornhausen concludes, will arouse suspicion. For this conclusion appears to be more the achievement of theological artifice than the legitimate findings of objective inquiry.

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## CHRISTIANITY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION[1]

In recent years there has been a growing common concern among historical and theological scholars and religious educators who approach their tasks with scientific apparatus as to the differentia which constitute the essential character of the Christian religion. This problem has become extremely acute with the religious educator who conceives the task of Christian education to be to assist self-realizing persons to achieve moral and spiritual personality through a creative experience in dealing directly with their responses to specific situations by which they realize themselves. Now that the content and procedure of Christian education is increasingly conceived as the experience of growing persons as that experience undergoes interpretation, enrichment, and control in terms of spiritual values, the problem becomes more and more insistent: By what criteria shall the learner and the teacher judge what is the Christian outcome to a given concrete and specific situation? In fact, it is the necessity arising out of the operational use of Christianity in religious education that has given urgency to this problem that has presented itself, though not so urgently, in the data with which the historian and the theologian deal. Professor Coe's book derives its chief significance from the fact that it is the first systematic and forthright attempt to answer this question in the growing literature of religious education.

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[1] *What Is Christian Education?* By George A. Coe. New York: Scribners' Sons, 1929. 300 pages. $2.50.

The author's methodology is to attack the problem from the standpoint of the specific problems that arise within the educational operation rather than from a set of a priori principles. As a result, his treatment of the problem is correspondingly realistic and fruitful. He starts with the growing consciousness of the ineffectiveness of religious education in the Protestant churches both of the United States and of mission lands. What are the sources of this weakness? The author's analysis locates them in a *transmissive* education that seeks to reproduce in the young the traditional religious experience of the past. The solution of the problem he finds in a *creative* education that deals with current personal and social experience as it moves toward the realization of values that are resident in contemporaneous life.

It is through creative education that is concerned with self-realizing persons that the author finds the opening way to the discovery of the creative character of Christianity, the radical element of which consists in its emphasis upon *the supreme value of persons*. By orienting itself toward self-realizing persons education becomes Christian in the degree that it becomes creative.

Interestingly enough, education becomes more creative and at the same time more Christian in the degree that it utilizes the scientific method. When measured by this criterion the author thinks it is quite open to question whether the education of the state is more scientific when it faces the radical issues of social living than is the education of the church. Indeed, here in these radical personal and social values, the author seems to imply, may lie not only the justification, but the necessity, of religious education in the total education of the child.

The author describes the approaches of current religious education to this problem of creative education and, from the experiments that are under way, as, for example, in the projected curriculum construction of the International Council of Religious Education representing the co-operating Protestant churches of North America, concludes that nowhere in public education are such significant and thoroughgoing reforms under way as in religious education. Perhaps herein lies one of the unique contributions of religious education to educational theory and practice.

Professor Coe tarries over the consequences which a whole-hearted adoption of the radical character of Christianity by religious education might have for the church, in developing a capacity and technique for self-criticism, in counteracting its denominational introversion, in the recovery of a vital religious experience, and in the rediscovery of God.

The author's answer to the problem propounded in the title of the book may best be made by quoting the six lines that constitute the final chapter:

*What, Then, Is Christian Education?*

> It is the systematic, critical examination and reconstruction of relations between persons, guided by Jesus' assumption that persons are of infinite worth, and by the hypothesis of the existence of God, the Great Valuer of Persons.

The reviewer is troubled about the author's use of the term "sick society." Such a concept seems not to be entirely consistent with his general point of view of reality as a *process*, a *becoming*. To the reviewer, from this point of view, society is not "sick"; it is in a process of growth, of development, with all the imperfections and maladjustments characteristic of an evolving process. Social "sickness" seems to assume lapse from a previous state of wholeness and soundness rather than continued readjustment within an evolving and at the same time a creative experience. Perhaps this is one of those residual "anachronisms" that essential Christianity will do well to discard.

William Clayton Bower

University of Chicago

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

Three recent books[1] have given attention to special phases of young people's work: two from the Pilgrim Press and one from the Abingdon Press. The Author of *Church Work with Young People* is Harry T. Stock, student and young people's secretary of the Congregational Education Society. He has written a number of manuals and brochures on phases of young people's work each of which has had a significant quality. This more thorough treatise is a fine statement of the best modern religious educational methods. His aim as given in the Foreword and consistently followed throughout the book is to help local leaders build wisely and courageously a program of their own suited to their own needs. He says:

> Programs of religious education must be cut to measure. Systems nicely ordered in secretarial offices, theories which emerge out of sequestered study unrelated to the process of social life, programs of "canned goods" recommended as containing the vitamines of Christian character—these have too often been instruments of paralysis rather than life-giving aids.

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[1] *Church Work with Young People*. By Harry Thomas Stock. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1929. vii+236 pages. $2.00.

*Finding a Religion to Live By*. By Charles Emerson Burton. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1928. 101 pages. $1.00.

*Senior Method in the Church School*. By Mary Anne Moore. New York: Abingdon Press, 1929. xv+360 pages. $1.50.

Mr. Stock writes with actual situations in mind. He realizes that good theory may be "sound in the abstract" but will not necessarily work in the concrete. On objectives, organization, curriculum, worship, leadership, service activities, recreation, relation of pastor and young people, and other topics he has carefully worked out principles and revealing illustrations. Sentences such as the following show the spirit of the book: "A local society should get all help possible but build a program which is uniquely its own," "Too many topics for young people sound like sermon subjects and posit a religious understanding and experience and theological background which the young people simply do not have," "If the biblical text [for a lesson theme] had no obvious application for the group something should be substituted: the time available during a year is so limited that a leader cannot afford to waste a single period on an insignificant issue," "Co-operation in program activities is a much more pressing need in most neighborhoods than is the formation of any type of intellectual organization," "A minister dare not pass by the best new book on Religious Education any more than he can ignore the theological 'best book of the year.'" The only weak spots in the book seem to be the two appendixes, I and IV, on "A Constitution" and "Co-operative Activities." The author does not seem to carry out his principles in either of these, but to have included some manuscript unrevised for at least ten years. Other than this, the book is a most consistent and practical application of vital principles of religious education.

The second book, *Finding a Religion To Live By,* is written by the general secretary of the National Council of Congregational Churches, C. E. Burton. Most books have more pages than are necessary to carry significant ideas. When a man is able to put his thoughts and message into brief compass he deserves large credit. The man who keeps close to the needs of folk finds them hungry for spiritual realities but with little time to spend in satisfying their hunger. They get lost in a big academic treatise on religion or theology and miss the vitalizing faith that they should get if it were there.

Dr. Burton has done a fine piece of work in giving a brief, sane statement of a religion that can be lived. He is modern in his outlook but finds opportunity to express his modern conception of religion in language that is familiar. One almost wonders what to expect when on the first page he reads the old-time phrase, "To be a Christian is to be a follower of Jesus Christ," but Dr. Burton soon puts a content that is meaningful into the words that are often used merely as a platitude. His philosophy of religion is summed up in his own words, "Whenever we formulate our thought concerning a great spiritual fact, that statement should constitute a force in our life; if it ceases to be helpful to life, and particularly if it becomes a hindrance, then that statement should be revised or dispensed with." The various creedal confessions are briefly discussed, and the character of God, the meaning of spirituality, moral responsibility, the value of the church, the use of the Bible, sin, prayer, the cross, are treated in a thoughtful and constructive fashion. Each of the religious terms is given a real content and positive value. The book should be particularly helpful to young people trying to think through a religious philosophy of life and would make a stimulating text for study classes.

The third book is one of a series of manuals on departmental methods in the church school. The author has had considerable experience as a teacher of high-school and normal-school students and knows the age group for which she writes. *Senior Methods in the Church School,* by Mary Anne Moore, is a well-organized presentation of general statements about the psychology of adolescence and some educational principles applicable to the religious education of older boys and girls. There is a disappointment, however, in reading it, because the author does not illustrate more specifically what she means by religious education of the group. The first half is filled with too many of the familiar statements found in psychologies of adolescence without any factual bases for the opinions loosely stated. And in the second half many quotations from educational writings are given without any special reason for their inclusion in a book on this subject. No clear method based upon a study of the life-needs of these fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds is presented. In one place "curriculum" refers to the "entire range of activities, materials and relationships through which the life experiences of the pupil are appropriately enriched," and a little later, "extra-curricular" activities are being discussed. If a keen analysis of what religious education of this group involved had been given, there would not have been any chance for such an error, but—there is not. The reviewer of this book does not want to suggest that this book errs more than most of its kind. It does not. It does what others have been doing about as well as any of them. But it fails, as many writers have done, to give any material evidence as to how the religious-education process actually may be achieved. It is content to say "should be established," "should be made to feel," "should be adapted," "should be led to consecrate," "should be trained to think," without giving any illustrations as to how such things are done. It gives a group of "characteristic experiences" of problem situations without any suggestions as to how religious education may become a factor in meeting the needs that are pictured. While this book may be accepted as "stimulating," it is another example of the lack of experimental facts and carefully analyzed case studies to guide effective organization of methods in religious education.

E. J. Chave

University of Chicago

## ECUMENICAL CHRISTIANITY[1]

These reports of the International Missionary Council furnish another periodical cross-section of the Christian church which every student of religious development would do well to ponder. Jerusalem, Nicaea, Chalcedon, Trent, Augsburg, Edinburgh, and now Jerusalem. Never before in the history of Protestantism at least has there been gathered together under one roof a body so representative of world-wide Christianity.

The Council centered its attention upon what it considered to be the five major challenges of the present-day world: (*a*) the general depravity of the 80 per cent of the world's population still living in rural communities; (*b*) the evils which attend the planting of western industrialism in Africa and the Orient; (*c*) the hindrances to the building of the kingdom of God arising out of the conflict of races and nations; (*d*) the attitude which the Christian church should assume to the non-Christian religions, taken at their best; and (*e*) the menace to the spiritual interpretation of the universe implied in secularism or naturalism.

As the leaders of the Council faced the world beset by these dangers they were moved to place their major confidence in the following: first, interdenominational missionary co-operation. This note was first sounded at New York in 1900, and again at Edinburgh in 1910; but what was then a fervent exhortation and a pious wish has since been formulated into definite bodies of co-operative activity, such as the International Missionary Council and subsidiary National Christian Councils in most of the mission countries. It now remains to give full support to this co-operative machinery. Second, devolution. Here, too, the ideals and promises of former decades are bearing fruit in the definite rearrangement of relationships between the "older" churches at home and the "younger" churches abroad. Both parties to the new relationship are now taking stock seriously of the new attitudes and obligations involved. Third, religious education. The missionary experience of the last hundred years has revealed the need of something more than mere evangelism, mission schools, and gathering converts into churches, if missionary methods are to be equal to the objective which inspires the undertaking. Now, for the first time, official attention is turned to religious education in the hope that this new technique of religious training, as it is being developed in the west, will provide more effective methods for the development of Christian attitudes and habits which shall be transforming and lasting. Fourth, the most serious thought of the gathering was given to the questions: What is Christianity? and What is the Christian message to the world? The recognition of values in other religions had raised the question of the uniqueness and universality of Christianity. Historical and scientific criticism had laid violent hands upon the fundamental postulates of the Christian faith. Secularism, as a philosophy of life which is becoming increasingly popular the world around, seemed to deny the reality of the spiritual. The answer of the Council to all of this was a reaffirmation of its faith in the Christocentric gospel. Christ is unique, in spite of the excellencies of other religions; he is above and beyond all criticism; he is himself the vindication of the reality of the spiritual.

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[1] *Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council.* New York: International Missionary Council, 1929. 8 volumes; 1907 pages. Cloth, $7.00. Separate volumes may be ordered as follows:

I. The Christian Life and Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Thought and Life. 424 pages. $1.50.
II. Religious Education. 225 pages. $1.00.
III. The Relation between the Younger and the Older Churches. 305 pages. $1.25.
IV. The Christian Mission in the Light of Race Conflict. 208 pages. $1.00.
V. The Christian Mission in Relation to Industrial Problems. 167 pages. $1.00.
VI. The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems. 272 pages. $1.25.
VII. International Missionary Cooperation. 126 pages. $1.00.
VIII. Addresses on General Subjects. 180 pages. $1.00.

Whatever may be the verdict of future generations, this pronouncement may be taken as representative of the moderately liberal Christian leaders of Europe, America, Africa, India, China, and Japan. For the time being it furnishes a common slogan about which differing bodies of Christians can rally without doing great violence to their convictions, and yet a statement sufficiently non-committal to allow for considerable latitude of interpretation. In these volumes it is twentieth-century Protestantism, interdenominational, international, and interracial, that speaks; and what it utters reveals that the Christian leaders have traveled a long way since the year 1900, when another great missionary conference was held in New York.

A. G. Baker

University of Chicago

## A USEFUL BOOK FOR ECCLESIASTICAL GO-GETTERS

The editor of *Church Management,* who is also the author of books with such typically American titles as *Putting It Across* and *How to Make the Church Go,* undertakes in the book[1] under review to present "a complete treatment of publicity opportunities and methods in the local church." The term "church publicity" he uses in a very broad sense to include all the devices by which a church calls attention to its presence, purposes, and program. The book is a deliberate effort to apply in a thoroughgoing fashion modern methods of publicity to the church. The technique of newspaper advertising, the preparation of all sorts of printed materials (as calendars, blotters, posters, etc.), the use of bulletin boards, highway signs, as well as word-of-mouth publicity and direct mail advertising, all receive attention. Detailed consideration is given to the planning of publicity programs in the interest of evangelistic or financial campaigns, interchurch activities, conventions, church organizations, and also to the shaping up of a program of personal publicity for the minister himself. To some of the less obtrusive ministers the last-named item will seem a bit distasteful. Methods of organizing publicity programs, either by the minister himself, or through a committee, or by a professional advertising man, come up for review.

There is much use of materials which actually have been used by churches; but these materials seem rather carelessly arranged. Indeed, one feels that we have here a compilation of materials which have accumulated in the author's files, selected chiefly on account of their mechanical effectiveness, arranged topically with rather indifferent success, and presented with a series of brief and somewhat hurriedly dictated introductions. This does, indeed, serve to show what actually is being done by churches in the matter of publicity. But it also leaves the unpleasant impression that the churches, for the most part, have proved themselves more adept at adopting the tricks and stunts of the advertising profession than in producing something worth advertising.

Some readers will get a little amusement out of some sections of the book. It is somewhat diverting to find the expert advertiser coming to the aid of the New Testament scholar. The author removes all obscurity as to the real reasons for some of Jesus' apparently conflicting directions to certain people who were healed by his ministry. When Jesus said to the healed leper "See thou tell no man!" but took the opposite course with the man freed from demons and said, "Go, tell thy friends how great things the Lord hath done for thee!" it was because "he knew when to make a release of news and when to refuse a release, and the person who knows that much is a pretty good publicist." Paul, too, not only understood the proper style of writing for direct mail advertising, as evidenced by his letters, but also recognized the advantages of display type and space. "See what big letters I make when I write you in my own hand!" The author would have done better to have found in present-day needs his sanctions for applying modern advertising principles and methods to the purposes of the church than to have sought such sanctions in farfetched interpretations of Scripture.

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[1] *Church Publicity.* By William H. Leach. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1930. 279 pages. $2.25.

The author's position in the publicity field give his words the authority of technical experience, and his book will be welcomed by those who seek guidance in applying modern publicity principles to church advertising.

Charles T. Holman

University of Chicago

## THE CHURCH FOR THE CITY

The typical city church, according to many recent studies, is a rather feeble and insignificant institution. It is numerically weak, operates with an inadequate plant and with insufficient and often poorly trained leadership. It in no way meets the demand which urban life makes for an institutional expression of religion which shall match the city's greatness and its need.

A few experimentally minded churches, however, frequently formed by the merger of two or three smaller churches have developed a commanding type of institution which may be setting the pattern for the city church of the future; a church worthily and adequately housed, with a staff of specialists rather than a single pastor, thus making possible a broad-gauge program of religious expression through worship, education, recreation, clubwork for children and young people, social work, music, visitation, and other functional ministries.

Such a church is the Wesley Methodist Episcopal Church of Worcester, Massachusetts, of which this book[1] is a fact-story told by the pastor. It was formed by the union of two older churches to erect a new building and develop a new and adventurous enterprise. It is said by Dr. Worth M. Tippy, of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, who contributes the Introduction, to represent "possibly the last word of Methodism in local church building, program and organization."

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[1] *A Seven Day Church at Work.* William S. Mitchell. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1929. xiv+255 pages. $2.00.

The book includes a description, with photographs and plans, of the beautiful Gothic building and of the parish-house with its educational and social equipment, which was erected at a total cost of $1,100,000; of the manner in which were developed its programs of worship and religious life, religious education, and service; and also of the administrative methods employed. It is a broad-gauge, seven-day-a-week enterprise and, according to the account given by the book, highly effective. We could wish for a more complete statistical statement with regard to various phases of the program and such an analysis of the membership and constituency of the church, Sunday school, and other organizations as would give a clear picture of the church's outreach, but such a statement evidently was not included in the author's purpose.

As might be expected, many difficulties and obstacles had to be overcome in welding these two churches into a new organization with a vastly different outlook and program. But they were faced courageously and carried through with resolution. Not all the problems are yet completely solved, but the experiment is moving forward successfully. Indeed, the church never expects to arrive at a fixed and static condition with all problems solved, for, as the author says, "in such a church both the problems and the folks are constantly changing. . . . . The purpose continually held in view is to keep the organization fluid, so that the changing personalities which direct it may be unhampered by insistence upon any hallowed and long-established methods, but may have the fullest freedom to realize their own initiative in the responsibilities given them."

The book is of interest, not merely as an account of what one church has done, but as illustrating a very important type of church development by reference to an outstanding example. The effectiveness of the work of this church, as of other city churches of its type throughout the country, ought to be carefully and critically studied by city ministers and church workers of all denominations, and particularly by those officials of the various church bodies who are responsible for the shaping of policies governing the development of city churches.

Charles T. Holman

University of Chicago

# RECENT BOOKS

## RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

ALLIER, REOUL. *The Mind of the Savage.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929. (Translated by Fred Rothwell.) xiv+301 pages. $3.75.

This work deals with the problem of the centuries-old differentiation between the civilized races and the so-called primitive peoples. The author analyzes the effects of magical technique in creating and maintaining the arrested status of non-civilized peoples. He concludes that all races of men belong to a single humanity with similar capacities, and that the culture peoples have upon them the responsibility for leading the backward races into a full share of the opportunities for complete development.

COBERN, CAMDEN M. *The New Archeological Discoveries.* With Supplement by George W. Gilmore. 9th edition. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1929. xxxiv+748 pages. $4.00.

This book, first published in 1917, was critically reviewed in the *American Journal of Theology,* Volume XXIII (1919), pages 112–16. It has been reprinted several times with corrections and supplements by the author who died in 1920. Since that date it has been sponsored by Dr. George W. Gilmore. The addition of a brief chapter by him surveying "Discoveries since 1920" constitutes the new feature of this "ninth edition." Reviewers of the first edition felt impelled to remark upon the numerous errors in the volume, which have been corrected in later printings. Some of these are interesting. For example, on page 199, one originally read that "Cicero did not know Greek until he was over eighty years of age," which would have been more than fifteen years after his head had been cut off by his executioners. This seemed to be going pretty far even for archaeology, and now the sentence has been made to read "Cicero did not know Greek well until he was far past middle life." This statement avoids trespassing on the domains of necrology, and it has just letters and spaces enough to fill up the hole in the mutilated line. But it is still misleading. Obviously the proper correction would have been to substitute Cato for Cicero in the original statement.

MATSUMOTO, NOBUHIRO. *Essai sur la Mythologie japonaise.* Paris: Geuthner, 1928. 144 pages. Fr. 100.

The author attempts a local orientation of the Japanese mythological lore. In the initial chapter he presents a résumé of the myths. The three succeeding sections deal, respectively, with the gods of water and thunder of Izumo, the solar deities of Yamato, and the cult of the maritime tribes of Kyushu. This analysis of the diverse local traditions later unified under the influence of the imperial power is very suggestive to the historian of Shinto.

PETTAZZONI, RAFFAELE. *La Mitologia Giapponese.* Bologna: Zanichelli, 1929. viii+118 pages.

The author of this work is one of the most tireless modern workers in the religious sciences. The present work begins a new enterprise—the translation of the source material of Shinto into Italian. The first book of the Kojiki is here translated, based upon Chamberlain's English translation and that of Florenz in the German. An introductory section outlines the story of religion in Japan.

## NEW TESTAMENT

MALDEN, R. H. *Religion and the New Testament.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1928. xiii+204 pages. $2.50.

A volume which has grown from a course of lectures designed to put a non-technically trained group into touch with contemporary judgments concerning the New Testament. The particular suggestiveness of the book comes from its putting of matters usually treated in England from the purely literary point of view into so practical a setting; the continuous relation of the New Testament with life is vividly set forth, and interesting data concerning the contemporary religious situation are given.

VOGELS, HENR. JOS. (editor). *Codicum Novi Testamenti Specimina.* Bonn: Hanstein, 1929. 13 pages and 54 plates. Bound, M.18.50; unbound, M.16.

This thesaurus contains fifty-one facsimile reproductions of New Testament manuscripts and three specimen pages from early printed Bibles, including the Bamberger thirty-six-line Bible, the Complutensian Polyglot, and the Sixtine Vulgate. The manuscript facsimiles, most of which have never before been published, are mainly representative of the great Greek manuscripts of the New Testament. Also the major versions, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Gothic, and Latin, are accorded varied representation. Two papyrus fragments of Acts from the Michigan collection and a fragment of Hebrews now in the British Museum are appropriately placed at the very beginning of the volume.

Uniformly the reproductions are of a high order of excellence, and the arrangement of material throughout is most convenient. In the case of important bilingual manuscripts, such as Bezae and Claremontanus, typical pages are placed vis-à-vis so that the Greek and Latin texts may be as readily compared as in the original codices. The editor's conspectus, which precedes the facsimiles, gives a brief description and history of each manuscript and also a valuable bibliography.

## HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

BÖHME, KURT. *Die Krisis der englischen Staatskirche: Der Streit um das "Prayer Book."* Gotha: Klotz, 1929. 82 pages. M.3.

This is the fourth of the series edited by J. F. Laun, entitled *Für die Einheit der Kirche.* After introductory chapters on the history of the English Prayer Book and the recent revisions in America and Scotland, Herr Böhme comes to his main subject, the Prayer Book controversy 1927–29. The main interest of the book is historical. The editor of the series appends a twelve-page essay on "The Conflict between Catholicism and Protestantism in the Anglican Church."

FLIEDNER, WILHELM. *Goethe und Christentum.* Gotha: Klotz, 1929. 147 pages. M.4.

Goethe's religious attitude is discussed in three main chapters: (1) Goethe's religion and ethics; (2) his relationship with Christianity; (3) an evaluation of his thinking. The merit of the book lies chiefly in the fact that it contains a careful selection of Goethe's words and opinions regarding religion in general and Christianity in particular. They are, partly historically and partly typologically, compared with the views of Schleiermacher, Luther, Augustine, Paul, and Jesus. This comparison, however, hardly succeeds in providing the basis for a profitable or even a suggestive estimate of the religious thought-world of the German poetic genius.

MARTIN, ALFRED V. *Luther in Ökumenischer Sicht.* Stuttgart: Frommanns, 1929. 266 pages.

This is a remarkable collection of brief articles by more than twenty interpreters of Luther, Protestant and Roman Catholic. Nearly half of the writers deal with aspects of Luther's teaching on the Church, or with the special question of ecumenicity in his writings. Sympathy for the reformer's ideals is revealed in unexpected quarters. The book is handsomely printed but defectively stitched.

SCHLIER, HEINRICH. *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1929. iv+188 pages. M.10.

The use of the *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* in the interpretation of the New Testament inevitably suggests the propriety and necessity of pursuing the same type of research in the study of later Christian writings. The present monograph applies this method to the interpretation of Ignatius. Its aim is to clarify the underlying religious notions of Ignatius and to determine the specific historical milieu in which these conceptions and this imagery were held to be vitally significant. Beside the possibilities of a Palestinian and a Hellenistic environment for early groups of Christians, Schlier feels it necessary to take account of a Syrian milieu, in which the religious syncretism was distinctly Iranian in character. He believes greater attention should be given to Reitzenstein's *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium* and Lidzbarski's work on the Mandean texts. Three chief topics in Ignatius' letters are selected for study: (1) The figure of the deliverer; (2) the deliverer and the church; (3) the martyr and the spirit-filled person. A detailed examination of the documents along these lines of inquiry yields the conclusion that Ignatius shows the coloring of a distinctly Syrian setting, where a type of gnosis with conceptions and notions kindred to those of Christianity was current. In genesis it was Iranian and had previously affected Judaism. Here one finds the forerunners of the Mandeans who perpetuated the memory of John the Baptist. In this Mandean atmosphere is to be found also the explanation of kinships between Ignatius, the Gospel of John, and the Odes of Solomon.

SCHWEIZER, JULES. *Le Cardinal Louis De Lapalud.* Paris: Librarie Felix Alcan, 1929. 200 pages.

Not a biography of Lapalud, but primarily a study of the relations of the see of Lausanne to the papacy, 1431–41, and secondarily an examination of certain important aspects of the history of the Council of Basel, in which the cardinal took a prominent part.

STRONG, SYDNEY (editor). *Roger Clap's Memoirs, with an account of voyage of the "Mary and John" 1630.* Privately printed, 1929. 57 pages. $1.00.

Roger Clap was one of the members of Rev. John Warham's congregation at Eton in Devonshire, and migrated to New England with the minister in 1629–30 and became one of the founders of the town of Dorchester, Massachusetts. The ship which brought the 140 members of Mr. Warham's church to America was the "Mary and John." Later (1635) Mr. Warham and most of his congregation at Dorchester became a part of the migration which left Massachusetts for the valley of the Connecticut and established the town of Windsor, Connecticut. Clap, however, remained in Dorchester, where he became one of the leaders in that Puritan community and was made captain of the principal fortress of the province; here he remained until 1686. He was a leading member of the church and is described as a "pious and godly man." He died in 1690, and in his old age wrote a brief account of his life for his six children. The present is the seventh edition of his *Memoirs* and is published by the editor for the numerous descendants of these New England patriarchs. The first four editions were printed in Boston in 1731, 1766, 1774, and 1807; a fifth was printed in Pittsfield in 1824, a sixth in Boston in 1844, while the present edition was printed in Seattle.

THOMAS, WILHELM. *Der Sonntag im frühen Mittelalter.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. 122 pages. M.3.

This scholarly investigation of the evolution of the Christian observance of Sunday on Celtic and Germanic soil to the tenth century is based largely upon the liturgies and the penitentials, and on the works of outstanding ecclesiastics of the age.

## CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE AND ETHICS

HARKNESS, GEORGIA. *Conflicts in Religious Thought.* New York: Henry Holt & Co. xv+326 pages. $2.00.

A simple, clear, readable, and comprehensive statement of the elements of a philosophy of religion in light of modern thought. The author's aim is stated as "aside from the desire to state it truly . . . . to avoid stating it profoundly." It is designed for college students. Even an advanced high-school student could read it with profit. This would be impossible if it did not conform somewhat to the traditional grooves of religious thinking. Yet it is a very thorough piece of work. It shows wide reading and full acquaintance with the latest American work in this field.

MACKINTOSH, ROBERT. *Values: A Bird's Eye Survey.* London: Independent Press, Ltd., 1928. 131 pages. 4*s.* 6*d.*

An elementary treatment of different kinds of value, one chapter given to each. The kinds of value considered are: utility, economic, pleasure, health, knowledge, aesthetic, moral, religious.

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

ENTWISTLE, MARY. *The Story of Musa.* New York: Friendship Press, 1929. 84 pages. $1.00.

Another attractive story of child life in other lands is added to the list of the Friendship Press. The two little Mohammedan children, Musa and Fatmeh, are pictured in their home, school, and neighborhood, and in a quite unpretentious way the values Christianity has brought to them appear in the course of their experiences. Only in two places does the author allow the miraculous elements of Christianity to appear, but it would have been better if these stories of cures by Jesus had been left out or rightly interpreted. The rest of the book is an excellent portrayal of the real spirit of Christian love and growing respect of persons of different races for one another. The book is intended for children of six to nine, and is well-graded in language and experience.

**Searles, Herbert Leon.** *The Study of Religion in State Universities.* "Studies in Character," Vol. I, No. 3. University of Iowa Studies, First Series, No. 141. 91 pages. $1.00.

A study of the progress, present status, legal aspects, and desirability of the study of religion in state universities. The monograph is divided into two parts. Part I deals with the development of the scientific study of religion. Part II traces the historical development that led to the exclusion of religion from tax-supported education and the current trend in the direction of increasing co-operation of church and state in the study of religion in the large majority of state universities. The author holds that it is desirable that religion should be studied in state universities on the ground that it is impossible to understand human culture otherwise, that the aims of religion and of education are similar, that the state university has a large part in the training of lay and professional leadership, and that there is need for intelligent and non-sectarian leadership in the interpretation of religion in modern thought. He suggests that the state might well be responsible for the scientific study of religion and that the church through the church-supported foundations and schools of religion should be responsible for teaching the content of religion. The obstacle to the study of religion, the author holds, is not religion as such, but the sectarian interpretation of religion. Four Appendixes add to the value of the monograph.

**Sullivan, Harry Stack** (secretary). *Proceedings of the First Colloquium on Personality Investigation.* Held under the auspices of the American Psychiatric Association, December 1–2, 1928. New York: American Psychiatric Association, 1929. 102 pages. Paper, $0.60; cloth, $1.00.

The conference of which these proceedings are a record derives its importance from the fact that it was the first attempt of the psychiatrists and social scientists to explore the problems and techniques of investigation that are common to their respective fields. It is of far-reaching significance that the meeting-point of these two approaches was located in the development of personality, where investigation of whatever sort is oriented toward persons who are in the process of development. While many suggestions were made regarding different approaches to the problem of the development of personality and many different techniques were discussed, the movement of the Colloquium was on the whole in the direction of the conviction that the integration of the techniques utilized by psychiatrists and social scientists might best be integrated by bringing them to bear upon the case study of specific persons in the light of the various factors that enter into the formation of personality. The Colloquium pointed a direction which co-operative research may well take in the study of human problems. Such co-operation will inevitably extend far beyond social science and psychiatry into other fields as well.

The Colloquium exhibited the lack of organization and sequence in thought which is characteristic of an unguided discussion. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the Colloquium accomplished a very decided result in bringing together a group of persons who are working from different viewpoints and in leading to a comparison of approaches and techniques. Such an informal procedure might well be followed by more systematic and organized procedures in future conferences.

## MISCELLANEOUS

ABBOTT, JUSTIN E., DR. (translator). *Bahina Bai.* Summit, New Jersey. v+300 pages. $1.25.

A translation in English prose of the writings of an Indian poetess.

CAUSSE, A. *La Bible de Reuss.* Paris: Librarie Felix Alcan, 1929. 43 pages.

A lecture reviewing the contribution of the French scholar, E. Reuss, to the scientific study of religion.

CAVAN, RUTH SHONLE. *Business Girls: A Study of Their Interests and Problems.* Chicago: Religious Education Association, 1929. v+97 pages. $1.00.

A report of the findings of an investigation sponsored by the Religious Education Association.

CROSS, ALLEN EASTMAN. *Pass on the Torch.* Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1929. 104 pages. $1.00.

A book of verse on religious themes.

INGE, DEAN. *Labels and Libels.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. 262 pages. $2.00.

Reprinted essays from the pen of the well-known dean of St. Paul's. They are classified under the following captions: "Religious," "Political," "Prognostications," "Social," "Personal." The volume bears the title of the first essay.

KOMROFF, MANUEL (editor). *The Apocrypha.* New York: Dial Press, 1929. 350 pages. $4.00.

This is a new volume in the series "The Library of Living Classics." The text is that of the Authorized Version of 1611. But the verse division of the text has been abandoned for a more sensible paragraph division. The book is a splendid piece of printing.

PALMER, E. H. (translator). *The Koran.* New York: Oxford University Press. xix+551 pages. 80 cents.

A reprint of this well-known standard translation in a small but attractive volume.

SMITH, ALFRED FRANKLIN. *Talking with God.* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1929. 151 pages. Cloth 50 cents; morocco $1.00.

A collection of prayers marked by simplicity and brevity, and expressive of the spirit and interests of religion today. The authors are active leaders in the conduct of modern worship.

WARFIELD, BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE. *Biblical Doctrines.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1929. 665 pages. $4.00.

The second volume of republished papers by the late Professor Warfield, of Princeton Theological Seminary.

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# THE PARISH PRIEST AND HIS FLOCK AS DEPICTED BY THE COUNCILS OF THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

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IT SCARCELY need be said that the Middle Ages produced many clerics who were an honor to the church which they served, who faithfully fulfilled their duties, and by their lives set a worthy example to their parishioners. Such priests, however, do not bulk large in medieval literature; they are simply taken for granted.[1] Their lives were less dramatic, less striking than were the lives of those who were more or less overcome with worldliness. Moreover the enactments of councils, one of the chief interests of which was reform, tell us only of the latter. It is accordingly a picture of the more unfavorable aspects of clerical and village life that one derives from a study of the councils of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Perhaps one of the most common failings of the medieval clergy was that they were addicted to the use of strong drink. With tiresome monotony, frequently under the heading *De vita et honestate clericorum* or *De tabernis*, the councils denounce those who were guilty of tavern haunting. "Clergy in Holy Orders," decreed the Council of London in 1175, "are not to take part in public drinking-bouts, nor are they to enter taverns for the purpose of eating or drinking unless compelled by the necessity of travel."[2] Archdeacons in the diocese of Lincoln were to investigate in their visitations whether priests were "lovers of drink or haunters of taverns."[3] A frequent conciliar injunction is: "From drunkenness and intoxication let all clergy diligently abstain."[4] A common form of drinking-bout in which the country people seem to have indulged was the *Scotale* or *church-ale*. Not only were the clergy advised to forbid their parishioners from indulging in such revelry, but they were sternly admonished not to participate in them themselves.[5] Priests who haunted taverns also engaged in playing with dice and gambling.[6] Much light is thrown upon the conduct of clergy in taverns by the decree of an early fourteenth-century council to the effect that if clergy received injury in a tavern, they could not obtain redress before the higher ecclesiastical authorities.[7] This evidence of the councils is substantiated by the episcopal visitations of Odo Rigaldi, who was Archbishop of Rouen from 1248 to 1275. Odo knew tavern-haunting priests who fought in taverns and gambled away even the clothes that they wore.[8] Fines, penance, and, as a last resort, suspension or deposition from office were the penalties decreed for the guilty. But the evil seems to have been too widespread to permit the wholesale carrying out of the drastic penalty of deposition.[9]

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[1] For the description of a model parish priest, cf. G. G. Coulton, *Social Life in Britain*, p. 213; E. S. Davison, *Forerunners of St. Francis*, pp. 349 ff.

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[2] Mansi, *Conciliorum amplissimà collectio* (henceforth simply referred to as "Mansi"), Vol. XXII. Cf. Trèves, 1238, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 480; Tours, 1282, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV; Saltzburg, 1274, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 140; Würzburg, 1278, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 849 ff.; Mainz, 1261, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1081.

[3] 1233, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, cols. 327–28.

[4] Fourth Lateran, 1215, Mansi, Vol. XXII, col. 1003; Le Mans, 1247, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 755–56; Cologne, 1280, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 346; Liège, 1247, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV; Würzburg, 1298, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV.

[5] Salisbury, 1256, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, cols. 911–12; Worcester, 1240, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 538. Cf. E. K. Chambers, *Mediaeval Stage*, I, 91, and note.

[6] Valencia, 1261, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, col. 1056; Saltzburg, 1274, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 533; cf. Gerona, 1274, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 936.

[7] Constance, Mansi, Vol. XXV, col. 30.

[8] G. G. Coulton, *Medieval Garner*, pp. 291 f.

Not only did priests frequent taverns for the purpose of drinking and gambling, but they also kept taverns themselves or sold wine in their houses.[10] A decree such as the following speaks for itself: "We decree that no ecclesiastical person presume to have or maintain, in the house or parsonage in which he lives, a tavern where wine is sold or where worthless, unstable or suspicious appearing persons are welcome or associated with."[11] This testimony of the councils is supported by evidence from other sources. "I have found clergy keeping taverns with the sign of the hoop," declared Salimbene, the Franciscan friar of the thirteenth century.[12] "As late as 1578," says Coulton, "the papal nuncio in Switzerland reported that the system of clerical innkeeping needed suppression."[13] Sometimes the parish priest even went so far as to carry on his brewing within the parish church itself.[14] The only case in which priests were permitted to sell wine legitimately was that in which the wine constituted part of their benefice or patrimony.[15]

Besides keeping taverns the medieval parish clergy also engaged in trade and other secular occupations and practiced usury. As early as the Council of Nicaea in 325 (canon 17) it was stated that the clergy were guilty of usurious practices which they were forbidden to continue under pain of deposition. The fact that this canon is twice repeated in the *Corpus Juris Canonici*,[16] as well as the frequent references in the acts of the councils, shows that the church had by no means suppressed the practice. "Let clergy not be tavern-keepers or usurers," declared a council of the early twelfth century.[17] "We prohibit all clergy from taking usury and filthy lucre," declared the Council of London in 1125.[18] "Clerical usurers and followers after filthy lucre as well as those who engage in worldly business we order to be removed from office and benefice."[19] The Council of Exeter in 1287 decreed that clergy should not presume to give their property out at usury under penalty of suspension from office and benefice.[20] At the council of Tours in 1163 Alexander III complained: "Many of the clergy (and we lament to say it, even of those who by their profession, their vow and their dress have cut themselves off from this present world), while they shrink from common usury as from a thing too plainly condemned, do notwithstanding lend their money to others who are in need, and take their possessions in pledge, and receive the fruits therefrom accruing beyond the principal lent."[21] Odo Rigaldi during his visitations found clergy who were guilty of usury,[22] and the bishop of Lincoln instructed his archdeacon to inquire, among many other things, whether any of the clergy in the diocese were usurers.[23]

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[9] This may be inferred from Odo Regaldi's visitation register.

[10] Mainz, 1299, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 1211 ff.; Gran, 1114, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI; Norwich, 1257, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 967; Saltzburg, 1274, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 140.

[11] Budapest, 1279, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 283. Cf. Liège, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 910–11.

[12] G. G. Coulton, *St. Francis to Dante*, p. 297.

[13] G. G. Coulton, *The Medieval Village*, p. 303, note.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Mainz, 1299. Mansi, Vol. XXIV, cols. 1211 f.

[16] K. J. Hefele, *History of the Church Councils*, I, 426.

Then priests frequently engaged in trade, many of the profits of which were regarded by the church as usurious. "We admonish," declared the Council of Exeter, "all clergy, religious and others, that no one of them become a trader or presume to engage in worldly commerce, and especially that which is dishonest."[24] The council of Arles decreed that no beneficed clerk, or anyone else in holy orders, by himself or through another should buy grain or wine for the purpose of reselling or trading.[25] The same decree was issued in substantially the same form by other councils.[26] Even the odious practice of "forestalling," or buying goods when cheap to sell more dearly, was practiced by the clergy. "We prohibit," declared the Council of Trèves in 1277, "priests and beneficed clergy from buying grain or wine cheaply from the poor in time of harvest or vintage in order later to sell it at a higher price."[27] Here again the evidence of the councils receives remarkable confirmation from the visitation reports of Odo Rigaldi, some of the typical entries of which are as follows: "Thomas, priest of Mesnil-Manger, is said to buy and sell horses and to trade in other ways"; "the priest of Haucourt buyeth and holdeth land on farm from the Abbess of Buieval"; "the priest of Berneval is a trader in cider, corn and salt. Item the priest of Bouville selleth wine, as it is said."[28] Other priests kept stock, pasturing their "pigs, horses, cows, sheep and other animals" in the parish cemetery.[29] Furthermore the Council of Liège knew of clergy who acted as bankers, butchers, fullers, shoemakers, and weavers.[30]

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[17] Gran, 1114, Mansi, Vol. XXI, col. 112.

[18] Mansi, Vol. XXI, col. 330.

[19] London, 1138, Mansi, Vol. XXI, col. 811; cf. Tours, 1163, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI; Third Lateran, 1179, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 345.

[20] Mansi, Vol. XXII, can. 24. Cf. Liège, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 910 ff.; Rouen, 1235, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 377 f.; Utrecht 1293, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1101; Quercy, 1299, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 1015 ff.; Conseranum, 1280, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 329 ff.; Montpellier, 1214, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, can. 5.

[21] Cited from Coulton, *Medieval Village*, pp. 284–85.

[22] Coulton, *Medieval Garner*, pp. 290 ff.; 311.

[23] Mansi, Vol. XXIII, cols. 327–28, art. 9.

The temptation was strong for the medieval clergy not merely to engage in trade but also to hold certain offices as agents of laymen or secular rulers. Thus the Council of Liège in 1287 mentions bailiffs of manors,[31] superintendents of forests and vineyards, toll-collectors, and millers.[32] We find priests also acting as notaries or advocates in the secular courts, a practice which, judging from the number of times that it is mentioned in the councils, was extremely common.[33] But the church prohibited the practice unless the clergy were acting in the interests of the church or of the poor, and then not for a fee.[34]

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[24] 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, can. 24.

[25] 1275, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, can. 14.

[26] Mainz, 1299, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1299; Würzburg, 1298, *ibid.*, col. 1190, can. 5; cf. St. Omer, 1279, Avignon, 1279, can. 12, Budapest, can. 8, Conseranum, 1280; Exeter, 1287; Liège, 1287, Trèves, 1238.

[27] Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 202.

[28] Coulton, *Mediaeval Garner*, p. 294.

[29] Chichester, 1292, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 1097.

[30] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 910–11.

[31] Cf. Conseranum, 1280, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 332.

[32] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 910–11.

Besides the priests who engaged in trade, kept taverns, farmed, and acted as officials of laymen, the councils present to us the hunting parson who prided himself on his dogs and falcon, and who occupied himself with hunting and fowling.[35] He delighted to adorn his horse with fancy trappings and bright colors, and to harness them with bridles of gold or gilt, while he himself wore gold spurs.[36] His own dress likewise was more in keeping with "the vanity of worldly men"; for he dressed himself in red or green garments of silk,[37] which were especially worldly, rather than in the closed cassock or mantle, the more sober and fitting dress which the church prescribed;[38] and allowed his hair to grow instead of maintaining the tonsure.[39] The clergy also went about armed with daggers, swords, spears, as well as weapons of other kinds, much to the scandal of the church and the laity.[40] A prohibition such as the following speaks for itself: "Let none of you (clergy) bear arms or swords militantly unless perchance in time of war or because of some good ground for fear."[41] Moreover the clergy did not hesitate to use their weapons, and the Council of Grado felt obliged to decree that if any clerk drew a sword on a layman, or struck him in any manner or did him any grave injury, he should be subject to the same fines and punishment at the hands of his bishop as a layman at the hands of a secular judge for injuring a clerk.[42] The wearing of arms, especially in the case of those who frequented taverns and gambled, doubtless led them into many a brawl. The use of arms likewise led the clergy to participate in jousts and tournaments.[43]

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[33] Conseranum, 1280, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 332; Rouen, 1231; London, 1260; Arles, 1260; Worcester, 1240.

[34] Champigny, 1238; Mansi, Vol. XXIII, col. 490.

[35] Rouen, 1214, Mansi, Vol. XXII, cols. 899 ff.; Paris, 1212, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 820; Fourth Lateran, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 1003; St. Omer, 1279, can. 11, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV; Milan, 1287; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 874.

[36] Worcester, 1240, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 533.

[37] *Ibid.;* Valencia, 1261, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, col. 1056.

[38] Tours, 1239, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 497 ff.; Copranitz, 1260, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1033.

[39] Worcester, 1240, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 533; Ravenna, 1286, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV; Würzburg, 1298, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1190; Montpellier, 1258, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 991.

[40] Valencia, 1261, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1056; Norwich, 1257, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 968; London, 1268, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 497; Budapest, 1279; Utrecht, 1293; Lincoln, 1233.

The medieval clergy were selected to fill secular offices partly because of their superior learning; but the councils of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries show that all too frequently even the parish priest was extremely illiterate, scarcely possessing the rudiments of learning which would enable him to conduct the services of the church. In the episcopal instructions for visitation in the diocese of Lincoln in 1233, the Archdeacon was to inquire, among many other things, "whether rectors of churches, or vicars or parish priests are enormously illiterate."[44] A Synod of Gerona in Spain in 1274 decreed that all clergy who did not know Latin, with the exception of those who were too old, were to be compelled to learn. Those who were too negligent to do so were to be suspended. The synod complained that "many" became clergy and obtained benefices who neglected to learn; and it positively forbade any clerk being promoted who did not know Latin.[45] The woeful ignorance reflected in the following decree of the Synod of Worcester in 1240 shows that the extent of the religious education which the ordinary parish priest bestowed upon the laity was extremely meager.

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[41] Conseranum, 1280, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 329; cf. Quercy, 1289, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV.

[42] Grado, 1296, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1168.

[43] Würzburg, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 849.

[44] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 327–28; cf. Cologne, 1260, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1015, can. 3.

[45] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 935.

> Let priests know what things are demanded for true confession in the sacrament of penance. And because the observation of the Decalogue is necessary for the salvation of the faithful, we exhort priests and pastors of souls in the Lord that they know it, i.e., the ten commandments of the law of Moses, which they should frequently proclaim and explain to their people. Let them know also what the seven mortal sins are which they should warn the people to avoid. Let them also know clearly at least the seven sacraments.[46]

Stephen Langton, in 1222, at the Council of Oxford counseled: "Let the Archdeacons at their visitations see that . . . . the priests can rightly pronounce at least the formula of consecration (in the Mass), and that of baptism, and that they clearly understand the meaning of these two formulas."[47] The same injunction was repeated in 1237, and "reveals," as Dr. Coulton has said,

> an abyss of clerical ignorance at which we may well stagger. In an age when the Bible was in Latin, all the church services in Latin, and only a small fraction even of popular religious books could be obtained in the vulgar tongue, it was necessary for the provincial councils to take elaborate precautions for ensuring that parish priests knew just enough Latin to pronounce, and understand, two every-day formulas of half-a-dozen words each.[48]

The examinations of clergy in 1222 in the diocese of Salisbury, and of Archbishop Odo in Rouen, in 1252 and following years, substantiate the evidence of the councils as to the widespread ignorance of medieval clergy.[49]

One of the doctrines to which the medieval church tenaciously clung was the celibacy of the clergy; and yet the canons of the councils of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries reveal very impressively the utter failure of the church to enforce it.

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[46] *Ibid.*, cols. 531–32.

[47] G. G. Coulton, *Religious Education before the Reformation*, pp. 69–70.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] Coulton, *Medieval Garner*, pp. 270 ff. Cf. *Religious Education before the Reformation*, p. 70.

"We decree," declared the Council of Clermont in 1130, "that those who, from the subdiaconate up, shall possess wives or concubines shall be deprived of office and ecclesiastical benefice."[50] "We warn all clergy," decreed the Council of Liège, "and especially priests in holy orders that, under penalty of suspension, they do not have or harbor any women in their houses except sisters, mothers, paternal or maternal aunts or their daughters, or daughters of a maternal or paternal uncle, or others too senile and aged for suspicion to exist concerning them. We deem 'aged' to mean sixty and over."[51] In spite of such regulations, however, parish priests continued to keep concubines, either publicly in their own houses or elsewhere.[52] Not infrequently such women were kept in the guise of housekeepers. The following decree of the Council of London in 1268 speaks for itself: "We decree that those who receive clergy into their houses for the purpose of sinning, or knowingly permit them to sin, or knowingly let or lend houses for their concubines, if they are clergy they shall be punished with suspension, if laity, they shall be dealt with according to the pleasure of the bishop."[53] When deprived of one mistress, priests sometimes proceeded to acquire another.[54]

Not only did priests keep concubines, but they also raised families, which they reared on ecclesiastical revenues. The Council of Würzburg in 1298 decreed: "For the sake of avoiding scandal, we strictly forbid priests to maintain their offspring which they have begotten while in Holy Orders."[55] The Council of Langets in 1278 forbade clergy, and especially those in holy orders, "to bequeath anything in their last will to their sons begotten by them in Holy Orders."[56] If they willed their children or concubines ecclesiastical revenues, the will would not be valid.[57] Moreover, the Councils of Westminster in 1173 and of London in 1175 knew of sons who succeeded to their fathers' churches.[58] All the ecclesiastical penalties which the councils threatened, removal from office, deprivation of benefice, excommunication, enjoining laity not to attend masses at the hands of concubinary priests, were of no avail.[59] *The Constitutions of Salisbury* in 1256 frankly recognized that neither "evangelical authority nor canonical severity" had "up to that time been able to extirpate" these evils.[60]

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[50] Mansi, Vol. XXI, col. 438 f. Cf. Liège, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 852; Rouen, 1128, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 375.

[51] 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV; cf. London, 1125, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, can. 13.

[52] London, 1268, can. viii, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII; cf. Cologne, 1260, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 1013 f.

[53] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1324.

[54] Würzburg, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 852, can. 5.

[55] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1191.

The illicit relations that frequently existed between the parish priest and his female parishioners are reflected in the conciliar legislation concerning confession. The Council of Trèves in 1277 enjoined that priests should not interrogate penitents about sins of which they were ignorant, lest the confessional become a promoter of sin.[61] When it is decreed that priests, except in case of great necessity or infirmity, should not hear confession outside the church, that they should select a place in plain sight, avoiding secret and obscure corners in which to hear confessions, that they should not hear confession before sunrise or after sundown, or when they were alone with a woman in the church, and that they should preserve a humble mien with their eyes on the ground, not looking at the faces of female penitents, the reason is obvious.[62] Plainer still is the decree of Cologne in 1280 that priests should not hear the confession of women with whom they had sinned, nor of the mediators or abettors of their sin, but should send them (whether male or female) to honest and discreet confessors.[63]

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[56] *Ibid.*, col. 213; cf. Mainz, 1261, can. 39, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 1094–96.

[57] Council of Saumur, 1253, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 811.

[58] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXII, cols. 143 and 147 ff.

[59] Rouen, 1128, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 375.

[60] Cf. Matthew of Paris, I, 84, for further evidence.

[61] Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 195.

[62] Liège, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 316; Cologne, 1280, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 353; Münster, 1279, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 887 ff.

One of the problems of the church of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was that of the wandering clergy. Priests had a habit of deserting their parishes for study or travel without obtaining the sanction of their ecclesiastical superiors and sometimes without even providing for the spiritual care of their parishioners.[64] Besides there was a multitude of clerical vagrants, charlatans, and imposters, many of whom were probably unbeneficed and unordained. They traveled from parish to parish, armed with forged papal letters or sham relics, claiming the right to hear confession, absolve, and preach.[65] The cupidity of these pardoners, as they were called, was the cause of many scandals in the church.[66] They imposed on the credulity of the simple by the pardons which they sold and on the parish priests who were unable to deny the authenticity of their credentials. Accordingly, the councils decreed that no wandering clerk should be admitted to a church to preach, to hear confession, or to celebrate mass without the approval of the bishop.[67] The councils also tell us of the presence of *goliardi* who entered parishes in the rôle of jesters or actors to entertain.[68] Priests were warned to be on their guard against all such and not to permit them to sing at mass.[69]

Then the enactments of the councils frequently throw a good deal of light upon the relation of the parish priest to his flock. Not content with enriching himself by engaging in secular activities, the parish priest exploited his ecclesiastical position, charging fees for all the services that he performed. Thus we find the Council of London in 1125 decreeing: "We forbid that for chrism, for anointing, for baptism, for penance, for visitation of the sick or extreme unction, for the communion of the body of Christ, and for burial any fee at all be exacted."[70] Not only was this decree, or the substance of it, frequently repeated throughout the twelfth century, but throughout the thirteenth the councils were still issuing the same prohibitions and apparently with as little success.[71] The Fourth Lateran Council speaks of the complaints of clerical extortion as "frequent"; and at least one bishop instructed his archdeacon in his visitations to inquire "whether any priest extorted money for penance or the other sacraments or imposed penance for the sake of gain."[72] Furthermore, the prohibition, so frequently issued, forbidding priests, unless under exceptional circumstances, to perform more than one mass a day, seems to have been based upon the desire to prevent the exploitation of that holy rite.[73] Priests were also forbidden to impose upon their penitents masses for which they would be obliged to pay.[74]

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[63] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 353.

[64] Santonensis, 1298, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1186; Budapest, 1279, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 285; Rouen, 1189, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 583; Saltzburg, 1274, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 146.

[65] Nogaro, 1290, *ibid.*, Vol. XXXIV, cols. 1067 ff.; Mainz, 1261, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 108; Würzburg, 1298; Exeter, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 829–30.

[66] Mainz, 1261, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 1085.

[67] Berry, 1280; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 629; Würzburg, 1298; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1191.

[68] Rouen, 1231, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 215; Sens, 1237, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 512.

[69] Trèves, 1277, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 201.

If the priestly exactions for the performance of the sacraments created friction between the priest and his parishioners—and the evidence seems to show that such was the case—much more did the collection of tithes which the church not only sanctioned, but enforced. The Council of London declared in 1175,

> All tithes of the land, whether of produce or of fruits, belong to the Lord and are consecrated to him. But because many are found who are

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[70] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 330. Cf. London, 1175, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII; Tours, 1163, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 1178; Toulouse, 1119, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 226; Westminster, 1173, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 143; Rheims, 1148, *ibid.*, Vol. XXI, col. 717.

[71] Paris, 1208, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, can. ii; Avignon, 1209, *ibid.*, can. v; Fourth Lateran, 1215, *ibid.*, can. 66; Rouen, 1216, can. 13; Tours, 1239; Worcester, 1240; Norwich, 1257; London, 1268; Trèves, 1277; Exeter, 1287; Liège, 1287.

[72] Instructions of Bishop of Lincoln, 1233. Mansi, Vol. XXIII, cols. 327–28.

[73] Trèves, 1227, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 33; Tarragona, 1239, *ibid.*; Vol. XXIII, col. 513; Würzburg, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 853.

[74] York, 1195, *ibid.* Vol. XXII, col. 653; Trèves, 1277; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 195.

unwilling to give tithes we decree that, according to the ordinances of the Lord Pope, they be admonished three times to pay without diminution tithes of grain, of wine, of fruits of trees, of animals, of wool, fruits of the field, of butter, of cheese, of linen, of hemp, and of other things that are annually renewed. If they do not then amend, they shall be anathematized.[75]

The very frequency with which the canons of councils deal with the whole matter of tithes also reveals the great difficulty which the church had in collecting what it regarded as its just dues, but which the peasants regarded as oppressive exactions.[76] The peasants contended that tithes should be paid only on the net receipts, after the expenses of sowing and harvest were deducted,[77] but the councils admonished the clergy to warn their parishioners that tithes must be paid on the gross receipts.[78] Even many of the laity who paid tithes faithfully did not pay in full, and hence the church regarded them as filled with "blind cupidity."[79] Accordingly, priests were advised to question penitents in the confessional whether they had defrauded the church or the clergy of their tithes.[80] If ecclesiastical penalties proved of no avail in coercing their parishioners, the aid of the "secular arm" was to be invoked.[81] Possibly this difficulty in collecting tithes may have been responsible for the farming out of them to the laity, a practice which the councils condemned.[82]

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[75] London, 1175, *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 150.

[76] Ravenna, 1286; Durham, 1275; Bourges, 1276; Poitiers, 1284; Chichester, 1289; Worcester, 1240; London, 1127; York, 1250; Lille, 1252; Rouen, 1188; Chichester, 1292; York, 1195; Avignon, 1209.

[77] Avignon, 1209, can. 5; *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 787.

[78] *Ibid.;* cf. G. G. Coulton, *Mediaeval Village,* chaps. xx–xxi. Exeter, 1287, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, cols. 836 ff.; London, 1175, can. 13.

[79] Durham, 1275, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 155.

[80] Aquilega, 1282, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 425. Cf. G. G. Coulton, *Social Life in Britain,* p. 341, for instructions of the Chancellor of Cambridge University to guide priests in the duties of their profession. The Chancellor writes: "Let peasants and serfs be questioned (in the confessional) whether they have defrauded by withholding or diminishing their tithes either of produce or of personal labor."

[81] Ravenna, 1286, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 622.

[82] Cf. Avignon, 1209, can. 5; *ibid.*, Vol. XXII, col. 787; Chichester, 1289; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1061.

Another form of clerical oppression which the councils sanctioned was the taking of *mortuary,* which was ordinarily the best or second best beast amongst the deceased serf's belongings. Inasmuch as it was regarded as doubtful whether there was anyone who had not at some time, wittingly or unwittingly, withheld the payment of tithes, the church felt justified in reimbursing itself after a man's death.[83] Aegidius, Bishop of Salisbury, in 1256 decreed that if the deceased had amongst his property three or more animals, the best was to be reserved "without deceit, fraud or protest" for the church in which he had received the sacraments while he lived.[84] But if only two animals were to be found among the goods of the deceased, the exaction of mortuary was, in accordance with the clemency of the church, to be relaxed.[85] That this merciful restriction of mortuary was, however, an exception to the general practice is evident from the good bishop's statement that it was his desire to prevent quarrels which "frequently arise" between rectors of churches and their parishioners. In this case the bishop intervened to mitigate the extreme hardships which the mortuary system sometimes entailed. That all were not so merciful is evident from the following decree:

> Let the principal animal be paid to the church as mortuary, whether cow, ox or horse, if it shall be of the value of VI *sous* or less. And as to garments, if mortuary be paid, the will of the church shall decide whether she shall have garments or III *sous* and VI *denarii.* But if he shall be a pauper and no mortuary be forthcoming, let his clothes be taken as they are.[86]

Another conciliar regulation which was sometimes employed for the exploitation of the laity was that no one should make a will without the presence of a priest.[87] Priests were to urge their parishioners not to postpone the making of their wills until they were on the point of death, but to do so while they were sound in mind and body.[88] The purpose of such a regulation is not far to seek: in order that the laity may be "thus induced to make amends and restitution (to the church) and to bequeath to pious causes."[89] The Synod of Liège decreed that laity should be urged, after they had made provision for their just debts, to bequeath their goods to the Church of St. Lambert in Liège, to their own parochial church, or to other pious uses.[90] A remission of twenty days' penance was promised as a reward. What wealth must not the church have thus received! Property of one dying intestate was to be devoted to pious uses for the soul of the deceased.[91] It is true that the church claimed that it intervened to prevent, under penalty of excommunication, pressure being brought to bear upon testators, so that they might bequeath their property as they chose.[92] But the evidence shows that it was an intervention that worked to the profit of the church.

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[83] Exeter, 1287, *ibid.,* Vol. XXIV, col. 844. Cf. Coulton, *Mediaeval Village,* p. 290.

[84] *Ibid.,* Vol. XXIII, cols. 910–11.

[85] *Ibid.*

[86] Sordense, 1239, *ibid.,* Vol. XXIII, col. 507.

[87] Liège, 1287, can. 34; *ibid.,* Vol. XXIV, col. 987; Würzburg, 1298, can. 12; *ibid.,* Vol. XXIV, col. 1192.

Since the medieval priest frequently appears as the exploiter of his flock and as the representative of capitalist interests, it need not be wondered at that he was often regarded with a good deal of hostility on the part of the laity. The exaction of fees for the sacraments and for burial, of tithes and mortuary, to say nothing of the competition of the clergy with laity in business and their immoral relations with parishioners, led to much friction between the priest and his people. The very fact that the clergy so frequently carried arms may possibly be an indication of the unpopularity with which they were regarded by the laity and their desire to defend themselves against it. The councils show that the clergy were the object of a great deal of violence, some of which was doubtless due to the violence of the age in which they lived, but much more to their unpopularity.[93] Among the items for inquiry within the diocese of Gerona in Spain was whether there was "any one who had killed a presbyter, deacon or other clerk, or mutilated them in any member?"[94] In a canon entitled "Concerning those who lay violent hands upon the clergy," the Council of Saltzburg decreed: "We strictly enjoin that in the parish in which such deed (of violence against the clergy) was committed, or such malefactor dwells, the rectors of those churches shall pronounce him excommunicate and denounce him on each sabbath and feast day."[95] "We ordain," decreed the Synod of Utrecht in 1293, "that if a clerk or presbyter is imprisoned, that parish shall be, *ipso facto,* placed under an interdict. If he is carried beyond that parish, the parish in which he is detained shall likewise be placed under an interdict. . . . ."[96] That such coercive measures were necessary shows that the laity were not interested in bringing to justice those who had laid violent hands upon the clergy.

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[88] Liège, 1287.

[89] Quency, 1289; Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 1023.

[90] 1287, can. 34.

[91] Exeter, 1287, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, cols. 830–31.

[92] Exeter, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, cols. 830–31.

[93] Rennes, 1273, can. 1; Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 33.

On the other hand there are indications that the parish priests frequently participated in the amusements and revelries of the people, although with the disapprobation of the higher ecclesiastical authorities. The chief amusements of the medieval peasants consisted in their games, dances, church-ales, and plays, which were often held either in the churchyard or even in the church itself on Sundays and holy days. In all these things the clergy sometimes took part.[97] Not infrequently we find clergy participating as actors or jesters in the plays or mimes.[98] They played at dice or quoits;[99] they participated in wrestling matches with the laity;[100] they took part in church-ales, at which the "drinkers pledged each other that he should be the more acclaimed who drank the most and drained the fullest cup";[101] they even seem occasionally to have indulged in the village dance along with the laity.[102] But such amusements were forbidden to the laity as well as to the clergy. The common impression that the medieval village dance was sanctioned by the church is proved false by the enactments of the councils. If the parish clergy connived at the village dance—and the evidence seems to show that they did—it was with the disapproval of the church. "Let priests prohibit under penalty of excommunication," declared the Council of Budapest in 1279, "the holding of dances in cemeteries or churches because, as Augustine says, it is better to dig or plough on feast days than to dance."[103] This is no isolated prohibition, but is repeated again and again.[104] The church likewise opposed the holding of mystery plays, theatricals, and pageants, especially in the churchyard or churches.[105] "Let priests not permit theatrical and other shameful plays to be held in the church," declared the Council of Trèves in 1277.[106] In this respect the medieval church, contrary to the popular notion, proved itself no more liberal than the Puritans of the seventeenth century.

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[94] Mansi, Vol. XXIII, cols. 939 ff.

[95] 1281, can. 13; *ibid.,* Vol. XXIV, col. 401.

[96] Mansi, Vol. XXIV, cols. 1102 f.

[97] Worcester, 1240, can. 38; *ibid.,* Vol. XXIII, col. 538 f.

[98] Fourth Lateran, can. 16; *ibid.,* Vol. XXII, cols. 1003 ff.

[99] Quercy, 1289, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 1015.

[100] Utrecht, 1293, can. 2, *ibid.,* Vol. XXIV, col. 1101; cf. Worcester, 1240, can. 38.

Finally, the canons of the councils afford us here and there a glimpse into the lives of the people and their attitude toward the church. Not only did the laity regard the church and its environs as a place in which they could indulge in their amusements, but they also made use of it for commercial purposes. "We utterly forbid under pain of excommunication," decreed one council, "taverns and all selling of wine in the churches and cemeteries."[107] The peasants used the churches as granaries and storehouses,[108] and the churchyards as pastures for their pigs, horses, cows, and sheep.[109] Merchants regarded them as favorable places in which to expose their wares for sale.[110] How well established the custom was is shown by the fact that the Council of Nevers felt it necessary to grant power to the canons of the cathedral to eject merchants with their goods from its sacred precincts.[111] The church was also regarded as a convenient place in which to hold court, conduct lawsuits, or for nobles to hold their *parlamenta*.[112] The parish church must consequently have been often a scene of disorder and tumult. One council declared that the clamor made by litigants in the churches frequently impeded divine service, and their quarrels led to shedding of blood and slaughter in the very churches themselves.[113]

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[101] Worcester, 1240, can. 38.

[102] *Ibid.*

[103] Mansi, Vol. XXIV, can. 43, col. 289.

[104] St. Omer, 1279; Rouen, 1214, can. 19; Liège, 1287, can. 20; Würzburg, 1298, can. 4.

[105] Worcester, 1240; Bourges, 1286; Liège, 1287; Utrecht, 1293.

[106] Can. 47.

[107] St. Hippolytus, 1284, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 510.

[108] St. Hippolytus, 1284, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 510.

Then the peasants were often indifferent toward the church and its feast days. They carried on work on Sunday,[114] and could with difficulty be induced to attend the parish church and its services.[115] They sometimes preferred to go to neighboring parish churches and there communicate and pay their tithes.[116] Even when they did attend they frequently disturbed the services. A decree such as the following is significant: "Let parishioners be instructed that on Sundays and other holy days they remain in the church solemnly and devoutly, at least while mass is being sung, constantly following the prayers, not, as has been customary hitherto, noisily running about anywhere through the cemeteries and other places near the churches, and frequently to no purpose but an unseemly one."[117] Not only did they disturb the mass when present by their chatter, but they sometimes departed before mass was over.[118] Moreover their resistance to the payment of tithes and their indifference to the ecclesiastical requirement of confession both show a lack of piety on the part of the medieval laity. The frequent exhortation of the councils that priests urge their parishioners to come to confession at least once a year, and the penalties with which those who were negligent were threatened, reveal the inability of the church to enforce this regulation.[119] Laity even claimed that the presence of a priest was unnecessary in marriage.[120]

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[109] Chichester, 1292, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 1079.

[110] London, 1268, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 1247–48; Norwich, 1257, *ibid.*, col. 464; Exeter, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 802; Nevers, 1246, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 731–32, can. 2.

[111] Nevers, 1246, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, cols. 731–32.

[112] Liège, 1287, can. 8.

[113] Saumur, 1253, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, col. 811.

[114] Rouen, 1214, can. 19; Compostella, 1114, Mansi, Vol. XXI, col. 120; Salisbury, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 901.

[115] Budapest, 1279, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 285; Chichester, 1292, can. 20.

[116] Budapest, 1279, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 285; Gerona, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 943.

[117] Chichester, 1292, can. 15.

The lack of fidelity to the church on the part of medieval people is also shown by their use of magic and by their continuation of pagan practices. Among the sins which only the pope could forgive the Council of Exeter placed "divination and sacrificing to demons and praying to anyone except God."[121] The Synod of Gerona decreed that investigation should be made as to whether swineherds, herdsmen, or hunters sang diabolical songs over bread or herbs and then hid them in a tree in order to free their animals from disease or accident, or in order to injure those of someone else; whether there was any woman who claimed that, through certain performances and incantations, she could change a man's mind from hate into love; whether there was anyone who, on the kalends of January, maintained any practice that was handed down from the pagans.[122] The ancient practice of gathering medicinal herbs to the accompaniment of a charm seems to have been continued from antiquity. "In the collection of medicinal herbs it is unnecessary to do or say anything but make the sign of the cross and say the Lord's Prayer."[123] Divination, by which souls were damnably deceived, was proclaimed idolatry, and those who were guilty thereof were liable to excommunication.[124] The holding of wakes, in which the participants sang "during the night hours diabolical songs over the dead and drank and ate as if they were rejoicing over their death," was likewise forbidden.[125]

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[118] Gerona, Mansi, Vol. XXIII, col. 946.

[119] Exeter, 1287, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 790; Cologne, 1280; *ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, col. 355.

[120] Trèves, 1277; Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 196.

[121] 1287, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, cols. 844 ff.; cf. London, 1125, *ibid.*, *Vol.* XXI, can. 14.

[122] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 946.

Thus a study of the enactments of the councils shows that the lives of the clergy as well as of the people fell far short of the ideals for which the medieval church stood. We can understand the Middle Ages and medieval people only by laying aside all romantic pictures of them and observing them as they really were.

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[123] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 943.

[124] Nogaro, 1290, can. 4, Mansi, Vol. XXIV, col. 1067 f.

[125] Gerona, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIII, col. 943.

# THE SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

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AFTER several generations of archaeological investigation in Palestine and other Bible lands, a survey of the trend and possibilities of this sphere of research is in order. Archaeological work may be described as the discovery, examination, and interpretation of vestiges of former human life upon the earth. Not only is the historical period of man's career of interest to the archaeologist, there is also a rich field for study in obtainable remains of the prehistoric period. However, so far as scriptural records are concerned, the biblical scholar is interested mainly in the archaeological light which may be thrown upon the history of the nations and the peoples to whom reference is made in the Old and New Testaments.

The pages of sacred history have already been illumined extensively by revelations of the spade in Bible lands. If one examines books on Bible history, Bible geography, Bible customs, etc., which were written a hundred years ago, the truth of this statement is demonstrated most strikingly. At that time little external evidence of the truth of the biblical record existed aside from the writings of the Greeks and the Romans, while classical references capable of verifying biblical narratives and descriptions were sparse enough. At present, after long and arduous investigations on the part of explorers, excavators, decipherers, and other specialists in various spheres of archaeology, a vast amount of data of dependable value has been collected. This fresh knowledge has contributed a corroborative background to the Bible as a whole and has confirmed many individual scriptural assertions.

Another important result has accrued inasmuch as a veritable science of biblical archaeology has been developed. This is not one science, but a combination of several sciences, viz., the science of excavation, the science of judging débris stratification, the science of dating by means of pottery, the science of linguistic interpretation, and the science of a co-ordinated explanation of archaeological finds. We are no longer at the beginning of the process. A long and tedious way has been traversed. Well-tried and accredited archaeological principles and methods are now at our disposal. The natural tendency is to look for a corresponding advance in achievement. That which has been accomplished during the past decade, owing to favorable conditions in oriental lands, does not belie this hope. The future beckons because many rich archaeological treasures are sure to be unearthed.

Because of the facts which have been presented in the foregoing paragraph the possibility of formulating certain principles of biblical archaeology suggests itself. If a single archaeological object is chosen as a basis of procedure, one may ask the following questions concerning it:

1. What is its character as an archaeological object?
2. What is its value as archaeological evidence?
3. What is its relation to other archaeological material?
4. What appeal does it make for interpretative purposes?
5. What skill is necessary in estimating its value?
6. What degree of certainty is provided by its data?
7. What light does it throw upon the biblical record?

With these seven questions in mind the actual scope of biblical archaeology may be discussed with some hope of arriving at definite conclusions. This is attempted in the seven sections which follow.

## I. THE MATERIAL SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

The materials of biblical archaeology are very tangible. Objects which have withstood the ravages of time for centuries supply the data used in this science. If those who give their energies to its cause are properly prepared, they need not build their house on shifting sand. There is nothing ephemeral or illusive in that which the spade of the archaeologist reveals. The justice of this claim will appear as the discussion proceeds.

As soon as the débris of an authentic biblical town in Palestine is disturbed by the excavator, vestiges of structures built long before the time of Christ begin to appear. These outlines of the walls of houses, storage places, sanctuaries, and city defenses gradually take shape as the unearthing process advances. Finally, the detailed plan of the area formerly inhabited is disclosed. This in itself is a valuable archaeological result which can be duplicated at numerous sites in Palestine and at sites in all lands related in any way to Bible history. So much of this work has already been done at different locations that the types of walls for distinct periods are known. This means that it is possible to date masonry with a fair degree of accuracy, and hence a chronological criterion is at hand. Palestinian city mounds are characterized by layers of débris representing different stages of occupation indicated by well-defined lines of demarcation. This is also true of many mounds outside of Palestine. Without going into further details it may be stated that the archaeologist can learn a great deal from the architectural remains which he uncovers. Much of the history of a site may be reconstructed in this way and the actual periods of its existence determined with approximate exactness.

The archaeologist looks for small objects as well as large structures. In fact, where indications require, every basketful of earth is sifted with the utmost care so that the tiniest objects made by the hand of ancient man may be recovered. This vigilance is exercised particularly when débris is taken from ancient graves. Thus beads, gold ornaments, bronze implements, vessels due to the skill of the potter, clay votive images, in short, many types of manufactured objects revealing the embodied design of ancient artisans are obtained. All such examples of the art of antiquity are valuable, but pottery is the most valuable of all. This is due, in the first place, to the seemingly unlimited supply of ceramic fragments which may be taken from a mound. Complete vessels are not so plentiful, but they may be found in the general débris of a site, in burial deposits, and in the silt which has accumulated in cisterns. However, that which gives the greatest value to this type of archaeological material is the fact that styles of pottery varied much in different periods. These variations are so clear and distinct, especially in Palestine, that a definite science of pottery periods in relation to the layers of mounds has been worked out in a most satisfactory way. It should be remembered that débris stratification and pottery sequence go hand in hand. Although they cannot be classed as written records, they nevertheless speak a language to the archaeologist which he understands and appreciates.

It is fortunate that the impulse of ancient man, to a large extent, was to place his records upon imperishable materials. Throughout all Bible lands many inscriptions were engraved upon stone, although, so far as discoveries have indicated, the tendency to do so was not extensive in Palestine. Among the Sumerians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, and other peoples contemporaneous with them clay was a durable substitute. Plastic when in a moist condition, clay hardens when dried and assumes the consistency of stone when thoroughly baked. It disclosed itself as admirably adapted for cuneiform characters indented by means of a stylus. The Egyptians made extensive use of a pliable, perishable writing material, i.e., papyrus, which was especially suited for hieroglyphic, hieratic, demotic, Coptic, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin records. Many inscriptions were also placed upon wood by the Egyptians. Papyrus spread from Egypt to the rest of the ancient world. Likewise, parchment was a widely used material for writing purposes among the people of antiquity. The range of archaeology would have to be curtailed considerably if papyrus had not become the main writing material in the Nile Valley, which possesses a climate capable of preserving it for thousands of years, and if clay had not become the main writing material in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, the ruins of which now yield both baked and unbaked clay tablets of great age. Numerous inscriptions upon different kinds of material and in different languages have already been unearthed, and it is the hope of all those interested in the excavation of historical sites that written records will be found. The ancient languages of Bible lands are now easily decipherable, so that whenever a legible inscription is found its general import can be determined immediately, since every fully organized archaeological enterprise has on its staff linguists as well as practical excavators. The decipherment and interpretation of inscriptions, including even the smallest fragments of ancient writings, may be regarded as constituting a most important department of biblical archaeology.

The secure basis of the science of biblical archaeology is indicated by the foregoing discussion. As soon as a typical wall is laid bare it can be ascribed to its proper period; as soon as a piece of standard pottery is found it can be fixed in its chronological setting; as soon as an inscription in a known language is discovered its archaeological message can be ascertained. The value of such definitely controlled criteria is very great.

## II. THE INTRINSIC SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

An analysis of the data furnished by biblical archaeology provides substantial ground for confidence in its accepted findings. This is due to the fact that archaeological material in general possesses characteristics which commend it as evidence. All authentic archaeological objects are indubitable vestiges of past life. With little exception they came into existence during periods of history which can be dated with sufficient accuracy. Emphasis should be placed upon a number of resultant advantages.

The supreme worth of archaeological material lies in the fact that it is contemporaneous with the biblical occurrences and descriptions upon which it sheds light. The full force of this assertion will be realized when it is remembered that no original manuscripts of the books of the Bible are in our possession. The earliest extant copies fail to synchronize with that which they relate by many centuries. If the old written sources of the books of the Bible had been preserved and could be found, a tremendous gain in biblical interpretation would result, but there is no assurance that such a far-reaching discovery will ever be made. In the absence of recovered indications as to how the Bible began to be recorded, the light on biblical times and events furnished by the spade of the excavator is of inestimable importance. The veracity of this testimony cannot be impeached. It is an authoritative voice from the past which cannot be silenced, a message from the days of old which cannot be ignored.

The uniqueness of archaeological material as proof so far as the Bible is concerned is enhanced because the evidence employed is external and not internal. There is no tendency in this statement to minimize the value of internal evidence, but all will admit the peculiar force which is attached to external evidence. If the Bible is represented by a circle, all the discoveries of an archaeological character which have any relationship whatsoever with the sacred record are as a rule outside that circle. This adds immeasurable weight to every bit of illumination and corroboration accruing from the investigation of ancient remains in Bible lands. A find verifying some outstanding portion of scriptural sources of information assumes, therefore, the proportions of a discovery of the first magnitude. Archaeological evidence because of its external character possesses strong validity. It cannot be brushed aside as of no consequence. It must inevitably be considered in any attempt to test the authenticity of the Bible.

The disinterestedness of archaeological evidence should also be emphasized. No one questions its utter impartiality.

For anyone to hold the view that the ancient inhabitants of Bible lands purposely produced imperishable objects and records in order that the Bible might be verified thousands of years after their time is preposterous. All archaeological material—architectural, artistic, literary—is the direct outgrowth of the normal flow of life in antiquity. It has not sprung from the ulterior motive of influencing peoples yet unborn in favor of religious books not yet canonized. Hence the story told by that which is recovered from the débris of ancient centers of population is all the more credible. There is no biased note in its attestation, no prejudiced tinge in its evidence. What it vouches for belongs to the realm of fact.

This combination of conditions serves to make unshakable those conclusions which are based upon straightforward evidence. Confidence is inspired because the past speaks to us authoritatively, directly, impartially.

### III. THE LOGICAL SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

In the interpretation of archaeological material there is no place for haphazard reasoning. Careful discrimination and meticulous judgment must be exercised if the pitfall of wrong inferences is to be avoided. Only by following these principles can dependable organized knowledge of any type whatsoever be gained. Of importance, therefore, is the fact that archaeological material possesses certain qualities which should be kept in mind by those who would learn the secrets of antiquity.

The science of biblical archaeology has progressed far enough for certainty to exist with reference to a considerable body of data. As has already been indicated, decisive judgments, within reasonable limits, can be rendered on the basis of familiar types of walls and works of art, exactly determined variations in pottery, and inscriptions in the mastered languages of ancient peoples. It should be regarded as axiomatic that definite conclusions can be drawn only from archaeological material the full significance of which is within the ken of those who employ it for interpretative purposes. By way of illustration, if an inscription is discovered, all the characters of which are clearly legible and all the words of which are thoroughly understood, it is evident that the complete translation of the inscription is possible. If its chronological setting can be fixed, still greater value may be attached to it. Should such an inscription contain an allusion that is capable of throwing light upon anything recorded in the Bible, it possesses the highest importance as archaeological material. Data the true significance of which is under control can alone be regarded as capable of furnishing fundamental and unambiguous criteria.

In any excavation of standard pretensions survivals of ancient occupation are often found which have relative rather than positive value as archaeological material. An inscription containing a strange word or phrase may come to light. Under such circumstances the meaning of the record is relative, i.e., it depends upon the decipherment of the new linguistic factor. The degree of relativity varies considerably, however. It is conceivable that the grammatical lacuna caused by an uncontrolled part of an inscription may be of little consequence so far as the meaning of the whole is concerned. On the other hand, the sense of the entire literary document may depend upon the meaning of the section that represents a contextual break. In either case, search may be made in cognate languages for the equivalent of that which is unknown in the discovered record. Relative meaning may also result from this process, inasmuch as there may be different shades of meaning for an individual word or phrase. Nevertheless, in some cases it is not difficult by this procedure to arrive at what may be regarded as the approximate sense of an otherwise baffling inscription. Aside from literary documents, various types of archaeological material which do not at first fit into the scheme of known data may be treated in the same way.

There is always the chance of unearthing archaeological material of cryptic significance. This may be a hitherto unknown cult utensil, a new type of pottery, a puzzling bit of artistic work, an enigmatic inscription, etc. Attempts at explaining such new data may not meet with success. This does not mean that archaeological material that cannot be properly elucidated should be removed from further consideration. Nothing of an archaeological character should be left out of later calculations. It may be that some future discovery will at a stroke unveil the meaning of that which cannot now be expounded. A word in an inscription may constitute a problem for a long time, but it may appear ultimately in a context which will solve its connotation. Excavations are the most valuable oftentimes when they bring material to light which assists in the understanding of that which was discovered previously. The ultimate potential importance of unexplained archaeological material is great, although in the meantime it may be entirely useless.

From a logical standpoint archaeological material of known quality has the highest value in throwing light upon the Bible. That which has relative quality cannot lead to more than tentative conclusions. That which has unknown quality should have no place in biblical interpretation. It must be remembered, however, that all archaeological material of relative or unknown quality may pass ultimately into the category of known data by reason of subsequent discoveries.

## IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

There are different attitudes in which archaeological material may be approached. A study of these possible attitudes constitutes an investigation of the psychological scope of biblical archaeology. A definite angle is contributed to the collection and interpretation of data by the mode of treatment employed. That varied modes of treatment may be the result of divergent interests needs no proof. It is possible to think of three main types of interest in archaeology so far as scriptural illumination is concerned.

An overpowering interest in ancient remains from a purely archaeological standpoint may exist because of singular admiration for recovered vestiges of past civilizations. It is possible for this to arise from a highly developed artistic or linguistic temperament submerged in the professional aspects of the science. Unbounded gratitude is due those who have devoted much time to discovering, recording, elucidating, and comparing archaeological data even though there has been no thought as to the possibility of linking the material with biblical accounts. The collection and arrangement of facts in an orderly manner has its distinct value. This kind of tedious but interesting labor must be performed unceasingly and ungrudgingly if archaeological progress is to be made. Biblical archaeology, in the last analysis, cannot exist if there are no archaeologically minded investigators. However, if an interest in archaeology per se is so intense as to drive out any recognition of contact with the biblical record, important ancient literature which has survived through the centuries is debarred from consideration.

An entirely opposite viewpoint is that which is concerned mainly with the part which archaeological data may play in verifying the Bible. There is a legitimate place for that interest in the Bible which would treat it as a collection of ancient records rightfully to be compared with the archaeological material of Bible lands contemporaneous with the events which have been preserved in writing. The propriety of a positive attitude which would seek to prove the Bible correct by every available means may be granted. Because a certain theory of the Bible may be involved in the process cannot be cause for criticism. Progress would be made in no science if investigation were unguided by hypothesis. However, the extreme must be avoided here also. Warm zeal for scriptural corroboration may lead to the ignoring of cold archaeological facts. Enthusiasm unchecked by reason may even result in reading more into the facts than is warranted. Searching scrutiny and careful discrimination are needed in any attempt to employ recovered survivals of antiquity for the purpose of elucidating or verifying the Bible. The one who attempts to deduce inferences in the field of biblical archaeology ought to be capable of the most rigid self-criticism.

Between the two extremes which have just been described there is a satisfactory mean comprised of scholarly interest in archaeological data associated with reverent interest in the Bible as a historicoreligious record rooted in the distant past and hence susceptible of careful comparison with the results of archaeology. Such an attitude is able to contribute the most to biblical archaeology. It avoids the indifference of lukewarmness toward cherished canonized books and at the same time evades the zeal which would decide the case at all times in favor of sacred literature. Fortunately the trend of the science is toward a union of accurate archaeological technique with calm yet devoted scriptural interpretation.

Biblical archaeology, if it is to thrive as a science, must be guided neither by a severity inclined to subtract all historical value from the books of the Bible nor by a blindness ready to interpret archaeological data irrespective of merit for the purpose of corroborating the Scriptures. Strict adherence to fact can be maintained most effectively by not leaning excessively in either direction.

## V. THE SPECIALIZED SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

Due to the fact that archaeological material has increased greatly in quantity, a distinct sphere of technical research has resulted. Not only is this field of investigation fascinating in itself, but it makes a general appeal on account of possible contributions to a better understanding of situations, scenes, and events depicted in the Bible. So many factors are involved in the proper interpretation of archaeological data that complexity rather than simplicity results. Hence the qualifications of those who are to pronounce authoritatively concerning the meaning of archaeological facts in relation to biblical statements are of supreme importance.

The preservation and advancement of any science depends upon specialists, and biblical archaeology is no exception to the rule. Assiduous study and persevering labor are essential requisites. Merely to acquire a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of archaeological data is an immense task in itself. In reality, the mastery of a single branch of biblical archaeology, whether it be ancient architecture, ancient art, or ancient literature, is the work of a lifetime. Therefore the rôle of the expert in the field of biblical archaeology is an inevitable and indispensable one. However, the investigator who would qualify in this profession must know the Bible as well. To be ignorant or unappreciative of the genius and character of its pages, to be unable to deal competently with its message in the original languages and extant versions, to fail to respond to its unique value both as history and religious literature, these are deficiencies likely to deprive the interpreter of much that would aid him in his arduous pursuit. Hence the deciding word in biblical archaeology can be uttered only by one who is versed in both archaeology and biblical literature.

Not all who are interested in biblical archaeology have the time to qualify as trained experts. This does not mean that they may not become careful students of the subject. The more general aspects of the science are within the grasp of the intelligent investigator even if detailed technical processes cannot be utilized by him. Naturally he is limited in the deduction of new and independent inferences, although the broad trends of biblical archaeology are not confined to the comprehension of an inner circle. In other words, the science is not esoteric. It is possible for any outstanding result of biblical archaeology to be presented in such a way that the ordinary reader may realize its fundamental implications. However, the fixing of determining principles and the settling of disputed questions should not be intrusted to the amateur in the subject, no matter how sincere and earnest he may be. If this were done, the foundations of the science would crumble.

A valueless type of approach to the data provided by biblical archaeology, from the standpoint of tested judgments, is made by those who exhibit a willingness to grasp at every straw of apparent biblical corroboration without a desire to go into the grounds of proof or to give much concern to the real merits of the evidence. This is the position of the novitiate whose zeal is untempered by calm consideration. Neither scientific truth nor lasting results can be expected from such an attitude. A course so superficial is all the more fruitless because it is unnecessary. The amount of authentic and irrefutable archaeological data now at our disposal is so enormous and the bases of a real science are so clearly at hand that all attempts to deal with the material in a cursory manner represent wasted energy.

Biblical archaeology, as based upon the scrupulous deductions of capable experts, constitutes a true science which will continue to develop and expand, as excavations progress, with consequent growing contribution to the sphere of biblical interpretation.

## VI. THE ACCURATE SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

The permanence of far-reaching conclusions depends upon the degree of accuracy attainable in the comparison of biblical and archaeological data. No aggregation of facts can be regarded as contributing to scientific knowledge if precision is entirely lacking. This rule applies to biblical archaeology with peculiar force. Exactness and finality are not possible in all instances, but there should be a striving for secure principles, standard processes, and settled criteria whereby sound results may be achieved.

Several factors must be under control if certitude is to be gained. This can be explained best by using a single process in biblical archaeology as an illustration. In such a process three steps are necessary: (1) The archaeological material under investigation must be scrutinized carefully. Only if its characteristics are fully known can it be used for drawing definite conclusions. (2) The biblical passage with which comparison is sought must be examined with equal caution. If too much is taken for granted with regard to its meaning, resultant inferences may contain truth mixed with error. (3) The actual comparison of archaeological and biblical data must be free from fallacy. An inclination to sophistry will invalidate the results which are presented. If proper discrimination is observed in all these steps and if the facts constitute unambiguous data, positive demonstration is possible. It should be said that the science of biblical archaeology furnishes numerous examples of dependable reasoning along the lines that have been indicated. A study of these examples will aid in applying the same principles to fresh archaeological material.

Presumptive evidence has considerable weight in any attempt to arrive at conclusions. There may be a lack of complete clarity with regard to a modicum of data in the three steps belonging to a comparison of archaeological and biblical material. This is sufficient to prevent entire certainty, but there are conceivable instances in which a legitimate amount of confidence may be felt in drawing inferences even under such circumstances. However, this type of assurance should be regarded as qualified rather than absolute. Readiness to admit this and willingness to suggest that the ultimate decision in the case depends upon future discoveries are to be expected if one is aiming at punctilious accuracy in the science.

Supposition is an approved scientific procedure. The tendency to indulge in theories and hypotheses in any search for truth is not to be condemned, since it is natural for the human mind to postulate where it cannot prove, to imagine where it cannot demonstrate. The discovered archaeological material capable of throwing light upon certain biblical passages may be very meager, but it may be enough for a number of interesting conjectures. Such conjectures are entirely in place, if they are submitted as conjectures and not as conclusions. However, no conjecture should do violence to the facts as known. Further findings in the field of archaeology may fortify or refute a conjecture. Ultimately, if sufficiently buttressed by new data, a conjecture may pass, oftentimes by the road of probability, into the realm of certainty.

The range of certitude in the field of biblical archaeology is extensive enough to furnish stability to the science. Sole attention to questions mainly in the sphere of probability and conjecture is not necessitated by the material at hand. However, all archaeological facts related in any way to the Bible should be studied and evaluated.

### VII. THE PRACTICAL SCOPE OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

How effective is biblical archaeology in the actual illumination of portions of the scriptural records? May varying degrees of light be thrown upon different biblical passages? It would be unreasonable to expect absolute uniformity; in reality there is considerable divergence. Three main possibilities suggest themselves, but it should be remembered that there are many intermediate grades of corroboration.

Of primary importance are those instances in which facts mentioned in the Bible are unmistakably referred to in ancient inscriptions which have been discovered and deciphered. Such instances constitute direct corroboration which cannot be denied or rejected on account of misinterpretation. The prism inscription of Sennacherib which refers to the Assyrian ruler's campaign in Syria and Palestine and which mentions Hezekiah, the Judaean, in connection with a circumstantial account of the siege of Jerusalem without ensuing capture is a good illustration of direct corroboration. Many other instances of direct corroboration, dependent upon various types of archaeological data, might be cited.

There are numerous instances in which archaeological evidence sheds light indirectly upon some phase of the biblical record. This is recognized as indirect corroboration. For example, forms of the name Abraham have been found in Babylonian texts contemporaneous with what is regarded as the patriarchal period. In no case is the name applied to an individual who can be identified with the biblical Abraham.

However, proof is furnished that such a personal name existed in the time of the First Babylonian Dynasty. Furthermore, there is strong cuneiform indication that travel between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean lands of Syria and Palestine was common in the period to which Abraham is assigned. These facts, without direct reference to Abraham, contribute plausibility to the biblical accounts concerning him and thus furnish indirect corroboration.

There are instances in which the results of archaeological investigation, although intimately related to certain questions of biblical interpretation, raise new questions the solution of which is not easy. Unsuspected vistas of history requiring co-ordination and inviting speculation are often disclosed. Indeterminate corroboration results. Thus the celebrated Amarna letters have contributed much to our knowledge of Egyptian influence in Palestine in the fourteenth century, B.C. At the same time they have made the science of biblical archaeology responsible for the unraveling of a difficult enigma. The exodus of the Israelites from Egypt and their invasion of Canaan have become complicated historical problems. Who were the Habiru, and was there more than one return of descendants of Jacob to the promised land? The attack of Merneptah upon Israelites in Palestine in the thirteenth century B.C. is perplexing to certain scholars. However, the archaeological evidence thus furnished cannot be disregarded or discounted, even if confusion ensues in the minds of some from an attempt to harmonize what has been discovered with the biblical record. Probably the best attitude under such circumstances is to hold final judgment in abeyance while awaiting the discovery of new data.

Many of the archaeological discoveries which may be compared with what is recorded in the Bible lead to positive results. Direct and indirect corroboration of the Scriptures predominates. Not only is this so, but there are instances in which problems raised by partial archaeological data have been solved decisively by the recovery of additional facts.

LIBRARY.

# THE DIVERSITY OF RELIGION

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OF ALL the vain but persistent quests of man—quests for the philosopher's stone, for the fountain of youth, for the elixir of immortality—none has been more fondly or more stubbornly pursued than the quest for a definition of religion. Year after year, and generation after generation, new definitions continue to be offered, but none of them finds general acceptance. Why has this quest so signally failed? Because religion is not any one thing.

A well-known work on the history of religion is entitled *Orpheus*. A complete account of all the varying forms of religion, if such an account were possible, might very well be called *Proteus*. Homer tells us that Menelaus, returning from the Trojan war, was detained by the gods on an island, until the daughter of Proteus took pity on him and helped him to trap her father. To escape the firm clutch of Menelaus, "the ancient one of the sea" changed rapidly from one shape to another: "at first he turned into a bearded lion, and thereafter into a snake, and a pard, and a huge boar; then he took the shape of running water, and of a tall and flowering tree." Menelaus, however, refused to let go until Proteus submitted and told him how to find his way home.

Now religion in the course of its history has assumed a multitude and a variety of forms which would have sorely taxed even the metamorphic powers of the old Hellenic deity. Menelaus did succeed in holding Proteus fast, but strive as we may to hold religion and discover its essential nature, it eludes our grasp. Of course, from a practical standpoint, we may seize and hold the thing itself, and learn from it the way home, without being able to define it or to describe it adequately. What is significant for our present purpose, however, is that religion is more Protean than Proteus. It is not one thing but many. Verily the name covereth a multitude of sins, and of virtues, too.

For example, religion is a matter of the inner life, and as such is intensely individual. Professor Whitehead defines it as what a man does with his solitude. None of us can know just what religion means to his neighbor. Our religion, if it be real at all, must be our own. Only to a limited degree can it be shared with any other soul. But religion is also an affair of group activities and experiences. In a recent public address Dean Sperry, of the Harvard Divinity School, defined religion in terms of the sense of belonging to something. Historically, he said, it arose in connection with man's consciousness of membership in a social group. Now when the mystic speaks of religion as he knows it in his own experience, and when the sociologist describes religion as he observes it in the history of the race, they use the same word, but are they really talking about the same thing?

The variety of meanings attached to the term appears when different people are asked to state their ideas of a religious person. Many will reply at once that a religious man is one who believes in God, or in God and immortality. To them religion is belief. "As a man thinketh, so is he" religious or irreligious. I have heard it stated in a Christian pulpit that admission to heaven depended not upon life but upon belief. "The kind of life we live," said the preacher, "may determine the place assigned to us in heaven, but it is what we believe that determines whether we shall get there at all or not." Consequently, the survival of religion in the world depends upon the maintenance of certain intellectual propositions. Religion stands or falls with this or that philosophy—our own, of course. But, given the belief, a person is not necessarily and *ipso facto* religious. A young man once said to me, "The preachers tell us, 'Believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and you'll be saved.' Why, there isn't a fellow anywhere around here that doesn't believe Jesus Christ is the Son of God, but we know mighty well we're not Christians." Obviously, a definition of religion in terms of belief alone is inadequate. "The devils believe, and tremble."

The statement that a person is religious often means that he is a church member, or that he goes to prayer-meeting regularly. Religion thus becomes a matter of specific activities and institutions. Yet no thoughtful person would regard this as the sole criterion. Forms and organizations have their place. No description of religion which ignored them would be complete. Few, however, would maintain that the existence of religion is inseparably bound up with the life of its institutional expressions.

Often what is held to be the distinctive mark of a religious man is the quality of his character and conduct. "There's what I call a real Christian," we say, and we mean that there is a man who exemplifies the Christian ideal of life. Christianity is "the Jesus way." To be religious is to live according to the highest ethical ideals. Certainly, an account of what religion actually is and has been must give due place to the important part played by religion in the moral evolution of our race. But, here again, religion and morality are not the same. I have heard a mother say of her son, "He's a good boy, but he isn't religious." The distinction between morality and religion is sometimes very sharply drawn. While the Christian evangelist insists that one may be moral without being religious, the Hindu claims that one may be religious without being moral.

To be religious means to many people neither belief nor conduct, to say nothing of participation in certain forms and institutions. The mother just quoted as saying that her boy was not religious meant that he had not been converted. To her religion was a particular kind of experience. The psychological study of religion during the last two or three decades has emphasized this aspect of the religious life. Once more we must acknowledge that here is something which a true description of religion must take into account, though once more we should decline to identify religion with any specific type of experience.

Religion is belief; religion is an organized social institution; religion is conduct; religion is experience. In varying degrees and in multifarious forms religion combines all these ingredients. The permutations and combinations are unlimited. How can we hope to comprehend under any definition such a complex, heterogeneous group of phenomena?

One point seems to be very generally accepted by recent writers on the subject. It is agreed that religion is best understood as a matter of activity in the pursuit of recognized values. This suggests a different mode of approach to our problem. Let us ask what are the religious values, what are the needs and wants whose satisfaction is sought in religion. Will not this afford us a unifying principle?

Frequently religion involves a radical *Umwertung aller Werte*. The values most highly regarded by the world at large are relegated to the bottom of the scale, and in their place those things which are unseen but eternal become the primary object of the soul's desire. The Hindu philosopher, facing the prospect of an eternal round of death and rebirth, finds no satisfaction in the thought of endlessly repeating life's experiences. Life is evil; returning again and again is a thing of dread. The goal of all his hope is to escape definitely and finally from the wheel of existence, to know that "there is no returning." Salvation is not eternal life but deliverance from life. Other religions picture in glowing colors the life of the world to come, but the common values of this life are despised. In Taoism the hereafter is not taken into account at all; nevertheless the end sought is not worldly welfare but inner peace in mystic union with the Absolute. *Contemptus mundi* is a familiar phenomenon in religion the world over. The religious values, we are tempted to say, are spiritual values.

But that is not always true. Even more frequently religion is just one of the ways by which men try to satisfy the natural needs and desires of this life. By hunting and fishing, by agriculture and manufacturing and trade, man seeks food, clothing, shelter, safety, health, and comfort for himself and his family. In religion he finds a supplementary method of pursuing the same ends. Prayers, sacrifices, hymns, and ritual dances are used to insure the growth of the crops, the increase of the flocks and herds, the safety of the village, and the health of its inhabitants. The gods hold our fate in their hands; it is good business to keep them well disposed toward us. We must find which are the most powerful and the most reliable among them and cultivate their favor. "If God will be with me," says Jacob, "and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat and raiment to put on, . . . . then Jehovah will be my God."

As a business proposition, to be sure, religion may sometimes fail. In a community known to the writer, the people used to tell about a man who had joined the church only to withdraw in disgust after two years. "There's nothing in religion," he said; "for the last two years I've had the poorest crops I ever had!" But failure is not unknown in other forms of business.

At any rate it is not too much to say that to the great majority of the sons of men religion has always been, at least in part, a matter of business. The motive for seeking material blessings and the attitude toward the powers who are asked to grant them may be much nobler than the calculating *quid pro quo* relationship just indicated. The sense of dependence which Schleiermacher made central in his conception of religion, together with a profound sense of the greatness of God, may lead men to feel that no amount of effort on their part can suffice to win their daily bread, unless they also seek the favor of the Giver of every good and perfect gift. But whatever attitudes and motives may be involved, the fact remains that men have sought by religion the satisfaction of their natural needs and desires. Instead of withdrawing their minds from material goods and setting their affections on things that are above, they have used religion as a method for attaining the common ends of everyday life. Religion is business.

A similar diversity may be noted with respect to political values. "My kingdom is not of this world," says Jesus to Pilate in the Fourth Gospel. "Our citizenship is in heaven," writes Paul to the Philippians. Thus religion has often made men bold to rebel against kings and governments, saying, "We ought to obey God rather than man." Elijah makes Ahab tremble. John Knox addresses a monarch as "God's silly vassal." On the other hand, religion has very commonly been made to support political authority. Rulers reign by divine right. "Who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed and be guiltless?" Laws are given by the gods: Moses receives the Law from Yahweh, and Hammurabi receives his code from Shamash. Criminals are tried by ordeal, that the gods may make manifest the innocent and the guilty. Frequently the condemned are delivered to the gods for punishment. Offerings are duly made before any important enterprise is undertaken. Oracles are consulted regarding weighty matters of state. Before beginning a campaign or a battle Saul and David summon the priests with the ark and have the sacred lot cast. Mesha, king of Moab, begins the account of his victories over the Hebrews with the statement, "And Kemosh said to me, Go take Nebo against Israel." Religion is an effective means of welding empires together and securing loyalty. The Bolshevists call it "the opiate of the people," used by the ruling classes to drug the proletariat and keep it submissive. History gives some excuse for the charge. An Augustus revives the old Roman religion and adds to it emperor-worship. A Constantine utilizes the growing influence of Christianity to strengthen his empire and insists upon unity in the church, that there may be unity in the state. Religion is government.

Religion is knowledge. Intellectual values are highly prized. Of course knowledge does not always mean the same thing. The mystic finds supreme assurance in an experience of direct contact with Ultimate Reality. The knowledge of God is in itself the end and the way of salvation. "This is life eternal, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." So the Brahman philosopher seeks deliverance from the chain of *karma* by the knowledge that he and Brahma are one: "That, O soul, art thou!" But this mystical experience is not the only kind of knowledge honored by religion. Scholarship and practical wisdom are often regarded as marks of divine favor or as means of attaining it. Learning has sometimes been the exclusive prerogative of priests or monks. Not only magical lore and erudition in sacred writings and ecclesiastical traditions, but also the investigation of natural phenomena may be counted among the pursuits encouraged by religion. Some of the greatest names in science and philosophy are those of priests and other devout Christians, and the result of scientific discovery has often been an increase of faith and reverence. With much truth we may say that religion is knowledge.

With equal truth we may say that religion is ignorance. The little boy's definition of faith as "believing what you know ain't so" has much to justify it. *Credo quia absurdum est* is a principle not often frankly avowed but rather frequently followed. Students of Christian history have observed that at one period the church allows men to read the book of Nature but forbids them to study the book of written revelation; at another period the written word is studied assiduously, but the book of Nature is closed. If facts contradict our creeds, we close our eyes. Religion is ignorance.

Religion is recreation. Worldly pleasures, to be sure, may be condemned unsparingly. "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth." A sour face is often thought to be a mark of spirituality. In a Christian Endeavor meeting I once heard a young lady give this original version of I Timothy 3:16, "great is the misery of godliness." And no one seemed to see anything amiss in the statement! The Buddhist monk must vow not only that he will not eat after noon, indulge in musical or dramatic performances, or make himself attractive with garlands, perfumes, or ointments, but even that he will not sleep on a bed that is comfortable. Yet Buddhism is a Middle Way between indulgence and asceticism. Enjoyment and religion often seem to be regarded as mutually exclusive, not in New England only, but throughout the world.

But look again. In all lands and in all ages you may see religion serving as a form of recreation. The religious festivals of our Celtic and Teutonic ancestors were occasions of the most hilarious merrymaking, often far exceeding the bounds of propriety. Holy days easily become holidays. Festivals, games, and contests are often religious observances. Dances and plays grow out of religious rituals. Tragedy has its origin in the worship of Dionysus, and modern European drama grows out of the mystery plays. All the arts find both material and opportunity in the beliefs and practices of religion. Not only does religion afford occasions for recreation, however; it is itself to many people a means of entertainment and distraction. A young minister in a college community was once told by the president of the institution that he should not try to stimulate thought by his preaching. "People come to church," said this educator, "to rest." When a college girl says that she no longer goes to church because she gets more thrills from a movie, she at least reveals frankly what she would expect from a church service if she did go and reminds us that there are many people in the churches who think of public worship as a sort of weekly Chautauqua. Religion is recreation.

Now in its truest sense recreation is not an unworthy function even for religion. The experience of worship at its best provides the finest means of recruiting exhausted reserves, restoring lost perspective, and recovering zest for the work that must be done. Faith is "the victory that overcometh the world." Faith removes mountains; it subdues kingdoms. Religion is power to meet life and overcome it. But, again, religion is also a refuge from life. All too many people have found in it an unreal world of wish-fulfilments, to which they flee from the hard and brutal facts of life. The hermit runs away from social responsibility to a lonely cell in the wilderness. And many who are not hermits and take no monastic vows resort to religion as a world of make-believe. Abundant cases may be found in which religion is not a strong tower of defense but a weak defense-mechanism.

The desire for distraction and escape, the craving for thrills, may seek its satisfaction in an emotional debauch. What drives one man to drink will drive another to religion, and the results in both cases may be surprisingly alike. Then religion is intoxication. The extreme excitement, sometimes artificially induced, which appears here and there in almost all religions, from Saul's "prophesying" and the "enthusiasm" of the Graeco-Roman mystery cults to the "shouting" and "shakes" of crude American revivalism, can hardly be described as anything but a form of inebriety. Psychologists, from James to Leuba, have shown how closely the mystic's experience resembles the effects produced by alcohol and drugs. Indeed, the beatific vision is sometimes deliberately sought by the use of artificial stimulants. Even the gods themselves may require such means of reinforcing their valor: Indra takes copious drafts of Soma before attacking the dragon. In one of the sects of Hinduism the poison of passion is attacked by a homeopathic method. Wine, meat, and sensual indulgence are the means of union with Shiva. Of course there is also a much nobler sense in which religious experience may be a kind of intoxication. A great saint and mystic is called "a God-intoxicated man." The Apostle Paul wrote to the Ephesians, "Be not drunken with wine, wherein is excess, but be filled with the Spirit." The contrast between the exalted spiritual state described by such expressions and the crude manifestations just mentioned only serves to confirm the thesis that religion is not one thing but many.

What Emerson says of poetic inspiration applies with equal force to religious experience:

> It is a secret which every intellectual man quickly learns that, beyond the energy of his possessed and conscious intellect, he is capable of a new energy (as of an intellect doubled on itself). . . . . This is the reason why bards love wine, mead, narcotics, coffee, tea, opium, the fumes of sandal-wood and tobacco, or whatever other species of animal exhilaration. . . . . But never can any advantage be taken of nature by a trick. The spirit of the world, the great calm presence of the creator, comes not forth to the sorceries of opium or of wine. The sublime vision comes to the pure and simple soul in a clean and chaste body. That is not an inspiration which we owe to narcotics, but some counterfeit excitement and fury.

Evidently we cannot define religion in terms of the values which it endeavors to realize and conserve. They are not always social values in the sense that they make for social welfare and progress. Monasticism, which is certainly a religious phenomenon, is often parasitic and destructive from a social point of view. And if we say that religion seeks "socially recognized values," how large a group is necessary to make the recognition social? Frequently the religious man's scale of values is diametrically opposed to that of the society in which he lives. Again, what kind of recognition is involved? Sometimes society at large recognizes ascetic ideals as valid for a small group of saints, while emphatically repudiating them for itself. Perhaps there is something to be said for the practice of the Chinese and Japanese people, who resort to Buddhism for assurance of blessedness hereafter, to Confucianism for their ethical ideals, and to their ancient national deities for the temporal necessities of this life. At any rate what has been said is surely sufficient to show the reason for our persistent failure, in spite of all attempts, to construct a satisfactory definition of religion. We have been trying to define the indefinite. Religion is not one thing but many.

Of course this does not mean that one cannot or should not define what religion means to him personally. For each individual and for each group there need be nothing indefinite about it. What seems to us to be the essential nature of religion we may well endeavor to express as exactly as we can. The result, however, will not be a descriptive definition of religion as it has existed in history, or as it exists throughout the world today. Having said, "This is what religion means to me," we have no right to deny the name of religion to everything not embraced by our statement, like the missionary (quoted by Professor Moore in his *Birth and Growth of Religion)* who said that the savages to whom he preached had no religion: they worshiped devils. Most of our ideal definitions are too narrow. They exclude many people, if not whole groups, who call themselves religious and have as much right to the title as we have.

The opposite extreme may be seen in the current tendency to define religion as "the quest of the good life." This is inclusive enough, if we mean by the good life everything that is regarded as desirable by the people concerned. Such a definition puts the chief emphasis where it belongs, on activity in pursuit of values, and has the further advantage of including the non-theistic religions. But it includes also every other interest and activity of mankind. It amounts to the same thing as saying that religion means everything that is done to get anything that anybody wants. A definition that is too broad is no better than one that is too narrow. We cover the ground only by covering the whole earth. The term we are discussing is broad enough without being stretched to include activities for which we have other names that are quite satisfactory. Aesthetic creation and appreciation, ethical culture, social reform, patriotism, education, and many other things have much in common with religion, but they are not religion. Without departing from the historic associations of the word in the slightest we have a sufficient variety of phenomena to make an adequate descriptive definition impossible. And, after all, except for academic purposes, such a definition would not be as valuable as our varying ideal definitions, if only we recognize them for what they are.

We may not only state what religion means to us personally; we may also, in the interest of comity, try to find the highest common factor in different forms of religion. Doubtless the better we understand one another, the more we shall find we have in common, and the more we find the better. There are limits, however, even to religious unity. Liberty also is precious, and so are honesty and clear thinking. A frank recognition of our differences, provided it does not involve misunderstanding, is as important as the realization of our agreements. Why may we not join hands wholeheartedly and work together so far as we are able, and then, when we reach the parting of the ways, part as friends and with mutual respect? Indeed, for the sake of unity itself, how can we hope to iron out our differences until we know just what they are? Why talk expansively of unity in essentials when we do not agree as to what is essential? To one Christian group the principle of apostolic succession is fundamental. To another baptism by immersion is a matter that admits no compromise. Many radical divergencies in conviction and in basic point of view divide the various branches of the Christian church. Even Christianity is not one thing but many.

Indeed, the greatest differences are not always those between separate organized systems. The distinctions we have been noting cut across the lines that mark the divisions between the world's religions. If we place the various religions side by side in parallel columns, the differences up and down the columns are often greater than those which separate one religion from another. A liberal Protestant has more in common with a liberal Jew than he has with the members of some nominally Christian sects. At the same time there are real and vital differences between the religions too. It is not true that all religions are the same at bottom, or even at the top. And, wherever the lines of demarcation may fall, nothing is lost by frankly acknowledging that religion may be one thing or it may be another. The use of the same name does not guarantee the identity of the object.

At least it is obvious that we cannot include under any sweeping judgment everything that calls itself religion. We cannot say that religion is true or that religion is false. We cannot say that religion is good or that religion is bad. We should do better to stop trying to lump all forms of religion together and concern ourselves rather with promoting higher and worthier kinds of religion. Like patriotism, like love, religion may be an ennobling or a debasing force in life. The old distinction between true and false religion still holds good. The thing of chief importance is not whether a man has something that can be called religion, but what kind of religion he has.

# THE THEOLOGY OF CRISIS IN THE LIGHT OF SCHLEIERMACHER

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NINETY-EIGHT years after the appearance of the final and definitive edition of that second greatest systematic theology which Protestantism has produced, Schleiermacher's *Der Christliche Glaube,* an English translation has been published.[1] The translating has been done by a group of eight British theologians, under the joint-editorship of Dr. H. R. Mackintosh and Mr. J. S. Stewart. It is the former whose translation of Ritschl three decades ago has already laid many under his debt. The present admirable undertaking is a notable achievement of British theological scholarship. Four generations of Protestants have felt the emancipating touch of Schleiermacher's mind. The leaven of his thought is far from having exhausted its virtue. In the uneven and heterogeneous mass of contemporary Christianity remain thousands upon thousands who have yet to come under his liberating influence. When they first read Schleiermacher's *Addresses on Religion,* their eyes will be opened to the possibility of the retention or the recovery of religious faith in an age of doubt and indifference. Their theology, too, under the stimulus of his *magnum opus, The Christian Faith,* will enter a period of reconstruction that will enhance its vitality as theology becomes for them a practical discipline and a descriptive science.

Students of the history of theology, also, will welcome this monumental translation. Taken together with his *Reden* it will enable them to trace the development and modification of Schleiermacher's thought from the time of the Wednesday Society to the more conservative period of his theological professorship. As they read they will be amazed to find it the source of so much they prize or decry as being typically modern. Schleiermacher placed great emphasis on the church. He stressed the fundamental importance of religious experience. He set forth a basis for theological tolerance. He made science and religion independent of each other. Sin he defined as the segregated self. He might almost be called the father of our current Christocentrism.

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[1] *The Christian Faith by Friedrich Schleiermacher.* Edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928. 760 pages. $6.50.

To no other Protestant leader, with the exception of Luther, has a more extensive literature been devoted than to Schleiermacher. How far he is from being outmoded may be judged from the fact that a German volume of four hundred pages, devoted to an attack on his theology, has recently reappeared in a second and revised edition, only four years after its original publication.[2] The author of this thoroughgoing criticism of Schleiermacher is Dr. Emil Brunner, professor of theology at the University of Zurich, and one of the Swiss leaders of the so-called "theology of crisis" that seems to be making a rather striking impression on the religious thought of the continent. Dr. Brunner, who some time ago spent a year as one of the Foreign Fellows at the Union Theological Seminary, is known to Americans through his two recent visits here as a special lecturer.

The translation of *The Christian Faith* has an added, if passing, timeliness because of Brunner's vigorous attack upon its author. It may serve as a measuring rod by which to gauge the characteristics of the theology of crisis. Some such convenient criterion as this is much needed. The new school has attracted a good deal of attention in this country but its exponents have found difficulty in making its positions and its temper clear to American readers. This does not imply that the Barthian movement (to use the name of its first prophet) has been incompetently set forth. Quite the contrary. But standing by itself, there has been lacking a basis of comparison and contrast between this novelty and something relatively familiar or easily available to the American student.

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[2] *Die Mystik und das Wort.* By Emil Brunner. Tübingen: Mohr, 1928. 399 pages.

A theologian may be known by his distastes. Find out what violently displeases him, and you will have a clue to his own theological preferences. In none of his writings does Brunner fail to collide with one or another of Schleiermacher's positions, but it is in his *Die Mystik und das Wort* that he collides head on.

Brunner objects to Schleiermacher on the ground that the latter, though pious, was no Christian. He used Christian-sounding words but he deflated them of their rightful meaning. One might point out that Brunner could not make this criticism of Schleiermacher if he had looked at Christianity in the light of its history, and come to see what a variety of forms and doctrines it has covered. But Brunner is talking about a normative definition of Christianity, not a descriptive definition. According to the norm derived from the Christianity of the first apostles, the faith of Luther, and the theology of Irenaeus and of Kirkegaard, Schleiermacher (so says Brunner) is no Christian. An analysis of this judgment of Brunner's will reveal the essential features of his own theology.

Schleiermacher was an empiricist. To Brunner this is his most objectionable characteristic. Schleiermacher was foolish enough to believe that a man can reach God through the medium of, or by the interpretation of, his own experience. That Schleiermacher selected the feeling of absolute dependence as the experience which is to be called religious, i.e., which connects us with God, is to Brunner a matter of secondary importance compared with Schleiermacher's general thesis that there is any aspect of self-conscious experience whatsoever which may be identified as consciousness of God, or which will give assurance of God.

This is the error of all mysticism. The mysticism Brunner attacks is not classic mysticism with its hostility to culture and social responsibility. The contemporary mysticism which arouses his ire is a romantic cosmic aestheticism.[3] Its keynote is experience. Its common interest is the inner emotions of the soul. Its highest value is intensity of feelings. The mystic of this sort begins with himself. A historical revelation is embarrassing to him. He believes in himself. He suffers under the illusion that he has discovered a way—the mystic path—by which he can lift himself or sink himself into the heights and depths of deity. The mystic, confident in the efficacy of his method, relies on self-help. He saves himself. "By his own spiritual exercises he reaches an island of peace in the midst of the world's stormy sea of conflict; a place of quietness where there is no struggle but only rest and enjoyment. There the rift is healed and the individual has a good conscience."[4] He has God, now, in the immediate present. His longing is satisfied. Yet this experience, however ineffable, is bought by the mystic at too great a price. His supposition that in it he has laid hold on God is, according to Brunner, fallacious. His assertion that he has merged his soul with the All is mere phraseology.

The fact is that a mystical religion, such as Schleiermacher was guilty of vamping onto Christianity, never gets beyond subjective feeling. It remains an inward movement in the soul of man. It evaporates in an emotional titillation which has no grip on external reality. It is concerned with human attitudes, not with objective truth. Such a religion becomes an aspect of anthropology and loses its external reference. It is perforce agnostic. No wonder Schleiermacher was so indifferent to the necessity of definite statements about the nature of God. A logical conclusion of this misinterpretation of religion would be the posing of such a question as, Is theism necessary to religion? Schleiermacher's answer would be in the negative. Religion has nothing to do with God. Religion, according to

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[3] See *ibid.*, chap. v, pp. 48 ff.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

Brunner's interpretation of Schleiermacher's mysticism, is a method of private living unto oneself and one's social and physical environment. By a process of spiritual gymnastics individuals will gradually attain a state of perfection here on earth. Religion is equivalent to cultural optimism. It supplies the motive power for working over the raw material of life into orderly living. It previsions no great catastrophic change of scene. Rather, by a gradual continuous progress, the tares will be weeded out from the wheat. The doctrine of evolution is, in fact, "the magic-key that opens all doors" of Schleiermacher's thought.[5] Its omnipresence in his system accounted for the relativity of difference between good and evil. It undergirded his religion of culture. It provided him with his principle of continuity. It blinded him to the original dualism between the absolute and the "given" in the world.

Schleiermacher's system, in Brunner's opinion, was the result of a thoroughgoing misunderstanding of the nature of God and of his relation to the world. It was based on a pantheistic naturalism. Reading God in terms of substance, Schleiermacher and his like were bound to correlate, when they did not identify, God and the world. Schleiermacher was prevented from maintaining a complete identification only by his notion of causality, which led him to posit as the whence and the why of the world a God who is himself the world under another aspect and who is quite unthinkable apart from the world. Schleiermacher was therefore "sick with immanence." He seemed to be totally unaware of the split which divides existence into two parts: God on the one side, and man and nature on the other. His failure to perceive this radical dualism was due to his principle of continuity. There was for Schleiermacher no mystic line severing the human from the divine. In the romantic twilight of his aestheticism he failed to note the demarcations between personalities, the radical character of sin and evil, the hiatus between human progress and heaven. He toned down all sharp differentiations and mollified all bitter contradictions in the interest of the continuous progress of mankind onward and upward forever.[6]

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 276.

Schleiermacher's correlation of empiricism, mysticism, subjectivism, and evolution is, according to Brunner, the typically modern interpretation of religion. It is the root of the Christian humanism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Schleiermacher is monistic, Brunner's position is dualistic.[7] To Schleiermacher God is the soul of the world; to Brunner, on the contrary, God is the creator of the world. He is no limitless, boundless, indefinite being, hardly to be distinguished from the world. He is not immanent in the world. God and the world are not mutually correlated. Schleiermacher's doctrine of continuous creation was plausible only because he failed to recognize the absolute difference that exists between God and nature. Actually, Brunner affirms, there is no continuity. There yawns a great gulf between creator and creature. Over against both man and nature is the transcendent God. It is as impossible to go through nature to God as it is to go through human nature to God. There is no meaning of God in human experience or history. The human and the divine do not overlap. The best in us is never God in us.

Out of nothing God created the world. This doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, according to Brunner, is not intended to explain the origin of the world but to maintain God's absolute freedom and difference as over against the world. Having created the world, he is its sovereign and its free lord. God could not be free any more than we if he were imprisoned by the chain of cause and effect. That God is in no wise dependent on the world for his existence nor bound in any way by nature makes thinkable his freedom and hence his personality. Personality is not a limitation upon God, for personality is essentially free and arbitrary. God, for instance, is free to love

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 329 f.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

whom he will, or to give the world an entirely different constitution, changing completely its laws, natural and spiritual.

Being personal, God can enter into personal relations. It was to enjoy personal relations with human beings that he created the world. (Brunner rejects utilitarian interpretations of God's chief end in creation which affirm that his chief end is to guarantee human purposes or to illuminate life's problems.) But the personal relations which God initially established between himself and human beings have been broken by the latter through the misuse of their original freedom. Their disobedience is, furthermore, an insult to his honor. God is the great lawgiver and judge. He cannot permit contempt of court to go unpunished. Were that to happen he would cease to be God. His punishment is not pedagogical discipline but the penalty exacted by an offended sovereign and inexorable judge. Juridical symbols best suggest the relation between God and man.[8] The obstacle that lies athwart the road between them is not sin as Schleiermacher understood sin. To the latter sin was something negative, an absence of the consciousness of God. It was something peripheral and so not part of the real me. It was because Schleiermacher never thought in terms of an absolute difference between right and wrong that he could talk of sin as though it were imperfection or mistake. His principle of relativity prevented him from acknowledging the absolute demands upon himself of the law of God. He was insensitive to the categorical imperative. As he lacked moral earnestness, it was natural for him to discount guilt. He was spiritually in no position to appreciate the gospel of justification and reconciliation any more than a man who has never been sick can appreciate a cure or a recovery.

Brunner himself does not undertake to explain sin. The most significant thing about it, he claims, is that it is inexplicable. It is irrational. Only a man who takes it lightly, like Schleiermacher, could fit sin into a metaphysical system of thought. Because of its recognition of sin Christianity is incapable of being harmonized with any philosophical system. To explain sin is to explain it away in its stark irrationality. The doctrine of original sin, far from being an explanation, serves only to bring out more impressively its irrationality.

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[8] *Der Mittler.* By Emil Brunner. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927. 565 pages.

Brunner is not concerned with particular sins. In so far as he deals with the content of sin he confines himself to the general statement of fact that people fail to live up to the stern moral obligations which they cannot but acknowledge are theirs. They break God's laws. They are disobedient to the divine lawgiver. They know themselves to be personally estranged from him and yet they can do nothing about it. It is impossible for them to re-establish the broken personal relationship.

At times, in fact, he becomes quite non-empirical in his treatment of sin.[9] Sin is not so much a fact of experience as an inference. Schleiermacher was far from right in treating sin and the consciousness of sin as identical and interchangeable. The existence of sin cannot be experienced. We do not become aware of our sin by looking deeply into our hearts. No, we infer that we are sinners because such an inference is the only possible explanation of the undoubted fact of God's ignominious death on the cross. What other reason could there be for this than that we are sinners and that the great gulf which yawns between us and the Holy One must be crossed by the latter? The very fact that God thus comes to us is evidence that we are farther away from him than we may have thought we were. Thus, like many of his fellow-fundamentalists, Brunner's doctrine of sin is a priori rather than empirical.

If there is, then, no way from man to God, there is a way from God to man. God can himself take the initiative and effect an entrance into the human sphere. Being intangible by human experience and not reachable through human exercises, however pious, God must perforce remain unknown unless he makes himself known to us. Hence a revelation of some kind becomes indispensable if we are to be saved. Yet this revelation cannot be given in terms of human experience. It must arise outside the human sphere altogether, else it will partake of human frailty and be incapable of mediating to us the saving contact with objectivity which alone is the cure for our subjectivity. On the other hand this revelation, since it is the revelation of a personal God—"the Absolute as personal reality"[10] —can occur only through the medium of personality. The dilemma is resolved by the paradox of a God-man.[11]

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[9] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, pp. 240, 397; *Der Mittler*, p. 548.

This personal agent of salvation entered human experience as a historical figure, Jesus of Nazareth. But, "in so far as Jesus is an historical figure and his life an historical event, he is not the revelation of God."[12] Jesus' personality is a historical phenomenon. History is merely human experience. To fix attention on Jesus as the founder of Christianity is to interpret him wholly in human terms. To praise Jesus as one among other religious geniuses, though having a maximum degree of religiosity, is still to place him within the ranges of natural human possibility. To evaluate him as a dynamic personality operating within the realm of humanity to enliven in people an already existent but latent consciousness of God, is also to leave him within the human sphere. All this Schleiermacher was guilty of. He emphasized, as Brunner more than once remarks, the "impulses" we receive from Jesus.[13] He did not realize that Jesus' historical personality is irrelevant to his mediatorship. It is not because Jesus was the perfect man, our ideal exemplar, that Brunner claims him as Redeemer. It is not because of his teaching or his perfect love. It is not even because Jesus completely lived up to what he said—perhaps he did not—for even the perfectly moral and religious individual cannot speak to us with final authority.[14] He is still only a man.

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[10] *Religionsphilosophie Evangelischer Theologie.* By Emil Brunner. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1927. 99 pages. See p. 36.

[11] *Der Mittler*, p. 206.

[12] *Religionsphilosophie Evangelischer Theologie*, p. 75.

[13] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 199.

What constitutes Jesus Mediator is the fact or the faith that he is from the other side, the God side. The what of his character is inconsequential in comparison with the whence of his being. His origin is different from ours. He is from God. Schleiermacher was wrong in his assertion that the difference between Jesus and other people is a quantitative difference. Jesus was not just a greater St. Francis. Were he like any other person in history he would not be the revelation of God. The difference between us and Jesus is absolute. Jesus breaks the continuity of history.

Our relation to Jesus is a non-historical one. Whatever there was of historical advantage in the relation of the original disciples to him, as over against us at our temporal distance, has nothing to do with his contemporaneity as an object of our faith. On the other hand, there is in this current relation to Christ nothing of a Christ-mysticism. The Christ of faith is not the object of our ecstatic feeling and vision.

He is unique. He is a word, an act, of God. He is what God has to say to us, and this is: You belong to me; despite your sin, I re-establish the interrupted communication and fellowship between us. Jesus tells us God's secret: that the barrier between man and God has been overpassed by God. For God is love. When the loving God takes the initiative and crosses the boundary between himself and lost humanity, he comes disguised in lowly guise. His sovereignty is a strange beggarly sovereignty.[15] God has to demean himself to our level in order to make contact with us where we are. This reaching out of deity into the sinful world is a costly event; for sin that stands in the way between his creatures and himself is no joke. God is tremendously in earnest about it. His gospel is a cry of alarm, a thunder word of eternity. That the sovereign of the world is thus gracious and willing to free us from the bonds of death and hell is more wonderful than words can tell. We are face to face with one of the strangest of all paradoxes: "that God, who has created the world and filled it, who holds all things in his hand, who is omnipresent and almighty,—comes."[16] To be sure, this divine graciousness is unapparent to the unbeliever. To the unfaithful God remains always a hidden God, a *deus absconditus*, or at most an angry God, whose character is to be inferred from the nature of the physical world.

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[14] *Der Mittler*, pp. 199 f.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 500.

But the believer knows that by the offices of the Mediator atonement is made for this sin and God and man are reconciled. Brunner adopts Anselm's theory of the atonement. Redemption is thus made effective and is accepted. To be sure, a man still remains a sinner. Each day he must repent anew, for even the life which has been reconciled to God is not apart from the rest of social life. Since we do not as believers withdraw from the social order, either by a kind of monastic segregation or by suicide, we continue to be "poisoned" by it. In other words, the redemption points to the future. Faith is eschatological. The believer is not saved, but he believes he will be. Schleiermacher's notion of salvation as a present possession must be given up, says Brunner.[17] Salvation is a promise. The Christian remains in a state of perpetual tension. He never becomes content. What the ultimate salvation will be like he does not claim to know. But he is sure of it, even though he cannot conceive it. As a believer he can wait for it in confident despair, in despairing confidence, in certainty and uncertainty.[18] Schleiermacher, Brunner declares, was optimistic on the basis of what he had experienced; he himself is hopeful in spite of what he experiences.

Thus, in summary it may be said that, according to Brunner, Revelation, as the account of it just given amply demonstrates, includes both speaker and speech. The Word is not only a personal mediator but a gospel. This gospel, in brief, is the first commandment. But it is possible, and Brunner obviously thinks it important, to distinguish the four aspects already noted, which correspond very closely to the doctrinal content of Christian orthodoxy: creation, the fall of man, reconciliation, and final redemption. They form together an indissoluble unity, and all details of doctrine find their places within this unity.[19]

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[17] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, pp. 261, 264, 385.

[18] *Der Mittler*, p. 483.

This gospel is contained in the Bible. The word is spoken in the Bible, and yet the biblical words are not themselves the revelation. It is necessary to distinguish between the human and divine aspects of the Bible. Otherwise one is likely to make a fetish of Scripture. Orthodoxy has not infrequently been guilty of such bibliolatry. Brunner declares that "faith in the Bible includes rather than excludes biblical criticism" and that of the most rigorous character. "The Bible is full of mistakes, contradictions, erroneous interpretations of innumerable human, natural and historical relations. . . . . It is overgrown with mythology even in the New Testament."[20] But that does not interfere with the authority of Scripture to the believer who has discovered its central and unifying theme, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

There is no proof of the truth of the fourfold content of revelation. Belief in the objective reality of God, the ascription to Jesus of divinity, the inference concerning the present sinful condition of humanity are none of them intellectual judgments. How, inquires Brunner, can it be scientifically demonstrated that Jesus differs in any significant way from Buddha or Socrates? And, as concerns God, next to the foolishness of denying God, he adds, is the foolishness of proving him. "Only if you forget what God means can you make this mistake. What can be proved is under no circumstances God. God must first be disrobed of his sovereignty and majesty before he can be fitted into the frame of a rational proof."[21]

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[19] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 336.

[20] *Religionsphilosophie Evangelischer Theologie*, p. 79.

[21] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 102.

No! that any of these "facts" is a fact is quite contrary to reason. They are unthinkable. They destroy the reasonable continuity of life as we have become accustomed to understand and use it. They inject a strain of irrationality into an otherwise orderly world. Reason moves by continuities. It advances from the more familiar to the less familiar. It deals with similarities. But revelation, of which the facts already noted are the content, is something absolutely discontinuous with our experience. Revelation is an intellectual enormity.

There is, however, in the human being a "transcendent quality" or capacity that corresponds to the transcendent and unique nature of revelation. This capacity is faith. It jumps beyond present and all known circumstances. It is supraempirical. It is not "a psychological function."[22] It is by faith that these facts of revelation are apprehended, and by faith only. Revelation can only be believed. To subject revelation to the tests of rationality would be to subordinate faith to reason. This, in turn, would involve the subordination of God to man.

So faith is the antithesis of thinking. "Faith is not an intellectual relation to doctrine."[23] That is the error of orthodoxy. Nor does faith begin where knowledge leaves off, as the scholastic theology maintained. Faith denies to reason any jurisdiction whatsoever over the subject matter with which faith deals. Being independent of knowledge, faith is not disturbed by the fruits of knowledge. "It is extremely naïve to believe that Copernicus could put mankind out of the central place in the world-whole which is ascribed to him by faith in the creation and redemption."[24]

Faith is likewise the antithesis of mysticism. It looks out, not in. Faith is the human response to the objective truth contained in the divine self-revelation.

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[24] *Religionsphilosophie Evangelischer Theologie*, p. 89.

> Faith in God is the opposite of experience of God. To have faith in God means that in spite of the fact that there is between God and man a separation so great that it cannot be bridged or even conceived as bridged let alone experienced,—in spite of the fact that there is no way leading from God to man nor a single little point in the soul in which a man is not far distant from God, fallen away from him, least of all in the innermost recesses of the heart; in spite of the fact that there is no human experience, not even the holiest that is both human and divine,—nevertheless, just as we are we are united to God, because God so wills. And this we know although it goes against all experience, because God says so. . . . . This is the clear witness of the reformation.[25]

Faith is thus an act of decision in favor of Jesus as the revelation of God. The decision is not speculative, nor aesthetic, nor ethical. It is a personal response, a trust in the speaker of the word. Faith is "capitulation to God."[26] Nevertheless, this human response is not solely nor wholly a human response. So profound is the gulf between the human and the divine that the human is incapable itself of apprehending the divine. Faith is aroused by the Mediator. It is his gift. The Holy Spirit coming within us appropriates God's word. "The subject that has faith is not the human psyche but the Holy Spirit."[27] (The relation of the two is not stated.) God says yes for us. For God can be known only by God. Therefore, this attitude of faith is not amenable to psychological analysis. Faith belongs in the realm of theology, not psychology. Only the believer can discuss it.

There would seem, however, to be possible even here a limited employment of psychological criteria. Why is it, for instance, that one man responds and another remains indifferent to the preaching of the Word? It is because certain states of mind more than others make a person "open to revelation." This condition of mind is the realization of the Heracleitean character of the world.[28] It is a sense of the evanescence of life; a dissatisfaction that grows out of a realization of human relativity; a disillusionment with hopes placed on human culture and progress. The period of cultural dizziness which began with the enlightenment is almost over.[29] Faith presupposes moral earnestness, which in turn is increased by faith. Faith is born out of a moral crisis when the will makes shipwreck. Brunner does not attempt to analyze the experiences that produce this feeling. He does not describe the content of the law and the moral ideal which the individual falls short of. He is content with the vague generalization that, "when the water reaches the chin, but not before, may God be found, *de profundis*."[30] But even here, paradoxically enough, one is not aware of one's sinking condition until, by faith, one knows one's Redeemer. Only the despairing man knows what faith is; but only faith teaches a man true despair.[31]

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[25] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 188.

[26] *Der Mittler*, p. 23.

[27] *Die Mystik und das Wort*, p. 359.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

It is likewise possible to describe the ground of assurance and the nature of the credentials which arouse the responsive faith of certain people. To this problem Brunner returns again and again, as though he were aware that he must counterbalance the thrust toward skepticism which is latent in his position. In the end his assurance is not very dissimilar from that of Schleiermacher, whose relativity he vainly thinks he has escaped. Revelation is its own proof.[32] It is self-grounded. It exerts a coercive pressure on us. It takes us captive. It is authoritative because it comes "from across the border."[33] One cannot question whether it can happen because it has happened.

No summary statement can succeed in reproducing the intensity and fire of Brunner's writing. The floods of his emotional power are well-nigh overwhelming. In casting about for theological literature similar in temper to Brunner's tumultuous, polemical, and loose-reined style, one is startled to find one's memory reverting—*mirabile dictu*—to the very author

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[30] *Der Mittler*, p. 267.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[32] *Die Mystik und das Wort* (1st ed.), p. 386.

[33] *Der Mittler*, pp. 212, 298.

Brunner so violently disagrees with: to the Schleiermacher of the *Reden.* Temperamentally these two men have much in common. Each of them conceives of himself as leader of an erring Christianity back from the desert-lands of irreligion. Their trumpet-sounds are equally certain, equally vibrant, and pitched to opposite ends of the scale!

Undoubtedly Brunner often gives the impression of being intoxicated by the exuberance of his own loquacity and self-hypnotized by the repetitious iterations of his several theses. It is by no means possible to account for the rise and spread of the Swiss theology on so trivial a ground as that of the emotional power of its leaders. Yet one cannot but suspect that depths of feeling such as they exhibit would, if put at the disposal of some other theology or even of some secular cultural movement, stir lethargic masses to vital response and gain for their leadership an equal following.

When Schleiermacher is used as a measuring-rod by which to gauge Brunner's theology, the discovery is made that the latter sets over against the former's thoroughgoing monism with its explicit emphasis on the immanence of God an equally one-sided dualism with its complete preoccupation with a transcendent God. In other words, Brunner attacks Schleiermacher on the battle-field which the latter already occupies. His strategy is not to strike at the enemy's flank or to disregard him altogether but to overthrow—with vehemence—every position which Schleiermacher took and replace it with its opposite. The possibility of synthesis is radically excluded. Brunner has returned to the fold of orthodoxy. Yet his orthodoxy is an orthodoxy without biblical literalism. It is orthodoxy vitalized by emotional fervor and a vague but genuine ethical earnestness.

# A PRESENT-DAY EVALUATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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THE emphasis upon the ethical aspect of religion in liberal Christianity has been one of its saving features. In contrast to the older dogmatic emphasis upon metaphysical matters, this practical interpretation of religion has proved particularly appealing to many minds; and, accordingly, liberal Christianity has appeared to be directly in accord with modern sentiment and with modern thinking. Yet the mere fact that its emphasis is ethical does not necessarily indicate that its point of view is congenial with modern interests. The adequacy of its ethical appeal must depend upon the nature of its ethical objective. It is the purpose of this analysis to evaluate Christian ethics at this point, first, with reference to its proposals for individual ethics, and, second, with reference to its proposals for social ethics.

## I

The ethical point of view of liberal Christianity is the counterpart of its religious outlook; consequently, Jesus is made normative in ethics as well as in the Christian's spiritual life.[1] Jesus' character is assumed to be the perfect ideal for the Christian's character, and his life the ideal pattern for Christian living.

The method of ascertaining Jesus' normative ideal has varied in Christocentric presentations. The earliest mode was to relate the "teachings of Jesus" in systematic form.[2] So long as the reliability of the Gospel records was not questioned, this method seemed satisfactory. But historical research soon pointed out that the Gospel writings were almost a half-century removed from the actual time in which Jesus lived; and, further, that these accounts were concerned primarily to interpret and relate Jesus to their own age. Thus it became obvious that it was not possible to reproduce Jesus' ideal in terms of a definite body of teachings. Instead, it was suggested, Jesus' ideal was to be found in certain controlling principles which motivated his life. These controlling principles were reduced to what was termed "the law of love," implying love to God and love to man.[3] Numerous interpretations of "Jesus' method of love" have been proposed. Not only has it been advanced as the singular method of adaptation in men's social relations, but it has been absolutized as fundamental in cosmic behavior.[4] Christocentric theologians, in the main, however, have emphasized the practical interpretation of the law of love, although they assumed the metaphysical proposition that love is absolute. Their doctrine of the kingdom of God implied it: for the kingdom was the divine end of the world; consequently love, being the law of the kingdom, must be the divine law of God.

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[1] Cf. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, pp. 9–14, 442–72, and 511 ff.; Herrmann, *Faith and Morals*; Harnack, *What Is Christianity*; W. N. Clarke, *The Ideal of Jesus*; Foster, *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*, pp. 190–279; King, *Theology and the Social Consciousness*, and *The Ethics of Jesus*, chaps. vi, vii, and viii; W. A. Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, Parts III and IV; H. S. Coffin, *Some Christian Convictions*, chap. vi, and Fosdick, *The Modern Use of the Bible*, pp. 104–10.

Back of all these efforts to locate the normative factor in Jesus for ethics has been the assumption that Jesus disclosed, either in his teaching, his own individual character, or both, the absolute ethical ideal embodying the true response to the *will of God*. To be sure, this authoritative feature has not always been explicit. Jesus had been declared the ideal for man's moral life because the experience of his personality compelled one to acknowledge his moral supremacy.[4a] But this was a refinement of the method—not a deviation from it. External authority was replaced by inner authority. But the method continued to be an appeal to authority.

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[2] Clarke, *The Ideal of Jesus;* Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question,* and *Jesus Christ and Christian Character;* Cadoux, *The Guidance of Jesus for Today.*

[3] Ritschl's characteristic phrase for defining the ethical ideal was "action inspired by love" (*op. cit.*, p. 12). Cf. also Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 224; King, *Laws of Friendship, Human and Divine.*

[4] Dean Shailer Mathews suggests that there may be a correlation between Jesus' method of love, as a law for human relations, and the scientists' principle of "creative coordination" in cosmic behavior. Cf. *Jesus on Social Institutions,* pp. 54 f. See also his *Contributions of Science to Religion.*

This appeal to authority has been further refined in present-day Christocentric thinking. One example is Dr. Fosdick's challenge to "take Jesus in earnest." It is his conviction that among the repeatable experiences that one may find in the Bible, one element is paramount: "The spirit and quality of Jesus were meant to be reproduced in his followers."[5]

> In the New Testament the Master's life, like music, was meant to be reproduced. As a score of Bach or Beethoven, into which the composer's love of harmony once was poured, is meant to be caught up by each new generation and played over again, interpreted by organs, orchestras, choirs, by old instruments that may abide and by new ones that may be invented, so the life of Jesus in the New Testament was meant to be reproduced in all sorts of circumstances, by all sorts of temperaments, until the whole earth should be full of it.[6]

This has the appearance of an aesthetic appeal: to reproduce the "spirit and quality of Jesus" in the sense that musicians reproduce the "spirit and quality" of Bach or Beethoven. But Fosdick's challenge implies more than a mere aesthetic response to Jesus' ideal, as he himself insists: it is an inevitable response to the Absolute Ideal. It points back to "the majesty of the moral law, the sovereignty of God's will, the beam of whose eternal justice no man can ultimately tip."[7]

The conditions of the ethical life, then, according to this point of view, like the conditions of man's spiritual life, are conceived as having been determined by a supernatural end. Accordingly, it follows that Christocentric theologians assume the ethical task to be that of ascertaining the revealed ideal, and of successfully applying it normatively in human living.

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[4a] Cf. Herrmann, *Communion with God*, and Foster, *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*.

[5] *Modern Use of the Bible*, p. 195.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

Now, in contrast to this normative interpretation of the ethical task, the whole trend of modern ethics has been to interpret the ethical task experimentally with reference to moral needs arising out of the conditions of life within the natural world. This approach has focused attention upon the moral requirements of human ends, growing out of the interplay of human relationships, rather than upon the requirements of supernatural ends. It has sought to create value for human living; not merely to reproduce an a priori perfect pattern. The effect of this approach has been to regard all ideals as relative and functional, rather than as absolute or normative. It has subjected all ideals to the experimental test: how do they contribute to the concrete end of human welfare for which the ideal is to function?

Now when the Christocentric ideal is shorn of the a priori prestige that revelation gave it, and is put upon this experimental basis, several interesting questions arise:

1. Modern ethics may raise the question as to whether the kind of life that Jesus lived and advocated is desirable from the point of view of the modern man's condition of life. At least this becomes an open question in an ethics in which ideals are ascertained experimentally with reference to human ends. But from the point of view of Christocentric ethics, this question is presumptuous. To raise such a question is to confess that one has not experienced the compelling power of Jesus' inner life, and consequently has not attained "the Christian selective sense,"[8] or has not been "overwhelmed with the force of undoubted reality,"[9] or has not become capable of recognizing an inevitable "value-judgment."[10] The desirability of the ideal which Jesus is said to have disclosed is frankly assumed by Christocentric theologians without question, for, in view of

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[8] Clarke, *Use of the Scriptures in Theology*, p. 66.

[9] Herrmann, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[10] Ritschl, *op. cit.* Cf. also Foster, *op. cit.*, p. 45, and King, *op. cit.*, pp. 241 ff.

their *Christian experience,* they contend, it is the most certain fact they know.[11]

Obviously, here is a point at which Christocentric ethics and modern scientific ethics are not likely to come to a satisfactory adjustment, for the one speaks from the standpoint of revelation, the other from the standpoint of experimentation; one from the standpoint of an absolute standard of good, the other from the standpoint of relative goods. Christocentric ethics seeks to adjust man ethically to a supernatural objective; modern scientific ethics, on the other hand, seeks to fulfil man's own moral objectives in the light of conditions existing in his natural environment.

2. Again, modern ethics may raise the question as to whether the perfection of character, to which Christocentric ethics aspires, can be attained under the conditions of life in which man finds himself. Christocentric theologians readily admit that their ideal is no easy one. On the contrary, they suggest, "taking Jesus seriously, is the most searching ethical enterprise ever undertaken on earth."[12] Nevertheless, it is added, "whatever else happens, we Christians, if we are to be sincerely Christian, must take Jesus in earnest."[13] Thus the concrete inquiry as to the attainability of the ideal is sidetracked by a logical imperative. But from the standpoint of modern ethics, this does not dismiss the inquiry as to the practicability of Jesus' life and character for modern life, or, more properly stated, the practicability of the *ideal* which Christocentric ethics has derived from impressions of the life and character of Jesus. Modern ethics cannot overlook the fact that this ideal has been defined independently of the world of experience, and hence, that Christocentric theologians have not taken into account facts in the natural world, both as re-

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[11] We would call attention to the difference between the Christocentric method of appealing to Jesus' ethical ideal, and the one suggested by Dr. Wieman, *Wrestle of Religion with Truth,* pp. 66 f.

[12] Fosdick, *op. cit.,* p. 192.

[13] *Ibid.*

gards man's constitution and his environing conditions, which definitely condition his behavior and his character.[14]

From the standpoint of Christocentric ethics, precautions regarding naturalistic conditions would be entirely beside the point. For the convenient thing about a revelation ethics is that it is not conditioned by facts in the world of experience. It may define its ideal independently of the world of experience and, with the aid of supernatural forces, rise above the natural world to meet its a priori standard. So long as one can appeal to supernatural aid, the correlation of the ideal with the world of experience may be regarded as an unimportant factor.

Christocentric ethics has provided such a measure. It has defined the character and life of Jesus as normative for the

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[14] Within recent years, the scientific study of behavior and of character formation, especially in the fields of biological and the social sciences, has called attention to the bearing which conditions, both within and without the organism, have upon the individual's ability to modify or improve his conduct. For example

1. The physiological psychologists have made evidence that psychic responses, formerly supposed to have been unmixed spiritual phenomena are conditioned to a large extent by physical, bodily functions. Now the variation among individuals in the matter of bodily health and capacities is obviously enormous; hence from the standpoint of biological heritage alone, the capacities of individuals to attain standards of conduct vary greatly. (Cf. C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* [1924]; Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality,* and *Personal Equation.* See also Herrick, *The Brains of Rats and Men* [1926]).

2. The behavioristic psychologists have called attention to the large part that stimuli play in the matter of human conduct. Here, again, individuals are shown to vary in their sensitiveness to various kinds of stimuli. Consequently, the problem of character formation and of character reconstruction becomes complicated by the interplay of the individual and his environing stimuli.

3. Recently, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, building upon the findings of the new psychology, have disclosed important facts concerning the subconscious which bear materially upon the problem of human character and conduct.

4. Social psychology, studying the individual self in relation to other selves and to the group life as a whole, has compelled us to recognize the importance of social conditions in the problem of understanding human conduct and of shaping its course.

These observations are suggestive of the fact that the problem of improving human character and conduct, when viewed in the light of naturalistic conditions, is fraught with numerous complexities. Hence to propose that individuals shall attain to a given moral standard, irrespective of the nature of the ideal, or of the capacities of individuals, is to modern ethics, an impractical demand. For it clearly recognizes that there is a correlation between the individual and the ideal which must be taken into account before the attainability of the ideal can be determined.

Christian, and has then pointed man to the supernatural moral power of Jesus to aid him in attaining the ideal. Without this supernatural reinforcement, Christocentric theologians readily admit the impossibility of attaining the revealed ideal. This has been explicitly expressed in Fosdick's words:

> Let us say it abruptly: it is not so much the humanity of Jesus that makes him imitable as it is his divinity. If he be only a good man, he is an isolated phenomenon, like Shakespeare or Napoleon in other realms. *How can we, pulling on our own bootstraps, set out to lift ourselves by imitation to the likeness of such?*
>
> But if Jesus is divine and if divinity hedges us all about like the vital forces which in winter wait underneath the frozen ground until the spring comes, that is a gospel! Then the incarnation in Christ is the prophecy and hope of *God's indwelling in everyone of us.*[15]

Thus in thrusting the responsibility of moral renewal upon extranatural forces, Christocentric theologians have overleaped the naturalistic objections to its impracticability, and have emancipated their ideal from further scientific criticism. But they have done so at the cost of identifying Christocentric ethics with what is essentially supernaturalism. In the light of these considerations, the modern man, who has become committed wholly to a naturalistic world-view, is more likely to be confused than helped in his ethical quest by consulting Christocentric ethics.

## II

Christocentric ethics has defined the Christlike ideal not only for the character of the individual Christian, but as a social ideal to be actualized in human relations as well. In Dr. Coffin's challenging words, "this ideal it holds up in contrast with the existing social order in any age as a protest, a program, and a promise."[16] The era of social Christianity was fluent with similar challenges.[17] Such writings as Walter Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, and *Christianizing the Social Order*, Scott Nearing's *Social Religion*, and others of like temper and motive[18] expressed the conviction that the social order was to find its ideal fulfilment only as it applied earnestly and consistently this spirit and quality of Jesus in social relationships.

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[15] Fosdick, *op. cit.*, pp. 270–71. (Italics mine.)

[16] Coffin, *Some Christian Convictions*, p. 170.

[17] See Shailer Mathews, "The Development of Social Christianity in America during the Past Twenty-five Years," in *Religious Thought in the Last Quarter Century* (1927), G. B. Smith, editor. This article also appeared in the *Journal of Religion*, July, 1927.

Within recent years, the official bodies of some of the Protestant churches have appropriated the Christocentric social gospel, and have embodied it in their social creeds. The following official report of the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., is a typical statement illustrating this tendency:

> As a Christian Church, accepting the revelation of God's nature and purpose which He made through Jesus Christ, we hold it to be our duty not only to proclaim to all men what this revelation means for the life of the individual and of society, but also particularly to instruct our own members in the duties which Christian discipleship lays upon them. To this end the General Assembly of 1910, in response to a request from a number of presbyteries, issued a statement "of the thought and purpose of our Church regarding the great moral questions arising out of the industrial and commercial life of the people." Reaffirming this statement, we desire to prefix to it a declaration of our convictions respecting the whole subject with which it is concerned.
>
> 1. *The Ground of our Social Interest.* Our persuasion of our right and duty to speak on contemporary social questions *grows out of our certainty that God has revealed to us in Jesus Christ not only the way of salvation for the individual, but also an ideal of life which defines the right relations of men to each other.*[19] This Christian ideal of social life is formed by these beliefs:
>
> *a*) That God is "the father of all men," and that men as His children are potential members of His kingdom.
>
> *b*) That God has made men members one of another, bound together in society, and that therefore this society ought to be a brotherhood of love and service.

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[18] Cf. J. R. Campbell, *Christianity and the Social Order;* Hall, *Social Solutions in the Light of Christian Ethics;* Washington Gladden, *Social Salvation;* Vedder, *Socialism and the Ethics of Jesus.*

[19] Italics mine.

*c*) That God has sent His Son Jesus Christ to be our Saviour from sin and to establish His Kingdom among men.

*d*) That God is now and ever at work in the world by His Spirit for the accomplishment of His will.

2. Believing thus, we hold that it ought to be our aim to bring these truths to bear upon every relation of life, economic, political, legal, ecclesiastical, social. We cannot but see that much in our present social order is contrary to the mind of Christ and we believe that it is our duty to protest against these unchristian things and, so far as we can, to establish in their place that which is Christian.[20]

We find here, underlying this theological approach to social reconstruction, the same assumption that was observed back of Christocentric ethics for individual living, namely, that God's will has been revealed, and should, therefore, be actualized in human society. Socially, Christocentric ethics has identified God's will with what is believed to be the fundamental principles of the kingdom, which defines objectives in terms of service and relationships in terms of love. Christianizing the social order, therefore, implies applying these fundamental principles to the objectives and the relationships of modern society.

Now it is interesting to note that the social pattern underlying these proposals is the family: God is father of all men, and men, as His children, are potential members of His kingdom. And, accordingly, it follows that inasmuch as God has bound men together in an organized society, it is to be expected that "this society ought to be a brotherhood of love and service."[21]

In a theologically controlled culture, this appeal had force. In medieval society, for example, in which religion dominated the state, and materially influenced the economic life of society as well, the family pattern, as a basis for ethics, appears quite adequate. The relationships of society here appear to be reasonably parallel with the relationships of the family. But the

[20] *Minutes of the Presbyterian General Assembly*, 1920, pp. 181–83.

[21] Cf. item (*b*) in quotation above.

modern structure of society, especially in America, presents a far more complicated situation. Here science has largely displaced the theological control of culture;[22] democracy has displaced paternalism; and industrialism, with its multifarious developments, has completely revolutionized the economic status of the modern world. The implications of this changed point of view in modern culture place serious difficulties in the way of the Christocentric program, and thus curtail its social ambitions. Further than that, these conditions have created entirely new moral problems, of which Christocentric ethics appear to be wholly unaware, and consequently offer no interpretation. It is at this point especially that Christian ethics discloses serious limitations.

### DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING CHRISTIAN ETHICS

1. The rise of a scientifically controlled culture has markedly modified the social outlook. For along with the rise of science has occurred the development of experimental methods of inquiry in contrast to speculative and dogmatic reasoning. And this change in thinking has precipitated a change in cultural temper. Hence, whereas Christian ethics assumes the necessity of "doing the will of God on earth" as a manifest obligation, modern ethics, so far as ethical theory is concerned, has literally "parted with the will of God."[23] It does not have the slightest sense of obligation to carry out divine injunctions. On the contrary, it defines objectives solely in terms of humanistic ends.[24]

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[22] It should be added, of course, that the social-mindedness that accompanies the theologically controlled society still persists among a vast portion of the present generation. This is more true in Europe than in America, for there the separation of church and state has come about more recently.

[23] Fite, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 60.

[24] At present there is an increasing tendency toward recognizing the necessity of adjusting to larger than human conditions. In Europe this trend takes the direction of a renewed emphasis upon the "will of God in human life." In America, the emphasis has assumed a more naturalistic turn in terms of adaptation to supremely important factors or behaviors in environment. This approach takes the matter of "right living" out of the realm of logical ethics, and discusses it in terms of organic adjustment to God as an all-important behavior in the universe.

2. This bears directly upon the relation of Christian ethics to the modern social situation. Christian ethics defines its social task and ideals in the light of its theological prepossessions regarding the divine plan for society. The basis for its social platform and program, therefore, is explicitly theological.[25] Obviously, then, those agencies in society which have assumed the viewpoint of science, rather than of theology, are not likely to share with the advocates of the Christian program in their zeal to Christianize the social order. On the contrary, scientific workers are more apt to distrust Christian idealism in its ambitions for society on the grounds that they are too impractical. On the other hand, Christian reformers will probably regard this judgment as a taunt from a materialistic conservatism, and will thus propose to fight the issue out on the basis of idealism versus materialism. As a matter of fact, however, the issue is really between *Christian* idealism and *scientific* idealism—between a revelation approach and an experimental approach to the reconstructing of society.

3. The relationships of modern society are exceedingly complex compared with the simple social structure assumed by Christian ethics. Hence, when the attempt is made to apply the social principles of Christian ethics to conditions in the present social order, the outcome seems disheartening and disillusioning. For example, what disposition might Christian ethics be expected to make of the conditions that have been precipitated by the strife between capital and labor? Here the relations are not the simple, brotherly relations that exist within family groups. The cleavage between these two factions is deep-rooted in an economic grievance so fundamental that neither workmen nor capitalists can sublimate it sufficiently to regard each other as brothers. Even to qualify the appeal by urging co-operation between the worker and the employer hardly meets the problem. Co-operation toward what? Each has his dominant objective: the employer asks for co-operation

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[25] Cf. sec. 1 of quotation.

toward increased production;[26] the worker, toward increased wages.[27] Just what, then, is implied in the appeal to co-operate?

4. The impersonalized relations existing in modern economics, due to the emergence of "Big Business," have created a condition in which moral responsibility is almost utterly lacking. How effectively might one expect the "rule of love" to operate, therefore, in a social situation in which the influence of large, impersonal trusts and corporations dominate and control conditions? The appeal of Christian ethics becomes largely words in the face of those opposing factors and circumstances.

5. But aside from the many other moral intricacies that continually arise out of the industrial situation, the very nature of business, as an institution, presents a perplexing problem to Christian idealism. Christian ethics proposes to "'Christianize" business by modifying its motive so that instead of seeking private gain, business will contribute to public service.[28] However far society may succeed in socializing business,[29] the question will persist as to whether business can be Christianized in the sense implied by the Christian ideal without attacking the very genius of business as an enterprise. For the fact is, the fundamental end of business *is* profit-making.

> Business is bargaining; buying and selling, and producing of goods and services for sale. Business is the struggle for wealth. Business is the

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[26] Cf. E. M. Herr, "How the Church Can Aid Industry," *Business and the Church*, edited by Jerome Davis (1926). The author suggests that the church can aid industry by encouraging the workers to co-operate with their employers.

[27] Cf. W. Williams, *What's on the Worker's Mind?*

[28] Cf. *The Social Creed of the Churches*. See also Johnson and Holt, *Christian Ideals in Industry* (1924).

[29] The movement toward the social control of business has progressed with surprising rapidity since the war; so much so, in fact, that it has been referred to as "the modern economic revolution." An excellent analysis of the problem and a survey of present tendencies reflecting endeavors to deal with the moral problems involved is given in J. M. Clark's *Social Control of Business* (1926). See also W. H. Hamilton, *Current Economic Problems* (third edition, 1926), for a wide selection of readings dealing with the history of the industrial problem, and with current opinions on the problem of control.

> system of social co-operation by mutual exchange. And since part of a definition consists in knowing what a thing is not—*business is not charity or benevolence,* though motives of various generous sorts enter in to shape the essential character of the institution. It is not play, but work; a means to an end rather than an end in itself, though, like any worth-while activity, it has a way of becoming an end in itself and of enlisting people's interest in "the game" as such. It is not warfare and it is not anarchy, for not everything is fair in business, and the rules to which it is subject have at least an orderly intent.
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> Like any game subject to rules, business is a thing of double purpose: the purpose of the rules and that of the contestant under them. *The purpose of the contestant is a simple one—to win.* He is not responsible for the rules, but he must adapt his play to them. According to his lights, he may aim to win in harmony with the spirit of the rules, or according to the letter, which he may stretch as far as possible. He may aim to stop just short of things for which he would be penalized if the umpire saw him, or he may aim to violate the rules as much as he can when the umpire does not see him. All these classes of tactics are found both on the football field and in the struggle of business. As for the purpose of the rules themselves, they generally aim, first, to codify and standardize something which has grown up spontaneously . . . . and to control the sport, striving to make it a good test of strength, skill, and co-ordination, to keep it reasonably safe, and incidentally to make it enjoyable for the spectators.[30]

6. The conflict-situations arising out of modern culture which offer serious resistance to the program of Christian ethics are numerous. We have indicated here only a few of the very obvious ones. Others might be cited, such as: racial prejudices, conditions due to immigration, religious antipathies, growing antagonisms between the city and rural consciousness, and class feelings of various sorts. These prejudices are deep-rooted in history, and therefore are not likely to be swept away readily by argument or persuasion. They are strongly imbedded in the emotions, and thus do not yield easily to rationalization. The aspiration for the "brotherhood of man" therefore —even within a single nation—around which Christian ethics

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[30] J. M. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 12. (Italics mine.) Cf. also Tufts, "Ethics of Capitalism," *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, p. 68.

has organized its social program, faces barriers which appear to be almost impassable.

7. The secular organization of American society further complicates the ambition to "Christianize the social order." America is not a Christendom, as is frequently assumed, nor does it bear the same relation to Christendom that most European nations do. On the contrary, it has welcomed within its borders, worshipers of the God of Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and Buddhists; and likewise has included many who worship no god at all. And with equal right! American society, therefore, presents to the viewpoint of normative religion and ethics a complicated social organization. And the task of applying revealed ideals to social relationships in such a society, in the sense implied by "Christianizing society," proves to be a perplexing undertaking, for the reason that revelation has practically no prestige or authority in a secular society. Furthermore, from the standpoint of American culture, it is hardly to be expected that the revealed ideals sponsored by Christianity should be accorded any more social sanction than those cherished by other recognized religious faiths. The fact that other religious faiths have been decidedly in the minority, compared with Christian numbers, has led many Christian people to assume that America is really a Christian nation in *name,* and their earnestness has, thereupon, impelled them to urge that America become Christian in *fact.*[31] In view of the community of faiths existing within America's borders, however, one might even raise a question as to the ethics of the ambition to "Christianize society" in America.

## III

In view of the circumstances, which we have reviewed, what may one say regarding the present outlook for Christian social idealism? One's immediate inclination is to say that if

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[31] The problem of the Christian and politics has been suggestively dealt with in G. B. Smith's *Principles of Christian Living,* chap. xvii.

Christianity has nothing more than idealistic norms or abstract principles to offer, Christian ethics will probably contribute very little to the creative social task. But if, on the other hand, Christian leaders are becoming aware of the true state of things, and are agreeable to reconstructing their policies and methods accordingly, Christian idealism may be a very decided asset to the social enterprise. For the church holds among its resources a wealth of moral zeal which has the capability of being a mighty force in whichever direction it asserts itself; and, further, through its methods of worship (unsatisfactory though they may be), it has the potential means for creating moral sensitivity and insight which may be exceedingly valuable to any program of social reconstruction.

To some degree, certain current indications suggest that Christian leaders are becoming aware of the church's opportunity:

1. Increasingly, religious leaders are responding to the appeal to improve human life irrespective of theological precedent or authority. In several of the official declarations by church bodies upon issues such as the outlawing of war, for example, the major appeal is in terms of the improvement of social life *as such*. Only as an after-thought do they append their theological reasons for pursuing this social aspiration.

2. Again, Christian leaders are more and more engaging in an experimental study of social conditions. Through their own "Social Service Commissions" and by means of the Research Department of the Federal Council of Churches, the churches are coming into first-hand contact with the complex social situations, which readily disclose to them the need of something more than resolutions and theological platitudes. The effect of this research by church agencies upon the course of Christian idealism cannot be overestimated. Inevitably it must shape it in the direction of more empirical endeavors.

3. This first-hand contact with social problems, through specialized agencies, is impressing church leaders with the

magnitude of the social question, as well as its complexity. In some cases this disclosure is leading them to define the function of the church in social reconstruction more carefully. Not a few have expressed the opinion that the church is not qualified to propose the program for reconstructing society, but that it is peculiarly equipped to contribute moral sensitiveness and moral dynamic to socially enlightened endeavors. Christian idealism may create, through worship, an increased awareness of the need of social betterment, and may also intensify eagerness to ennoble social living. But this point of view carries with it the recognition that other agencies may have to be intrusted with the actual work of diagnosing social ills, prescribing remedies, proposing new goals, and the like.

4. But carefully defining the function of the church in social reconstruction does not mean minimizing the importance of its contribution. Nor does it mean lessening the church's responsibility. On the contrary, it requires more earnest effort on the part of the church in the matter of rendering itself adjustable to varying social conditions. This may imply recasting the "Christian message" to make it applicable and creative for whatever social development it seeks to inspire. Accordingly, the "Christian message" in foreign lands, conceivably, would not be the message for America's reconstructing areas, and vice versa. What we are saying here is that Christian idealism will have to be flexible enough in content to adapt creatively to whatever social experiment is being tried.

In conclusion, we would add that carefully defining the church's function in social reconstruction certainly implies intelligently developing its methods of worship so as to render them productive of the kinds of attitudes and insights which will actually further social betterment.

# MISSIONARY APPROACH TO THE POVERTY AND IGNORANCE OF INDIA

CLIFFORD MANSHARDT
Bombay, India

INDIA, as every informed man is aware, is preponderantly a land of villages, and the major portion of Indian mission work is in the villages. It follows, then, that if our missionary work is to be effective, it must make a definite contribution to village life.

Indian village life, as I see it, is laboring under two major handicaps: poverty and ignorance. The Indian agriculturalist is poor, woefully poor, receiving in the Bombay presidency an annual per capita income of about Rs. 75 only. Where the rainfall is uncertain and the soil poor, as in many of our mission areas, the income per head is calculated to be about Rs. 33-12-0 per year, as against a necessary annual expenditure of Rs. 44 for food and clothing. More than 90 per cent of the total expenditure of the Indian farmer is spent on such necessities as food, rent, and clothing. If the land is to be improved, or any extra expense is incurred by sickness or other cause, the villager has no other recourse than to borrow, and hence it is that three-fourths of the Indian agriculturalists are not only living on the margin but are piling up debts.

It is a common statement that the Indian villager is in debt because of his own thriftlessness or because of his wasteful expenditures at the time of marriages and religious ceremonies. This statement is partly true. Many of the Indian people are not thrifty, and certain it is that far too much money is wasted upon weddings and seasonal feasts. But the indictment does not cover the whole case. The causes go much deeper. We must also consider the bad physical environment, the lack of rainfall, and the enervating climate. We must consider the unusual economic situation of India, where the vast majority of the population are dependent for their living upon one industry alone—that of farming. We must remember that while in Western countries the industrial revolution is an accomplished fact and a balance has been struck between agriculture and machine industry, in India the industrial revolution is but in its infancy and there is no such thing as an Indian working class relying wholly upon machine industry for its support. The only thing the ordinary villager really has enough of is spare time. At certain times of the year he has no other alternative save idleness and unemployment.

But even this does not exhaust his troubles. His cattle die; his agricultural implements wear out; the government demand for revenue comes at an inopportune time; and the villager's only recourse is to turn to the money-lender. The village money-lender is said to be the most important man in India. In India as a whole there is one money-lender to every 367 of the population, and the rates of interest vary from 25 to 300 per cent. The landholder has no choice. In time of stress he must either starve, give up his land, or go to the money-lender—and go to the money-lender he does. He borrows to the extent of his credit and becomes more and more deeply involved, generally securing his borrowings by the mortgage of his land.

But still the tale is incomplete. Mann, in his study of a village in the Poona District, shows how the average size of the agricultural holding has declined from 40 acres in 1771 to 7 acres in 1915; while of the total holdings 463 were less than 1 acre, and 112 less than ¼ acre. An economic holding in this same section of the country is generally regarded as from 10 to 15 acres. The reason for this condition is the practice of fragmentation. Where land was formerly held by one cultivator, it has been divided and subdivided until today the ordinary villager owns a fragment of land here and a fragment of land there, without enough land in any one place to pay him to dig wells, introduce fencing, or agricultural improvements.

This then is the picture: a partly idle, inadequately fed, indebted village people. And to this people the missionary has come, presumably to be of some practical help. He offers them religion and complains bitterly of their hardness of heart because they do not accept his offering. He talks to them about a rebirth, when the most of them have not the slightest conception as to what constitutes a sanitary first birth. The more I think upon the problem, the more it seems to me that our missionary method is but partial. The missionary does have a message to the hearts of men, but he also must have a message that ministers to their bodies. As St. James pointed out long ago, it is of no use to request a hungry brother or sister to depart in peace without giving him something more. An adequate gospel must give that and something more.

At the very outset we must recognize that the missionaries are not the only forward-looking people in India. All of the things I have thus far mentioned are from the studies of Indian economists, and public-spirited Indian men and women are working hard in their endeavor to meet these problems. The function of the missionary, as I see it, is not so much to blaze new trails as to endeavor to co-operate with and lend strength to the Indian leaders themselves.

The problem of poverty cannot be met by increasing the number of workers on the mission pay-rolls or by the indiscriminate handing out of doles. The cure must be decidedly more far-reaching. The most apparent causes of poverty, such as thriftlessness and the waste of money upon ceremonies and feasts, can be dealt with through the means of education. I am opposed to the village missionary being simply a shepherd to the Christian community. I believe he has a definite responsibility toward the whole village. Here is common ground for a good beginning. Through public-school posters, through talks, through dramatics, and through stereopticon lectures, a definite attack can be made upon these problems, though it may take a long period of years to bring about their actual solution.

The development of Indian industry is comparatively recent. Though the old handicrafts of the villages have declined with the advent of Western civilization, there are not enough organized industries to absorb the surplus farming population. Despite certain sentimental agitation to the contrary, India does need more factories. The present position of Indian agriculture and industry is a purely anomalous one. Cottage industries will meet the situation part way and should be encouraged, but cottage industries cannot be regarded as a complete solution to this most perplexing problem.

Education in thrift and the development of cottage industries are two constructive forward steps. A third and extremely important step is the encouragement of co-operative societies, both for the purpose of lending money at reasonable rates of interest, and for the joint marketing of the surplus crop. It is not my intention to go into the details of co-operation. The information is easily obtainable from central bureaus by all who desire it. It is worthy of record that several missionaries have played a leading part in the co-operative movement, and that in certain mission districts every village of size has its co-operative society, organized with the aid and encouragement of the district missionary.

I have already mentioned the evil of the fragmentation of land—the dividing and subdividing of fields until they are economically wasteful. The obvious remedy is to encourage the consolidation of holdings, and in this movement the missionary can play his part. But it will be a long time, possibly generations, before public opinion will be ready to take this step. In the meantime the missionary can use his influence in persuading the owner of property to hand it on to one heir, who is charged with the responsibility of administering the property and keeping it intact for the benefit of all the heirs. He can persuade caste and village leaders to help in bringing about the voluntary exchange of holdings. He can go to individual farmers and show them the advantage of co-operating with other farmers in the joint cultivation of their adjoining fields, as well as co-operating in the division and marketing of the product. These things are simple, and yet they are most far-reaching for the welfare and development of the Indian village.

As another practical step for the economic improvement of the village people, the missionary can at times arrange to increase the amount of land under cultivation by assisting in the reclamation of what is commonly known as "agricultural waste." By obtaining the advice of government agriculturists, much unused land can be restored, often with little more outlay than the sinking of a good well.

So much for a very sketchy treatment of the relation of the missionary to the problem of poverty. To cover this one subject in detail is not a matter of pages but of volumes. And yet, even these few suggestions indicate a lead which should prove itself to be quite fruitful.

We turn now to the closely allied problem of ignorance. In a way poverty and ignorance are two sides of the same shield, but many of the causes of poverty have no connection with literacy or illiteracy—they are rather facts of nature.

In every mission district there are schools, hosts of them, of all kinds and descriptions. Some are good and some are bad. Others lie in between. They are colorless. They remind one of the character of Dante who was spurned by heaven and scorned by hell. The reason is not far to seek. The majority of the missionaries have been brought up under a fixed educational pattern. It is a heritage from the past and ill adapted to meet the needs of the present. A school system adapted to the needs of neither modern England nor America is transplanted upon the soil of India and is expected to bear fruit. But one cannot raise grapes of thistles. The wonder is that we have done as well with the job as we have.

If missionary education has any present-day justification, it must be a "different" education, relating itself to village need. It must be a superior education. The ordinary mission apologetic that the mission school is giving something which the local board school cannot give, must be examined in the light of actual accomplishment. Some schools are giving a plus, but unfortunately they are not in the majority. A large percentage of the mission schools could be closed tomorrow with absolutely no loss to the people of India. It is not my intention to outline a course of study for mission schools, but I do think that we should honestly face the whole school question. It is far more Christian to close a few poor schools for the benefit of the remainder than obstinately to hang on to what we have for the sake of tradition. Our Christian schools should be powerhouses instead of refrigerators. They should be lighthouses instead of flickering candles. If the missionary claims to represent Christ in India, he must represent him with his best, for was it not Jesus himself who said: "What do ye more than others?" The question is just as pertinent to the twentieth century as it was to the first. What do we in our schools? We must do more than others!

And if we are to do this "more," our obligation is not fulfilled when we have taught the children. We must also regard village education as including the fathers and mothers. Every village school should be looked upon as a potential social center. Every village school teacher should be a trained social engineer, enlisting all the available power in the village to his aid. The mothers should be trained in the care of children. Adults should be encouraged to continue their education, to learn to read worth-while vernacular literature and to have an intelligent outlook upon questions of the day. There should be evening and off-season classes on the care of the soil, on manures and the breeding of good animals. There should be propaganda for co-operative societies and for cottage industries. There should be lectures upon temperance, thrift, the sex problem, and the evils of early marriage. There should be classes in home-making and simple cooking. There should be instruction upon the care of the teeth, the care of the body, diet, the importance of pure water, housing, ventilation, village sanitation, the disposal of refuse, and the prevention of such diseases as enteric, malaria, tuberculosis, smallpox, cholera, and plague. There should be music, dramatics, athletic contests, and wholesome fun. Character education should not be considered as a thing apart. Growth in character should be expected as the logical result of intelligent participation in the life of the village.

And right at this juncture I can hear my overworked missionary friends questioning, "And who pray is to do all of this?" I think we must admit that the whole program cannot be undertaken at once. But at the same time we should not underestimate the power of our allies. Just as Elisha of old saw the heavens open and unseen hosts ready to rally to his support, so the modern missionary will find unexpected helpers at hand when once he begins to advance. Once a village is set apart as a demonstration center, the movement soon spreads and goes forward of its own momentum. And, granted that it does mean extra work, that is small excuse for shirking. Many fine things have been accomplished by the missionary group in India, but greater things are still in the offing. The modern gospel for India is the old, old gospel of life—life more abundant.

# CRITICAL REVIEWS

## NABONIDUS AND BELSHAZZAR[1]

When I was first asked to review Dougherty's book for this *Journal,* I accepted the task with some misgivings. A book on Assyriology could hardly be successfully discussed in a journal from which all technical discussions have of necessity to be left out. After reading the book through, my fears vanished. We have here plainly a book of apologetics, and the theologian will be the one to appreciate it.

Every one of us is familiar with works in which scientific canons are thrown to the winds and all kinds of gratuitous assertions are fearlessly made: plain cases of "fools rushing in where angels fear to tread." Nothing like it here. Dougherty is a very good scholar and shows great skill in weighing the evidence. So we have here a case of the angel fearing to tread but going in just the same. So patent is the effort not to sink in any of the many pitfalls lying all around that one cannot help asking himself: "If the author knew that progress would be so dangerous as to be almost impossible, why did he attempt it at all?" To this question there is no answer. Anyone who likes arguments will follow with interest the process by which the author, after presenting a hypothesis which is at best merely possible, immediately proceeds to assure us that he knows his case is not proved and that a probability remains only a probability. Practically nowhere in the book does the author use a doubtful argument without warning the reader that the case is not proved. Thus a single section of the book might carry conviction. But the real trouble comes when all these probabilities are finally linked together. To one assumed conclusion is added another which is also more or less doubtful. The first two serve as the basis for a third assumption which in itself is not their necessary corollary; and so the house of cards goes up, ready to come down at the first little touch.

The author first concerns himself with showing that Nabonidus had an exalted and noble ancestry, and quotes Nabonidus himself who calls his father "wise prince, perfect prince, courageous minister, reverer of the great gods, reverer of the gods and goddesses." According to the author,

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[1] *Nabonidus and Belshazzar* ("Yale Oriental Series: Researches," Vol. XV). By Raymond Philip Dougherty. New York: Yale University Press, 1929. xii+216 pages. $3.00.

"such titles justify us in assuming that the father of Nabonidus had noble connections, political importance, and religious piety." However, the only thing which clearly appears from these is that Nabonidus' father was neither a king nor of royal blood; for such facts would have been clearly mentioned. An exaggeration of his father's importance is more than natural; it was practically necessary. No one takes seriously all the titles that the king bestows upon himself or the assertion that his destiny had been decreed by Sin and Ningal for the lot of royalty while he was still in his mother's womb.

An added proof of the importance of Nabonidus the author finds in a contract wherein one Nabu-naid, who is a witness, is called "the one who is over the city" and his paternity is not mentioned. "This fact alone," according to the author, "warrants a comparison between him and Nabonidus who became king." Possible, though quite uncertain.

At this point the reader will begin to ask: But why all these arguments to prove that Nabonidus was such an important personage? The more important Nabonidus becomes, the more inexcusable is the mistake of the Book of Daniel in ignoring him altogether. But the answer finally comes. Nabonidus had to be important from the very beginning, or Nebuchadnezzar would not have given him his daughter in marriage. And this marriage is quite necessary for the final argument, as we shall see later on. Here the best I can do is to quote:

> All the facts which have been presented—and there has been an endeavor to omit no important fact—indicate the probability as well as the possibility that Nebuchadnezzar wedded an Egyptian princess. . . . . That a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar by his Egyptian consort should have been named Nitocris is entirely believable, and that this daughter should have become the spouse of Nabonidus may be looked upon as a normal incident in the course of events.

Nothing is impossible; but the fact remains that we do not know that Nebuchadnezzar married an Egyptian wife. We know still less that a daughter was the result of this marriage. Moreover, it is highly improbable that this supposed daughter of a Babylonian king should be called with an Egyptian name; and it is still further removed from probability that this problematical daughter of an assumed Egyptian wife of Nebuchadnezzar may have married Nabonidus. But why all this heaping up of improbabilities? To save the statement in Dan. 5:1 to the effect that Belshazzar was the son of Nebuchadnezzar. We know that Belshazzar was the son of Nabonidus, and we know also that Nabonidus was *not* the son of Nebuchadnezzar. The way out of the difficulty was to make Nabonidus the son-in-law of Nebuchadnezzar. In Assyrian the word "son" can be used in the meaning of "grandson" or linear descendant. I could add examples of this special usage from the newly discovered Nuzi tablets. There a certain Aqawatil is called son of Zigi, whereas we know very well that he is only his grandson. But in all instances the descent is from the father's side, not from the mother's. I have yet to find an example of anyone being called the "son" of his grandfather on the mother's side. Thus the argument, built up so laboriously, comes against an insurmountable difficulty at its end.

The author gets on solid ground when he proves that Nabonidus had left his residence in Babylon for a number of years and taken his abode in Tema, in Arabia. During Nabonidus' absence his son Belshazzar exercised royal authority in Babylon. This part of the book is a real contribution to science, and we are grateful to the author for his careful treatment of the cuneiform evidence. But from the standpoint of apologetics even this helps very little; for the author is careful to point out that Belshazzar, while acting as a substitute for his absent father, is never called "king" in any cuneiform source. The most we can say is that Daniel's mention of "Belshazzar the king," while a mistake, is an understandable one.

Nabonidus' absence from Babylon might well explain Daniel's ignoring him, but for the fact that, as the author points out, he had returned to the city before the time of its fall. Of this the cuneiform sources leave no doubt. Worse still, it is Belshazzar who appears not to have been there. After the fourteenth year of his father's reign, all cuneiform references to Belshazzar cease altogether. The more documents the author brings in, the worse this silence becomes. An argument from silence is of course uncertain; but if we suppose Belshazzar had died, or had simply retired from active life, what would become of the whole thesis?

The capital defect of this book is that the author entirely ignores cumulative evidence. In a work which is essentially a defense of the historicity of the Book of Daniel, one might expect some such phrase as this: "The Book of Daniel has been badly treated by the higher critics. I am going to show that its background is historical." But we find nothing of the kind. The Book of Daniel, as a whole, does not appear to interest the author. He concerns himself with its fifth chapter only, just as though the rest of the book had no bearing whatsoever on that chapter. And even concerning this he does not dare affirm that it is historical. He contents himself with saying (the italics are his) that *"the fifth chapter of Daniel ranks next to cuneiform literature in accuracy."* This in itself means very, very little. "Next" may indicate a close second, or there might be miles between the first and the second. Even in its very careful wording, the statement is not supported by the evidence. The outside source which ranks next to cuneiform literature is Berossus, who rejects the whole episode of Belshazzar and does not even mention him. And this is as it should be, since Berossus is really a cuneiform source translated into Greek.

All that this carefully worded affirmation really means is that the Greek and Jewish sources are just as far apart from the truth as Daniel is. This is at best a doubtful consolation. And even in the treatment of other sources the cumulative evidence is entirely left out. Great stress is placed on the real meaning of a sentence, while no attempt whatsoever is made to weigh the real historical value of the source. Herodotus, Xenophon, Josephus, and Baruch, which Daniel precedes in rank only because of its employing the name "Belshazzar," appear as having the same historical value.

Coming now to the real question, what do the cuneiform sources really say? They say: (1) that Belshazzar is a real historical personage, and that he is the son of Nabonidus; (2) that this same Belshazzar did exercise royal power in Babylon at the time of his father's absence in Arabia, though he was not called king; (3) that Nabonidus was in Babylonia near the time of its fall; (4) that the city was taken without a fight, and by Gobryas, a general of Cyrus. Cyrus himself entered the city a few days after capturing Nabonidus, who had fled away.

There is no mention of Belshazzar the king, the son of Nebuchadnezzar; no mention of any banquet or following slaughter; no possibility of introducing Darius, the Mede, who is given credit for the capture of the city. We might say that the only correct thing in the whole chapter in Daniel is the spelling of the name Belshazzar.

Why not abandon, once for all, these attempts at making historical what was not meant to be historical? Why spoil the beautiful, naïve story of Daniel by crushing it under the weight of a historical content it was never intended to carry?

Notwithstanding the elaborate arguments and the expenditure of labor and ingenuity, this book fails to prove its point. The admirable Introduction by Professor Montgomery to his critical commentary on Daniel still remains the very last word that can be said on the subject. And this is not because of any fault of the author. He has done everything that it was possible to do, and as well as it could be done. But no one, however skilful and thorough, can be successful with an argument of this type. Apologetics and unbiased scientific presentation are most difficult to mix.

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## THE BIBLE AND LIFE[1]

One wonders sometimes whether anything really new can be written concerning the Bible. Occasionally a book appears which makes the reader feel that at least the Bible has been approached in a new way. Ordinarily the chief item which is new is the fresh reaction of the author. That is the special impression one receives from the first of the two volumes now in hand. It is the story of a man who was reared in conservative religious circles, entered the Presbyterian ministry, came into contact with views of the Bible and of religion entirely different from those he had received in youth, found himself undergoing a radical transformation in religious experience, became aware that he could not conscientiously preach as his ministerial associates expected him to present his message, offered a frank statement of his thinking to the presbytery of which he was a member, and, as he anticipated, learned that the unanimous vote of the presbytery was against his continuing in their fellowship.

The small book which he has written as an outcome reveals wide reading, extensive familiarity with the literature concerning the Bible, and the essential knowledge of biblical history for our time.

In some respects the volume is suggestive and perhaps even stimulating. At the same time, the reviewer cannot escape the impression that the author has been more succesful in revealing the irritation of his own experience than in describing the experience in such a way as to be helpful for others whose early relations to the Bible have been somewhat similar to his own and who are endeavoring to work through the problems for themselves. If Mr. Richardson could have preserved, both in his own experience and in the composition of the book, a more equable temperament and a more sympathetic reaction as his life was being remade, a book he might then have produced would doubtless have been of distinct assistance to many. One can only hope the present book will be that.

Two or three minor items ought to be noted. The extensive bibliography, covering seventeen pages, is rather an indication of the wide reading of the author than a list of books likely to be of service for those who may read the volume. On page 94, ten lines from the bottom, there is an unexpected error in grammar, "whom I thought," appearing where we should have "who, I thought."

In the considerably larger volume by Professor Willett, we have a story of the Bible and life from a historical rather than individual point of view. Perhaps it would be more correct to describe the book by Dr. Willett as a work dealing with life and the Bible, that is, life through the centuries as pictured and, to some extent outlined, in the pages of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.

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[1] *Life and the Book.* By Hillary G. Richardson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 179 pages. $1.75.

*The Bible through the Centuries.* By Herbert L. Willett. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby, 1929. 337 pages. $3.00.

In language which is sympathetic, fluent, perhaps sometimes almost too diffuse for the purpose in hand, Dr. Willett tells of the world as it was before the Bible began, incidents connected with the beginning of the Bible, something of the prophets and the way in which they wrote, the priests and their services, the wise men of Israel, the literature which was prepared and widely read though it did not find a place in the Bible as we know it, sacred books of somewhat similar import among other peoples, the growth of the New Testament, and the experiences in translation and otherwise through which the Bible has passed in its manifold use to our time. One sees accordingly that this volume does not undertake to present new material so much as to assemble, in a new way, in readable form, more fully than has been done before, the essential outcome of generations of faithful Bible study.

In general Dr. Willett has escaped forms of language which are likely to offend those who come to his book without the experience through which he has passed intellectually and religiously. Occasionally, however, a negative statement appears, such as the complete sentence on page 3, "The Bible is not a perfect book," or, such language as the sentence on page 286, "The Bible discloses certain features in virtue of which we have a right to call it inspired," which are likely to grate upon the feelings of some at least of those whom the author would like to carry with him. One ventures to call attention to such minor items with a recognition, at the same time, of the difficulty an author faces who undertakes to be faithful to all his material and yet avoid negations and qualified statements which seem to imply a discount of views of the Bible which are really assumed.

The bibliography offered by Dr. Willett is briefer than that of Mr. Richardson and, for that reason, as well as for the choice of titles, more likely to assist those for whom it was intended. It would be still more useful if the names of the authors included their initials rather than merely the surnames, as anyone accustomed to going to a catalogue in order to secure a book will be aware. A bibliography should always include the initials of the forenames of each author, and the first forename in full if there is only one.

An item which should be noted for the publisher of the volume by Dr. Willett is an irregularity of format caused by the imperfect handling of some of the folios, at least in the copy received by the reviewer, particularly beginning with page 155.

An important and useful portion of Dr. Willett's book is the rather full and well-arranged Index.

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## MAHATMA GANDHI

It goes without saying that this book[1] appears at a most opportune moment. Not only India, but all the reading world, is watching the deeds and listening to the words of Mahatma Gandhi with very real interest. But to understand his words and his deeds and his aims without some background of knowledge concerning the man, his past efforts and achievements, and his guiding ideas, is impossible. To provide the reader with this background is exactly the aim of Mr. Andrews' book. And nowhere else—unless the reviewer is greatly mistaken—can so adequate a background within so small a compass be found. This is not a life of Gandhi: it is Gandhi himself speaking to us. For Mr. Andrews has presented the man in and through his own words, and has largely confined his work to a selection of significant passages from Gandhi's writings. One would have to read through most of Gandhi's books and most of the files of Young India to get an equally comprehensive view of the things for which this remarkable man stands.

Of course no book of selections can be all-inclusive; and, while Mr. Andrews has shown us many sides of his many-sided friend, his selection has, almost inevitably, been influenced by his admiration. The reader of Mr. Gandhi's own autobiography, the second volume of which has recently appeared in English translation, will be impressed with some things of which Mr. Andrews gives but little hint. Particularly Gandhi's ideas about diet and about education and his unscientific mode of thought will startle the reader of the autobiography, and reveal a strain of zealotry which he who confines himself to Mr. Andrews' book would not fully realize. The autobiography reveals to us a real saint, a man of strong will, of complete and selfless devotion, of exalted character, but also a mind which in some of its workings is so irrational that one would hesitate to commit to it the guidance of a nation of 320,000,000 people. Some suggestion of the zealot side of his hero Mr. Andrews does give us in dealing with Gandhi's emphasis upon cow-protection as a religious duty, with his enthusiastic defense of the caste system, and with a few other points upon which the two friends cannot fully agree. For Mr. Andrews by no means accepts all of Gandhi's ideas, and in several passages points out what he regards as mistakes and logical inconsistencies in his attitude. But in spite of these things, and in spite of the odd notions which this remarkable man holds upon matters of education and diet, no reader of this or any other true book about Gandhi can fail to realize that this Indian contemporary of ours is a genuine saint: not an ineffectual angel, not a stained-glass window figure, but a strong, determined man, with a seemingly inexhaustible will, completely devoid of personal hate, living a life of constant and efficient devotion. Not many generations of mankind have possessed such a contemporary. It is a privilege to become directly acquainted with him through the pages of Mr. Andrews' book.

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[1] *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas.* By C. F. Andrews. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 382 pages. $3.00.

James Bissett Pratt

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## THE RELIGIOUS QUEST

Anyone who would like to realize afresh and vividly the meager provincialism of Westernized thinking about religion and to minimize it in his own reflections by a guided glimpse at the evolution of religion in humanity at large will find especial stimulus in this just-published survey of the story of religion by Professor Haydon.[1]

Conceiving religion with a generosity that will doubtless expose him to the shafts of more meticulous logical classifiers—as the age-long quest for shared human values—Dr. Haydon sympathetically compares and evaluates the decisive points in the theologies, cosmologies, rituals, moral ideals, and authoritative writings of the influential religions, endeavoring to reveal through the whole checkered story both the consuming power of the religious impulse and the tragic handicaps that have hitherto prevented it from attaining its promised land. A difficult task this, to accomplish in a volume of less than two hundred and fifty pages, but the author displays everywhere the deftness and generalizing skill of the artist as well as the sound grasp of the competent scholar, and he carries out his task without a trace of the sometimes subtle but none the less distressingly evident partisanship of most Western incursions into the field of comparative religion.

As would be expected by those familiar with Professor Haydon's other writings, his interpretation is humanistic without qualification—religion is an entirely human enterprise, its gods are the objects of human need, its ideals goals of human aspiration, its myths grandiose explanations of prized experience. This will be viewed as a source of dismal weakness by many, as the only guarantee of intelligent dealing with religion by some. The present reviewer is perfectly willing to put the problems of religion in such terms whenever it seems helpful to do so; none the less he shares the feeling of those who hold that the metaphysical question will not entirely down. After all, it is a real issue whether we can take the religious attitude toward gods recognized to be of our own creation, or whether that attitude demands the conviction that whatever is worthful in ourselves is rather produced by the object before whom we bow. But this latter conviction requires a metaphysic which humanism as such can hardly give us. Professor Haydon's theme in the present volume is too clean-cut to justify chiding him for omission in it of these metaphysical discussions, but there are many who would welcome a frank facing of them at his hands.

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[1] *The Quest of the Ages.* By A. Eustace Haydon. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1929. xiii+243 pages. $2.50.

His definition of religion as the quest for shared goods throws a somewhat novel light on the comical logical predicament that anyone is under if he attempts to compress into a formula what he means by the word. When we define it in terms that set it off sharply from other phases of experience, we are quickly put to confusion by those who point out that religion really bears on all of life and that nothing can justly be left out. When we define it in all-inclusive terms, we are equally easily confused by those who ask by what right we give the name of religion to the totality of conscious experience. In preferring the second horn of this dilemma, Professor Haydon doubtless proceeds as wisely as any definer of such an elusive affair. It is, however, well to recognize clearly that what this signifies is that the author likes the word "religion" sufficiently to wish to apply it to something that others with equal logical justification would prefer to describe in other terms. Conscious life itself is a quest for shared good. And a more carping critic than the present one might insist that there is a more serious logical difficulty in this way of defining religion, with especial reference to the word "shared." After all, there are the hermits to whom religion means the quest for a private rather than a shared good, and a cruelly divisive as well as a socializing effect of religion has been evident in all but the rarest of its devotees. Truly, in defining religion even the most genial and tolerant mind can hardly become quite impartial: we either define to bless or we define to damn.

But there is no book at present in our libraries with quite its combination of stimulating virtues. For the breadth of its sweep, for its consistent adherence to the humanist approach, for its sympathetic appreciation of even the crudest forms of religion and its scrupulous fairness toward all the world-religions, as well as for its challenging portrayal of the contemporary religious crisis, it can hardly afford to be left aside by those who wish to think sanely about religion.

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## THE MESSIANIC HOPE[1]

The material in this comprehensive book constitutes a careful and thoroughgoing treatment of the origin and growth of messianic conceptions in the Old Testament, along with a study of other related religious and political ideas. It is based upon, and is a development of, an earlier work by the same author under the title *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*. One is impressed by the completeness of the discussion. Customs connected with the court of Israel, such as the anointing of the king and the identification of king and priest, introduce the volume. Israel borrowed the custom of anointing the king from the Amorites by way of Melchizedek. Among the so-called "royal" psalms no messianic or eschatological elements are to be found. Since Psalm 2 can be explained by no concrete political situation in Israel, it must have been influenced from foreign sources. Wherever possible, these songs are referred to definite historical conditions rather than to imaginative eschatological beliefs. The king as possessing superhuman knowledge and healing power, as a son of God, and as a divine being, are conceptions discoverable in the Old Testament, but they have their roots in Egyptian and Assyrian practices. Deutero-Isaiah bears undeniable evidence of the Babylonian domicile of its author.

The prophetic elements in the messianic idea are sketched in detail, with a wealth of critical suggestions regarding the pertinent prophetic passages. The author's warm appreciation of the prophetic genius and temperament is very clear. He rightly ridicules the practice, still too frequently pursued, of applying prose standards of literary criticism to the poetic pronouncements of the prophets. A prophetic utterance contains two unrelated sections, promise and threat, hope and doom. While having no literary connection, they are to be ascribed to the same individual prophet. The prophet's hatred of sin, and his intense patriotism, determine this apparent incoherence in his speech. But there are also groups of prophets distinguished by their acquiescence in the *status quo* and by their optimism. These are the court prophets against whom the revolutionary prophets of the opposition party are aligned. The identification of the king with the Messiah was effected by the court prophets. The oracles against foreign nations, contrary to the school of literary critics, are based upon an original natural catastrophic event. This element is the oldest, rather than the youngest, portion of the oracles.

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[1] *Der Messias—Forschungen zur Religion und Geschichte des A.T. und N.T.* By Hugo Gressmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. 506 pages. M. 36.

The messianic kingdom is a projection into the future of an ideal golden age in the past. The transformation of nature, tranquillity among men and animals, and a new covenant with the deity are features of this ideal future. The refashioning of swords into plowshares is one among several indications of the absence of prophetic motivation in this picture of a glorious future. The nomadic ideal is not one of peace, but of war and strife. Since the prophet shared this nomadic interest, the form of the future kingdom is to be traced chiefly to primitive mythology and folklore, and not to prophetic writers. Behind it all is probably a Babylonian source. The belief in a messianic kingdom for the future must be founded upon an ideal kingdom existing in ancient times. But Israel had no primitive king. Her monarchy appeared relatively late. Consequently the concept of an ideal king has a foreign origin, that is, it came from Egypt through the Amorites. A very impressive piece of reasoning, provided the major premise is trustworthy!

The much-argued passage in Isaiah, chapter 7, refers to a messianic individual, who is to establish peace and destroy Israel's enemies. The general view, whereby the story of the birth of a child to be called Immanuel is regarded as an indication of time, is dismissed with brief consideration. The view is too allegorical. In refutation of the literary-critical school, which postpones the origin of the messianic hope in Israel to post-Exilic times, it is affirmed that Israel had no national existence in that period, and had no interest in political matters. How, then, could she have formulated the conception of an ideal king? The servant in Isaiah, chapter 53, is neither Israel, since sinlessness could not be attributed to her, nor the personification of prophecy, nor a historical person, but an ideal figure, combining prophetic and royal qualities, a kind of personification of religious and national longings of the exiles. The idea of the Son of Man (Daniel and IV Esra) may be traced to Iranian-Babylonian beliefs. The sacramental eating of the Son of Man (John 6:51–56) suggests the Egyptian eating of the eye of Horus, resulting in new life and power. The connection is unmistakable.

It is the obvious purpose of the writer to discount the older position respecting messianism, held by Wellhausen and others. Perhaps the reaction to this position has caused Dr. Gressmann to swing too much to the other extreme. At times he places too much emphasis upon foreign influence and historical backgrounds. His work on the Tower of Babel, recently reviewed in this *Journal,* shows a strong Babylonian bias. In the present volume Egyptian influence is by no means neglected. On the other hand, textual and linguistic problems receive discriminating attention. Without question, *Der Messias* is the most thorough and searching examination of the messianic problem in the Old Testament yet produced. It certainly is a work of real significance for a knowledge of the Hebrew and Christian religions.

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## JUDAISM IN THE DISPERSION

A new interest in certain aspects of Jewish life in the Diaspora is attested by several books that have recently appeared. One of these volumes is a suggestive interpretation of the missionary work of Judaism. More than forty years ago Georg Rosen conceived the idea of explaining the rapid growth of Hellenistic Judaism as a result of the spread of the Hebrew religion among other Semites, and particularly among the Phoenicians, already scattered about the Mediterranean in pre-Christian times. But before the study could be completed its author died and his son, engrossed in other duties, was unable to prepare the manuscript for publication until he secured the assistance of Georg Bertram, a theological professor at Giessen.[1] In spite of the handicap of composite authorship, the discussion is very stimulating. Evidently the editors have taken great pains with the materials, especially in bringing the wealth of matter in the footnotes down to date. The main thesis of the book is that the so-called Diaspora was more a spread of the Jewish religion than a multiplication of the Jewish race. Colonization and natural increase are thought to be quite insufficient to account for the numerous adherents of Judaism throughout the Roman world at the beginning of the imperial period. There must have been a large accession of proselytes, particularly from among the Phoenician emigrants, who culturally were nearest akin to the Jews. This theory is offered to explain the rapid disappearance of the large Phoenician population scattered around the Mediterranean before the Romans gained the ascendancy. The descendants of these Phoenician settlers were so quickly absorbed by Judaism that within almost a generation the Phoenicians as such had completely disappeared. One cannot say that the truth of the hypothesis is demonstrated beyond doubt, but it is deserving of serious consideration. Perhaps it is unfortunate that its presentation has been so closely linked with the thesis that Judaism was essentially not the religion of a race but was, and had been ever since the Exile, universalistic in its genius.

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[1] *Juden und Phönizier. Das antike Judentum als Missionsreligion und die Entstehung der jüdischen Diaspora.* Von Georg Rosen. Neu bearbeitet und erweitert von Friedrich Rosen und Georg Bertram. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929. 185 pages. M. 14.

The two most conspicuous representatives of Judaism among the Gentiles in early Roman times were Philo of Alexandria and Josephus. The place of the former in Hellenistic Judaism is a topic of abiding significance and one that has of late awakened fresh interest. In a recently published study by Professor Goodenough of Yale, Philo is presented as a practical lawyer.[2] The investigation is based upon Philo's *De specialibus legibus*. From this treatise the author believes it possible to extract a more specific picture than has heretofore been available of the law used by Jews in their own courts in Alexandria. While it is recognized that Philo always regarded himself a loyal Jew, who by resort to philosophical mysticism and allegorical interpretations continually endeavored to demonstrate to Gentiles the permanent validity of the traditions of his ancestors, it is also insisted that he accepted the necessity of a "horrible imprisonment in practical affairs." In the discharge of these immediate duties he had acquired a profundity of legal knowledge and training, the core of which was gentile rather than Jewish. The result was that in the treatise in question he was chiefly concerned, especially in the area of criminal and civil law, to restate the prescriptions of the Torah, or even to alter them or deny them in a literal sense altogether, in order to make Jewish laws accord with the actual laws, sometimes Roman and sometimes Greek, that were in force among the Jews of Alexandria. He systematically altered the sense or even the text of Scripture in order to effect a comprehensive agreement with the local gentile jurisprudence. Hence his rewriting of the Torah "was not an academic amusement, but the product of necessity" (p. 14). This hypothesis is presented with a wealth of detail and an incisiveness of interpretation that carry conviction. But one is not required to lose sight of the fact that Philo never abandoned his belief in the validity of divine revelation or his confidence that one day the divine law would displace the more temporary human jurisprudence at the moment in force even among the Jews of Alexandria. The Messianic dream of Israel was to become a reality in the future when the Jewish people, because they had been law-abiding under their present heathen rulers, would ultimately be rewarded by the inauguration of a new divine régime. This study is of value not only for the light it sheds on the Judaism of the Diaspora, but for the suggestions it offers to one who is concerned with the relations of the early Christians to the legal authorities in the Roman state.

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[2] *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews under the Early Roman Empire as Described by Philo Judaeus.* By Erwin R. Goodenough. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929. vii+268 pages. $3.00.

The allegorical exegesis of Philo has been subjected to further research in a new monograph by Edmund Stein,[3] whose Philonic studies in connection with his translation of the tractate on the *Confusion of Tongues* in the new German rendering of Philo's works has prepared him for this task. By way of introduction the author takes pains to discriminate between allegory, metaphor, and symbolism as used by both Greeks and Jews. He briefly examines the beginnings of allegory among Hellenistic Jews as represented in the work of Aristobulus, the Letter of Aristeas, and the so-called "Wisdom of Solomon," and he points out that the Jewish *haggada* also prepared the way for the use of allegory. But the phenomenon in Philo is far more highly developed than in any of these predecessors, and this fact raises the question of Philo's creative contribution. A decade and a half ago Bousset proposed the previous existence of an allegorical school from which Philo drew his materials, and evidence for this opinion was sought in the fact of the numerous contradictory elements met with in Philo's works. He must, it was assumed, have derived a great deal from an already existing composite allegorical tradition. Stein doubts the validity of this proof, but subscribes to the hypothesis and defends it by an examination of Philo's use of Hebrew etymologies. He concludes that Philo had no adequate knowledge of Hebrew, but depended for his etymologies upon various current traditions that were already the possession of the schools. Philo simply repeated the types of allegory already in vogue. The sources upon which he drew were the gentile practice of the art, its use among the Therapeutes and Essenes, and the work of other Hellenists. But all his sources were in Greek, which was "not only his mother tongue, as he himself boasted, but the only language he knew" (p. 32). A further indication of foreign influence lies in the fact that Philo was fond of referring to allegorical interpretation as a "mystery," some expositions constituting the "greater" and some the "lesser" mysteries. But for this imagery he is thought to be indebted most immediately to the Therapeutes and the Essenes. Philo's credit for originality in exegesis is not large; his service consisted fundamentally in the preservation of tradition. His original contribution to the allegorical tradition was "extremely small" (p. 61).

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[3] *Die allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandreia.* By Edmund Stein. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1929. 61 pages. M. 3.20.

The mysticism of Philo is the principal theme in still another recent study on the history of ancient mysticism by a young German scholar.[4] The discussion falls into two divisions: first, a study of the origins of Philo's conception of "sober intoxication" and, second, a history of the influence of this notion in patristic literature down to Augustine. Present uncertainty regarding the genesis of Philo's mysticism, and the influence of the emotional experience within early Christianity, make welcome a new investigation in this field, especially by a student who acknowledges that his inspirations have been largely derived from the previous work of such scholars as Norden, Reitzenstein, and Bousset. An examination of Philo's language leads to the conclusion that his thought was distinctly mystical in character. The state of sober intoxication was attainable only through a union of the purely spiritual side of man with the divine, and presupposed an ascetic type of life on the part of one who would realize the experience. It was an act of the divine favor bestowed directly upon the worthy man, or else mediated through the agencies of *Logos* and Wisdom. Turning to a consideration of analogous notions among the Greeks, one finds there a sharply defined picture of divine possession to explain the phenomena of ecstasy and inspiration. Also the "divine drunkenness" of the Dionysus cult offered a parallel experience, from which the Gentiles had developed a definite doctrine of a divine indwelling in both prophets and poets. Philo and his Greek contemporaries were alike inclined to account for the personalities of unique individuals on the theory of "divine men," the classical example of such for both Jews and Greeks being the prophet through whom the divine spirit speaks. But the Philonic notion of "sober intoxication," which is sharply contrasted with physical drunkenness, represents a closer fusion of ascetic and intellectual interests, the more immediate antecedents of which are found in the Graeco-oriental religious movement known as Gnosticism. Philo is, in fact, to be regarded as an exponent of this movement, whose beginnings are contemporary with his activity (p. 90). Philo's imagery passed over into Christianity through the mediation of Origen and his successors in the East and Cyprian, Ambrose, and Augustine in the West.

Although Josephus is a far less attractive person than Philo, the former has awakened the interest of the English scholar, Thackeray, who is preparing a text and translation of Josephus for the "Loeb Classical Library." An invitation to deliver a series of lectures at the Jewish Institute of Religion in New York provided an opportunity to present in popular form the latest results of research.[5] There are six lectures, as follows: "Life and Character of Josephus: Estimate of Value of His Works," "The Jewish War," "The Jewish Antiquities," "Josephus and Judaism: His Biblical Text," "Josephus and Hellenism: His Greek Assistants," "Josephus and Christianity." The author is, generally speaking, lenient in his judgment of Josephus, whom he calls "a pacifist without the strength of character to control the militants, who had no use for a mediator" (p. 21), but he never faltered in his patriotism. On the quality of his work as a historian some rather severe criticisms are announced. The *War* is rated more highly than the *Antiquities,* but even the former was primarily a work of propaganda. The most distinctly new phase of criticism presented by the lectures is the attempt to specify the sections of the *Antiquities* that came not from the pen of Josephus but were the work of his editorial helpers. Their part our author thinks was a rather large one. The argument should be read at length in Lecture V. The question of Josephus' references to Christianity is treated in halting fashion with much deference to Eisler's sensational claims for the reliability of the Slavonic version of Josephus. On the whole Thackeray's criticism is cautious, even conservative, and is more likely to be made a point of departure for further research than to be accepted as a satisfactory solution of the problems involved.

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[4] *Sobria ebrietas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der antiken Mystik.* By Hans Lewy. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1929. 175 pages. M. 12.

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## PAGAN REGENERATION

The investigation of the world in which Christianity had its birth and early development goes on apace. The environment of this religion in its early stages has never before been so clearly presented as it is today. Perhaps one might say with equal truth that it was never so well understood. Scholars are showing us an age fascinating in its varied and human interests and culturally important. The more specifically religious environment of primitive Christianity has been receiving considerable attention recently. Three books of more than passing importance have appeared within a few months. All deal with this phase of history and, being written in the English language, have materially increased the facilities for knowledge of this field available to those who use only that tongue. They are *Experience with the Supernatural in Early Christian Times* by Shirley Jackson Case, *The Religious Quests of the Graeco-Roman World* by Samuel Angus, and the volume[1] with which this review deals.

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[5] *Josephus, the Man and the Historian.* By H. St. John Thackeray. With a Preface by G. F. Moore. New York: Jewish Institute of Religion Press, 1929. ix+160 pages.

In this work Professor Willoughby investigates the principal Graeco-Roman religions of redemption of the late pre-Christian and the early Christian periods with the purpose of discovering if they possessed anything that might be compared with the striking Christian thought expressed in the words of the Fourth Gospel, "Except one be born anew he cannot see the kingdom of God." The Eleusinian and the Dionysian mysteries and the Orphic system are carefully examined with this thought in mind, and in each case the conclusion is reached that a very definite rebirth experience was an integral part of the cult. The chief oriental religions of redemption which were then making their contributions to the complex religious life of the time are next subjected to painstaking review. The cult of the Great Mother, the religious ideas and activities centering in Mithra and those of Isis are interrogated regarding the regenerative idea and practice. The conclusion is the same in each case—the rebirth experience is part of the fabric of the religion.

The author proceeds to devote his attention to the interesting and somewhat tantalizing Hermetic literature. Seeking the experiences which lay behind and were genetic to this literature, he finds what he considers to be indubitable evidence that one of the central elements of Hermetic religion was the experience of regeneration. A chapter is devoted to the thought and writing of a man whose importance for the understanding of some early Christian ideas is but now coming to appreciation, namely, Philo of Alexandria. Threading the sometimes vague, sometimes labyrinthine pathways of his religious thinking, Mr. Willoughby decides that "Philo did believe that individual regeneration was possible."

An opening chapter on "Pagan Piety in the Graeco-Roman World" and a closing one on "The Social Significance of Mystery Initiation" complete the volume.

The book is of value from several standpoints. It sets forth clearly and vigorously an imposing array of facts that are not too well known to those not able to use the French and German languages, to say nothing of the classics. His English readers will be grateful to the author for this accession to their materials. The writer holds to his thesis with quite delightful constancy and refuses to be drawn from it by the siren voices of most attractive departures. For those familiar with the mysteries of the period the question may arise as to the necessity of so much argument to prove what would surely be freely admitted—that these religions did have the idea and the cult machinery of the new birth. Nevertheless, it is well to have such material gathered in a single volume and to have the point abundantly established. It will not need to be done again for some time. The discussions on Hermeticism and Philo are excellent, and for the reviewer they constitute the most interesting part of the book. They will serve many as an introduction to further consideration of two fields which the careful student of Christian environment cannot afford to ignore. The selected bibliographies which follow the chapters are well chosen.

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[1] *Pagan Regeneration.* By Harold R. Willoughby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929. ix+307 pages. $3.00.

Mr. Willoughby does not raise the question of the relation of these ideas and practices to, or their influence upon, the Christian thought of the new birth, although it is not hard to see that the matter is in his mind. The justification for this procedure lies in the statement that the volume before us is but a "prolegomenon to further research in Christian origins." It is indicated that in this further study the question will be faced especially in relation to the origin of Pauline mysticism. For the author's contribution to this important consideration we shall wait with what patience we can command.

The exposition of the procedures of the various religions is so excellently done, with such a constant and useful reference to source material and relevant literature, that criticism is in danger of being disarmed. Doubtless some will feel, and not entirely without warrant, that there is a strong desire, perhaps too strong, to find ethical implications and results in these cult practices. In the matter of personal religion general rules are precarious, but if one dared to infer generally from the history of religions one would be tempted to say that where the ritual predominates the tendency is for the ethical to become a minor feature. The *opus operatum* is not conducive to the development of high moral qualities. In the two contemplative religious experiences discussed by the author, the Hermetic and Philonic, where ethical transformation is indicated the cult is negligible. Of course, this matter of ethical effect is one of the moot questions and the final answer is not yet.

One fears that at times there is danger of a too easy assumption that early Christianity was homogeneously sacramental. The author nowhere makes such a statement but there is no recognition of any other type. It is true that an almost casual knowledge of early Christianity will convince one of both the early and rapidly expanding presence of sacramental elements in the new religion, but apparently it was not so until it touched the non-Jewish field and then probably so only gradually. If the author has in mind only the religion of the church catholic then even this mild criticism does not obtain, for catholic Christianity made one of its strongest appeals to the Graeco-Roman world as a sacramental mystery. But it may be that Professor Willoughby will clarify these points in his subsequent volume.

The importance of the subject, the patient and careful investigation of the writer, the clarity and forcefulness of the presentation combine to make this a welcome addition to our literature on Christian origins and to give us a prolegomenon that raises our expectation regarding discussions yet to come from the author's pen.

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## KNOPF'S NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION

The Knopf *Introduction to the New Testament*,[1] of which the sections on language and text had been written by Professor Lietzmann, has been reworked under the general editorship of Professor Weinel, although of the new edition Professor Lietzmann has revised the discussion of the canon. It is useful to have so concise a handbook brought up to date. However, it is disappointing to find that recent work in the New Testament field has occasioned but few, and these only minor, changes. Naturally, the most significant changes are in the bibliographical references, but even here the substitutions and additions are hardly numerous enough, nor sufficiently inclusive of significant productions, to warrant the editor's statement that the references to literature make the volume a handy guide to the history of New Testament science. This is the more disappointing, since the plates have been made anew, and the editor was not confined by the necessity of keeping to the old makeup.

A few indications of content will suffice. The section on language is essentially the same as in the earlier edition; the discussion of Semitic influences on the New Testament does not seem to be as important in Germany as it is in England and America. The section on text is slightly larger, with a few alterations, e.g., a different example from Tischendorf's apparatus is given. Strangely enough, the discussion of *Formgeschichte* is exactly the same as in the 1923 edition, with the sole exception that a bibliographical notice of K. L. Schmidt's recent work is added. Has this movement made so slight stir in Germany? On the other hand, the discussion of literature on the Apologists is fresh and inclusive of new material. Strangely enough, the sufficiently brief treatment of the religion of Judaism is even more compressed than it was in the earlier edition; there is no other mention of new literature than the notice of later editions of already-named books. The section on the life of Jesus is re-written; it is recognized that it is impossible to write Jesus' biography, and there is a frank facing of chronological problems. There is a new paragraph which discusses the social implications for Christianity of Jesus' teaching. In this section bibliographical references to new materials are many; it is interesting that Bousset and Brunner are classified among the Barthians. In the treatment of Paul the most important change is made by adding a paragraph on Paul and the early community, evidently a response to the influence of K. L. Schmidt. The new literature on Paul is mentioned in a section far removed from the discussion of its subject. In this section Bultmann, too, is grouped with the Barthian movement, and his work characterized as dialectical theology.

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[1] *Einführung in das Neue Testament*. 3d ed. By Rudolf Knopf (with the collaboration of Hans Lietzmann, re-edited by H. Weinel). Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1929. xvi+408 pages. Unbound M.10, bound M.12.

As might be expected, the Mandeans are mentioned, but they are noticed briefly; Bauer's work, but not Bultmann's, on their influence upon the Fourth Gospel is noticed.

A feature which comes to the attention of English-speaking students is the rarity of mention of English or American publications. Indeed, it is only in the section on text that even English work is noticed, and here it is passed by briefly. Curiously, Professor Lake's indispensable handbook is called a *Büchlein* and is dated 1900. The sole reference to an American book is to Peabody's *Jesus Christ and the Social Question,* and one may risk the guess that this was noted because it is translated into German. One does not wish to be captious about questioning an elementary textbook, but it does seem to be fair to ask why Streeter's *The Four Gospels* or G. F. Moore's *Judaism* is unknown to a writer who affirms that his work is bibliographically adequate.

Still more serious is the question of the slight impression which the book suggests has been made by recent work upon the Gospels and upon the Mandeans and their literature. Doubtless the scant notice afforded these findings is due to the desire of the editor to preserve the main features of the book as planned by its original writer. This is understandable, but the impression thus given is certainly misleading.

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## A STUDY ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Here is a book[1] that is by no means easy to read, partly because it develops theological propositions in an exegetical way, and partly because the quotation of pages and pages of contributory source material, the content of which continually transcends the limits of the immediate context, repeatedly interrupts the slender thread of exegetical continuity, and taxes the reader's patience sorely indeed. Let us hope it is not the beginning of a new *"Methode."*

In spite of this, Odeberg's book is extremely valuable, and will, with its wealth of interesting detail and penetrating analysis, repay in the reading the individual who ventures to trace out its maze. The task which Odeberg has set himself to accomplish is that of clarifying and formulating some of the fundamental concepts of Johannine thought. To this end he has analyzed in detail, with the help of rabbinical, philosophic, syncretistic and gnostic sources, some twenty-five significant passages in the first twelve chapters of John and promises a further volume on the later chapters of the book.

As we have remarked in another connection ("The Fourth Gospel and Contemporary Thought," *JBL,* Vol. XLIX [June, 1930]), this book is symptomatic of a change in the current treatment of the Fourth Gospel. For some six years Continental students of the Johannine tradition have been under the spell of the Mandeans. Of the fact that the Mandeans have something to contribute to the interpretation of John no one is more convinced than the present writer. In the past, however, the Mandean texts have been used more as a source of, than as a key to, Johannine mysticism, to the complete disregard both of the individuality of the Fourth Gospel and of the remainder of the contemporary religious tradition. In both of these particulars Odeberg has broken the spell successfully. For this he is to be congratulated.

Among the interesting passages which Odeberg has subjected to penetrating analysis some are most excellently treated. His discussion of the "gift of God" in connection with John 4:7–26 is most illuminating. Other sections are, however, not so convincing. The Metatron, whom, like the Essenes, the cautious scholar will seriously let alone, forms rather a shaky basis for the interpretation of John 2:24–25. In the discussion of rebirth, John 3:5 ff., Odeberg is certainly on the right track and most helpful indeed, though personally we believe that in his treatment of the passage he has confused two ideas: the idea of the relation between cosmic birth and rebirth, and the idea of the relation between rain as a fructifying efflux of God and the birth out of water "from above." We should prefer to subordinate the latter to the former and thereby to avoid neglecting the Spirit as an independent factor alongside of water in the process.

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[1] *The Fourth Gospel.* By Hugo Odeberg. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1929. 336 pages. 10 Kronor.

Among the important ideas to which Odeberg continually alludes as elements of the Johannine theology, none is more frequently mentioned than that of the so-called "essentiality" and "inclusiveness" of the Son of Man. The author's views on this point are determined, we imagine, by Reitzenstein's concept of the "redeemed redeemer," who, as Anthropos and as the personification of the world-soul, sums up in himself the reality of the lives of all men, and thus in himself saves all of humanity. Now the "essentiality" of Jesus as savior in the Fourth Gospel and elsewhere will of course have to be admitted, but the "inclusiveness" we are not prepared to admit at once as a primary determinant of Johannine soteriology. Mystical union of the believer and his Lord is naturally presupposed in John, but, except possibly in Colossians, it is a concomitant rather than a determinant of salvation for New Testament writers. Nor is there any need in the New Testament for the idea of the "inclusiveness" of the savior because the cogency of the application to the individual of the merits of Christ's act has already been established on a different plane, apart from the assumption of the solidarity of humanity in Christ. It is the essential optimism which Christianity derives from its Jewish origin and the fact that it continued to connect the original creation of man with God himself (rather than with the evil spirits as in syncretistic lore) which lends force to the idea that since God became what we are, therefore, we can and do become what he is.

Finally, whatever the Christology of the Fourth Gospel may be, we see no reason for assigning to the name Son of Man a particularly determinative significance therein, and to say that the Christ of John is what he is in view of the "Manhood" interpreted into the title after the analogy of the Anthropos speculation. The use of Son of Man by John strikes one rather as an echo of Palestinian tradition than as an important cog in his theological machinery.

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## AN INTERPRETATION OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY

In *The Authority of the Bible*[1] Mr. Dodd has sent out, he tells us, "to study the specific religious value of the Bible." To that task he brings ample scholarship (he is as thoroughly at home in the Old Testament as in the New, which is his special field) and keen spiritual insight. He begins with the great prophets of the Old Testament, discussing in turn the forms of prophetic inspiration, the content of prophecy, and the personal religion of the prophets. This is perhaps the strongest part of the book. He goes on to the expression of the corporate religion of the Jewish people in the historical writings of the Old Testament, the Psalms, and the Wisdom literature, and shows how the religious insights of the prophets were worked out in the life of the community. But the Old Testament religion at its best left some very important problems unsolved, such as those of the conflict between cultus and spiritual religion, between universalism and separatism, between transcendence and immanence. In the New Testament these problems are met "out of a direct experience of spiritual things of which Christ is the centre." The section devoted to the New Testament seems to me the least satisfactory in the book; Mr. Dodd confines himself almost entirely to the Synoptic Gospels. A fourth section is given to a consideration of the idea of "progressive revelation" as it has emerged in the discussion of the two previous sections. The divine self-revelation, he holds, is necessarily progressive, because it is always relative to human faculties and human needs. The conclusion of the whole discussion is that the Bible reveals God just as Jesus Christ did, "not by uttering dogmas to be accepted without question but by leading men into such an attitude to life that they could see that certain things must be true."

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[1] *The Authority of the Bible.* By C. H. Dodd. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. xv+310 pages. $3.00.

All this is excellent; and if we grant Mr. Dodd's initial assumption (the word is his own) that "for us the measure of any authority which the Bible may possess must lie in its direct religious value, open to discovery in experience," then he has established the authority of the Bible. But I cannot see that anything is gained by talking of authority if what we really mean is religious value. Mr. Dodd is plainly reluctant to tackle the difficulties which are involved in the whole conception of authority, but he cannot avoid some attempt to define the term. Authority in its primary form, he says, is "the authority of the truth itself, compelling and subduing." If this is all that is meant, the use of the word is quite unnecessary and had better be avoided. We do not speak of the authority of the multiplication table or the propositions of Euclid, just because their truth is "open to discovery in experience" and "compels assent." In the first sentence of his Preface, Mr. Dodd speaks of "the general revolt against authority." Does any sane person revolt against the "authority" of truth which is "open to discovery in experience"? But of course Mr. Dodd recognizes that there is another kind of authority, which he calls secondary, and defines as "the authority of persons who being presumed to know the truth communicate it to others." He appears to assume that the only ground for the presumption that those persons know the truth is that such of their statements as have been tested have been found to be true. This does not seem to me to be an adequate explanation of the origin of authority of this kind, but, however that may be, any such authority is certainly quickly destroyed when we discover our "authorities" making erroneous statements. A comparatively small element of error in their teachings is enough to destroy it completely. No one would concede any authority to a textbook of science in which, let us say, one statement in ten is demonstrably wrong. Mr. Dodd claims for Jesus "a unique moral perfection" which gives a "unique authority" to his words. But he admits frankly that there are in his recorded teaching sayings "which either are simply not true, in their plain meaning, or are unacceptable to the conscience or reason of Christian people." This crucial instance suffices to show that no authority of this secondary sort can be claimed for the Bible. Yet modern biblical scholarship, while it has made it impossible any longer to claim any real authority for the Bible, has revealed more clearly than ever its abiding spiritual value, as Mr. Dodd has shown so excellently. It is unfortunate that he has retained the word "authority," which will probably only repel many of those who would profit most by a study of his book.

J. Y. CAMPBELL

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## SCIENCE AND RELIGION

This volume[1] consists of five lectures, and in the nature of the case cannot be regarded as an exhaustive treatise on the subject. Of the five lectures, three deal with science, one with the effect of science upon philosophy, and the other with the reconciliation of the conflict between science and religion. The book is therefore not so much a discussion of religion in an age of science as of science in its relation to philosophy and religion.

The chief characteristics which Professor Burtt finds possessed by science are its recognition of the universality of law, tentativeness in thinking, and its dependence on exactness as expressed in mathematics.

The element of tentativeness he especially finds represented in pragmatic philosophy, and the desire for mathematical science in the new realism. The tendency of all recent philosophy, however, he finds to be largely analytic; but it is not, like science, susceptible of experimental test. In fact, in his own words the realm of philosophy "is the chilly and bare but immaculate playground of the logically possible. Its function is that of a generalized forerunner of scientific knowledge."

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[1] *Religion in an Age of Science.* By Edwin A. Burtt. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1929. xiii+153 pages. $1.50.

The relationship of science to religion, or, more accurately, the status of religion as seen from the point of view of science as thus described, is somewhat sharply drawn, not only in the course of the general discussion but particularly in the final chapter. The modifications which have come over religious thought by virtue of the development of the scientific attitude is regarded as a conflict of fundamental attitudes as to what is the greatest value in life. That of science is "intellectual honesty and social verifiability pursued in an atmosphere of complete tentativeness and mutual co-operation. The ideal of religion has been that of personal salvation attended by inflexible loyalty to some revered leader, institution, or doctrine." This conflict can be resolved not by abandoning science in the interest of religion but by remolding religion into harmony with the interests of science. This Professor Burtt, in the light of the history of religion, thinks can be done. But in order that it shall be possible, there must be a revision of belief in the good God controlling creation, if in this goodness there is involved the historical position of orthodoxy as to sin and natural evil. But good God must be. The idea of good, however, varies with successive ages. In our own scientific age we are prevented from gaining the full conception of the goodness of God by the persistence of the ideas of God as derived from the past. Any ideal must be contemporary if it is to be effective.

In consequence Professor Burtt holds that the effort of liberal religion to make Jesus normative and in any sense final is anachronistic. If religion is to be really acceptable in an age of science, it must abandon all attempts to resuscitate a loyalty to a past leader and founder, and must consist in the actual living as if goodness were really ultimate. And if one really wishes to express in life the love of goodness which inheres in his own conception of God, he must put himself on the level of the person whom such confidence would possibly help. But he must not impose upon that person a belief in his God. Our religion is free from inner self-contradiction when "it really identifies God with love as the best present symbol to describe the ideal of moral goodness." We must ourselves be loving, and to be loving we must be tentative and in accordance with the human values for which science stands.

With such an argument we have much sympathy. A religion that is only a group of beliefs is certainly at the mercy of a growing intelligence. I am not sure, however, that there is any necessary conflict between science and an intellectual formula which attempts to legitimatize a moral attitude, provided that the formula itself is regarded as functional rather than as scientifically final. One must heartily agree with the statement that it is "more important to be like God than to insist verbally on his reality." But why may we not do both? It would be difficult, if not impossible, for most people to feel that a belief in an actual God cannot be used as a basis for sacrificial tentative living, or that such faith has in it no help in dealing with one who does not believe in God. If religion is a functioning of the life process in search for human satisfaction by a proper adjustment with the personality-producing elements of total activity, it is hard to see why it is necessary for one to abandon belief in such personality-producing forces in order sympathetically to serve one's neighbor who has no such belief. To say that an idea must be universally held before it can be used by those by whom it is held, is certainly not in accordance with the method of science. What we can do in the spirit of science is, in full sympathy with their own intellectual unrest, to ask others to test our conclusions as to God by their own experimenting. It would seem to me that to insist that one must be silent as to what one has one's self found to be true in one's own experimenting is quite as dogmatic as to insist that others must accept one's own conclusions before they themselves verify them. Is not the true attitude of tentativeness in religion just this: the putting of our religious experience and consequent convictions as hypotheses which others may test? Such an effort would certainly not undertake to coerce an atheist into a belief in God any more than a physiologist who has new knowledge about a gland would dogmatize about his discovery. It would seem as if Professor Burtt in his last paragraphs had swung to this position. If this interpretation be correct, it seems to follow that it is not quite accurate in drawing a contrast between science and religion, to identify religion with theological assertion. Genuine religion is essentially a process of co-ordination. A correct interpretation of the Christian religion would not identify that religion with the patterns in which its fundamental attitudes are expressed. For if there be any permanent element in the Christian religion, it is that the attitude of love to men helps one to a belief in the love of God, and an attitude of confidence that God is love is a motive to love to men. Such attitudes are dramatized in the story of Jesus and have persisted notwithstanding the stupidities and ignorance of social customs by which they have been opposed. Every doctrine of Christianity is an attempt to show the rationality and trustworthiness of such attitudes by means of patterns drawn from the struggle between love and its opposite in contemporary social life. The circumstances of the formulation of such rationalization and the effort to enforce it for the benefit, as it was believed, of mankind, are certainly not to be perpetuated in our modern world. But why should not this century-long process, however described, be regarded as an unconscious and increasingly intelligent attempt to reach that belief in universality which resides alike in the tentativeness of science and of faith?

SHAILER MATHEWS

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## THE RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

In recent years many works have appeared protesting the tendency on the part of a group of scientific and philosophic writers to interpret the world and life in terms of mechanical processes alone. To many people it has seemed that the world dealt with by the physicist and chemist was the "real" world and that non-physical interpretations of the world had little in the way of tangible evidence. While friendly to scientific interpretations of the world, Professor Wright maintains that there are other interpretations equally valid, and that religion stands or falls with the validity of a "spiritual" interpretation.[1] Science has built up a "physical" world. The author of this book asks if there is like evidence for a "spiritual" world or for a realm of values.

According to Mr. Wright, the scientific view of the world is not a description of objects as we experience them in daily life. It is an explanation of the character and changes of objects in terms of their geometrical and mechanical properties. It explains the world in terms of its primary or physical properties, as a mechanical system, as extension in time and space, and as motion and mass. On the other hand, the world of everyday life and perception presents a great many different qualities, such as color, sound, taste, odor, etc., and these qualities seem to belong more intimately to the objects which possess them than do the properties presented by the scientific view. Science seems to leave out of account the very qualities which give meaning and value to objects. Moreover, these "sensory appearances" are the sole empirical source of our knowledge of the scientific order of physical events.

Professor Wright believes that the validity of an interpretation of the universe in terms of meaning and value can be established only if two conditions are fulfilled, namely, that "constant and uniform relations" shall be discovered and verified between objects in their aspect of value and that these relations shall organize existing objects into a coherent system. He believes that these uniformities of relations are discovered by our responses of appreciation, not by physical measurement. These responses of appreciation are three: first, the response of appreciative understanding through which an object loses its connection with the confused and changing world and becomes a member of the stable order of meaning and value which intelligence has discovered. Second, we have the response of practical invention which gives functional adaptability to objects. This includes the effort to utilize all the available resources for the creation of new values. Third, we have the response of aesthetic appreciation which indicates a uniformity of relationship among objects in their aspect of value—that of "significant harmony." In these three ways we discover the uniformities of relation between objects in their aspect of value.

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[1] *The Religious Response.* By Henry Wilkes Wright. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. 256 pages. $2.00.

Science verifies its laws of physical causation. Can these relations in the realm of values be verified? Professor Wright thinks that they can, although here we leave the world of action and enter that of appreciation. These uniformities of relationship are features of the real world which are explored, or worked out, by the intelligent interaction of an organism with its environment. For example, understanding, insight, and interpretation express themselves externally in oral and written discourses. Practical inventions are expressed in the entire range of mechanical instruments and social customs and institutions. Aesthetic perception is expressed in artistic creation of all sorts, e.g., painting, poetry, music, etc. The author believes that "through these external expressions, the relations discovered among objects in their aspect of value become capable of experimental investigation and verification." Moreover, they can be critically appraised and tested. These activities of appreciation are responses to the real value of objects and indicate that there is a spiritual order or world—an "objective system organized on the basis of intrinsic meaning and value rather than physical causation."

Mr. Wright believes that the objective system of values implies a "Cosmic Intelligence." While values are in a sense created by our own rational insight and perception, they are also discovered. He says,

> We grant that the succession of physical events with which man's organic existence connects him requires for its explanation a physical universe or order of events in space-time. Does not the universality of man's rational outlook which associates him with others in the community of intelligence equally require for its explanation the conception of an all-comprehensive intelligence which embraces within its permanent unity all intelligent individuals?

Since we assume that the order of physical events, which is an inference based upon the facts of perception, and not a fact of direct experience, is real and existed throughout the course of evolution, is it not equally fair to assume that the attributes of value, the capacities for reorganization and adaptation, the intrinsic harmonies, are features of existence no less real?

According to the author, this spiritual interpretation of the world is essential for religion. Religion is an independent source of authentic experience about the world and about life. The aim of religion is the "realization of the objective system of personal and social values through communication with the Cosmic Intelligence." We possess "three psychophysical agencies of personal communication: articulate speech, practical invention and construction, and aesthetic perception and expression." In the field of religion these take the forms of "prayer, devoted service, and worship."

In some places the author is a little vague and one wishes that he had talked in more specific terms. On the whole, however, the book is stimulating. Modern science is simply one way of interpreting the universe in which we live. It is not the only way, and it undoubtedly has its limitations. Mechanism seems to be a valid scientific program and it should be applied as far as possible, but it seems inadequate as a complete interpretation. Some will claim that Professor Wright is interpreting the universe from the point of view of human hopes and ambitions. Perhaps he is—but there seem to be many "levels" and "units" in the evolutionary process. Why insist on fixing attention upon one set of units, whether electrons, atoms, cells, or persons, and demanding that all things be reduced to these particular units?

DENISON UNIVERSITY — HAROLD H. TITUS

## WHITHER CHRISTIANITY

That popular religion has penetrated to new levels of thought is attested by the titles of four recent books bearing on Christianity[1] which face the problem of the place of religion in modern life. The form which the problem now takes is indicated by the title of Professor Schilpp's book. He raises from a variety of angles the question as to whether Christianity is *passé* but urges first of all a clear understanding of what Christianity is. As "an attitude, a force, a life" Christianity is deeper than its institutional or creedal forms; and as such it can survive the fate of the church or the creeds, and even revive the church itself. That such an inner revival is sadly needed the author freely avows; but it depends on freedom of individual thought coupled with effective convictions. Among these the most important are faith in God, in Christ, and in prayer. Men believe in God because it is to some men absolutely necessary so to believe, because it is productive, because it recognizes and meets man's need for a dependable power, and because it is the best answer to man's ultimate questions. The only God who can achieve these functions is Jesus' "God the Father"; but Jesus' God is known only through Christ himself as a living force. But in this case, with a fixed revelation rejected, how shall man find certainty in religion? Personal certainty being what he really seeks, this will be found in personal application of Jesus' principles in life. By seeking to realize his spirit in the world that science shows, man uses scientific facts without falling into scientific dogmatism.

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[1] *Do We Need a New Religion?* By Paul Arthur Schilpp. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. xvii+325 pages. $2.50.

*The Recovery of Religion.* By Dwight Bradley. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1929. 235 pages. $2.00.

*Whither Christianity.* Edited by Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. viii + 304 pages. $3.00.

*Man's Social Destiny in the Light of Science.* By Charles A. Ellwood. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1929. 219 pages. $2.00.

The book furnishes a well-ordered statement of the problems, but it offers only trite solutions of them. The patronizing attitude here found toward certain philosophic positions like mechanism is unfortunate and unproductive and ill becomes a philosopher, especially in view of his superficial treatment of so crucial a problem as theism.

More penetrating is a briefer and more concise volume by Mr. Bradley, who writes as a minister but with keen philosophic insight. In place of a survey of a variety of problems, this author tackles a single problem and pushes it farther. Confronted by the persistent dilemma of what M. C. Otto called "natural laws and human hopes," Mr. Bradley takes hold of both horns and goes beyond science and religion to a higher synthesis. While science deals with the objective world, religion deals with the subjective world; but these two are held together by what the author calls "the critical and creative reason." This is a unifying function of the mind, which takes the sensory data of scientific observation and the intuitive insights of religious mysticism and weaves them into an interpretation of experience which is neither scientific nor mystical but of a third, higher quality. The process is revealed par excellence in worship, and "through worship man is saved from his dilemma" and achieves "the recovery of religion."

Obviously the strength of this position depends upon its theory of knowledge, which is fortunate in that much of the author's rhetorical fireworks aimed at scientific naturalism and at various modern substitutes for religion can be passed over with the casualness which they merit. The heart of the book, then, is in the opening chapter which poses the question and in chapters iii, iv, viii, ix, and xi. The objective world of science is relative in space and time, relative to the senses and constructed into a space-time continuum by reason for the purposes of physical life. Such a world, the author points out, is only partial, and the points in space-time continuity are artificial abstractions; but it is a sufficiently organized world for confident adjustment. On the other hand, the subjective world stands over against the space-time world as a totally different realm. Just as mysticism seeks to show the objective world unreal and the inner world the only true one, so science dismisses subjective experience as unreal—and man is torn by the struggle. To confuse the two worlds is disastrous as shown by the failure of a "science in search of God" and by mystic interpretations of nature. Perception of the subjective world comes by intuition which reveals a continuum that is neither spatial nor temporal. Here are eternity and the Absolute. But—and here is the crucial point—both sensory impressions and intuitions can be analyzed and interpreted by "the critical and creative reason." Neither world, however, can be *explained* by reason (p. 192) and the subjective world it can interpret only in relative and objective terms (p. 196); yet it can relate the intuitions of God to an experience of nature (p. 200).

One recognizes in this some echoes of the Kantian epistemology and of Ritschlianism with its objective understanding and subjective intuition; but here the problem is complicated by a third "critical and creative reason" (akin to Kant's *Urteilskraft?*). The author is apparently beset by a problem which emerges only from a dualistic background; and he offers a solution which has to posit a purely speculative sort of third estate of reason to hold together what is so obviously a unit: the human personality. Might it not be simpler to see in the subjective-objective contrast, which he makes so rigid, a variety of meanings in the same world of experience? This is what his "critical and creative reason" is supposed to do; but this reason thrives upon the discomfiture of the other two instead of being the basis for the other two. Were this fundamental unity of the human organic life recognized, then the two worlds would appear as mere abstracted meanings, rather than as the bases for his dialectical erection of the synthetic reason. The author has faced courageously an obvious conflict in our experience; but he has not used the tools available in modern psychology, preferring rather Hegelian methods of philosophizing.

By contrast with the individual appraisals and speculations of these two men, we find in the symposium on *Whither Christianity* the combined judgments of a group of liberal ministers. All of the authors of the volume are actively engaged in the enterprises of institutional Christianity. Here, then, is a sourcebook of information (apparently badly needed) for people like Professor Barnes and a recent group of Quaker laymen, who misstate the position of "the Christian church" on the problems of modern religious thought. It is to be hoped that many of the unchurched intelligentsia will read the essays, all of them. Perhaps such readers will be left wondering, with this reviewer, whether an interrogation point after the title of the volume was omitted deliberately or inadvertently; whether the book stands as a pronouncement or a query.

There is much to support the former conclusion, for the essays are in substantial agreement on several points. In the first place, all of Andrew D. White's vociferous demands in the name of science have been accepted, including the more recent discoveries of evolutionary biology and higher criticism. Science is hailed, no longer as an enemy but as a rather benighted friend, badly in need of religion's assistance. The tone of the book is one of expressed convictions rather than of tentative weighing of alternatives: clearly all the writers feel under pressure to meet demands for definite guidance. But the essays are, on the whole, characterized by fairness and restraint, and one is impressed throughout by the writers' sense of larger problems beyond, forbidding dogmatism, despite a few sweeping generalizations. The condescension toward science, referred to in the foregoing, is based largely on a not too critical acceptance of Eddington and Whitehead, though Mr. Krumbine admits the "great satisfaction with which we cling to the skirts of an Eddington like scared children and forthwith grow very bold and outspoken" (p. 61). Whether this is due to mere fashion in thought whereby many preachers exploit the startling to reinforce and revivify the familiar; or to a not wholly disinterested participation in the current reaction against scientific method; or to a failure to discriminate between Eddington's logical critique of science and his philosophic idealism which makes a clear jump from the limits of science to the sufficiency of mystical insight—to which of these causes the attitude is due is not clear.

The writers struggle throughout to reconcile an empirical method (referred to again and again as the adventurous character of religion) with an idealist philosophy. Certainly, with the striking exception of the scriptural premises of Mr. Pidgeon, the one Canadian writer who treats of church unity, the writers seek sources of guidance in terms of current adjustment: President Beaven's chapter on missions is a treatise in the conflict of cultures; Messrs. Sockman and Douglas Horton are clearly aware of current sociological theory in dealing with social and international ethics; if Mr. Day is not so clear on the objective, as on the subjective, side of prayer it is because he approaches it psychologically;

Dean Gilkey sees in Jesus the power of exemplary leadership as a crystallization of our highest ideals. Yet authority is always reserved to "spiritual adventure"—operating, as President Palmer insists, with the traditions of Christian experience as background and tools. This is why the question mark seems to belong in the title. For either the authors are really experimenting, with the future to yield the proof of their assumptions, or they have accepted a solution in a Christocentric faith renewed through mystical insights. On this point the more positive writers are least empirical, and the more empirical least positive. Whither Christianity?

The Cole Lectures for 1929, by Professor Ellwood, present the problem of Christianity's future in a wider setting. In six popular lectures he appraises the trends of scientific control in social life as a whole with special reference to science, government, education, and religion.

Stirred to a counsel of encouragement by the pessimism of contemporary leaders of thought, he seeks to indicate the lines along which positive control may move. The gauntlet thrown down by MM. Gaultier and Benda in France, by Whitehead and Dewey, Erskine, Mencken and Ayres, Raymond Fosdick, and Harry F. Ward is here picked up. It will startle those defenders of the faith who see in Ayres' attack on "science the false messiah" a victory for religion, to read the author's estimate of this attack as the most radical form of unbelief fraught with the threat of moral paralysis. Dr. Ellwood, however, seeks to know the worst; and then takes stock of "The Resources of Mankind." The greatest of these is man's creativeness seen in the long history of cultures made and remade; and this power works today with knowledge never dreamed of in the former crises of the race. Even if calamity should come, the future will make use of it.

It is refreshing, in the midst of the vogue of Whitehead and Eddington, to find so strong a case presented for a broader view of science, to include social science. The artificial strictures of physical pointer-readings are here modified by a new scientific technique (i.e., an "organized intelligence") which uses other methods than quantitative measurement. To exclude these human factors is to narrow the scope of science till men, confident of the reality of human facts, will seek their knowledge elsewhere. Yet even social science can only inform, says the author; it cannot motivate and it cannot evaluate (pp. 93 f.; but cf. pp. 109, 172 f.).

The future of government will lie in more complete "maintenance of order and justice between individuals and groups within the state; . . . . defense of the state against external aggression; . . . . promotion of the economic welfare of all classes within the state; (and) . . . .

promotion of education and . . . . diffusion of knowledge" (p. 131). In this quest democracy and Christianity share faith in the possibilities of the common man (p. 144).

Education will come to increasing recognition of its duty not only to furnish facts and methods for thought but also to teach the values which are universal (chap. v). Social science furnishes a basis for evaluating our social and ethical systems.

Accordingly, religion will have a prominent place in the future of society; for its concern is precisely with "the highest personal and social values" and with a "valuating attitude toward life and toward the universe" (p. 185). It "controls through participation in the ideal values of group life" (p. 186). Since the salvation of civilization rests upon the will to know and use the truth for social ends, religion must itself instill a love of truth by embracing the scientific spirit (p. 191). At this point Professor Ellwood takes exception to views of religious experience which assign it to any specific area, and insists on a basis of religion "as wide as life itself" (p. 194).

In an admirable summary of an enormous field of study, the author moves with remarkable sure-footedness till he comes to discuss theology. Here he leaves sociological analysis and encounters the speculative problems of philosophy, only to lapse into uncritical attack upon non-theistic philosophies. Taking Whitehead's conclusion as an initial predication he says, "'Religion,' rightly says Professor Whitehead, 'is the reaction of human nature to its search for God'; and if there be no corresponding reality, then the search and all its results are vain" (p. 195). Theology is to decrease that "a mature religious consciousness which takes these postulates for granted" may increase! One cannot forbear to ask whether theology will not always be concerned with the task, outlined earlier in the book, of estimating and organizing the values of life. Now, theology may be regarded as the operation of creative intelligence in the criticism and reconstruction of religious values, utilizing the findings of science. But any such creative enterprise must not be limited in its operations by foregone conclusions. Yet Mr. Ellwood insists upon the finality of certain historic doctrines, especially theism. His statement regarding Jesus' place in the future of religion is, however, more tentative despite its apparent note of certitude (p. 211); and his argument here follows substantially the lines of his earlier book on *Christianity and Social Science*. The volume will be valuable to every reader who takes it as it is meant to be taken: as a challenge rather than as a sedative reassurance. The query of the foregoing symposium, *Whither Christianity*, is here placed in its larger perspective in the form "Whither Christian Civilization?" None of these books gives the answer.

EDWIN EWART AUBREY

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## HELL

When, a few months ago, I asked one hundred high-school students what the subject of my address at our next Sunday evening meeting ought to be, I was shocked to find that the only subject on which general agreement could be secured was "What and Where Is Hell?" Agreement on it was unanimous. The judgment of the students was vindicated both by the attendance at the next meeting and the abundance of questions in the forum period following the address. But it was the first time in a ministry of sixteen years that I spoke on hell. If there are any other preachers who are liable to be embarrassed similarly, I am certain this little book[1] of a dozen essays will help them maintain their nonchalance.

There are twelve contributors to the volume. Eleven of them are British and write from an experience avowedly religious; the twelfth is an American, "an informed contemporary," who writes of the pagan's hell.

"Modernist Protestantism . . . . believes in Purgatory but not in Hell." That Purgatory, to continue quoting Dean Inge, "is a place with a fine tropical climate, really bracing to the constitution, where one trains for the next examination." The Catholic, Abbott Butler, though insisting on the dogmatic fact of hell and not blinking its severity, is quite as loathe, commendably loathe, to send anyone there, as is the modernist Protestant. He, too, loves to dwell on St. Catherine of Genoa's tractate on purgatory, and purgatory ought to be associated with heaven not with hell. Moreover, Annie Besant protests that "the Real Hell is a reformatory, not an empty punishment."

"Hell is an element of any religion which is morally healthy." So is it written by Professor James Moffatt, and seconded by W. E. Orchard and F. W. Norwood. The last named believes in hell as a doctrine and proclaims in the words of Adam Bede that he looks at it "as if the doctrines was like finding names for your feelings." Sheila Kaye-Smith, as if to support this generalization, is certain that "every significant religious revival has been accompanied by a quickening sense of the danger and terror of Hell." Despite the insupportable pictorial extravagance about hell, a growing humanitarianism and an increasing tendency to make God out to be insufferably amiable, all of which tends to wear down our "faith" in hell, the fact remains that while "there may be a Heaven, there must be a Hell."

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[1] *What Is Hell?* (A collective work. Chapter i by Dean W. R. Inge.) New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. 186 pages. $2.50.

Irwin Edman, the one American in the book, winds up the symposium by what seems like an attempt to prove that "the creedless members of our disillusioned generation are in hell much of the time." The modern inferiority complex is the ancient conviction of sin; the modern sin against the integrity, profound and uninfringible, of one's own nature is the ancient sin against the Holy Ghost. "Our cynics and our scientists are our contemporary friends. They remind us of gross glandular facts at the basis of our ecstasies; they goad us with the emptiness of a world that might once for us have had beauty and meaning. The fallen angels were in Hell because they could not have enjoyed Heaven. We are in Hell because we cannot enjoy the earth or ourselves."

One closes this book with a feeling that here, at last, one of the ancient doctrines has been re-conditioned adequately for our modern digestion. It may be that this is the first of such doctrines to be re-conditioned so adequately. Then, too, it may also be that the doctrine of hell is exactly the doctrine to treat first. How could we live if we did not have both "a Heaven for ourselves and a Hell for our neighbors"!

MILES H. KRUMBINE

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## BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY[1]

Discussions of the reality and the possible conditions of life after death fall into three general classes: the first group are mystical, basing their conviction on incommunicable subjective experiences of the authors; the second are metaphysical, attempting to prove the certainty or the plausibility of a future life by deductive arguments from dogmatic assumptions or the statements of "authorities"; the third are scientific, endeavoring to explore various hypotheses about a future life in the light of objectively defined and verifiable experiences. The three books under review combine in varying degrees the metaphysical and scientific approaches.

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[1] *Immortability*. By S. D. McConnell. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 178 pages. $1.50.

*Man's Consciousness of Immortality*. By W. Douglas Mackenzie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929. 87 pages. $1.00.

*Spiritualism and the Church*. By Daniel Hole. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1929. 121 pages. $1.50.

*Immortability* is an essay by a retired Episcopalian rector eighty-five years of age. Those who would like to sit down, with an old gentleman of keen intelligence, varied experience and wide reading, for a prolonged chat on the subject of a future life, will find the perusal of this book a pleasant experience. Those who look for carefully annotated and logically organized analysis of the problem on even a metaphysical plane will be somewhat disappointed.

*Man's Consciousness of Immortality* is the Ingersoll lecture for 1929, presented by the president of the Hartford Seminary Foundation. This little book organizes its argument around five alleged facts, asserted as drawn from current scientific conclusions, but open to considerable question. Many anthropologists and students of history would be apt to challenge, for example, "The First Fact": that "belief in personal immortality is found to have been universal in human history"; or "The Fourth Fact": that "belief in immortality has been essential to the discovery and pursuit of moral ideals and values." When it comes to the interpretation of the asserted facts, and the deductions drawn from them, differences of opinion would be even more pronounced. The argument presents one thinker's reasoned synthesis of scientific findings, and as such is provocative; but its metaphysical arguments leap too far beyond the data, and bend their supports too much in wished-for directions, to prove convincing to skeptics.

The third book, *Spiritualism and the Church,* is written by an avowed Catholic. The first half of the volume is devoted to a brief but apparently open-minded presentation of some of the outstanding results of psychical research. The author concludes that the evidence creates a "practically overwhelming" probability that psychical phenomena involve actual communication with discarnate intelligences. The second half of the book attempts a logical adjustment between these conclusions and the dogmas of the Catholic.

Inasmuch as the pope has warned Catholics against participating in spiritualistic seances, the author's avowed commitment to Catholicism makes it imperative for him to emphasize the dangers of consulting mediums and to attempt to show the superiority of Catholic beliefs over the interpretations of the spiritualists. We thus observe a most interesting transformation from the inductive, open-minded, truth-seeking attitude of Part I, to a dogmatic, shut-minded, tradition-supported attitude in Part II. The author's final plea for a development of "the communion of saints" will meet a sympathetic response from many who are interested in this problem.

HORNELL HART

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## A CHALLENGING THEISM

In the uncertainty and confusion concerning God at the present time the inquiring mind may well turn for guidance to the recent work by M. Édouard Le Roy, the leading interpreter of Bergson, intuitionist, modernist, and author.[1] Nor will he be disappointed. For this is at once a major contribution to the philosophy of theism and a book of deep and earnest religious faith. The literary style is a constant reminder of Pascal—who, indeed, is often referred to—clear, scintillating, engaging, and at times passionate in intensity and genuine eloquence.

The reader is conducted to the heart of the discussion over the somewhat thorny pathway of a penetrative criticism of the customary arguments in proof of the Divine Existence, at the end of which the conclusion is reached that the classic proofs are entirely inadequate, although of value as reinforcements—defining the attributes of God rather than establishing his existence.

In searching for more convincing evidence of the Divine Existence, M. Le Roy starts from the experience, which he paints in vivid colors, of a universal human unrest. This unrest is actuated, as he interprets it, by a deep desire *(volonté)* for something unattained, which proves upon examination to be a longing on the part of men to surmount themselves, to go beyond their present attainment, to be more than they are. In other words, it is a longing for that spiritual life which alone is to be regarded as a truly "human" life. From the primacy of this moral urge there emerges the initial affirmation of God. It calls for faith, which is a unitive outgo of the whole self toward its object.

The idea of God, however, is essential, as well as experiential knowledge of him, and needs to be explicated. To this M. Le Roy devotes a brilliant and clarifying chapter, following it with a study of the conditions of the religious life and concluding with brief but pertinent answers to various objections.

Here is a theism as daring as it is inclusive. It leaves no place for atheism. There are no atheists according to M. Le Roy, except "atheists by intention." All philosophies affirm God. All men believe in him. This belief embodies the soul of the traditional, as well as of the philosophic, view. It is inescapable, self-confirming, self-attesting. This is immanentalism of the most thoroughgoing character. And yet God is described as transcendent *(au delà)* as well as immanent, beyond as well as within, the goal toward whom, as well as in whom, we live. Society, as well as the individual, finds itself requiring him.

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[1] *Le problème de Dieu.* By Édouard Le Roy. Paris: L' Artisan du Livre, 2, Rue de Fleurus, 1929. 350 pages. Fr. 20.

The Divine Personality is very positively affirmed by M. Le Roy, yet is interpreted in a large and rational manner. "God acts within us and above us in the manner of a person, of goodness, of love. . . . . To yield to his solicitation, to give ourselves to him, is the condition of our true birth and progress in personality, the sole efficacious means of our becoming better and better as persons." For he is the source of our personality. Yet this is in a sense a pragmatic belief. It does not mean that God is an individual. Indeed, it does not deny that God is superpersonal, if by this "barbaric word" one means to indicate a direction of thought beyond personality.

So comprehensive a philosophy of religion makes an appeal by its very catholicity. It is intuitional, idealistic, personalistic, pragmatic. Questions inevitably arise as to whether it allows of sufficient differentiation of God from humanity, whether it makes adequate recognition of the experience of otherness, and of the fact of evil in man and in the cosmos, whether it is able to meet contrasted interpretations of life and of the cosmos. Yet, even when these doubts are admitted, and the need of thorough and critical examination recognized, this fresh and vivid presentation of theistic belief is full of challenge and promise, coming as it does from the ocean deeps of a sincere faith and the wide horizons of a clear, elevated, and comprehensive mind.

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## A CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM

So many competent books have recently been written with the express purpose of showing why theism is no longer a tenable position that one turns with interest to a new defense of the theistic view by an author[1] who is obviously well acquainted with the best of the literature that has been sent out from the opposing camp. Nor is the interest lessened when one finds that the author has adapted the form as well as the content of his argument to the experimental temper of our age, neglecting the older "evidences" and "proofs" in favor of a series of tentative hypotheses which lend themselves readily to confirmation or contradiction. Professor Horton gives us not only the results of his reflection, but, considering the small size of the volume, a surprising amount of insight into the processes which led to his conclusions, and a large body of material for the reader to work on himself. At the same time the book is notable for its stylistic qualities. In aesthetic sensitiveness it is worthy of a place beside the works of such able "humanist" writers as Krutch, Lippmann, and Bertrand Russell.

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[1] *Theism and the Modern Mood.* By Walter M. Horton. New York: Harper & Bros., 1930. xiii+189 pages. $2.00.

The fallacy implicit in the position of the "humanist" group, by and of whom so much is now written, lies, Professor Horton finds, not so much in the distinction between man and nature as in that between fact and value. The "humanists," meaning by the term those who have set up a new religion of humanity (not those who have adopted new canons of literary criticism), have exalted human values and extolled the scientific method. But, having eliminated all faith except faith in man, their next step will be to doubt even this faith and to adopt a rigid naturalism, or else to see that human values are not isolated, but are part of a vast value-producing scheme which extends out into the knowable part of the mysterious cosmos itself. Either naturalism and despair or a belief in the objectivity of values—this, as Professor Horton sees it, is the dilemma which the humanists confront. They continue to exalt human values at the expense of God and science at the expense of religion without noticing that man viewed exclusively in the light of science is a creature to whose life values are irrelevant. Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch has realized this and has plunged into the depths of pessimism. Professor A. E. Haydon appears to have emerged from the slough of despond with a tentative hope that cosmic support may be found for human aspirations. Mr. Walter Lippmann has affirmed not only that human desire must be made to fit the cosmic facts but that a certain partnership with the environing world is thus established. Professor Horton believes that one should go still further and observe that the organic connections which give value to human life do actually ramify out into the non-human world and so make values a part of the intrinsic structure of the world of fact itself. Modern realisms are overcoming the dualism which has haunted philosophy and religion since Descartes, and are accepting life, love, and beauty as integral parts of the cosmic scheme.

Humanism as a view of the universe is unsatisfactory, but theism must itself not neglect the humanistic aims. It must accept humanism's demand that religion be brought into line with the scientific spirit, and that it become "humane" in the most complete sense of the word. Theism must also become truly empirical, limiting its ideas to those which can be based on an experience of God. On this foundation Professor Horton develops his own philosophy of religion, acknowledging his indebtedness to such writers as Professors Hocking, Lyman, Macintosh, and Wieman. God is, as Tolstoy said, "he without whom one cannot live." God is found in the best impulses of the wider self, also in society and history, also in the world of nature. Toward the end of the book an interesting comparison is drawn between the absolutistic God of Baron von Hügel, the God who is a perfect object of devotion, and the limited God whom G. A. Studdert-Kennedy so passionately proclaimed. Theism must include both conceptions. God is "a Being both transcendent and immanent, active and at rest, suffering and at peace, personal will and impersonal cosmic energy, born once upon a time in a Palestinian stable and nevertheless without either beginning or ending."

Many questions remain untouched, but, as the author remarks, the perfect definition of God never will be framed. The book is one which avowedly is but feeling its way among highly disputable issues and pointing to possible conclusions. The reader will find, however, that the pointing is carried on in a deliberate and purposeful, yet critical, manner. He will find also that the path is not always the traditional one. Yet, as the author observes, "if you do not feel the presence of God at Hull House or the Assembly of the League of Nations, you certainly will not recognize him when you meet him in church."

J. S. Bixler

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## CHRISTIANITY AND ETHICS[1]

At a time when ethics, and especially the Christian ethic, is so much discussed in popular print, with a net achievement of more confusion than clarity, it is an occasion for especial satisfaction that Professor Wright of Dartmouth has written so lucid and comprehensive a text on general ethics. For this *is* a text, designed for undergraduates, and an admirable one for such use. Two motives can be detected running through the book: a concern with undergraduates' problems, and a desire to place ethical problems in an intelligent, comprehensive setting.

After the conventional initial chapter on definitions, Part I discusses moral evolution with special reference to the modern Occident; Part II offers the psychological foundations of moral conduct; Part III reviews modern ethical theories; Part IV tackles the major questions of political and social ethics; and Part V is a final chapter on the relation of ethical postulates to religion and metaphysics.

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[1] *General Introduction to Ethics.* By William Kelley Wright. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. xv+559 pages. $2.75.

*The Idealism of Christian Ethics.* By George Walker. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1929. xii+254 pages. $2.75.

The author calls himself a eudaemonist. He subscribes to the intuitionist view that the ought is "irreducible to anything else," but adds that "what particular acts are good, right, and what ought to be done, can only be known through considering the consequences of the actions . . . ." (p. 352). Christian ethics seems to be absorbed into general ethics: ". . . . the conviction has spread that since all true ethics is Christian ethics, ethical problems can be studied independently. Those ethical conclusions which bear the tests of sound reasoning and careful observation must be accepted. Such conclusions will be sure to agree with true religion. If they do not agree with any theological beliefs, this is an indication that the latter are erroneous and must be revised" (p. 161).

What then, is the relation of ethical postulates to religion? Mr. Wright endeavors to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of assuming, on the one hand, that our particular moral criteria are absolute and eternal values; and, on the other, that there are no moral criteria binding on the individual. The solution is found in a conception of emergent evolution in which moral values appear with reasoning powers as a phase of that teleological tendency toward organization which characterizes the cosmos and manifests God in the moral quest of social good. On this theistic basis rests the possibility of a religious quickening and sustaining of one's moral life through communion with God, and the vindication of moral values in immortal partnership of the human personality with the achieving God.

The transition from this book to the Baird Lectures of the Aberdeen minister is inevitably abrupt, since Mr. Walker finds in Christian character the *summum bonum* from which ethical criteria are derived. "The distinction . . . . between a purely scientific theory of man's ethical life and the Ethics of Christianity is that the former derives its ideas of morality from the data of man's actual experience as interpreted by his reason, while the latter seeks to learn and interpret the Good as Christ has made it known in His person, His life, and His teaching" (p. 19). But since Christ was limited in the expression of his moral nature by the conditions of the first century, Christians must seek to emulate his principles rather than to reproduce his life. This quest is the history of progressive Christian ethics; and is made possible for the individual to apprehend by God's grace which gives man the dynamic not attainable in his own nature. Here is the point where Christian ethics, we are told, is superior to secular ethics (p. 223). This regenerative action of the Divine Spirit is supplemented by the influence of Jesus' life which is the end (and therefore the motive) of Christian morality.

The comparison of these two books sharpens up the crucial issue. Is the Christian movement to base its ethics upon its system of doctrine, or upon observation of human experience in the empirical sense? Does doctrine dictate ethics or follow after it? Is Jesus "good" because his principles have been found to be essentially sound in experience, though future experience might reverse the finding; or are the principles of Jesus normative in an absolute sense because he was the absolute good?

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## CHRISTIANITY IN OUTLINE

Professor Nagler's title,[1] while fairly justified, is not correspondent to a distinctive quality of his book, which does no more than some others toward setting the Christian religion and church in their places in the stream of history. What is distinctive is its plan. Much material is separated from the main narrative and treated in a group of essays on "institutions and movements," occupying two-thirds as much space. The object is to gain clearness in the narrative and consecutive attention to the subjects of the essays. The plan, in the author's use, hardly approves itself, for some of the things separately treated are so organic to Christian history that their exclusion from the general survey distorts it. To dissect out the formation of the ancient Catholic church, the rise of the papacy, monasticism, and the expansion of Christianity and relegate them to isolated consideration is obviously unsound method. A somewhat similar plan is followed in parts of the main history. The treatment of the medieval period, for example, consists largely of discussions of topics, "movements and institutions," and "types and contributions." The result is that chronological order is obscured and little impression of development is made.

A merit is that details are subordinated and attention is fastened on principal matters of religion and morals. These Professor Nagler treats generally with breadth of interest and power of appreciation, though with little original insight. But there are some serious defects of consideration. The author's evident lack of sympathy with sacramental religion may have something to do with his placing "the development of sacramentarianism" in connection with Latin Christianity of the third century, a post-dating which involves misinterpretation of the earlier history. Anglo-Catholicism is barely mentioned, while some space is given to modern philosophical teachings which are certainly no more important. British religious history, until Wesley appears, is decidedly slighted. The account of the Anglican reformation is meager to the point of unintelligibility. Neither Tyndale's translation nor the King James is mentioned, nor is the Toleration Act. In the modern period matters of thought crowd out institutions. Neither the Scottish Disruption nor the formation of the United Free Church is referred to, and German Protestant church organization, before and since the war, receives no attention.

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[1] *The Church in History.* By Arthur Wilford Nagler. New York: Abingdon Press, 1929. 468 pages. $3.00.

Mistakes, smaller and greater, are too frequent. Ignatius "was the author of the fiction that the twelve apostles had appointed bishops as their successors," Clement of Rome being ignored. A remarkable addition to our knowledge is offered in the assertion that the Council of Constantinople of 381 reaffirmed the declaration of Nicea "with additional articles on the divinity and personality of the Holy Ghost and on the complete humanity of Christ." Francis of Assisi "became a monk"—just what he did not do. The ecclesiastical reservation in the Peace of Augsburg is evidently misunderstood. Ethan Allen, we learn, was "the leader" of "early American Arminianism," and this movement "raised up in protest the ponderous intellect of Edwards." Allen's one theological book was deistic, not Arminian, and was published twenty-six years after Edwards' death. Among American revivals "was that of 1858–59, which began in the East and then through Charles G. Finney's energetic leadership spread throughout the northern section of the country." The revival was in 1857–58; Finney tells of hearing about its progress through the country while he was preaching all the time in Boston; he went to England late in 1858. Misquotations and inexact statements are numerous. These things cause an impression that the author lacks familiarity with the sources, which is deepened by the fact that his references are almost altogether to secondary books.

While Professor Nagler is obviously an unsafe guide as to facts and contributes little in fresh interpretation, he does describe enthusiastically and in the main truly the well-known large aspects of church history.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

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## A DISTORTED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

A new volume purporting to trace the history of Christianity in relation to its "historical environment and inner development to our own day" leaves the reader in a state of conflicting emotions.[1] In some sections of the book one finds a wealth of detail, while in other parts the story is very sketchily told—is sometimes little more than a résumé of commonplace statistics. The volume is quite appropriately styled "a collective work"; there are twenty-two authors. But there is an astonishing lack of proportion and co-ordination among the different contributions. One would like to know what editorial policy operated to produce this strange mosaic. Perhaps light would have been shed on this question had not the copy submitted by the publishers for review been mutilated by the removal of pages vii f. Possibly this missing leaf contained an explanatory Preface, which certainly is much needed.

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[1] *The History of Christianity in the Light of Modern Knowledge: A Collective Work.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929. xxii+780 pages. $6.50.

For the history up to the time of Paul's death the narrative is very full. Apparently an effort was made to narrate not only everything that had happened to the Christian movement, but everything that has been done in recent years to acquire information regarding the gentile and the Jewish settings of the movement, the linguistic and textual study of the New Testament, the Apocryphal Gospels, the Greek papyri, and the theology of the New Testament. This last topic is allowed more than fifty pages of space, while the theological work of Origen or of Augustine draws hardly a page, and other notable theologians of historic Christendom, like Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, seem to have been quite forgotten. One reaches the end of the apostolic age on page 425, and at that point the narrative speeds up so rapidly that a bare sixty pages carry the reader all the way to Constantine. In telling the story from Constantine to Charlemagne less than fifty pages are consumed and forty-five more bring us to the Reformation. This movement in all of its different aspects is summarized within sixty pages of text, and with increasing celerity one passes on to the "Christianity of Today." Brevity is effected by arbitrary omissions and the selection of topics having to do mainly with questions of doctrine or policy, without any attempt to integrate the evolving history of a movement within the social and cultural life of peoples in the different countries where the new religion has become a significant factor in civilization. From this volume one would hardly suspect, for example, that there had been an expanding history of Christianity on the American continent over a period of some three hundred years. On the whole, barely a couple of pages of text have any concern whatever with the history of Christianity on this side of the Atlantic. Its career in Eastern lands, like Egypt, Syria, Armenia, Greece, and Russia, has suffered a similar neglect.

Though exceedingly bad in its design this volume is excellent in certain of its parts. The initial essay descriptive of the Roman Empire in its political and administrative aspects at the beginning of the Christian era is adequate; the next article on Roman religion is excellent; and the third chapter by Gilbert Murray on "Religion and Philosophy" might well be termed brilliant. The exposition by E. Bevan on the mystery religions is very disappointing, not because lacking in statistical information, but because of the writer's incapacity to enter appreciatively into the spirit of these cults and his fear lest someone may think they had contaminated Christianity by contributing something of their own genius to the new religion. The descriptions of Palestine and Judaism are particularly fresh and suggestive. A separate chapter on "The Bible as Christ Knew It" seems scarcely necessary at this point, interesting as it is from the side of archaeology. In his essay on John the Baptist, James Moffatt has added to the usual data a cautious reference to the more recently discussed Mandean sources. Perhaps no other contributor faced so difficult a task as that of F. C. Burkitt in his essay on Jesus. He has followed the lines of his earlier studies and told in brief compass the story of Jesus' career in the framework of Mark and in terms of apocalypticism. He has not troubled himself with *Formgeschichte*, or with more recent debates about Jesus and Pharisaism, except to remark in closing that Jesus cannot be adequately portrayed as primarily a teacher, a wise sage.

The further history of the new movement that emanated from Jesus is interrupted at this point by a long detour into archaeological fields. The quality of the materials in this section of the book shows no especial distinction. One who wants any adequate knowledge about the "Earliest Archeological Records" will have to seek it elsewhere and at much greater length. G. Milligan's two chapters on the language of the New Testament and the papyri are sufficiently long, but they cover ground already widely familiar and easily accessible, and their contribution to the study of Christianity's history is altogether out of proportion to the space used. And what is the point of a chapter on "The Apocryphal Gospels"? If a detailed account of the literary sources for the history of Christianity had been a part of the purpose of the volume, then this matter would have been in order. But also one would have been entitled to a similar introduction to the canonical Gospels and Epistles, to the epistles of Ignatius, to the apologies of Justin, and all other documents used in reconstructing the history. The treatise by C. A. Scott on "New Testament Theology" injected at this point is traditional in type and may puzzle a reader who has the curiosity to compare, for example, what is here said about the teachings of Jesus with what has previously been set forth by Burkitt on the same subject. Returning to the Christian movement where it was left by the death of Jesus, we are carried along to the end of the apostolic age under the pleasing leadership of F. J. Foakes Jackson. The story is told with considerable fulness of detail but with a rather too comfortable avoidance of debatable issues for a reader who has acquired the appreciation for minutiae that the earlier parts of the volume demand.

The remainder of the book—considerably less than one-half its bulk—is much more uniform in the character of its parts. Eighteen centuries of Christianity's history are divided up into eight periods and assigned to as many authors, each apparently instructed to fill approximately fifty pages of text. There is only one interruption. This is a chapter on "English Versions of the Bible" (why not a chapter on versions in other vernaculars?) injected between the counter-Reformation and Jansenism. The period from Paul to Constantine is cared for by C. H. Dodd; J. H. Baxter covers the years 312–800; R. S. Rait carries the narrative on to the Reformation; Archibald Main takes the sixteenth century; David Ogg the seventeenth; H. B. Workmann the eighteenth; C. J. Webb the nineteenth; and the volume closes with an essay by William Temple entitled "Christianity Today: Social and Christian Ethics."

The dominant aim throughout the latter part of the book, sketching the history from the end of the Apostolic age to the present, seems to have been to produce a compendious survey of events and opinions. The contributors are men of first-rate scholarship in their respective fields, but as they interpreted their task in this volume it offered them no opportunity to make any contribution toward a new understanding of the history of Christianity as a whole, or of any particular period in its development. They were content to summarize statistical information rather than to interpret the process of historical evolution.

Shirley Jackson Case

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## THE PAPACY IN DOGMA AND IN HISTORY

Professor Gilbert Bagnani, of Italian and Canadian parentage, historian of the Campagna, and lecturer by invitation in Rome, in London, and in the universities of McGill, Toronto, and Columbia, is a star of considerable magnitude among the better class of historical popularizers. His sketch of the history of the papacy[1] is justly described on the jacket as "this brilliant and possibly provocative work." It is a book of arresting generalizations, and these, while often disputable, rest in the main upon a partially revealed substructure of massed facts. The author has something of the scintillating wit of Chesterton, whom he far surpasses in information. His distinction of style is achieved, not as in Chesterton's case by exploitation of the method of paradox, but by sheer condensation and force of thought.

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[1] *Rome and the Papacy*. By Gilbert Bagnani. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1930. xv+259 pages. $3.00.

The book will probably prove more popular than influential; nor is it at all certain that its influence will prove favorable to the papacy, of which Signor Bagnani claims to be a loyal and believing subject. It seems, indeed, to convey something of the impression of a debunking biography of the Holy See. The author flatly affirms, it is true, that for him the Petrine transmission of authority is a matter of faith "quite independent of historical evidence"; that, indeed, if historical evidence should prove unfavorable to it, he would "unhesitatingly reject the evidence, rather than abandon the dogma." History seems thus quite discounted—in the language of the sage, "all bunk"—if it attempts to deal with the papacy. But he then sets free his historical powers, not, indeed, upon the dogma itself, but upon the means by which the truth of the dogma has been realized in the story of the centuries. These means he finds "sometimes clear and unswerving, sometimes strangely tortuous," and we cannot but feel that in some passages he is taking an unholy delight in exploring the devious paths of papal policy and exposing the error, ignorance, crookedness, and futility of some of the weaker successors of the Fisherman. When, for example, he writes:

> All Catholics believe that the Divine Providence will prevent any Pope from teaching error *ex cathedra* in such a way as to make it binding on the Universal Church, but it is too much to expect it to endow every Pope with great intelligence,

and when he explains the avoidance of theological error by popes "badly informed or unable to understand the questions submitted to them" as "the best proof of divine guidance," we fear for the effect on the piety and loyalty of readers who share his attachment to Rome. Nor are we greatly reassurred by the sentence which follows the one last quoted:

> Pope Zozimus was obviously ignorant of the Pelagian doctrines which he tentatively approved in 417, but God saw to it that he should change his mind and condemn them the following year.

A number of such expressions of the historian's naïve orthodoxy make us feel like invoking the shades of Voltaire and Gibbon—writers with whom he shows evidence, by the way, of more than a casual acquaintance. Perhaps it is unjust to suggest a veiled Voltairean irony. On the whole, Bagnani is in the relation to historical science in which Duns and Occam found themselves in relation to philosophical truth: if it cannot be wholly harmonized with dogma, dogma, being primary, remains unimpaired.

When he becomes hortative, he seeks to convey the assurance that the future security of the papacy rests firmly on the promises of God. The preservation of the papacy, through the service of unworthy human instruments and the employment of discreditable means, in all the perilous crises of the past, all the more impressively confirms, he would tell us, the dogma of papal authority.

> No man [he concludes] can know the measures by which God will preserve the independence of His Church. We can await the future with confidence, certain that the Divine Providence will preserve the spiritual authority of Rome until the awful day when Christ himself will take the place of His Vicar.

But again a spirit of mischievous curiosity will ask: Is there a lurking subtlety in his expression "the awful day"—an esoteric suggestion of something to be enacted in the church visible, rather than merely a conventional reference to the *dies irae* of traditional eschatology? Perish the thought! But the book is as advertised: "brilliant and possibly provocative."

University of Chicago JOHN T. McNEILL

## THE "LOST TRIBES"

*The Lost Tribes A Myth*[1] by Professor Allen H. Godbey is a work of immense erudition in the fields of early history and anthropology. The title does not do justice to the wide scope of the work. The "lost-tribes" question is only a point of departure for a detailed study of Hebrew origins, Jewish dispersion, world-wide propaganda for "Yahu-worship," and the question of the racial integrity of the Jews.

Dr. Godbey's thesis is that by the time the Aramaean tribes came into Palestine, "Yahu-worship" already existed among their ethnologically mixed predecessors. The word "Ibri" was not ethnological but geographical, and referred to the mixed groups living west of the Jordan. The conquering Aramaeans, proud of their racial purity, gradually forced various peoples to claim Aramaean (and later "Jewish") descent. There was a steady Yahu propaganda all through the ages and all over the ancient world, through Palestinian trade colonies and military settlements. Thus, most of North Africa (the whole Sahara region), Berber, Agau and Negro, became Yahu-worshipers and considered themselves "B'nai Israel" or "Philistim." In Asia the worship spread through Persia, the Caucasus,

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[1] *The Lost Tribes a Myth* (suggestions toward re-writing Hebrew history). By Allen H. Godbey. Durham: Duke University Press, 1930. xx+802 pages, 44 plates. $7.50.

Southern Russia, Mongolia, China, and Japan. Yahu-worship thus covered Asia and led to the claims of B'nai Israel descent still to be found in India, Afghanistan, and China.

In this setting, the whole "ten-tribes" problem vanishes away. Since there was never any "pure-blooded" Israel which was the sole carrier of Yahu-worship, there are no pure ten tribes tucked away in some corner waiting to be rediscovered.

It is impossible to go into all the important matters dealt with in this book, as, for example, the idea that prophets, especially Deutero-Isaiah, represented the view opposed to the "Jewish" race consciousness, or that Yahu worship is originally not Semitic, etc. It is sufficient to state that he gives a convincing picture of a widespread and successful Jewish propaganda beginning with the earliest times.

It is, however, somewhat to be deplored that Dr. Godbey, when speaking of Jewish pride of descent, uses rather bitter language of a type not quite suitable to a scientific work: e.g., "their pioneer ancestors were not of the arrogant, modern, white Jew type" (p. 344); or, when saying that the Judaization of the Malabar Coast did not put an end to caste distinction in India: "How should they who assert themselves The Race of all races, the Caste of all castes, put an end to caste-distinctions in any people" (p. 355); or, "the Jewish habit of announcing anything as done by Israelites, if the performers have been induced to accept Hebrew names" (p. 371).

Occasionally, the author, being rather carried away by his thesis, makes a number of curious text interpretations. Speaking of Ezra's insistence on ethnic purity, he asks "can the insistence that every worshiper swear he was of Aramaean ancestry come from him?" (Deut. 26:1–5). But the reference in Deuteronomy referring to the statement which was to accompany the bringing of first-fruits is far from being a boast of ethnic purity. It is an expression of humble gratitude saying in effect: Although my ancestor was a mere Aramaean nomad, God has blessed me. So far is this from being a boast of pure Aramaean descent, that many Jewish commentators did not believe that the word Arami referred to Jacob at all; but they mistranslated the verse as follows: The Aramaean (Laban) tried to destroy my father (Jacob)! The author speaks of the prejudice which must have existed in Palestine against *gêrîm* and finds in the Psalms and elsewhere complaints of these "oppressed *gêrîm*" as in Ps. 39:12 and even in Ps. 120:5, which he seriously translated: "Woe is me! for I am a *gêr* of Meshech!" (p. 588). The strangest translation of all is that of Lev. 25:23, of which he says (p. 480): "The same rebuke [against the popular discrimination of the native Jew against *gêrîm tôshabîm*] is embodied in

Lev. 25:23: 'You are all only *gêrîm tôshabîm* yourselves!' The speaker must have known [Godbey continues] that a segregate pure-blooded ethnic Israel never existed." Now this verse forbids the final sale of land because, as it says, the land belongs to God and we are only God's tenants. To extract from such a clear statement a rebuke against Jewish ethnic pretensions is surely carrying a theory too far.

In spite of a number of such faults of temper and overzeal, the book is a magnificent collection and arrangement of important material, and it gives for the first time, as far as the reviewer is aware, a full picture of the spread of Judaism (or of part-Judaism) all over North Africa and Asia.

SOLOMON B. FREEHOF

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## CANNIBALISM AMONG SOUTH AMERICAN INDIANS

The center of interest in this volume[1] must lie in the chapter entitled "L'Anthropophagie rituelle des Tupinamba." There is probably nowhere available an equally complete account of ceremonial cannibalism. The form the custom took among the Tupinamba affords a striking instance of the modificability of human nature. A notion of right conduct more alien to our own can hardly be imagined. A captive in war was brought back by the Tupinamba, adopted into the tribe, and treated much like a native-born member. He was married to a widow or other female relative of a man slain by his own tribe and whose death his own ritualistic destruction was to avenge. After months or even years of this life a five-day period of ceremonial preceded his death. In a drinking-bout which occurred shortly before he submitted himself to the strangling-cord, the victim joined fully and equally. All members of the tribe ate of his body. And finally, if a child had been born of the union, the child was also killed and eaten—and the widow and mother was the first to partake.

We are told that occasionally the wife aided the captive-husband to escape. Human nature, among the Tupinamba, was not wholly unrecognizable to us. Yet ordinarily the full program was carried out in spite of the fact it was a part of their religion—no, it was carried out because it was their religion. The cannibalism was a religious act. The ritual was a solemn profession or renewal of the values most deeply held. The solidity and self-confidence of the group were thereby attested. All ate; the small children were required to approach and dip their hands in the blood. If a jaguar, most feared enemy of the tribe, was slain, his body was treated just as was the body of a hostile tribesman, and a similar communion was observed. In this account the relation of religion, ritual, and social control is apparent.

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[1] *La Religion des Tupinamba et ses rapports avec celle des autres tribus Tupi-Guarani.* By A. Métraux. Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1928. 258 pages.

The volume is a proof of the fact that valuable work in ethnology may be done within the walls of a library. The Indians described here have long been extinct. Four hundred years ago they dwelt along the Brazilian coast where now are Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. No professional ethnologist ever visited them. Yet they are among the best-known Indians of South America. This is because their customs were reported in great detail by travelers and missionaries, some of whom lived long among them. M. Métraux has used these sources with much critical skill, and has moreover discovered hitherto unknown manuscripts, especially a valuable account by Thévet.

ROBERT REDFIELD

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## THE BASIC PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS[1]

What is the gist of the missionary motive, and what is the most characteristic act of a missionary? In the early days of the modern movement, missionaries believed that they were sent "to snatch the heathen as brands from the burning" or to supplant and annihilate false religions. At times an impression has been given that the core of missions is competition between founders of centuries-old faiths; at other times that the contest is between incompatible "systems" of supposed truth. Two assumptions characterize all such conceptions: That the missionary acts in an official, representative capacity, and that, by virtue of his representative status, he is related to non-Christians as a superior to inferiors. The central act, accordingly, is telling or declaring something that contains an implied or expressed command.

Professor Fleming, at one time a missionary, but now a professor of missions, is foremost among the friends of the missionary enterprise who for some years have been developing a different point of view—a radically different one in its method of approach to the question and in some of its conclusions. His recent work on *Ways of Sharing with Other Faiths* is the climax of a series of studies that have to do with different angles of the central problem. Roughly stated, his contribution consists in taking the dynamics of the whole enterprise out of the realm of easily accepted generalities and putting it into the realm of ascertainable concrete facts. Thus conceived, the gist of missions is found in the attitude of an individual person, the missionary, to some other person with whom he has direct relations. All questions of historical truth, of theological or philosophical assumptions, of ethical systems, and even of particular ethical practices, are secondary to the establishment of fellowship between two persons in face-to-face relations. The crucial question then becomes, What would be a truly Christian attitude on the part of a convinced Christian toward one who is not Christian and is not convinced?

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[1] *Ways of Sharing with Other Faiths.* By Daniel Johnson Fleming. New York: Association Press, 1929. xii+268 pages. $1.75.

The answer that Professor Fleming gives has the following rare combination of qualities: It offers, not a generalized sentiment deduced from the concept of Christianity but an analysis of typical practices of particular missions and missionaries; it exhibits, with psychological insight and with sympathy, the missionaries' own reasons for these practices, but it tests each of them by its known effects; it makes room for variations of personal approach because the persons to be approached are not all alike; and withal it is so open-minded and genial that any really friendly missionary might use it as a letter of introduction to any cultivated non-Christian.

But, just because Fleming is so friendly, sympathetic, and understanding, his analysis constitutes the most drastic exposé. He constructs a sort of scale of aggressiveness, and then a scale of the "inducements" upon which reliance has been placed, inviting any believer in missions to find his own place therein and then judge whether this scale-place accords with the Christian principle of the sacredness of personality. Next, he invites us to define our position with respect to the process whereby persons are formed. Is our major emphasis upon the message, with the implication of authority, or is it upon the development of self-reliant thinking and choosing, with all that this implies as to authority?

The discussion leads up to this as the final problem: How, if at all, can we promote or develop in another person unqualified independence of mind and at the same time induce him to share with us some (to him) new value that we are certain is of superior quality? Fleming's answer (chapter xvii) is a gem of educational analysis. We most respect another, we most stimulate him to become an active, independent self, when we enrich the material of his thought and lead him to reflect upon the most important alternatives. But—here's the rub—this must include stimulus to genuinely independent judgment upon the values in question; in the case of children, such training as will lead them, as they mature, to examine critically the work of their teachers—this, even though it entails the possibility of unpredictable revisions of what the missionary holds dear.

Such is the intellectual and spiritual distance between the Williams College haystack and the now-emerging missions! The remaining questions, not here under consideration, concern the historicity of some elements in the assumed "message," and the true quality and effect of types of conduct and of worship that constitute what the missionary regards as Christian living. But, *mirabile dictu,* according to the principles of Fleming's conclusion, these matters can be worked out by co-operative thinking and experimentation by the missionary and those to whom he is sent.

George A. Coe

Evanston, Illinois

## HOW THE CHURCH CAN SERVE CITY FOLK

Charles Hatch Sears is one of the none too numerous company of city mission executives who combine religious passion with scientific spirit. For twenty-five years he has been general secretary of the New York City Baptist Mission Society, and for ten years of the Baptist Church Extension Society of Brooklyn and Queen's. And in all those years he has kept his eyes open and his heart sensitive to human need as it emerges under the stresses and pressures of modern urban life in America. It is his awareness of what the city does to people, and of what the church may do to help them transcend adverse environment, that finds expression in his most recent book.[1] Dr. Sears is not so much concerned to study the material development of the city as to study the effect of urban conditions upon human relations; neither is he so much concerned to discover the factors which will enable a city church to achieve institutional success as to discover the effective forms of ministry which a church may render to people facing the adversities peculiar to modern city life. Thus, both the city and the city church are appraised in terms of their effects upon personality, and the positions which the author maintains are supported by reference to a multitude of cases which have come under his personal observation.

The book is prepared for use in mission study classes. Used by such groups, it will clarify thinking upon the problems to be solved if the urgent demands for religious ministry growing out of urban conditions are to be met and religious privileges are to be equalized in the city.

Charles T. Holman

University of Chicago

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[1] *The Crowded Ways.* By Charles Hatch Sears. New York: Council of Women for Home Missions and Missionary Education Movement, 1929. xii+193 pages. Cloth $1.00, paper 60 cents.

# RECENT BOOKS

## RELIGIONS IN GENERAL

CREEL, H. G. *Sinism: A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese World-View.* Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1929. 127 pages. $2.00.

Wrongly listed as a publication of the University of Chicago Press in the April issue, 1930, of the *Journal of Religion.*

GUNKEL, HERMANN, and ZSCHARNACK, LEOPOLD (eds.). *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.* 2 Aufl. Band III, Bogen 46–51, M. 3.60; Bogen 52–59 und Tafel 25–40, M. 7.20; Bogen 60–68, M. 5.40; Band IV, Bogen 1–17, M. 10.80. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929–30.

Since the progress of this work was last noticed in these pages the third volume of this encyclopedia has reached completion and the fourth has advanced to the entry "Niederlande" (col. 544). There is constant evidence of the same qualities of comprehensiveness, mastery of detail, and careful revision that have marked the previous *Lieferungen* in this new edition of the work. Every field of study in religion is served, although naturally Christianity receives chief attention. In the parts listed above there are several longer contributions of great value for present-day knowledge of these subjects. Students of the more practical side of Christian activity will be especially interested in the articles on missions, moral instruction, and teaching activity. In the field of doctrine, particular attention may be directed to the discussions of mysticism, mythology, monism, monotheism, nature, liberalism, suffering, body, and soul. But in this section of the alphabet it so happens that the historian of Christianity finds the most important entries in his particular field of interest. He is given indispensable materials in such articles as "Luther and Lutheranism," "Melanchthon," "Middle Ages," "Monasticism," "Manicheans," "Liturgy," "Painting and Sculpture."

## HEBREW LITERATURE AND RELIGION

BERTHOLET, ALFRED. *Dynamismus und Personalismus in der Seelenauffassung.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. 20 pages. M. 1.50.

A paper read before the Congress for the History of Religion in Lund, Sweden, in August, 1929. It is a study of the conception of the soul among primitive peoples. The conclusion reached is that the primitive conception of the soul is analogous to the primitive conception of the superhuman and so has a twofold basis, viz., one personalistic and one dynamistic, i.e., a combination of personality and automatic dynamic substance. A wide survey of primitive conceptions leads to this result.

FELDMANN, FRANZ. *Geschichte der Offenbarung des Alten Testaments bis zum Babylonischen Exil.* Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1930. xii+230 pages. *Broschiert* M. 7.60; bound M. 9.60.

A book written by a Catholic scholar for the use of priests in training. It bears the *imprimatur* of an archbishop and is thus proof against all modern ideas. It is oblivious of modern scholarship and of interest only as showing the attitude of the Roman church toward scientific and historical questions.

HORST, FRIEDRICH, *Das Privilegrecht Jahves.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1930. 124 pages. M. 9.50.

This is an exceedingly detailed and analytical study of the Deuteronomic Code. The conclusion reached is that the original element in that Code consists of a decalogue, now scattered through the Code from 12:26, 27–17:1*a*, which deals with ritualistic matters directly affecting the worship of Yahweh. All the rest of the Code is in the way of expansion and supplementation of this original decalogue.

JACK, J. W. *Samaria in Ahab's Time.* (Harvard excavations and their results; with chapters on the political and religious situation.) New York: Scribner's, 1929. xi+175 pages. $3.00.

This is an excellent and concise book presenting the main facts of the excavation of Samaria by the expedition from Harvard University. It is a scholarly piece of work and will be found very useful.

JEREMIAS, A. *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients.* 4th ed. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. 852 pages. Unbound M. 42; bound M. 45.

This presents the Old Testament from the point of view of archaeology. It is provided with 293 illustrations, three maps, a Hebrew and a German glossary, and a list of New Testament passages referred to in the text. It is an excellent summary of the results of archaeological research upon the Old Testament, and has proved its usefulness by the fact that a fourth edition is now called for. But the point of view dominating the book is theological rather than historical, and the effort of the author is to demonstrate the fact that the modern point of view represented by Julius Wellhausen and his successors is all wrong. This attempt can hardly be called a success, and it is interesting in this connection to recall that Hugo Gressmann a few days before his death, here in Chicago, declared that though he had long been opposing the view of Wellhausen he was now convinced that Wellhausen was essentially right. Scholars will find the work useful even though they do not accept its point of view.

RYAN, OSWALD. *The Challenge of the Prophets.* Anderson, Ind.: Warner Press, 1929. xx+128 pages. $1.00.

This little book is full of enthusiasm and idealism, but it lacks the fundamental qualification of exact scholarship. It fails in critical appreciation of the necessity of distinguishing between original documents and later interpretations and supplements of these documents. A glowing Introduction is furnished by the late Senator Beveridge.

STRACK, H. L. *Hebräische Grammatik mit Übungsbuch.* 14th ed. by Alf. Jepsen. München: C. H. Beck, 1930. xvi+242 pages. M. 7.

This standard Hebrew grammar has proved its usefulness so completely that it has now attained its fourteenth edition. It tries to combine the needs of the beginning student with those of the more advanced students. But the latter class will find very little material meeting his needs. The grammar follows the old lines as a book for beginners, starting with the details of grammar and word forms, which to some of us seems the driest possible way to begin the study of a language. From the purely grammatical point of view the book will be found reliable and wholly trustworthy. It is good to find it recognizing frankly the biliteral character of some verbs and nouns.

## JUDAISM

Heinemann, I. (ed.). *Die Werke Philos von Alexandria.* V. Teil. Breslau: Verlag von M. & H. Marcus, 1929. v+294 pages. M. 15.

This is the fifth volume in a new German translation of Philo's works begun under the editorship of Leopold Cohn over twenty years ago. Six years have elapsed since the fourth volume appeared, but the editor expresses the hope that both the sixth and the seventh (final) volume will be published within another two years. The dearth of modern translations of Philo makes it highly desirable that this rendering be brought to completion as soon as possible. Volume V contains the following treatises: "On Drunkenness" and "On Sobriety," both translated by Maximilian Adler of Prague; "The Confusion of Tongues," by Edmund Stein of Warschau; "On Abraham's Migration," by Rabbi Posner of Kiel; "Who Is the Heir of Divine Things?" by Rabbi Joseph Cohn of Hamburg. The favorable reception accorded previous volumes must be extended to this one also. Inevitably different translators somewhat complicate the problem of standardizing renderings of Philo's Greek, but the employment of various hands was essential to the completion of so extensive an undertaking. All of the editor's assistants are manifestly competent workmen. It is fortunate that Jewish scholarship has made itself responsible for this task, for the Alexandrine Hellenist can be understood correctly only by one well versed in Jewish religious lore, yet Philo is a figure of first-rate significance for the history of early Christianity. The German rendering of his works constitutes a useful supplement to the critical edition of the Greek text edited by Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland.

Le Sieur de Simonville (trans.). *Cérémonies et Coûtumes.* Translated from the Italian of Léon de Modène. New edition. Paris: Rieder, 1929. 220 pages. Fr. 12.

Léon de Modène (1571–1648), that many-sided and troubled genius of the Jewish Renaissance in Italy, rabbi of Venice, and author of many works of astonishing critical acumen and courage, wrote, at the request of an English nobleman, for James I a description of all the ceremonies and customs practiced by the Jews of his time. The work was soon translated from the original Italian into English, French, Dutch, and Hebrew.

The French translation was by Richard Simon (1674), one of the pioneers in the science of biblical criticism. This translation is now reprinted with all the archaic spelling. The Introduction is by the famous Franco-Jewish author, Edmond Fleg, and is part of a series of books on Judaism published under his direction.

Munk, Salomon (trans.). *Le guide des égarés par Maïmonide.* Paris: Les Editions Rieder, 1930. 278 pages. Fr. 15.

Salomon Munk, the French Orientalist who died in 1867, will be chiefly remembered for his epochmaking labors in the field of Arab-Jewish philosophy. His greatest literary work was the three-volume edition of the original Arabic text of Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed.* This edition, based upon texts in the Bibliothèque and in Oxford, provided with annotations and a translation will long remain the definitive edition of the *Guide.*

Edmond Fleg, the author of *The Life of Moses, Solomon, The Jewish Anthology,* and other works, is the editor of a series of Jewish classics published by Rieder. The eleventh volume in this series, *Ceremonies and Customs,* by Leon de Modena, was already reviewed in this *Journal*. The present work, the twelfth of the series, consists of the less abstruse portions of Salomon Munk's translation of the *Guide*. While, of course, the problem which confronted Maimonides—namely, how to harmonize Judaism with Aristotelianism—is no longer a pressing one, nevertheless Maimonides' spiritualization of Jewish tradition is still significant. This book will therefore find many readers among those interested in philosophy and theology.

PHILIPSON, D., LAUTERBACH, J. Z., and MORGENSTERN, J. (eds.). *Hebrew Union College Annual*. Vol. V. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College, 1928. 620 pages. $2.00.

This substantial volume contains eleven papers, six written in English, four in German, and one in Hebrew, by first-rate scholars in the various fields of interest represented. President Morgenstern's discussion of "The Book of the Covenant" is in itself a monograph of 151 pages; and the essay of Z. Diesendruck of Vienna on "Teleology in Maimonides" is almost as extensive. The other contributions are briefer, but range over a wide field, e.g., "The Poems of Haggai," "The Jewish Catacombs and Inscriptions of Rome," "An Unknown Hebrew Version of the Sayings of Aesop," and "Divine Help as a Social Phenomenon." The five volumes that have now appeared in the series attest the high quality of Jewish scholarship and constitute a veritable encyclopedia indispensable for all students in any communion who have occasion to seek information on subjects related to Hebrew and Jewish history and culture.

## NEW TESTAMENT

GILBERT, GEORGE HOLLEY. *The Christian Content of the Bible*. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 207 pages. $2.00.

Dr. Gilbert, acting upon the consciousness of the uneven quality of the Bible, presents what he considers its ultimate content. Everyone who knows the author or his work will appreciate his aim. But it is difficult to see why it took exactly this issue. The contemporary scientific study of religion desiderates manifold sources which will exhibit the processes of development; it does not deprecate the Jewish element of the Bible, but welcomes the apprehension of the Christian content in the light of the Jewish. It would appear that Dr. Gilbert's result points in the opposite direction to his purpose, his "Christian" scripture is a fixed, static quantum. Another futile attempt to articulate Christianity's essence.

NESTLE, EBERHARD. *Novum Testamentum Graece*. Edited by Erwin Nestle. Stuttgart: Privilegierte Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1930. 662 pages, 2 maps. M. 2:50.

The fourteenth edition of Nestle's handy edition of the Greek New Testament exhibits slight change from the edition of 1927. There is but one charge, a merely verbal alteration, in the Latin Introduction (p. 19), aside from the addition of the final paragraph which explains the addition of new symbols. The most important items here referred to concern the evidence of Irenaeus in the patristic and of family theta in the manuscript field. The Caesarean text theory is mentioned, as it was in 1927 (p. 16), but it does not appear that the editor is conscious of recent amplification of the theory, nor does it appear that the theory has affected the text or the apparatus. Indeed, the symbol theta in the apparatus seems to refer to the readings of the codex rather than the family theta. There is added to the Introduction the German statement which parallels the Latin; the German does introduce some new symbols, however. The

Nestle Greek Testament is assuredly popular; if its complicated symbols are mastered so that the apparatus can be used it is unquestionably useful.

## JESUS

Baillie, John. *The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity.* New York: Scribner's, 1929. xii+219 pages. $2.00.

In this series of lectures, delivered on the Ely Foundation at Union Theological Seminary, an effort is made to restate the essentials of traditional Christology and to avoid such forms of expression as are likely to give greatest offense to modern intelligence. The device employed is that of appealing to experience, insights into spiritual realities, restatements of the old truths, and the power of the simple gospel of the New Testament. By the use of these less formal tests of validity an effort is made to recover a fuller appreciation of the historic Jesus than has ever before been accomplished. One thus abandons, perhaps, the old terminology of the creeds, but only in order to recover the essential truths which they embody. The supreme significance of Jesus is still to be found in believing what the ancients, and particularly the New Testament authors, thought about him, provided that this belief is stated in terms so vague or modernized, or emotionally appealing, that modern intelligence will not be offended.

Fiske, Charles F., and Easton, Burton S. *The Real Jesus: What He Taught: What He Did: Who He Was.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. ix+261 pages. $2.50.

Bishop Fiske's earlier work, *The Christ We Know,* has here been reprinted with supplements and expurgations designed to give to the new volume the aroma of scholarship that one naturally associates with the work of Professor Easton. But the professor must have found breathing difficult under the smothering rhetoric and apologetics of the bishop. It must have been a relief to him to be privileged to say some things strictly on his own account in a couple of appendixes. He would be quite excusable if he had cherished a feeling of diabolical joy in slipping in on the final page of the book such outright statements of critical judgment as "the year of the crucifixion cannot be computed. . . . . We do not know how long the ministry lasted."

Glover, T. R. *The Influence of Christ in the Ancient World.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929. 122 pages. $1.50.

The Yale University Press publishes the lectures delivered by the public orator of Cambridge University at Oberlin and Yale. They undertake to explain how Christianity, with its many handicaps, was victorious in the religious competition of the ancient world. It can hardly be said that the attempt is successful. In the nature of the case, this necessarily follows, for with the author's inability to perceive the impact of Christianity upon the ancient world in any aspect save the literary, and with his distaste for any literature save the classical, he cannot be expected to appreciate Christianity as a vital movement. The pages of the book show also other limitations of the author's approach; he has, for example, the biased view of the mystery cults which inhibits a fair appraisal of Christianity's contemporaries, and which seems to obtain by reason of a very limited acquaintance with the literature of the subject. While the volume has flashes of the fine style in which Professor Glover sometimes writes, it can hardly be regarded as a significant addition to the studies of early Christianity.

RITTELMEYER, FRIEDRICH. *Behold the Man: A Picture in Four Aspects.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. 167 pages. $1.75.

Almost twenty years ago this little book originally appeared in German. It is now translated from the second, but not essentially altered, edition of 1920. It aims to present "the historically approved facts" about Jesus and at the same time to show that the picture thus restored "is proof against any loss of worth because of the results of historical investigation." There are four essays entitled "The Life," "The Personality," "The Message," and "The Significance of Jesus for Our Own Time." The point of view and method of the book are essentially those of the Ritschlian school, and are clearly indicated in such a sentence as "we do hold him to be the one sent of God because his sayings have verified themselves in our heart and life" (p. 141). The subjective norm, which makes Jesus a sublimation and idealization of a certain type of twentieth-century religious man, is dominant throughout the volume.

SCHONFIELD, HUGH J. *The Lost "Book of the Nativity of John."* New York: Scribner's, 1929. xiv+77 pages. $1.75.

Taking its clew from a dubious bibliographical reference, and assiduously using a few hints from tradition, the attempt is made to reconstruct a hypothetical document which, it is said, told the story of the birth of John the Baptist with an identification of him as messiah. The finding is alleged to furnish an explanation of the difficulties with which the gospel stories of the birth of Jesus are filled. Unfortunately, the author's treatment of his data does not suggest confidence in his hypothesis, and the data themselves do not seem to warrant the conclusions drawn.

*The Lord of Life: A Fresh Approach to the Incarnation.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. xii+343 pages. $2.50.

Eleven papers by nine English authors are combined in this volume, without assigning the responsibility of editorship to any single member of the group. But the character and purpose of the book are explained by the fact that it arose out of summer conferences of the Sandwich Free Church Fellowship and is thus a by-product of the Student Christian Movement. It represents a composite of Nonconformist rather than Anglican opinion, and has in view the practical purpose of presenting Christ in conformity with modern religious needs. Since these needs were conceived primarily in terms of theological opinion, phrased in the language of so-called "experience," it seemed fitting that the exposition should center about the notion of "incarnation," not as a postulate of the creeds but as a factor in the "experience of the Apostolic Age." Or, again, "to recover the New Testament experience is what we should be concerned about," and in the light of what we find there we should try to attain a true understanding of what is involved in our own experience. In other words, the formal Christology of the creeds passes out at the back door only to re-enter at the front under a thin disguise of modernism.

WALKER, ROLLIN H. *Jesus and Our Pressing Problems.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1929. 208 pages. $1.50.

Professor Walker attempts to obtain consideration for some questions current in our day by sketching how Jesus considered similar questions which were important in his situation. It is apparent, however, that much less is obtained from discussing Jesus' problems than from raising the question "What would Jesus do?" in ours. In other words, here is a discussion of certain life-problems from a point of view which seems to assume the unity of the modern Christian spirit with the ancient. The discussion is of considerable value, particularly as it reflects a fine personal experience, but the ideal Jesus of today, rather than the Jesus of history, is the source of its ethical impulse.

## HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY

ACHELIS, HANS. *Der Marmorkalender in Neapel.* Leipzig: Alexander Edelmann, 1929. 62 pages.

Study of a calendar inscribed on a marble plate five and one-half meters long in the church of S. Giovanni Maggiore in Naples.

BOEHMER, HEINRICH. *Analekten zur Geschichte des Franciscus von Assisi.* Second edition revised by Friedrich Wiegand. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. xii+75 pages. M. 3.40.

A new edition of the late Professor Boehmer's collection of documents on St. Francis of Assisi, prepared for seminar use. The Contents include a note on the sources and literature, the eighteen *opuscula sincera,* four dubious fragments, the spurious *regula penitentium,* and an Appendix containing extracts from Thomas of Celano and other primary writers on St. Francis.

CAMPBELL, JAMES MARSHALL. *The Greek Fathers.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929. ix+167 pages. $1.75.

An appreciation of the contribution of the Greek Fathers of the church to modern culture is an unusual but timely effort. This little book in the "Our Debt to Greece and Rome" series by a professor of Greek and Latin in the Catholic University of America will, it is to be hoped, be given a wide reading. The subject is one little if at all known outside of academic circles, but the book is written in a manner to attract the lay reader and contains within brief compass much that will interest him, while for the professional student of church history it constitutes a welcome summary of information regarding the intellectual leaders of Christianity in the eastern end of the Mediterranean basin down to the time of John of Damascus in the early part of the eighth century. During many centuries following the break between the East and the West, Roman and medieval Christianity in Europe remained quite unaware of its debt to the Greek Fathers, whose language was no longer known even among the most learned in the Western church. But the debt to this forgotten source was nevertheless great, and when the study of Greek was revived in later times it became newly appreciated. In so small a volume only a cursory treatment was possible, hence it will be more useful perhaps in stimulating further reading than in satisfying all curiosity. It presents a clear picture of the extent to which the Greek Fathers have been given attention down through the centuries, but it does not offer desired details as to specific items in their contribution to cultural history. Perhaps this important consideration was necessarily subordinated on account of limitations of space imposed by the plan of the series.

COULANGE, LOUIS. *Catéchisme pour adultes: II Les Institutions.* Paris: Les Éditions Rieder, 1930. 251 pages. Fr. 12.

The history of church dogma and institutions is made easy by Coulange in this interesting "catechism" or topical exposition, of which the first volume was noticed in our *Journal,* IX (Oct., 1929), 658–59. The general headlines of this volume on institutions are: "The Papacy," "The Sacraments," "Indulgences," "Ecclesiastical Celibacy," and "Worship." The evolution of institutions is treated in such a way as to discredit infallible claims, and there is considerable material in exposure of sinister practices in the Church of Rome.

de Faye, Eugène. *Origen and His Work.* Translated by Fred Rothwell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929. 192 pages. $1.75.

This series of popular lectures, originally delivered at the University of Upsala (Sweden) in 1925, appeared a year later in an English translation, which is now reissued in America. In the meantime the author has completed in three large volumes in French his extensive researches on Origen. Their publication has already been noted in this *Journal,* April, 1929, pages 308–10. But for readers unacquainted with the larger work this republished volume of lectures will serve excellently as a summary of the results toward which the author's intensive studies were already pointing when he delivered the course at Upsala. He finds in this Greek Father a vigorous effort on the part of a keenly religious personality to provide the new religion with full intellectual justifications. And the peculiarities of Origen's thinking which gave offense to later theologians and threatened him with disgrace as a heretic are thought to be prophetic of opinions that can be truly appreciated only in modern times.

Gardiner, Stephen. *Obedience in Church and State.* Edited by Pierre Janelle. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1930. lxx+221 pages. 15*s*.

Men of religion in the sixteenth century frequently show a remarkable suppleness of adjustment on political questions. The haughty but inconstant prelate whose tracts on issues involving political duties in his time are here reproduced will gain no new admirers either from the publication of his hitherto-neglected writings or from Mr. Janelle's treatment of him. The tracts are *On Fisher's Execution* (1529), a harsh attack on the heroic Bishop of Rochester; *The Oration of True Obedience* (1535), justifying the Act of Supremacy; and his *Contempt of Human Law* (1541), written in reply to Bucer, with whom Gardiner had been in conflict at the Conference of Ratisbon. These writings are in Latin. Defective sixteenth-century translations of the third are included, and conveniently paged opposite the original. In an admirable Introduction Mr. Janelle treats of the occasion of each of the tracts, and their place in controversy, but avoids entanglements in general biographical and political questions. A subsequent volume is promised, to deal with Gardiner's political ideas and their sources. Gardiner is not shielded from the charges both of injustice and of insincerity on the basis of these writings. He is nevertheless credited with patriotism, and with a certain moral continuity.

Greiff, Anton. *Johanneische Studien. I: Das älteste Pascharituale der Kirche, Didache 1–10, und das Johannesevangelium.* Paderborn: Kommissionsverlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1929. 205 pages.

The title of Dr. Greiff's study of the first ten chapters of the Didache is somewhat misleading so far as the bulk of the work is concerned. Less than one-sixth of the book is devoted to the comparative study of these chapters and the Fourth Gospel, the other five-sixths being concerned with establishing the position that chapters 1–10 of the Didache constitute Christianity's earliest Paschal-ritual, and that this work arose in Antioch in the first century. As the author indicates, however, these points about the Didache need to be made clear if one is to measure its relationship to the gospel; and to that relationship Dr. Greiff has given the preponderance of his interest, if not of space in his book.

In the relationship between these chapters and the Fourth Gospel, Dr. Greiff finds the solution of several major Johannine problems—the nature of the gospel, its "mystery" character, as described by Grill, its purpose, and its style. These questions are not discussed at length, but are merely thrown out as challenges to study, the author indicating briefly the line of direction which his own thought takes, and promising us a second volume devoted to Grill's theory. Greiff's major thesis regarding the relationship between the Didache and the gospel is that the author of the gospel knew the Didache, and built upon it, giving its views greater fulness and depth. He finds the structure of the gospel parallel to that of the Didache and thinks of the farewell discourses in chapters 13–17 as giving a liturgy for the celebration of the Eucharist, as in a similar fashion, he has found the prayers in chapters 9 and 10 of the Didache to be not those for everyday or private worship, but the officially sanctioned forms for the church's celebration of the Eucharist.

The acceptability of these conclusions to scholars at large is doubtful. It is difficult for the present reviewer to think of the gospel as having so formal a purpose, even if the dependence of it upon the Didache could be unquestionably established. Quite apart from the question of dependence, the gospel, both in its selection of material and its own avowed purpose, directs so much of its attention to the presenting of personal religious experience that it is difficult to see in it so formal an ecclesiastical aim. But whether the conclusions are accepted or not, one cannot but admire and pay tribute to the scholarly methods exemplified in this work. Dr. Greiff is a careful scholar, and he uses the tools of scholarship as a master.

HOENEN, RICHARD. *Die Freien evangelischen Gemeinden in Deutschland.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1930. viii+122 pages. M. 8.80.

An informing study of the little-known history of the Free Congregations in Germany. The history is brought down to the present date. An Appendix contains valuable constitutional documents.

KUHN, LE P. BERNARD. *Saint Jean Chrysostome et la prédication.* Paris: Bureau de l'anée Dominicaine, 1929. 52 pages.

An appreciation of Chrysostom as a preacher, whose eloquence is rated above that of any other orator, sacred or profane. He was superior to Demosthenes and Cicero because of the greater nobility of his themes, and he excelled Bossuet in that the latter catered to royalty while Chrysostom was the orator of humanity.

LIEBESCHÜTZ, HANS. *Das allegorische Weltbild der heiligen Hildegard.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1930. xi+179 pages. M. 15.

An extended analysis of the mystical and cosmological ideas and allegorical method of a distinguished late twelfth-century visionary nun.

LOOFS, FRIEDRICH. *Theophilus von Antiochen adversus Marcionem und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1930. xi+462 pages. M. 36.

The late Professor Loofs, of Halle, who in the course of his long and active career made numerous significant contributions to a better knowledge of obscure matters in the history of the ancient church, left the manuscript of the present volume practically finished at the time of his death on January 13, 1928. Its final completion and publication have been cared for by Johannes Ficker, also of Halle. The results of this study are of fundamental significance for our understanding of Irenaeus, and especially his famous doctrine of "recapitulation." This intensive research on the problem of his sources leads to the conviction that he was less original in this particular than has commonly been supposed, and it also sheds new light on the genesis and significance of the notion. Contrary to the widely accepted view that Irenaeus was unaquainted with Theophilus, Loofs finds Theophilus' treatise against Marcion to have been one of the principal sources employed by Irenaeus. But he was also indebted to many other contemporaries and predecessors. Detailed evidence of this fact is presented with great industry and skill. In a few closing pages the significance of these findings for an understanding of Irenaeus' contribution to the history of dogma is briefly estimated. The results are especially important for the complicated problem of the church's christological speculations during the second century.

MACCHIORO, VITTORIO. *Martin Luther—ein Held des Glaubens.* Gotha: Klotz, 1929. 144 pages. M. 4.

A brief and vivid appreciation of the reformer, with frequent and often fresh quotations from his works. Macchioro does not become entangled in the problems with which Luther historians are so largely occupied. Luther is a simple, great man—a superman indeed, whose sense of being the instrument of God is the source of an unfailing energy.

NORWOOD, PERCY VARNEY. *Progress and Prospects in Christian Reunion.* (Hale Memorial Sermon, 1929.) Milwaukee: Morehouse, 1929. 43 pages. Paper, $0.10.

An admirably lucid and conveniently brief interpretation of the history of modern church-union effort from the standpoint of a liberal Episcopalian. Professor Norwood appreciates the ideal of the Anglican communion and the difficulty of its attainment. He stresses the contribution of the Protestant Episcopal church, and urges that church to press forward in the cause. These pages should be read by all Protestants, especially by those who have not hitherto seen much idealism in the Anglican position on the question. A useful Bibliography of the recent literature of the subject is appended. A second Appendix on "Reunion and the Ministry" significantly concludes: "The probability is that reunion must await a more adequate doctrine of the Church than we have hitherto possessed."

SCHEEL, OTTO (ed.). *Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung.* 2. neubearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1929. xii+364 pages. M. 12.

The former (1911) edition of this collection proved exceedingly useful in promoting the study of Luther's early life. The collection has been greatly expanded and fundamentally rearranged. The chronological order of the selections has been changed from that of events to that of documents—a change justified by the fact that the same document often referred to events and experiences of different dates. The Introduction contains a bibliography of about 150 works and short studies, representing the bulk of the important Luther literature of the present century. The compiler has profited by recent research, and by the later volumes of the Weimar edition. The book may be taken as representing the ripened and completed research of a distinguished Luther scholar. It is well adapted for seminar use, and will prove an essential guidebook to all who seek to know the developing mind and personality of the reformer. Yet it is doubtful whether the book in its improved form will fill a place of as great importance as the slighter work of 1911. The interest of Luther students has already shifted somewhat from questions affecting his youth and personality to those which concern his mature ideas and objectives.

SEEBERG, ERICH. *Ideen zur Theologie der Geschichte des Christentums.* Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1929. 74 pages, M. 3.60.

In contrast with the "crisis"-theologians, Seeberg emphasizes the importance of history for an understanding of the nature and worth of Christianity. Admittedly history is not in a position to speak the last word in the sphere of religious reality, yet it must be allowed to utter the first word. Hence an effort is made to discover the nature of Christianity as a historical religion. First the reader is given a brief account of the modern theory of history—the "logic of history" as it is called—which regards past and present as belonging to one continuous stream of existence, all of which has a spiritual meaning capable of being comprehended. Accordingly, the nature of Christianity can be understood only by reference to the concrete and historical manifestations of the religion, including the Eastern church on the one hand and both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism on the other. But the final resort is to metaphysics and a sober supernaturalism. The inner meaning of history is not to be discovered in the heartless trial-and-error process of natural evolution. It is Christianity that shows the real significance of historical phenomena to be a disclosure of the life of the immanent God in the experience of mankind.

SIEGFRIED, THEODOR. *Luther und Kant.* Giessen: Töpelmann, 1930. 130 pages. M. 4.80.

Luther lived his faith, and Nietzsche thought his superman. Between them stands Kant, who felt the influence of Luther and generated the conception of Nietzsche. With this view the author proceeds to investigate the relation of Kant to Luther with reference to the conception of conscience. The four chapters are devoted to Luther's early conception of conscience which is studied from the lectures on Romans, that of his maturity, the autonomy of conscience in Kant, and conscience which has its source in faith.

WAGENMANN, JULIUS. *Entwicklungsstufen des ältesten Mönchtums.* ("Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte," 139.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1929. 24 pages. Subscription price M. 1.50; regular price M. 1.80.

This lecture affords a useful simplification of the early history of monasticism. By reference to the work of Antony, Pachonius, and Basil, Wagenmann indicates the development by stages: the hermit stage, the coenobite stage, and the Basilian type in which the community has a sense of obligation for the cure of souls beyond the cloister.

WALLER, E. H. M. *Church Union in South India.* New York: Macmillan, 1929. ix+96 pages. $0.80.

A useful introduction to a movement that attracts wide interest today, by a theologically conservative but ecclesiastically liberal Anglican bishop who has himself taken a prominent part in the negotiations. The book interprets the viewpoint of the Indian Christians, and supplies an outline of the history of the negotiations and of the principles of the projected united church.

## CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BRIERLEY, HAROLD E. *Life Indeed.* New York: Scribner's, 1929. viii+239 pages. $2.75.

In commenting upon Professor Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation,* Mr. Brierley states that the author "has practically nothing to say about the fundamental claims of Jesus Christ—which for many of us are the very crux of the problem of religion today." Again and again in this series of sermons he seeks his answer to the questions of contemporary life in Jesus. He frankly founds his faith "neither on an infallible Church nor on an infallible Book, but on 'The Infallible Person.'" Combining a rich acquaintance with present-day literature with a wide contact with people, he is able to write with interest and urgency upon this theme.

There also recurs throughout the book the note of immortality. For him, this is an essential in the understanding of life, and life indeed can come only as one greets its unfulfilled longings with the hope of growing and continuing life. While many of the sermons are occasional, in most instances his message grows out of his regard for Christ and his hope of immortality.

LERCHER, LUDWIG. *Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae.* Vol. IV. Innsbruck· F. Rauch, 1930. 763 pages. M. 13.

This is the final volume in a series prepared by a Jesuit scholar for the use of seminary students. The whole system of Roman Catholic beliefs is here treated comprehensively and by the well-known scholastic method. The exposition is remarkable for its elaborate detail, conciseness of statement, clarity of exposition, and apologetic forcefulness. Thomas Aquinas himself could hardly refrain from admiring and praising it, and non-Catholics would do well to adopt it as their guide when seeking light on the intricacies of the traditional Roman dogma. Volume IV deals with the virtues, the sacraments in general, individual sacraments, and the last things.

PFENNIGSDORF, E. *Der Erlösungsgedanke.* ("Deutsche Theologie," Vol. II.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929. 144 pages. M. 6.

In October, 1928, German Protestant theologians held a four-day theological retreat at the University of Frankfort. The subject, "The Doctrine of Redemption," was treated scripturally, historically, systematically, and practically in ten addresses by professors from various departments of several theological faculties. This volume contains the addresses and reports of the discussions, all of which were concentrated on one theme. This is an arrangement that may commend itself to theological teachers and ministers in this country. The third of these retreats is to be held this year.

SIEDEL, GOTTLOB. *Theologia Deutsch.* Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1929. 198 pages. M. 7.

The author makes and substantiates two claims for this ninetieth edition of the tract on mysticism which Luther edited in 1518: (1) He has modernized the German without losing the flavor of the medieval original. (2) He has written as a setting for its interpretation a discussion of the doctrine of deification in Dominican mysticism from both the theoretical and the practical point of view. Aquinas, Dietrich von Freiburg, Eckhart, the three great masters, and their pupils, Suso and Tauler, furnish the scholastic background for the understanding of the *Theologia Deutsch.*

VALENTINE, CYRIL H. *What Do We Mean by God?* New York: Macmillan, 1929. v+248 pages. $2.00.

A very verbose and circular argument for the contention that God is reality viewed as responding to the whole man; a postulate of faith having some measure of probability. Despite a repetitious insistence that our religion must be based on objectivity, the author's position is substantially that complete personality demands complete (and therefore personal) response, and that our whole-hearted response to reality thus connotes its personal responsiveness to us. The best part of the book is the questions which it raises but fails to answer.

## PREACHING AND WORSHIP

ATHEARN, WALTER SCOTT. *An Adventure in Religious Education.* New York and London: Century, 1930. xxi+505 pages. $3.50.

This is an account of the founding, administration, and results of the Boston University School of Religious Education and Social Service at the close of the first decade of its history. The projection of this school is described as an "experiment in the collegiate and professional training of Christian workers." The book consists of the decennial report of the author as dean of the school to the president and trustees of Boston University in 1929. The report is intended not only to place in the hands of the administration of the University official data concerning the school, but to make the information available to the educational public. The report discusses the philosophical assumptions upon which the school was projected, the administrative set-up, the program of studies, and the tabulable results in terms of student accounting and educational product. The history and work of the school is placed against a detailed background of American college and university practice.

CHARLES, R. H. *The Resurrection of Man—and Other Sermons.* New York: Scribner's, 1930. xi+264 pages. $2.50.

In nine sermons, which are a tribute to the high intellectual character of his congregation at Westminster Abbey, Dr. C. H. Charles traces the development of the idea of the resurrection of man through the Old and New Testaments. Up to the fifth century before Christ there was no definite belief in an after-life, save in a washed-out existence in Sheol apart from Jehovah. Everyone was requited to the full in this life. However, with Jeremiah's emphasis upon the individual as the religious unit and with the writer of Job's criticism of the orthodox doctrine of justice being meted out in this life, a conviction of a blessed immortality, both for the individual and for some future restoration of God's Kingdom on the earth, arose.

Discussing the views of Paul and Jesus, he finds that they place emphasis upon the on-going of the personality immediately after death. "Since the transformation of the faithful follows immediately on the death of the physical body, it constitutes also their Good Friday and likewise their Easter Sunday. There is no gap in the spiritual life or personality, least of all in that of our Lord."

His concluding chapters in this series sum up the arguments for and against belief in a happy future life. To him the necessity of bringing the facts of experience into harmony with the demands of his moral consciousness drives him to a belief in life after death. If this world were a "be-all" and "end-all," it would be a moral nightmare.

The remainder of the book is given to a series of sermons, five of which deal with Jeremiah and his contributions to religion. In all his writing Dr. Charles approaches his subject as a scholar, and he writes with the clarity of one who must seek to make his ideas intelligible to large congregations.

DODGE, RICHARD D. (ed.). *The Lesson Round Table 1930*. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1929. 359 pages. $1.25.

An exposition of the "International Uniform Sunday School Lessons for 1930." The first six months are devoted to "The Gospel of the Kingdom: Studies in Matthew"; the third quarter is devoted to "Representative Men and Women of the Old Testament"; and the fourth quarter is devoted to "Representative Men and Women of the New Testament." Each lesson is treated by a separate author, with few exceptions. Many of these are well-known clergymen representing a wide variety of communions and points of view. The Moffatt translation of the Bible is used in the text.

FISKE, GEORGE W. *The Christian Family*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1929. 138 pages. $1.25.

This book is an interesting outline of problems and supplements the author's former book, *The Changing Family,* in making religion vital to the home. It is more hortatory than factual and analytical, and leaves the aggravating feeling that little help in actual solution of problems is given.

HICKMAN, FRANK S. *Can Religion Be Taught?* Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1929. 53 pages. $0.35.

This book is the outcome of an address given by Dr. Hickman to the Sunday School Council of Nashville, Tennessee, in 1928, on the subject "Can Religion Be Taught?" It is an argument to show how religious education carries forward all the values of the old conversion and revival technique and adds something to religious experience that the old evangelism could not give.

JONES, CHARLOTTE C. *Junior Worship Guide*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1930. xvi+280 pages. $2.00.

Mrs. Jones has gone to considerable trouble to gather worship materials and plans for the junior department, and her contribution is organized with very practical situations in mind. For those who are seeking ready-made plans, or for those who want suggestions to enrich their own programs, this book will be found distinctly helpful.

POUND, J. PRESLEY (ed.). *Voices of the Age*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1929. xiv+222 pages. $2.50.

Among the many collections of contemporary sermons which are appearing these days from well-known publishing-houses, this volume is conspicuous alike for the eminence of its contributors and for the uniformly high quality of its content. Twelve leaders of the American and three of the British pulpit, chosen by balloting among a large group of ministers on the one hand and students on the other, contribute a characteristic sermon. There is special significance in the two great issues upon which these fifteen sermons focus. Four of them, by Drs. Fosdick, Norwood, Eddy, and Tittle, concentrate upon the question of war and peace as the most urgent social issue before our generation. Even more revealing is the fact that at least eight of the others face some aspect of the vital need for religious faith and hope in an age of sophisticated disillusionment like our own; they seek not only intellectual orientation with the results of modern science, but even more the discovery of deeper and more adequate sources of creative energy. The very titles of three of the notable sermons in the volume are spiritual "signs of the times": "Despair and Faith," by Dr. G. A. Gordon; "The Recovery of a Lost Enthusiasm," by Dr. Hough; and "Religion and Hope," by Dr. Niebuhr. Principal Jacks and Dr. C. C. Morrison build a bridge between social tasks and personal faith in two of the most constructive and prophetic sermons in the book.

## MISSIONS

CLARK, ALDEN H. *India on the March.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1930. xii+194 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.60.

A new and revised edition of a valuable book by the same title published eight years ago. The author was for years a missionary in India and is at present a secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston. Bibliography.

FISHER, WELTHY H. *Freedom.* New York: Friendship Press, 1930. 112 pages. $0.85.

A series of vivid chapters depicting the young life of India, and written for the children of America.

KERSCHNER, MABEL G. *The Missionary Education of Intermediates.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1929. 184 pages, $1.00.

The fourth volume in "The Leader's Handbook Series," dealing with the principles and methods of missionary education, adapted to different stages in the development of the child. Bibliography. Other volumes: *The Missionary Education of Beginners,* by Jessie E. Moore; *The Missionary Education of Primary Children,* by Wilhelmina Stooker; *The Missionary Education of Juniors,* by Jean G. Hutton.

STOWELL, JAY S. *Between the Americas.* New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1930. vi+180 pages. Cloth $1.00; paper $0.60.

A brief description of general conditions in Porto Rico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, with special reference to the work of the Protestant churches. Bibliography.

## MISCELLANEOUS

HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Types of Philosophy.* New York: Scribner's, 1930. xv+462 pages. $2.50.

As one would expect, this book presents the general field of philosophy in such a light that in the end the author's own type of idealism has the last word. For those to whom idealism appeals this will seem legitimate and as it should be. To those of us who find any idealism an example of what William James calls "tender-mindedness," and who would consequently have wished that types herein dismissed as inadequate might have been the finally triumphant ones, the book will appear biased and unnecessary. With all this, however, one must admit that the attempt has been made to make the book as fair as could be by a man with firm and far-reaching convictions.

The subject matter is divided, rather conveniently though arbitrarily, into seven types of philosophy, each of which is given an expositional and critical treatment. That the number of types is just seven is of no consequence. The division as made gives room for the treatment of all of the systems of thought which have played important historical and contemporary rôles. Under them one may group as subdivisions any other types he may desire. Following the first three parts, in which the types are presented, a fourth section deals with a proposed synthesis of the methods and includes the author's "Confession of Faith." The value of this last part will depend entirely upon the reader.

Prichard, H. Adye. *God's Communicating Door: Some Suggestions from the Philosophy of Psychic Research.* Boston: Richard G. Badger (Gorham Press), 1929. 99 pages.

This is a stimulating little sheaf of sermon-essays discussing from a devoutly Christian standpoint and in a philosophical rather than scientific manner some implications of psychical research. The booklet is suggestive and valuable in pointing toward the need for much closer integration between religion and psychical research.

Roth, Walter E. *Arts, Crafts, and Customs of the Guiana Indians.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929. xvii+110 pages. $1.00.

Taylor, Marie E. *Just Boys and Girls of Dear Old Chicago.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1930. 143 pages. $1.50.

Tegraden, JB Hollis. *Why Do We Do as We Do? Boston:* Richard G. Badger (Gorham Press), 1929. 231 pages.

A brief and popular exposition of the four fundamental "wishes" formulated by W. I. Thomas as the basic motives of human behavior. The discussion falls into three parts. There is an introductory chapter on the reason persons do as they do. The four fundamental "wishes"—for new experience, for security, for response, and for recognition—are expounded in their application to behavior. Four chapters are devoted to the larger implications of the operation of the wishes—their operation as a whole, their relation to intelligence, their relation to war, their relation to wealth, and their relation to worth. The "wishes" theory is important and throws much light upon human behavior. Many will feel, however, that human behavior is too complicated to be explained in terms of any one single formula.

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